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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPMENT OF A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF DISTRIBUTED
COGNITION PHENOMENA IN CONTROL CENTERS DURING CRISIS
CONDITIONS
Christopher J. West
Old Dominion University, 2006
Director: Rafael E. Landaeta

The purpose of this research is to develop and partially validate a
theoretical framework describing distributed cognition phenomena occurring in
organizational control centers functioning in crisis environments. Using a
systems approach, the work synthesizes existing constructs relating to
distributed cognition then supplements this knowledge with review of crisis
management literature. The goal of this effort is the development of a framework
for understanding the impact of crisis conditions on such phenomena occurring
within the specified setting. An exploratory case study approach was used to
partially validate and refine the framework by gauging its ability to interpret the
impact of crisis conditions on control center performance.
The researcher identifies a gap in crisis management literature relating to
the study of distributed cognition within organizational control centers. The
prevalence of and importance of institutionalized control centers to large
organizations expecting to experience environments requiring more rapid
processing of information and expedient reaction than usual is recognized within
crisis management literature. A primary purpose of such control centers is to
facilitate distributed cognition. Frameworks describing such phenomena in more
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general organizational settings can be found within distributed cognition
literature, organizational learning literature, and in military science. In some
cases the specific setting of control centers is addressed but not to the extent of
conceptually framing or applying a framework to the more specific setting.
The basic research questions explored are: (1) what are the key
constructs and interrelationships that structurally frame distributed cognition
phenomena within control centers? and (2) what are the structural impacts of
crisis conditions on the phenomena in such settings?
Results of this research could, (1) aid in the implementation of new
strategies, designs, training plans, methodologies, and technologies in crisis
control centers for complex, technically oriented organizations, (2) improve the
systemic design of and confidence in the assessment of mechanisms and
subsystems designed to facilitate distributed cognition within organizations, (3)
improve the general understanding of how distributed cognition takes place
within organizational control centers, and (4) lead to a better understanding of the
systemic effects crisis conditions have on the structures within control centers
designed to facilitate distributed cognition.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The establishment, development, and institutionalization of control centers
are natural responses by large, diverse organizations and bureaucracies to
facilitate the expeditious comprehension of and response to fluid, dynamic,
sometimes unexpected environments. The ability of these control centers to
fulfill their purpose is challenged even more as crisis conditions emerge in the
outside environment. Developing an in-depth, systemic perspective of how
cognition occurs within the specific setting of control centers functioning during
crisis periods, (1) could aid in the implementation of new strategies, designs,
training plans, methodologies, and technologies in crisis control centers for
complex, technically oriented organizations, (2) could improve the systemic
design of and confidence in the assessment of mechanisms and subsystems
designed to facilitate distributed cognition within organizations, (3) could improve
the general understanding of how distributed cognition takes place within
organizational control centers, and (4) could lead to a better understanding of the
systemic effects crisis conditions have on the structures within control centers
designed to facilitate distributed cognition. Additionally, (5) the framework may
be transferable to other distributed cognition systems in a variety of
organizational settings engaged in crisis management or response and may
provide similar benefits accordingly. These potential benefits motivate the
rigorous definition of the concepts involved as well as the construction of the
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suggested framework to answer the central questions of this research. Table 1.1
captures these potential benefits and will serve as a foundation for building the
remainder of this research process.

Table 1.1: Research Benefits
Overall Research Goal: Developing an in-depth, systemic perspective of how
cognition occurs within the specific setting of control centers functioning during
___________________________________________________
crisis periods
Potential
Description
Benefit
PB1
Provide a basis for better development of implementation
strategies for adapting new methodologies and
technologies to support such centers
PB2
Provide a more comprehensive, holistic assessments of the
performance of such centers, enhance the confidence
placed in such assessments, and subsequently enhance
training and practice regimes thereby enhancing control
center performance during times of crisis
PB3
Provide for further understanding of the distributed
cognition phenomena seen emerging from individuals and
subsystems involved in managing, and running control
centers
PB4
Provide a better understanding of the systemic effects crisis
conditions have on the structures within control centers
designed to facilitate distributed cognition
PB5
The framework may be transferable to other distributed
cognition systems in a variety of organizational settings
engaged in crisis management or response and may
provide similar benefits accordingly

Crisis Environments and Control Centers
Many large organizations usually operate within environments with some
level of predictability and develop their internal structure, processes, and
methodologies as well as posture their resources and personnel accordingly.
Many such organizations understand, both at leadership levels and throughout
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their functional sub-units, that they must also be postured for more unpredictable,
transitory sets of events significantly impacting their operations and requiring
more intensive, extensive, and timely study and reaction than normal daily
operations. Such sets of events constitute crisis environments that will be more
rigorously defined later in this proposal. Crisis management is essentially defined
as the preparation for, planning for, functioning within, and learning during and
after such sets of events (Hermann 1963, Mitroff 1994, Coombs 1999,
Loosemore 1998, Unzucker 2002, Lagadec 1990). Over the years, especially
since Hermann’s (1963) work, a large body of popular management literature
and a smaller body of academic organizational research literature has developed
around the topic of crisis management.
Much is written from an experiential basis describing specific lessons
learned from a variety of historical crises and developing and generalizing
conclusions for future implementation (Borins 2002, McConnell and Stark 2002,
Nudell and Anotkoll 1998; Lagadec 1990; Mayrs and Holusha 1996, White 2001,
Nelson and French 2002, Hooper 1999). Much is also written about the subject
from a prescriptive, “how-to” approach in which authors lay out an organizational
structure, hierarchy, systematic methodology, or implementation strategy for
various technological aids designed to provide an organization with a means to
provide oversight in a crisis situation (Johansenn et al. 2001, Loosemore 1998a,
1998b, 2001, Lee 1999, National Research Council 1996, Schrodt 1999, Coombs
1999, Ogrizek 1997, Mitroff 2000; Unzucker 2002).
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Many organizations that frequently expect to experience crises of
somewhat less predictable natures institutionalize their efforts to manage these
crises through the establishment of what can generally be called control centers
(Coombs 1999). Generally speaking, these control centers are usually postured
with batteries of specialized, trained personnel, communications devices, and a
large variety of plans, checklists, status boards, data management technologies
and other such artifacts. Crisis management literature has focused significantly
over recent years proposing that a primary function of institutionalized
organizational control centers is to facilitate the collective organizational
understanding of how to react to non-typical, fluid, dynamic environments or
crises (Coombs 1999, Vidaillet 2001, Lagadec 1990). However, the existing
body of knowledge within crisis management research has not yet yielded
systemic frameworks tailored to facilitate understanding the learning processes
that occur in the specific case of control centers. Additionally, the current body of
knowledge has not focused on developing a similar systemic understanding of
the impact of crisis conditions on control centers.
A systems approach is stressed here because within the crisis
management literature detailed above, a variety of disparate constructs are
proposed and researched but a holistic, comprehensive framework detailing the
interrelationships of these elements is lacking. Complex problems involving a
variety of observers’ and participants’ interpretations are suited to a systems
approach of setting boundaries, specifying interrelationships, and understanding
emergent phenomena (Flood and Carson 1993, Checkland 1981).
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Key to initially bounding this work’s efforts is development of what
constitutes a crises environment.

Figure 1.1 provides an overview of an initial

literature investigation in pursuit of such a definition.
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Figure 1.1: Definitions of Crisis_______________________________________
“a turning point for better or worse” - Fink (1986)
“A situation characterized by surprise, high threat to important values, and short decision time.”
Hermann, (1963).
“a major occurrence with potential negative outcome affecting an organization, company, or
industry. As well as its publics, products, services, or good name.” Fearn-Banks (1996)
“a major unpredictable event that has potentially negative results. The event and its aftermath
may significantly damage an organization and its employees, products, services, financial
condition, and reputation.” - Barton (1993).
“an event that is an unpredictable, major threat that can have a negative effect on the
organization, industry, or stakeholders, if handled improperly.” - Coombs (1999).
“Extreme events that cause disruption and put lives and property at risk. These require an
immediate response and application of resources beyond regular application.” - National
Research Council (1996).
“a Hippocratic concept: all illnesses reach a turning point. From here some are fatal, some go
on to recovery, all others develop to another form, and take on a different constitution.” Dab
(1993).
“a fit of uncertainty, and distress where everything is in suspense in anticipation of imminent
resolution of the illness." Bolzinger (1982).
“Crisis: a situation in which numerous organizations are faced with critical problems,
experience both sharp external pressure and internal tensions, and are then brutally and for an
extended period thrust to the center stage and hurled against one another, all in a society of
mass communication, in other words in direct contact with the certainty of being at the top of the
news on radio and television and in the press for a long time.” Lagadec, (1990)
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Three general themes emerge out of these definitions. First, crisis events
are considerably more significant and negative to organizations than normal
events in terms of their impact on organizational survival in its current state.
Second, they may have components of surprise, unpredictability, and difficulty
relative to the normal events organizations are ideally postured for. This notion
can be thought of as crisis environments being composed of a level of complexity
for which the organization is not ideally prepared. Third and finally, these authors
all point to the internal organizational and emotional stress caused by crises.
At this point by bringing these themes together a working definition can be
proposed: crisis environments are those (a) with potential for significant negative
organizational outcomes and (b) of a significantly greater level of complexity than
organizations are usually prepared for and as a result of either or both of these
elements (c) can cause significant internal organizational stress.
A well-developed understanding of what constitutes a crisis environment is
a necessary basis for building a framework to understand the impact of such an
environment on organizational control centers. Given the proposition that
facilitating more rapid conceptualization and reacting processes is a primary
purpose of such entities, this aim itself also needs to be approached
systemically.

The Concept of Distributed Cognition
Before describing the concept of distributed cognition, some basic, and at
this point initial, definitions of its conceptual underpinnings, as used for purposes
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of this work, is in order. First, distinction must be made between what constitutes
data, information, knowledge, and perhaps intelligence. Ackoff (1989) develops
a hierarchy of these concepts: data is nothing more than raw symbols
differentiating various states of the universe; information is data processed into a
useful form with some level of meaning answering the basic questions “who”,
“what”, “when,” and “where”; knowledge represents information applied to begin
answering “how”. Ackoff goes on to define understanding as the appreciation of
knowledge when one begins answering “why” and compares the distinction
between knowledge and understanding to the distinction between memorizing
and learning. Finally, Ackoff defines wisdom separately from the other four
concepts, which are focused upon the past. Wisdom is the ability to project
understanding for predictive purposes.
Moving on to the concepts of learning and cognition, Boisot and Canals
(2004) describe an agent’s act of perception as the transition between outside
stimuli and the creation of data; conceptualization as the transition between data
and information; and finally the processing of mental representations as the act
of using information to create knowledge. Boisot and Canals cite Clark (1997)
and Damasio (1999) for describing the agents “tuning” of such transition “filters”
as being driven by “cognitive” expectations. Rogers (1997) specifically describes
cognition as the act of modifying representations.
This systematic moving up between levels of mental usefulness is echoed
with analogous terms in the various frameworks, to be discussed later in this
proposal, describing organizational learning and distributed cognition. For
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purposes of this work no distinction will be made between learning and cognition
other than the understanding that cognition tends to be the favored term within
psychological, anthropological, and cognitive sciences while learning tends to be
used more prevalently in organizational research and management circles.
Furthermore learning and cognition will be accepted to constitute the whole
iterative process of converting data to higher forms of mental usefulness and
then moving beyond that to the point of acting and evaluating actions over time to
further improve usefulness. The higher forms described as wisdom and
understanding may also be used interchangeably with the notion of intelligence.
Perhaps the notion of learning occurring at more than just the level of the
individual first arose out of psychological, sociological, and anthropological
research circles. Dewey (1938), focusing on the means by which knowledge is
gained, stated,
“Experience does not simply go on inside a person. We live
from birth to death in a world of persons and things which is in large
measure what it is because of what has been done and transmitted
from previous human activities” (p. 39).

Other early authors similarly focused on the merits of understanding
individual behavior through the concept that one’s knowledge, thoughts, and
actions are rooted inside a system of existing knowledge and cultural artifacts
and processes (Vygotsky, 1929; Wundt, 1921; Allport, 1924). Roberts’ (1964)
suggestion that social organization reflects an architecture of cognition at the
community level seems to capture the essence of the perspectives.
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Within organizational management circles a general notion of collective
learning perhaps first began to arise when March and Simon (1958) commented
that the focus of their work is on “the flow of information within organizations that
instructs, informs, and supports decision making processes.” Weick’s work
(1979) focused on organizational psychology and embraced the organic
perspective of learning by focusing on the fact that knowledge is gained and
retained within organizational structures despite personnel turnover. Argyris and
Schon (1978) crystallize this stream of thought by describing organizational
learning as occurring when individuals,
“ ...experience a surprising mismatch between expected and actual
results...and respond through a process of thought and further
actions that lends them to modify their images of organization or
their understandings of organizational phenomena and to
restructure their activities so as to bring outcomes and expectations
into line, thereby changing organizational theory in use. In order to
become organizational the learning that results from organizational
inquiry must become embedded in the images of organization held
in its member’s minds and/or [its] epistemological artifacts (maps,
memories, and programs) embedded in the organizational
environment” (p. 16).

Within cognitive science, psychology, and anthropology, many authors
(Rogers and Scaife 1997, Magnus 2004, Giere 2001) point to Hutchins’ works in
the 1980’s and 1990’s with a variety of his partners (Hollan 1984, Pea 1996,
Kirsch 1998, Palen 1997, and Norman 1985) as first bringing the term distributed
cognition to the fore. These case studies, documenting the processing of mental
representations over time by groups of individuals, are cited for their
development of the perspective that distributed cognition is a distinct phenomena
composed of the processes by which collectives learn about and act within their
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environment. Hutchins (1995) cites Hinton and Becker’s (1992) construction of
models showing how two visual modules are able to share a representation of a
visual world in such a way that through their interaction they can recover depth,
something that neither can sense alone. The analogy is that differing
components of a collective can work together to achieve, maintain, and adjust a
representation of the outside environment.
Argyris and Schon’s focus on the embedding of images in organizational
artifacts mirrors these same ideas. By bringing together their work and that of
Hutchins and other authors, (Rogers and Scaife 1997, Magnus 2004, Giere 2001
Pea 1996) the following three basic themes seem to be repeatedly cited:
1) As opposed to cognitive science in general, the phenomenon of
distributed cognition is not limited to the boundary of the individual person. The
boundary can be repeatedly redrawn around a variety of subunits or groupings of
personnel and materials that accomplish cognition for the purposes of the
collective group
2) Again, as opposed to general cognitive science which focuses on the
mental representations of the environment which individuals use, maintain, and
adjust, distributed cognition focuses not only on such representations used by
groups but also on the interactions amongst group members, artifacts, and the
environment as mechanisms for accomplishing cognition.
3) The boundary of events relating to cognition extends broadly over time
not just encompassing any single chapter or single adjustment to a given set of
mental representations of the environment. Past events, artifacts, and
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knowledge bases of personnel within subunits experiencing significant turnover
over time may significantly influence the ability of a collective group to learn
about its environment.
By synthesizing these themes from the literature for purposes of this work,
distributed cognition can be defined as: the ongoing accumulation, distribution,
and synthesis o f knowledge across time, amongst personnel and systems, and at
all levels within a bounded organization, which leads to the development,
adjustment, and sometimes tearing down of shared mental representations of the
outside world within which the organization is trying to pursue its goals. More
rigorous, detailed development of the concept of distributed cognition follows in
the literature review chapter that will (1) provide a firm basis within cognitive
science and organizational learning literature and (2) develop a listing of authors’
themes and characterizations of the phenomena and (3) provide a detailed
description of the resulting frameworks they have constructed to describe it.

Overview of Existing Distributed Cognition Conceptual Frameworks
A variety of characterizations, conceptual models, and resulting
propositions describing distributed cognition processes have been developed
within the literature (March 2000, Dhar 2000, Crossan et al 1995, Argyris and
Schon 1978, Ocasio 2000, Boyd in Coram 2000). A central theme lying at the
foundation of these frameworks is the idea that cognition is essentially the
emergent, manifest development, adjustment, and propagation of
representations of the outside environment across an organization as it attempts
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to use them to influence that environment (Hutchins 1995, Wright 2000, Walsh
1995, Ocasio 2001, Waern 1999, Rogers 1997, Vidaillet 2001, Argyris 1996).
Figure 2.1 provides a brief overview of some of the more structured conceptual
frameworks and models.
This basic, defining element of cognition, the processing of
representations, then serves as a foundation for the development of a variety of
approaches to understand various aspects of the idea of distributed cognition
within organizations. Crossan, Lane, and White’s (1999) 4-I theory of
organizational learning identifies the key processes of intuiting, interpreting,
integrating, and institutionalizing and focuses on their occurrence at and linking
between the three primary institutional levels at which such learning takes place:
the individual level, the group level, and the organizational level. Argyris and
Schon (1978) identify 1) a surface type of learning that takes place within an
organization as it processes data within an institutionalized perspective of reality
and 2) a secondary, deeper learning that occurs when such perspectives are
questioned and altered at a more basic level. Rulke and Zaheer (2000) develop
an approach based on the dichotomy of self-knowledge, that knowledge
contained within a single organizational unit, and resource-knowledge, the
organizational unit knowing it doesn’t have the knowledge in question but
knowing where it can be gained. They then cross these characterizations with
the notions of purposive learning channels, for example, formal institutionalized
training such as classes and relational learning channels, for example, informal
person-person discussion of situations in order to capture the differing impacts of
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these forms of cognition within the organization.

Ocasio (2001) proposes his

SERTS (selection-enactment-retrieval-transmission- storage) model, developed
from empirical study, as a way of understanding how information is processed in
an organization. Lastly, the decision making process perspective of
“observation-orientation-decision-action” processing, so called OODA loops,
formally developed by John Boyd (in Coram 2000) is used as a recurring
framework within military circles (Fadok 1995, Cramer 1996, Plehn 2000) and is
very much analogous to the other frameworks discussed in describing the
learning process. Though, developed primarily with a protagonist versus
intelligent opponent’s or enemy’s point of view, the OODA loop process has
application within settings where the protagonist is merely trying to come to grips
with the pace of an external environment via looping through the OODA process
at sufficient speed.
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Figure 1.2: Functional Frameworks from Distributed Cognition Literature
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The use of these characterizations definitely informs and frames the
distributed cognition process and begins to approach a systems perspective. A
more rigorous, systemically developed, holistic framework would ensure
comprehensiveness as well as provide for a means to understand the impact of
crisis conditions on the specific case of organizational control centers.

Filling the Literature Gap, Research Goals and Questions
The goal of this research is to use a systems approach to develop,
validate, and adjust a conceptual framework, using constructs from distributed
cognition literature tailored to the specific case of control centers functioning
during periods of crisis. The validated framework could then be used as a basis
for the development of more rigorous control center performance assessment
criteria and the development of implementations strategies for introducing new
technologies and procedures into control centers. The four primary motivations or
potential benefits cited in the introduction to this chapter motivate the primary
research questions of the proposed research and subsequently the proposed
development of the Distributed Cognition in Crisis Control Centers (DC5)
framework. The primary research questions that would be explored in this
research are: (1) what are the key constructs that structurally frame the
phenomena of distributed cognition within control centers and how are they
interrelated? and (2) what are the structural impacts of the onset and
development of crisis conditions on the distributed cognition systems in such
settings?
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Flowing from these general questions are more focused objective
questions that will serve to guide the research. It should be noted, as shown in
figure 1.3, that the development of these interim objectives was part of an
iterative process involving the proposed literature review and the proposed DC5
construction process itself. These interim objective questions are:
1) To develop a set of general themes and characterizations relating to
distributed cognition and to understand how these in turn are developed into
existing conceptual frameworks and models.
2) To determine the general themes and characterizations within crisis
management literature relating to the impact crisis conditions have on
organizations.
3) To develop a conceptual framework capturing the impact of crisis
conditions on distributed cognition phenomena within control centers.
4) To develop and use an exploratory case study methodology in
conjunction with the developed framework to determine if it aids in describing and
understanding the functions and interactions of subsystems within a distributed
cognition system functioning in periods of crisis.
5) To partially validate the framework by using as a means for assessing
an initial fitness characterization of a distributed cognition system.
6) To partially validate the framework by developing a testing a training
plan designed to improve the performance of a distributed cognition system
functioning within a variety of crisis environments.
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Table 1.2 details the focused objectives and their interrelationship with
both the primary research questions and the potential benefits, previously
detailed in Table 1.1 of the research.
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Table 1.2: Focused Objective Questions
Overall Research Goal: Developing an in-depth, systemic perspective of how cognition occurs
within the specific setting of control centers functioning during crisis periods.
Primary Research Question 1 (PG1): What are the key constructs that structurally frame the
phenomena of distributed cognition within control centers and how are they interrelated?
Primary Research Question 2 (PG2): What are the structural impacts of the onset and
development o : crisis conditions on the distributed cognition systems in such settings?
Focused
Description
Primary
Potential
Objectives
Research
Benefits of
Research
Questions
Addressed
Addressed
(see Table
1.1)
PB1, PB2,
FOI
To develop a set of general themes and
PG1
characterizations relating to distributed
PB3, PB5
cognition and to understand how these in turn
are developed into existing conceptual
frameworks and models.
F02
PB1, PB2,
To determine the general themes and
PG2
PB4, PB5
characterizations within crisis management
literature relating to the impact crisis
conditions have on organizations
F03
To develop a conceptual framework capturing PG1, PG2
PB1, PB2,
the impact of crisis conditions on distributed
PB3, PB4,
cognition phenomena within control centers
PB5
F 04
To develop and use an exploratory case
PG1, PG2
PB3, PB4,
study methodology in conjunction with the
PB5
developed framework to determine if it aids in
describing and understanding the functions
and interactions of subsystems within a
distributed cognition system functioning in
periods of crisis.
F05
To partially validate the framework by using it
PB1, PB2,
PG1, PG2
to initially assess a distributed cognition
PB3, PB4
system’s fitness characterization and
subsequently using it to design a training plan
to improve performance.
F06
To implement the training plan in F05 and
PG1, PG2
PB1, PB2,
assess the improvement in performance of
PB3, PB4
the distributed cognition system.

Organization of Research Proposal
One final area of required research is examining the methodologies for
qualitative, case study oriented methods to support the collection of information
to validate and further adjust and develop the conceptual framework. As will be
detailed in Chapter III of this proposal, exploratory case study methodology is
most suited to both the research objectives as well as the data being analyzed.
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Case studies will be based on Air Force Unit Control Centers (UCC) preparing for
Operational Readiness Inspections via iterative exercises with multiple units of
analysis, the systemic functions of the UCCs themselves. The developed
methodology will be applied to support the objective of discovering the
applicability of the developed conceptual framework to training and equipping
UCCs for formal inspection. Case data will be systematically obtained and
analyzed through a developed case research strategy based upon the developed
conceptual framework and resulting in the population of a case database. This
database will compile multiple sources of evidence including transcribed event
logs, descriptions of the UCCs during the OREs, semi-structured interviews with
SCC personnel prior to exercises, the formal post exercise assessment reports
themselves, and follow-up validation interviews with case participants.
Figure 3.1 is a general overview of the entire research approach including
literature review, framework development methodology, and case validation
research design. Within the Literature Review chapter of the anticipated
proposal, first a general review of the development of the concept of distributed
cognition and resulting frameworks authors have developed will be undertaken.
Second, a general overview of crisis management literature will be provided
focusing on capturing crisis management characteristics specific to the case of
crisis control centers. Third, a detailed background of the type of case’s
proposed for study will be provided. Fourth, this knowledge base will then be
synthesized into the proposed DC5 framework.
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Within the Methodology chapter of the anticipated proposal, case study
research design literature is reviewed to support the development of a detailed
design for the specific purpose of validating the proposed conceptual framework
and resulting propositions. The development and defense of the case study
methodology will be presented. Case selection strategy as well as overarching
guidance for case data collection protocol will be developed.
Within the Research Design chapter of the anticipated proposal, detailed
data collection protocols and instruments will be developed to support the goals,
objectives, of the research and the study of the selected cases
Only after the approval of the research proposal, will the actual case study
fieldwork be undertaken. Results from fieldwork will then be reviewed and
analyzed to support the validation and adjustment of the proposed conceptual
framework. The resulting validated framework can then be used as a basis for
the development of control center performance criteria and the development of
strategic guidelines for deploying and implementing new technologies and
procedures into control centers. Additionally, further development and
refinement of the proposed framework providing better explanatory
understanding of distributed cognition phenomena in crisis situations can be
accomplished under the auspices of future research.
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Figure 1.3: Research Approach Overview
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Potential Benefits of Research to the Air Force and to the Academic Field
of Engineering Management
The means by which control centers gather, process, present, and orient
information into knowledge in order develop, implement, and adjust response
alternatives is captured by the definition of distributed cognition. The central
effort of the research is to develop a systemic, conceptual framework for
describing these phenomena as it takes place within an SCC and then to use it
as a structural basis for assessing and improving SCC performance. Hopefully,
the understanding guided by use of the proposed framework will lead to
improved performance to be confirmed when the unit being trained is formally
inspected by the ACC/IG team and thus the framework will receive an initial form
of validation. By developing a qualitative means of mining the data
characterizing a squadron’s SCC before and during an ORE such propositions
and the overall model itself can be validated and adjusted. Results could aid in
the implementation of new strategies, methodologies, and technologies in crisis
control centers, could improve the quality of the systemic comprehensiveness of
and confidence in evaluation and assessment processes, and could improve in
the general understanding of how organizational cognition takes place within
control centers operating in crisis conditions.
The proposed research will have three primary benefits within the
academic field of Engineering Management crossing the various components
making up this area of study. Firstly, the application of system engineering
approaches, central to the academic field itself, in order to comprehend, analyze,
and frame the complex system to be investigated will demonstrate the suitability
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of such methodologies to crisis management and organizational management
issues. Secondly, the framework produced as result of this research will
supplement the body of knowledge relating to (a) crisis management, (b)
business policy and strategy, (c) managerial and organizational cognition, (d)
social issues in management, and (e) conflict management, providing a new
framework for understanding problems relating to distributed cognition within
large organizations in crisis situations. Finally, the large and complex nature of
an Air Force flying wing, organizationally and technologically, operating within a
crisis environment is typical of problems faced by Engineering Managers. As a
result of this typicality and the proposed framework applications including the
development of performance assessment criteria and new technology/procedure
implementation strategy guidelines, the research is expected to have value
crossing over to similar sized and similarly complex organization.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Purpose, Objectives, and Organization of Literature Review
The primary purpose of this literature review will be threefold in reaching
toward the overall goals of this research. First, academic literature relating to
distributed cognition and organizational learning will be reviewed, critiqued, and
synthesized in order to gain perspective on the general definitions,
characterizations, and themes relating to these fields of study. Second, and
similarly, crisis management literature will also be reviewed to support the
development of an understanding of the topic and to develop specific
characterizations of crisis environments and their impact on organizations and
their control centers. Finally, Air Force organizational literature relating to the
function of fielded squadron control centers will be reviewed to gain an
understanding of official, organizational perspectives relating to these
organizational entities.
In Chapter III, two additional minor literature reviews will be conducted to
support the goals of this research. First, as was described in the previous
chapter, information developed in this literature review will be synthesized using
systems analysis methodologies to support the goal of developing a systemic,
conceptual framework for understanding the process of distributed cognition
within crisis control centers. A review of literature relating to systems analysis
methodologies suited to the nature of such problems will be accomplished as will
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the actual discussion leading to the development of the suggested framework.
Second, a review of case study analysis techniques will be accomplished in to
support the subsequent development of a plan for validating the suggested
framework.
Returning to the objective of this chapter, the efforts in the first area of
focus, distributed cognition, will be accomplished by presenting a review of the
academic literature relating to the field with the interim objectives, along the way
to supporting the framework development of Chapter III, of: 1) developing a
formalized working definition of distributed cognition, 2) developing a listing and
an understanding of the themes within the literature relating to the study of
distributed cognition, and 3) understanding existing frameworks others have used
to support a comprehensive, holistic understanding of distributed cognition.
Crisis Management literature will be summarized to support meeting the
interim goals of: 1) developing an overarching characterization of exactly what
constitutes a crisis environment, which will in turn lead to 2) developing a further,
more specific, listing of detailed characterizations of a crisis environment which
can then, in Chapter III, be used in conjunction with the body of knowledge
gained in the area of distributed cognition to develop the proposed conceptual
framework.
In order to support the focused efforts on the specific case of fielded
UCCs functioning in wartime environments, a summarization of the existing Air
Force literature relating to the staffing, equipping, operational functions,
assessment, and interaction with units outside, of an SCC will be undertaken with
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the interim objective of developing a further listing of specific characterizations of
the cases to be studied.
Figure 2.1, Literature Review: Purpose, Objectives, and Organization,
captures the organization, interim objectives, and overall purpose of this literature
review. Figure 2.2, Literature Review Map: Coverage Areas and Gaps, captures
the key subject matter areas of the literature review and their intersections which
form the literature gaps this work is attempting to fill. Table 2.1, Literature
Review Summary, at the end of the chapter will refer to Figure 2.2 as it
summarizes the content of the literature review and specifies the researcher’s
opinion of where gaps in the existing literature exist.
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Figure 2.1: Literature Review: Purpose, Objectives, and Organization
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Figure 2.2: Literature Review Map: Coverage Areas and Gaps
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Towards Defining Distributed Cognition: Roots of the Concept
Argyris and Schon (1996) argue that a term such as organizational
learning require specification in each particular context in which it may appear.
Given that the concept of distributed cognition is both central to this research
and, as discussed, that a gap in the literature exists relating to the lack of a
formal systems engineering application of the concept to crisis management
control centers, a concise working definition is needed. This definition would
serve to provide clarity and specificity to the term, distributed cognition itself,
which flows from and is used somewhat interchangeably throughout the literature
with other terms including distributed cognition, collective reasoning, collective
mind, and organizational learning. Additionally, a working definition derived here
specifically to serve the goals of this research will serve to enhance focus
specifically on the cases, crisis management control centers, to be studied.
Perhaps the notion of learning occurring at more than just the level of the
individual first arose out of psychological, sociological, and anthropological
research circles. Dewey (1938), focusing on the means by which knowledge is
gained, that is experience and education, stated,
“Experience does not simply go on inside a person. We live
from birth to death in a world of persons and things which is in large
measure what it is because of what has been done and transmitted
from previous human activities” (p. 39).

Other early authors similarly focused on the merits of understanding
individual behavior through the concept that one’s knowledge, thoughts, and
actions are rooted inside a system of existing knowledge and cultural artifacts
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and processes (Vygotsky, 1929; Wundt, 1921; Allport, 1924). Roberts’ (1964)
suggestion that social organization reflects an architecture of cognition at the
community level seems to capture the essence of the perspectives.
Within organizational management circles a general notion of collective
learning perhaps first began to arise when March and Simon (1958) in their
seminal work within the field, Organizations, commented that the focus of their
work is on “the flow of information within organizations that instructs, informs, and
supports decision making processes.” Weick’s work (1979) focused on
organizational psychology and embraced the organic or collective perspective of
learning by focusing on the fact that knowledge is gained and retained within
organizational structures despite personnel turnover. Argyris and Schon (1978,
1996) crystallize this stream of thought by describing organizational learning as
occurring when individuals,
“...experience a surprising mismatch between expected and actual
results...and respond through a process of thought and further
actions that lends them to modify their images of organization or
their understandings of organizational phenomena and to
restructure their activities so as to bring outcomes and expectations
into line, thereby changing organizational theory in use. In order to
become organizational the learning that results from organizational
inquiry must become embedded in the images of organization held
in its member’s minds and/or [its] epistemological artifacts (maps,
memories, and programs) embedded in the organizational
environment” (p. 16).

While Argyris and Schon focus on an organization learning lessons, in
both specific incremented time periods and more continuously, with broad
strategies on how to facilitate its occurrence and then develop a means of
understanding the depth, so-called “single loop” vs. “double loop,” of learning,
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other authors have begun to focus not just on the collective nature of learning
phenomena and its resulting implications but on the actual basic mechanisms by
which such organizational learning occurs. This narrower focus, arising out of
cognitive science interests as opposed to organizational behavior circles, is upon
the more organic, surface action of collective cognition versus the more
generalized process of organizational learning and its benefits to the
organization.
Amongst this group of authors, many (Rogers and Scaife 1997, Magnus
2004, Giere 2001, Rogers 1997), point to Hutchins’ work in the 1980’s and
1990’s as first bringing the term distributed cognition to the fore and his work in
conjunction with other authors, Hollan (1984), Pea (1996), Weitzmann (1984),
Kirsch (1998), Palen (1997), and Norman (1985) as laying the groundwork for
the development of distributed cognition as a framework for understanding the
processes which collectives use to learn about and act within their environment.
Hutchins (2000) himself provides a most concise review of the historical
development of the field drawing from its roots in the research of authors from
psychological, anthropological, and organizational science. In defending the
notion that cognition does not have to be confined within the “skin or skull” (p.1)
of the individual and in attempting to explain the concept of distribution between
disparate system subunits being necessary for cognition, Hutchins (1995) cites
Hinton and Becker’s (1992) construction of models showing how two visual
modules are able to share a representation of a visual world in such a way that
through their interaction they can recover depth, something that neither can

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33

sense alone. The analogy is that differing components of a collective can work
together to achieve, maintain, and adjust a representation of the outside
environment.

Defining Distributed Cognition and Organizational Distributed Systems
Synthesizing the work of Hutchins (2000) and the descriptions of that work
cited by other authors, Rogers and Scaife 1997, Magnus 2004, Giere 2001
Hollan (1984), Pea (1996), Weitzmann (1984), Kirsch (1998), Palen (1997), and
Norman (1985), the following three basic themes seem to be repeatedly cited:
1) As opposed to the regular science of cognition in general, the
phenomena of distributed cognition is not limited to the boundary of the individual
person, rather the boundary can be repeatedly redrawn around a variety of
subunits or groupings of personnel and materials that accomplish cognition for
the purposes of the collective group.
2) Again as opposed to the general cognitive science which focuses on
the mental representations of the environment which individuals use, maintain,
and adjust, distributed cognition focuses not only on representations used,
maintained, and adjusted by groups but also on the interactions amongst group
members, materials, and the environment as mechanisms for accomplishing
cognition.
3) The boundary of events relating to cognition extends broadly over time
not just encompassing any single chapter or single adjustment to mental
representations of the environment.

Past events, artifacts, and knowledge
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bases of personnel within subunits experiencing significant turnover over time
may significantly influence the ability of a collective group to learn about its
environment.
Before using these aspects of distributed cognition drawn from the
literature to provide a working definition for purposes of this research, an
explanation is in order regarding the terms distributed cognition and
organizational cognition. While the terms are used somewhat interchangeably
throughout the literature, the researcher generally takes organizational cognition
to be a subset of the broader general term distributed cognition, the distinction
being that while distributed cognition occurs on a general level across many
boundaries of sub-units within some broader collective human grouping,
organizational cognition describes the distributed learning occurring within a
specific bounded sub-unit; i.e., for purposes of this research the boundary of
interest will be drawn around the SCC organization. The researcher sees the
distinction as minor and finds throughout the literature that the themes and
constructs of either term are generalizable to the other themes thus while the
terms may be used interchangeably for purposes of this work, distributed
cognition will be preferred.
Using the cited themes of the literature, distributed cognition can be
defined as: the ongoing collective accumulation, distribution, and synthesis o f
knowledge across time amongst personnel and systems at all levels within a
bounded organization which leads to the development, adjustment, and
sometimes tearing down then redevelopment o f both tacit and explicit mental
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representations of the outside world within which the organization is trying to
pursue its goals.
Even further refinement of this definition is needed for the requirements of
this work. Specifically, defining a distributed cognition system as a system
designed or used by organizations for the intended purpose of facilitating
distributed cognition as described above is necessary. The importance of this
additional step of specification will be seen in Chapter III as it is used to facilitate
Beer’s (1984) system of interest specification in applying his Viable System
Model to the focus of this work.
While the pursuit of a working definition of distributed cognition specific to
purposes of this research served to introduce the concept and facilitate the initial
literature review into the field, a more detailed review is required to provide a
listing of authors’ themes and characterizations of the phenomena and to provide
a description of the resulting frameworks they have constructed to describe it.

Topical Streams of Distributed Cognition Literature
An extended general review of the academic literature relating to the
phenomena of distributed cognition and organizational learning literature, led to
the identification of several separate themes that repeatedly arise. Initial reviews
led to the identification, clustering and categorization of these themes while in
depth follow-up facilitated the development of a literature map tracking the ideas
of specific authors to the developed themes. Figure 2.3, Distributed Cognition
Literature Tracking Map: Emergent Themes of Authors, demonstrates the
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recurrence of these themes within literature relating to distributed cognition and
organizational learning. It should be noted that the listing of authors here is by
no means exhaustive but rather it is somewhat of a generalized representative
sampling of a larger set and its purpose here is to demonstrate the recurrence of
eight dominant emergent themes to be detailed in the following order: 1) the
complexity of the environment and the volume of information being processed by
such systems, 2) the integration of specialized expertise’s as a key function of
distributed cognition, 3) the occurrence and impact of errors within learning
systems, 4) a focus on the material, process, institutional, and technological
artifacts which develop within organizations to facilitate distributed cognition, 5)
the various key characterizations of the context within which the organizational
cognition is occurring that are judged to significantly impact the cognition
process, 6) the focus on and tracking of the propagation of representations
through an organization-the fundamental act of cognition, 7) the breaking down,
categorization, or description of the interaction of various structural functions of
learning organizations, and lastly, 8) the detailing of a variety of frameworks
sharing a cyclical theme describing the processes which must be looped through
in order for organizations to learn.
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Figure 2.3: Distributed Cognition Literature Tracking Map: Emergent
Them es of A uthors
Specialization: Organizations
dependent upon disparately
focused expertise

Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996)

Volume/Complexity o f
environment/information required
to be processed and tasks to be
accomplished in parallel

Vidaillet (2001)
Tamuz (2000)
Artman and
Garbis (1988)

c o o r d in a tio n

Errors: types o f cognition errors
and their causes/effects

Learning Loops: cyclical
conceptual frameworks for
understanding distributed
cognition processes

Perry, O ’Hara,
Spinelli, Sharpe
(2004)

Wright, Fields,
Harrison (2000)

Ocasio (2001)
Functional Breakdowns:
Categorization/description of
interim functions that compose
the distributed cognition process
Artifacts:
Very large variety o f materials,
processes, and systems required
to enhance distributed cognition
Representations:
Propagation/process-ing o f
tacit/explicit representations
defines the act o f cognition
Contextual Characterizations:
Qualitative characterizations o f the
context in which distributed
cognition is occurring

Hutchins (1980, 1985, 1994, 1995, 1996)

March (2001)
Rulke and
Zaheer (2000)

PaulChowdhury
(2000)

W aem (1999)
Decortis,
Norfalise,
Sadellie (2000)

Dhar (2000)
Fields, Wright,
Marti, Palmonari
(2004)
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Complexity: The Nature of the Environmental Information Being Processed
The first recurrent theme noted in the literature, complexity of the
environment stands apart from the other prevalent themes in that the others
relate to the process of distributed cognition itself. The environmental complexity
in which distributed cognition systems exist is repeatedly cited by authors as a
motivator or cause for the development of the system itself. Cognition has to
necessarily become a distributed act because environmental complexity
encourages it to arise. The initial grounding requirement motivating the rise of
distributed cognition within organizations is the complexity and challenging
nature of the environment in which organizations are functioning. Authors
researching distributed cognition break down this environmental characterization
into a variety of descriptive, thematic adjectives: problematically complex,
ambiguous, techno-centric, time constrained or dynamic, and demanding of
parallel and dissimilar tasks.
Complex environments are a primary driver of distributed cognition within
organizations and are repeatedly cited within distributed cognition literature.
Hutchins (1994) describes environments requiring a “weaving” of both a variety
of observations and a variety of knowledge bases in order to be understood.
Artman and Garbis (1988) describe the demands of environments requiring
different, disparate “domain” knowledge bases and information resources. Perry
et al (1998) note the volume of detail that must be processed, tracked, and
remembered in order to understand such environments. The difficulty of
understanding such complexity motivates organizations to posture themselves
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and assemble systems composed of requisite knowledge bases and capability so
that they can be understood.
If we extend complexity a step further, one must ask what indeed can be
knowable versus what may not be knowable. March (2001) describes ambiguity
as an “elementary problem” which organizations must overcome if they are to
become intelligent about their environment; correlation and causality between
events is difficult to ascertain and motivates intensive exploration of the
environment. Dhar (2001) notes that complex environments may be
discontinuous or non-linear; elements of the environment may have numerous
interactions that arise and diffuse, complicating the knowability of the
environment. Murphy et al (2001) notes that such ambiguity and diversity
motivates the setting of goals by organizations in order to begin breaking down
what must be understood and what can be ignored. Argyris and Schon (1996)
note that the search for causality within ambiguous events is a central aim of
both organizations. The ambiguity organizations perceive in operating
environments motivates the construction of systems designed to remove such
ambiguity.
Perhaps just an extension of the complexity of such environments, the
concept of a techno-centricity motivating distributed cognition is repeatedly found
within the research literature. As discussed previously when seeking to provide
an working definition of distributed cognition, boundary setting is key to defining
the system actually accomplishing the cognition; techno-centrism can arise both
in the environment outside of the organization in question or, if arbitrary bounding
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occurs, the influence of technologies within an organization can necessitate the
rise of distributed cognition. Artman and Garbis (1988) note that a techno centric
collection of communication devices may be viewed as the boundary line itself
between an organization and its environment, placing additional cognitive
burdens upon the organization to understand the technologies it uses to
accomplish such interface. Perry et al (1998) note that the complexity of the
world in which organizations operate is enhanced by the complexity of the
technologies existing today. Wright et al (2000) note that the capabilities
provided by technology internal to the organization for purposes of facilitating
distributed cognition require an understanding of their existence and capabilities
in the outside environment first. Complex technologies existing in the
environment in which organizations operate add to the complexity of that
environment itself and further require organizations to adapt themselves to deal
with such complexity.
Dynamic environments further complicate the organization’s task of
comprehension. Dhar (2001) describes the difficulties associated with complex
environments by noting that they are frequently and painfully either quick to
respond or slow to respond to outside stimuli, or characterized by infrequently
occurring phenomena, and further cites technology (computers, instrumentation,
etc.) as a means for systemically enhancing cognitive capabilities in such
environments. Vidaillet (2001) notes that organizations can quickly be overcome
by events because the timely development and processing of representations in
order to understand them cannot keep up with their pace. Wright et al (2000)
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focus on the artifacts organizations develop to be able to respond to time
constrained events, but such cognitive artifacts themselves exist because of the
nature of environments anticipated by organizations. The dynamic nature of
environments in which organizations operate requires urgency in developing
understandings and responses; distributed cognition systems are constructed to
meet this requirement.
Time constrained and complex environments require organizations to
accomplish different tasks simultaneously or to distribute them across the
organization. Artman and Garbis (1988) note that time constraints require parallel
and disparate, non-alike task lists and thus require organizations to field and
integrate a variety of expertises. Hutchins’ (1994) discussion of intersubjectivity,
an understanding or appreciation of another’s task to be discussed in more detail
later in this review, as a key characterization of the internal context within which
distributed cognition occurs assumes that a variety of different tasks are having
to be accomplished simultaneously. Waern et al (1999) as well as Wright et al
(2000) describe the “co-ordination”, to also be discussed in more detail later in
this review, of representations flowing from different organizational elements as
the primary function of distributed cognition systems; necessarily inherent in such
descriptions is the idea that a breadth of expertise cannot be maintained within
individual humans but must be distributed across several sub-systems in order to
comprehend, act, and meet the demands of such an environment.
This characterization of the environment in which distributed cognition
systems arise, flows from repeated themes cited in the literature. These themes,
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problematic complexity, ambiguity, techno-centricity, dynamic environments, and
demands for accomplishment of parallel and dissimilar tasks, are repeatedly
cited by authors as motivating factors leading to the development of distributed
cognition systems. Without such requisite characteristics in environments, it is
possible to see simplistic cognition within a single individual or simple systems as
being all that is required of an organization, but if and as these characterizations
begin to become true of an environment the phenomena of distributed cognition
within organizations begins to occur. Analogous to these themes, which exist
outside a bounded organization in its environment, are the contextual
characterizations authors draw of the nature of events and processes within the
organization.

Specialization and Integration
The complexity inherent in environments which leads to the rise of
distributed cognition systems within organizations also leads to the formation of
analogous, specialized subsystems designed to enhance the organization’s
ability to understand and react to specific aspects of a diverse environment. As a
result of the specialization, which develops to deal more efficiently with
environmental complexity, organizations must also integrate the data being
synthesized by the disparately equipped and trained specialized subsystems.
This integration, also referred to as co-ordination within the literature (Waern
1999, Wright 2000) of synthesized representations is where the idea of
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distributed cognition begins to separate from the mere collective sum of the
cognitive parts of the specialized expert systems.
As stated, many of the same characterizations of environmental
complexity from the literature described previously are also used by the same
authors to describe the reflective development of specialization within the
bounded distributed cognition system being studied. Rather than reciting each
author that made these characterizations and going over them once more,
perhaps a better way to illustrate this point is to review some of the actual studied
specialized subsystems whose expertise, recommendations, and conclusions
had to be organizationally integrated in order for the researcher to reach
conclusions about the nature of the distributed cognition phenomena which was
occurring. This review will also serve to summarize existing studies on the
phenomena of distributed cognition in fielded situations.
In perhaps the seminal modern work, repeatedly cited throughout the
literature, on the topic of distributed cognition, Hutchins (1980, 1990, and 1994)
makes the essential case that cognition exists at a systemic level within the
navigational functions of a US Navy ship at sea. Essentially, initial disparate
measurements of various external environmental items (visible geographic
points, celestial objects, time, satellite receptions, etc.) are made by a variety of
specialized subsystems, tools, and personnel and are turned into representations
further refined by other systems to produce fix, bearing, and speed. Citing the
general recognition that human cognition is the development, maintenance, and
adaptation of mental models or representations, Hutchins meticulously tracks
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such representations as they are born and mature through the ship’s navigation
function.
Later in other work with Klausen (1996, 2000), Hutchins also studies the
function of air traffic control from the perspective of an airplane cockpit again
tracking the processing of representations and information from ground controller
through the three officers on board and through the systems they use ultimately
into the control surfaces of the plane. Fields et al (1999) also study air traffic
control but focus on ground control rooms and the subsystems arrayed there to
process representations from radar returns into instructions to aircraft. No one
person or subsystem accomplishes the task itself, but an integration of these
specialized parts leads to the final goal.
Thagard’s (1993), (Giere’s (2001) and Magnus’ (2004) works are focused
primarily on making the argument that Science, in general, has evolved into a
large distributed cognition system, the intended goal of which is the search for
truth or causal explanation of observed phenomena. In advancing their
argument they cite specialized scientists themselves, instrumentation, models,
visual representations, academic journalism, academic certification processes,
award and reward systems, in addition to other functional systems all working
integrally together hopefully to achieve the goal of finding scientific truth. The
fact that such specialized subsystems exist and do work through an evolved
system of interrelationships suggests that Science is indeed a system of
distributed cognition.
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In focusing on an objective similar to the one selected for this work,
Artman and Garbis (1988) initially and in later work with Waern (1999), study the
integration or co-ordination of disparately developed representations through an
urban emergency phone call center. They cite the training, jargon, rules and
procedures, and systems available to the telephone operator receiving incoming
calls as separate systems which the operator and higher level controllers must
integrate to organize a response specific to the needs of the incoming call. The
diversity, variety, and complexity of potential calls require the development of
these specialized subsystems and their subsequent integration in order to meet
the center’s goals.
With a goal somewhat similar to that of this work, Wright et al (2000) focus
on developing a framework or model specifically designed for understanding
human-computer-interaction (HCI). Central to their Resources Model are six
abstract information structures informing the HCI process: plans, goals,
affordances, history, action-effect, and current state. Without describing these in
detail here or seeking to differentiate the framework that is the goal of this
research, which will be accomplished in Chapter III, it suffices that again these
represent sub-categorizations or specializations that a system synthesizes and
then uses to accomplish its specific goal, in this case understanding HCI.
Other authors prefer to focus on the nature of specific subsystems
common to distributed cognition systems and how they may specifically effect the
overall goals of the larger system.

Murphy et al (2000) focus on the relationship

between personnel performance feedback systems within organizations and the
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development and adjustment of overall organizational goals, arguing that the
tension between these subsystems impacts the ability of the organization to
understand and act within its environment. Tamuz (2000) and Vidiallet (2000)
both focus on how the institutionalized rules for categorizing aircraft accidents
and hazardous waste accidents respectively impact the ability of their
communities to learn from the accidents themselves. These more narrowly
focused studies of distributed cognition phenomena concentrate on specific
specialized subsystems that have developed within organizations overtime and
how they impact the overall process of learning itself, but the point for purposes
in this context is that such specialization of subsystems exists and is a pre
requisite for distributed cognition to occur.
Specialization and the development of focused subsystems of people,
materials, and artifacts arises because an organization is seeking to operate
efficiently within an environment so complex that it exceeds the cognitive ability
of collectives of mere well-rounded individuals and simple sub-systems. As a
direct result of this specialization of subsystems, integration of their resultant
conclusions, recommendations, responses, representations must occur for the
organization to meet its goals. This initial process of integrating specialized
efforts is where cognition begins to become a distributed act and not merely the
sum of the collective learning efforts of each specialized subsystem. Merely
integrating such representations, however does not fully describe the distributed
nature of the cognition or learning; a further distributed step occurs when
organizations must deal with errors made by themselves and their subsystems.
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The Impact of Errors within Distributed Cognition Systems
A topic repeatedly discussed within distributed cognition and
organizational learning literature is that of errors and their prevention, their
impact, and their processing within cognition systems. This focus on errors
within distributed cognition systems can be further divided into two primary
levels.
First, on the surface, as researchers attempt to determine what leads to
success within cognition systems they identify numerous artifacts and contextual
qualities found in such systems that develop over time in part to prevent, detect,
and mitigate errors and their subsequent system impacts. A listing of such
artifacts would include visual representational systems, computational offloading
systems, communications systems, meetings, memory and tracking systems,
institutionalized procedures, rules, and heuristics, purposive learning systems,
instrumentation systems. Similarly a listing of error preventing, detecting, and
mitigating contextual qualities descriptive of the setting within which a cognitive
system is functioning would include, horizon of observation, redundancy in
communications, redundancy in information storage, clarity in communications,
intersubjectivity amongst personnel and subsystems, and experience and
competence of personnel. As each of these individual topics is the subject of
much focus within the literature, they will be presented in greater detail with
distinctive citations to respective authors later in this review; the point to be made
here is that control of errors within distributed cognition systems is a fundamental
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driver of many of the emergent qualities of distributed cognition systems.
Environmental complexity coupled with the frailty of systems and personnel
necessitates that error processing be planned for and structured for accordingly.
A second focus on errors is on a deeper level, in that they drive the actual
learning or cognition occurring in organizations that is the more significant
adjustment of representations. Dhar (2000) focuses on the distinction between
so called Type I errors, the selection of bad alternatives, which are self correcting
and Type II errors, the rejection of good alternatives, which are only addressed
when participants within systems step aside and re-examine events,
expectations, and causal relationships. Hutchins (1994) discusses the impact of
integrating secondary, personnel on-the-job training goals into actual shipboard
navigation systems, in which overseeing personnel quietly allow some errors as
they occur to propagate through the system in order that junior personnel may
see the impact of the error, learn the various points where the error can be
detected and corrected, and gain an appreciation for why institutionalized
structure exists. Boyd, as described by Coram (2002) noted that an iteration of
decision or selection of alternative, within his OODA loop involved a feeding
forward set of expectations. After deploying the selected alternative and
observing outcomes, the orientation phase of his process involved determining
why expectations were not reached. Argyris and Schon (1996) define errors as
simply the tension existing between expectations and observations. Most of
these are caught by system functions and are corrected at an almost passive
level. Occasionally, however they are not caught until system wide impact
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begins to occur or an active, deeper learning takes place in which organizational
personnel question and adjust the structure of their system itself:
“Organizational learning occurs when individuals within an
organization experience a problematic situation...They experience
a surprising mismatch between expected and actual results of
action and respond to that mismatch through a process of thought
and further action that leads them to modify their images of
organization...and to restructure their activities so as to bring
outcomes and expectations in line...In order to become
organizational the learning that results...must become embedded in
the images of the organization held in its members minds and/or
the epistemological artifacts...embedded in the organizational
environment.”

Errors are a primary focus within the literature because they can inhibit the
performance of distributed cognition systems and as a result, such systems are
motivated to develop artifacts and contextual qualities to enhance their ability to
detect, assess, and mitigate errors as they occur. On a deeper level, errors may
be manifestations directly related to previous organizational actions or
experiences that no longer agree with accumulating data, motivating a more
fundamental reassessment of the existing environmental understanding and
organizational structure and function which lead to the error.

The Artifacts of Distributed Cognition
A primary focus of distributed cognition literature is on proving that
cognition is indeed occurring on a systemic level and not merely within the minds
of collectives of individuals. The suggestion is made that the creation and
adjustment of representations of the outside world being studied is being
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accomplished by individuals working in concert with a host of artifacts or
subsystems which are just as integral to the process as the individuals
themselves. The tracking of changes in representations through these artifacts
in the form of inputs and outputs is a recurring methodological basis for research.
An overview of categorizations of prevalent distributed cognition system artifacts
found in the literature is provided here to provide a flavor for what may be
considered an artifact of distributed cognition.
Visual representational systems are those that allow information to be
directly perceived without explicit formulation and that externalize, make explicit,
and system- orient the tacit representations existing within the minds of
individuals (Decortis et al 2000, Wright et al 2000, Walsh 1995, Paul-Chowdhury
2000, Fields et al 1999, Artman and Garbis 1988). Perhaps the most readily
recognizable example of a visual representation is a geographic or system wide
status map. Other forms include physical models of the outside environment,
graphic displays, charts, status boards, photographs, and a variety of other types
of displays.
Tracking and memory systems may or may not take a visual form
providing the perception benefits detailed above but they fulfill another core
purpose of curing the requisite attention deficit which may exist in groups of
individuals given the variety in their environment (Decortis et al 2000, Wright et al
2000, Hutchins 1995, Perry et al 1998, Dhar 2000, Paul-Chowdhury 2000, Fields
et al 1999, Tamuz 2000, Argyris and Schon 1996). Examples include once
again status boards and maps as well as event logs, computerized databases,
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checklists, maintenance histories, plans, personnel and materials listings,
accounting records, and even reminder notes.
Computational offloading systems are those that free other systems and
individuals to focus efforts elsewhere by absorbing the detailed, tedious, and time
consuming tasks of accomplishing computation (Perry et al 1998, Wright et al
2000, Ocasio 2000, Paul- Chowdhury 2000, Fields et al 2000, Hutchins 1990,
1994, 1996, Tamuz 2000).

Examples include the obvious computer software

and calculators as well as graphing tools, data-mining tools, mathematical
instruments, and presentation building tools.
Communications systems seem to be at the heart of a variety of
distributed cognition studies. Their primary purpose is to enhance the process of
gathering, and distributing data and messages into and through the system being
studied (Perry et al 1998, Wright et al 2000, Ocasio 2000, Waern et al 1999,
Johanssen 2001, Giere 2001, Paul- Chowdhury 2000, Fields et al 2000, Hutchins
1990, 1996).

Examples include the common telephone, as well as computer

networks, fax machines, radios, message boards, academic journals, chat
rooms, and even human runners.
Institutionalized processes is a catch-all of somewhat disparate artifacts
composed of resources and procedures that become part of the structure of
cognition systems themselves and can serve to meet several of the goals being
described here. Examples include plans, goals, mission statements, heuristics,
rules, categorization methodologies, clustering methodologies, simulation and
gaming techniques, jargon, prioritization listings, and other procedures. While it
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is difficult to align these artifacts into any one particular category, the idea that
they are a part of the structure of cognition systems is prevalent in the literature
(Perry et al 1998, Ocasio 2000, Waern et al 1999, March 2000, Johanssen 2001,
Giere 2001, Paul-Chowdhury 2000, Fields et al 2000, Hutchins 1996).
Purposive learning systems or training programs themselves are artifacts
designed to improve the performance of individuals and systems within cognition
systems. Hutchins (1996), Rulke and Zaheer (2000), and Argyris and Schon
(1996) in particular note the positive impact of designing training goals into and
considering training as part and parcel of cognition systems on the long-term
performance of those systems. Such systems include classes, books, manuals,
exercises, inspections, read-files, and academic journals.
Instrumentation systems are those which allow individuals to accurately
and precisely measure variability that would otherwise be beyond their capability
and in so doing amplify the system’s ability to detect and thus attempt to control
change in the outside environment (Wright et al 2000, Hutchins 1994, 1996,
Decortis et al, Dhar 2000, Fields et al 2000, Giere 2001, Magnus 2004). Types
of instrumentation are numerous and sometimes specific to the environment
being studied but include atmospheric condition monitors, sensors, tracking
devices, and sampling and testing devices.
This listing of the types of artifacts that may be found within distributed
cognition systems is provided here to give a flavor for exactly what these artifacts
are. They serve the purpose of aiding the individual and systems within an
organization to develop an understanding of the outside environment. While they
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represent physical manifestations of a cognition system attempting to achieve
their intended purposes other non-physical qualities of such systems also
emerge as key to enhancing distributed cognition.

Contextual Properties Impacting Cognition
In addition to identifying and describing a broad range of artifacts that may
be found within distributed cognition systems, authors also focus on several
emergent, contextual properties of the settings in which such systems operate
that can significantly impact system performance. Such qualities found in this
literature review include staff competence, leadership, intersubjectivity, horizon of
information visibility, flexibility, and redundancy. These qualities are identified
and defined here to provide a flavor for the contextual system properties
researchers have found to impact system performance.
While it may seem directly obvious that the competence of the personnel
within a distributed cognition system has a direct bearing on performance, it is
such directness that calls for it to be defined first as an important contextual
property. Hutchins (1996) notes that on-the-job training is woven into US Naval
shipboard navigation systems to improve the competence of personnel. Drills,
practices, and tests are done to train personnel and thereby improve system
performance. Wright et al (2000) note that personnel “competency traps” seem
to be a recurring cause of incorrect or halted representational propagation
through cognition systems. Paul-Chowdhury (2000) notes that personnel
motivation, reliability, absorptive capacity, and retention capacity are significant
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hindrances to knowledge transfer within organizations. Rulke and Zaheer (2000)
correlate both the self-knowledge and resource knowledge, not having expertise
on a given subject but knowing where it may be found, of managers to the
performance metrics of grocery stores. Staff competence is an obvious first
choice in selecting contextual properties of cognition systems that may have a
direct bearing on performance.
Somewhat related to staff competence but somewhat lightly addressed
within the reviewed literature is the idea of leadership within an organization
influencing cognition performance. Perhaps because it is a highly subjective
term and difficult to apply quantitative measure to, and perhaps because it can
be included under the overarching heading of staff competence, many authors do
not directly cite it as a property influencing performance, but it does seem
obvious that good organizational leadership would directly impact performance.
Without explicitly mentioning the overarching concept of leadership, Hutchins
(2000) in tracking mental representations through an airline cockpit crew, does
describe the impact of a decisive action and communication by the Captain to the
crew on quickly bringing system performance back to within an accepted norm.
Boyd as described by Coram (2002) noted that in making hard decisions a leader
had to convey their gravity to his subordinates as they acted upon them. Argyris
and Schon (1996) cite Schein’s (1992) definition of leadership as being “the
attitude and motivation to manage organizational culture” (p374). They propose
that,
“A learning leader must assess the adequacy of his organization’s
culture, detect its dysfunctionality, and promote its transformation
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by...promoting [his] assumptions [regarding learning] within the
culture of his organization...Leaders can foster a learning culture by
envisioning it and communicating the vision...”

Quality of leadership within an organization is a contextual property that
must be suspected of having a direct bearing on cognition system performance.
Hutchins (2000) cites Rommetvelt and Blakar (1979) and Wertsch (1985)
in defining intersubjectivity as the ability to put oneself in another’s shoes in order
to develop a shared understanding of a situation. His example in the case of the
airline cockpit is that of a First Officer sensing his Captain’s sudden need for a
specific bit of information quickly and providing it without being asked because
the First Officer also has some experience at accomplishing the Captain’s task
load. Similarly because the Captain knew that the First Officer had such an
intersubjective understanding of his tasks he correctly anticipated that the help
would be provided without asking. Other authors discuss the impact of
intersubjectivity on system performance by noting how the capability to
appreciate another player’s place within the system resolves errors quickly and
distributes assistance quickly, allowing representations to be sharpened and
actions to be coordinated (Decortis et al 2000, Vidaillet 2000). For
intersubjectivity to play a role in influencing the propagation of representations
through a distributed cognition system, potential sympathetic players must be in
a position to know what is occurring to other players.
Decortis et al (2000) define a horizon of visibility as “the functional
workspace that each participant can monitor in addition to its own task” (p.3).
Hutchins (1994) argues that the size of this space impacts error detection and
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correction because it allows or limits monitoring by other system players. By
making information flow visible to many players with intersubjective
understandings of one another, representations can be molded and adjusted
quicker and with less iteration. Fields et al (1999) refer to this concept as
accessibility of representations and note how artifacts play a key role in
broadening the sharing of information. Johannsen (2001) notes how monitoring
the background chatter within a control room plays a significant role in
constructing accurate representations. Perry et al (1998) refer to the visibility of
other perspectives facilitating the synthesis of ideas. In addition to a spatial
horizon of visibility a time horizon also exists; information must be processed and
transmitted by systems in a timely manner if it is to be used by system actors
(Artman and Garbis 1988, Hutchins 1994, Vidaillet 2000, Fields et al 1999).
Each of these authors is addressing the same idea; that is that distributed
cognition systems must develop or have designed into them architectures which
facilitate increasing the horizon of observation of individual system players.
Two additional contextual properties that obviously would be suspected of
impacting system performance are redundancy and integratability. Redundancy
in communications, information storage, computational ability, visual
representations, observations, and in other subsystems is cited by numerous
authors as increasing a system’s ability to detect errors and calibrate responses
(Hutchins 1994, 1996, Decortis et al 2000, Fields et al 1999, Tamuz 2000).
Similarly, subsystems must accept, process, and produce representations in
such a manner that they can be used and understood by other subsystems and
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players. Integratability or flexibility is key if representations are to propagate
accurately across subsystems and must be designed into distributed cognition
systems (Hutchins 1994, 1996, Fields et al 1999).
A variety of contextual qualities or emergent properties of distributed
cognition systems have a direct bearing on system performance. Staff
competence, leadership, intersubjectivity, horizon of information visibility,
flexibility, and redundancy were presented here to provide a flavor for the
manifest properties repeatedly cited within the literature and for their ability to
influence a cognitive system’s performance in fulfilling its intended purpose,
developing, adjusting, and processing representations of the outside
environment.

The Propagation of Representations - The Heart of Cognition
Within anthropological and psychological research into individual human
thinking and learning, the act of cognition is routinely defined as a mapping of
one kind of information to another through the selection and transformation of
representations (Marr 1982, Thagard 1996, Norman 1993, Vera and Simon 1993,
Hutchins 1995). In order for an organism to come to conclusions about its
environment, it must develop mental representations of that environment and
imagine what impacts its actions or the actions of others may have on that
environment. After acting or observing others’ actions and the ensuing
environmental changes, the organism can make judgments about causality,
interrelationships, and the accuracy of its conceived representations then
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iteratively adjust them accordingly. This process is the fundamental act of
cognition and learning.
Because this process traditionally has been thought to take place within
the brain of the individual organism or human, the study of cognition, that is the
processing of representations, has been confined to anthropological and
psychological circles. When the ideas of collective mind and distributed thinking
began to arise, as was discussed in the introduction to this literature review, and
organizations came to be thought of as thinking organisms, tacit, internal, mental
representations could be to some extent explicitly defined as they had to be to be
transferred between humans and between subsystems. Thus the major focus of
distributed cognition research, as has been discussed in detail previously, is in
making explicit these mental models being used within organizations and
tracking their development and processing over time (Wright et al 2000, Hutchins
1994, 1996, Decortis et al, Dhar 2000, Fields et al 2000, Giere 2001, Magnus
2004, Paul-Chowdhury 2000, Perry et al 1998, Ocasio 2000, March 2000, Rulke
and Zaheer 2000, Waern et al 1999, Rogers 1996, Tamuz 2000, Vidaillet 2000).
Additionally, what once was the province of anthropologists and psychologists
also began to draw the interest of the organizational and management science.
One might suspect some common themes to emerge from amongst this research
into the tracking of representational propagation and indeed as has been seen
thus far some have, but one might also expect there to be some common
functionality to the processes whereby such representations are developed and
processed.
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Common Structural Functions and the Emergence of Cognitive Cycles
within Distributed Cognition Literature

The purpose of the section of this literature review on specialization is to
describe how, in response to environmental pressures and the desire to operate
more efficiently given those pressures, organizations are motivated to develop or
evolve specialized subsystems which can employ their respective expert
knowledge bases in concert against the complexity of the environment. This
emergent organizational structure tends to be specific to the type of organization
and type of environment, i.e. businesses develop marketing, accounting,
production, and research divisions while cities develop transportation, law
enforcement, tax assessment, and building code divisions. From the distributed
cognition researcher’s perspective a goal may then be to understand how the
work of these disparately focused subsystems is synthesized into a collective
understanding of these environments.
Rather than looking at each organization individually, researchers have
developed some basic frameworks for understanding distributed cognition
systems in general by identifying functional commonalities to all such learning
systems. The purpose of this portion of the literature review is to first summarize
the works of other authors in identifying and describing some of the basic
functions of distributed cognition systems and second to highlight a recurrent
theme in many of these frameworks, that is the concept that learning involves a
repetitive, iterative cycling through of these suggested functions in pursuit of
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developing accurate representations of outside environments. Figure 2.4,
Functional Frameworks from Distributed Cognition Literature, presents a
simplified outline of the functional frameworks suggested within the reviewed
literature.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61

Figure 2.4: Functional Frameworks from Distributed Cognition Literature
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March (1991, 1998, 2000) identifies the two fundamental problems of the
organizational-environmental learning challenge as being ignorance and
ambiguity; ignorance simply being the lack of knowledge about the environment
and ambiguity being the lack of knowing how to change the environment. From
this basis, he then suggests that the two fundamental functions of learning
organizations are exploration, to gain knowledge and reduce ignorance, and
exploitation, in deciding upon and pursuing goals by using gained knowledge
thus removing the ambiguity of understanding the organizations place within the
environment. March then goes on to describe the balance that organizations
must maintain between these two functions; too much exploration and not
enough exploitation results in little productive activity and the organization cannot
sustain itself while the reverse results in an organization that never discovers
new alternatives and is prone to Type II errors that eventually finds itself no
longer adaptable to a changing environment.
Dhar (2000) reviews March’s work and extends his own two primary
means of organizational learning: learning by doing and learning through
interpretation. Learning by doing or experiential learning reduced to its core is
merely initiating or repeating actions that have worked successfully in the past
without much contemplation for why they work-an “if it works then do it again”
mentality. Not much is really learned other than that a correlation between a
particular action and a result exists; exploration is de-emphasized. Reduced to
its simplistic core, learning by interpretation is simply reaching conclusions about
interrelationships based on past historical data. In its extreme this form of
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learning is prone to errors due to small sample size and interpretations being
applied to non-analogous environmental situations. By defining learning using
extreme notions, Dhar is implicitly suggesting that both of his suggested forms
complement the other.
Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996), as previously discussed, cite errors or
the differences between expectations and outcomes as the driving force behind
learning. If errors are to be corrected organizations must ask themselves why the
discrepancies occurred and must make changes to prevent recurrences. They
identify a surface type of feedback loop, single loop learning, in which the
difference between expected outcomes and actual outcomes of previous actions
and strategies results in changes and adaptations to the strategy being deployed.
They then further identify a deeper form of learning feedback loop in which an
organization questions and adjusts the underlying theory supporting the
implemented strategy.
Argyris and Schon developed their framework from an organizational
science perspective and before cognitive science had really developed the
concept of distributed cognition within organizations, thus for purposes of this
research, some effort needs to be made to interpret their perspective in the
language of distributed cognition. A cognitive scientist would view single loop
learning as a minor adjustment or recalibration of an accepted representation or
a refinement of understanding how organizational actions impact the accepted
representation. Such changes to representations developed over time would be
in terms of minor changes in size or scale while double loop learning would be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64

viewed as a major adjustment or change in the actual structure of the
representation of the environment and its interrelationships with the organization
itself. One further noteworthy attribute of Argyris and Schon’s explicitly defined
organizational learning framework is that it is one of the original ones that view
the learning process as being composed of a series of iterative feedback loops, a
concept at the core of other frameworks.
Crossan, Lane, and White’s (1995) 4-I theory of organizational learning
rests on their identification of four basic functions: intuiting, interpreting,
integrating, and institutionalizing. Intuiting is the act of an individual recognizing
patterns or possibilities in the environment. Interpreting is the act of explaining
such ideas to oneself and/or crossing the individual’s boundary and explaining it
to a group of other individuals. Integrating is that group developing a shared
understanding based on the interpretations of several. Finally, institutionalizing is
when organizations formally act on the integrated concepts of such groups. By
focusing on the levels at which each suggested basic function is occurring, the
authors are implicitly suggesting that learning is indeed a distributed function.
They further suggest that these steps work in both directions as representations
are built from the bottom-up or feeding forward as they describe it, then
institutionalized and fed back down to individuals as they become the basis for
implicit action.
Crossan et al then go on to suggest four basic propositions relating to their
framework. First, a tension exists between assimilating new learning and using
existing learning, analogous to March’s balance between exploration and
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exploitation and Argyris and Schon’s single and double loops. Second, learning
occurs at multi-levels, personal, group, and organizational within an organization,
i.e. organizational learning is a distributed act. Third, processes link these levels;
again learning is an emergent, systemic, distributed act. Fourth and finally,
cognition affects action and vice versa, suggesting an iterative relationship exists
between the two.
Ocasio (2000) building on Weick’s (1979) work suggests his SERSTS
model based on the following functions composing the organizational processing
of representations: situation, enactment, retrieval, selection, transmission, and
storage, all of which are analogous to other frameworks already described.
Ocasio’s situation is essentially analogous to the outside environment used in
other frameworks. Enactment, a concept borrowed from Weick is essentially the
initial creation from scratch of different representations of a situation. Retrieval
refers to representations not necessarily created on the fly but supplemented
with existing representations of similar situations already developed by an
organization; again one notes the tension between exploration and exploitation.
Selection is the actual work of picking representations or combining them,
analogous to Crossan et al’s integrating phase. Transmission is the act of
propagating the representation through the various portions of an organization for
both refinement and action. Finally, storage is analogous to the
institutionalization of the given representation for purposes of future retrieval and
incorporation into action strategies. Implicit in Ocasio’s model, first, is the idea
that the cognitive action his functions compose has the purpose of leading to
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action to change the situation for the organization’s benefit and second, that
information and representations flow through an organization to such ends in a
continuous manner.
While developed somewhat separately from cognitive and organizational
sciences, Boyd’s conceptual framework of OODA loops, described by Coram
(2002), for purposes of explaining the actions of protagonists in military conflicts
is functionally analogous to the learning frameworks already discussed. Indeed,
Coram (2002) describes the objective of the framework as being a means “to get
inside the mind and the decision cycle of an adversary” (p. 335). As stated
before in this work, Boyd’s looping of information is composed of four distinct
phases: observation, orientation, decision, and action. Figure 2.4 provides a
detailed diagram used by Boyd himself (Coram 2002) as he briefed his concept
throughout the US military establishment in the 70’s and 80’s.
There are three issues of particular noteworthiness in Boyd’s framework
developed outside of other sciences dedicated to understanding the thinking
process. First, the idea he suggests of implicit feedback from the orientation
phase of his process to the action phase is suggestive of Argyris and Schon’s
single loop learning, March’s exploitation, and Dhar’s experiential learning.
Second, the feedback loop flowing from the decision phase to the observation
phase is suggestive of Argyris and Schon’s expectations being part of strategy
selection and being a means of measuring representation accuracy via the
existence of errors. Finally third, Boyd attempts to capture both culture and
context by citing their influences on the orientation phase of the process. And
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overarching all these points is again the iterative, meta-loop cited by other
authors of the learning process.
The purpose of this review was to provide a flavor for the existing
frameworks that can be found within the literature and to develop common
themes that exist across these frameworks. These themes include the notions
that cognition is an iterative, repetitive looping process, that it occurs on surface
levels and deeper levels relating to the degree to which representations are
adjusted, that natural tensions exist between using existing representations
repeatedly and adjusting them or developing new ones, and that the basic
functions of cognition consist of compiling environmental observations, searching
for and recognizing patterns within those observations that in turn can be
developed into conceptual representations of the environment, settling on a
representation as the basis of developing strategies of action and expectations,
and then implementing those strategies, observing results, and repeating the
process.

Summary of Literature Themes and identification of Literature Gaps
The purpose of this portion of the literature review is to develop an
understanding of the concepts of distributed cognition and organizational learning
and to detail the recurrent themes found across the literature. By integrating the
work of several authors, a working definition is developed particular to the nature
of this work for a more specific concept of distributed cognition: the ongoing
collective accumulation, distribution, and synthesis of knowledge across time
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amongst personnel and systems at all levels within a bounded organization
which leads to the development, adjustment, and sometimes tearing down then
redevelopment of both tacit and explicit mental representations of the outside
world within which the organization is trying to pursue its goals.
Additionally by structured review and clustering of like issues, the following
major themes relating to the study of distributed cognition and organizational
learning are identified: 1) the complexity of the environment and the volume of
information being processed by such systems, 2) the integration of specialized
expertise’s as a key function of distributed cognition, 3) the occurrence and
impact of errors within learning systems, 4) a focus on the material, process,
institutional, and technological artifacts which develop within organizations to
facilitate distributed cognition, 5) the various key characterizations of the context
within which the organizational cognition is occurring that are judged to
significantly impact the cognition process, 6) the focus on and tracking of the
propagation of representations through an organization-the fundamental act of
cognition, 7) the breaking down, categorization, or description of the interaction
of various structural functions of learning organizations, and lastly, 8) the
detailing of a variety of frameworks sharing a cyclical theme describing the
processes which must be looped through in order for organizations to learn.
Given that the focus of this work is on the development of a systemic,
conceptual framework for understanding the organizational cognition occurring in
crisis control centers, the difficulty one would find in applying the large and
disparately varied existing literary constructs to the specified case is indicative of
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gaps existing in organizational literature. First, construction of systemic
functional, structural frameworks for description of cognitive functions within the
specific case of crisis control centers is lacking. Johanssen et al (2001),
Hutchins (1994, 1996), and Waem et al (1999) all provide detailed insight into the
function of what can be considered control centers functioning in environments of
varying degrees of complexity and Vidaillet (2000) provides a case review
empirically identifying themes arising out of a crisis situation in which control
centers played a key role. The objective of these authors, however, is not to
develop and test conceptual frameworks in such settings and furthermore their
objectives are not to detail the impacts of crisis situations on the phenomena of
cognition within these settings.
Second, while some systems analysis concepts are prevalent in some of
the reviewed frameworks, Boyd’s seeming to holistically incorporate more than
the others, it is difficult to tell how, methodologically, these frameworks are
developed as the authors merely develop and present them based on ranging
literature reviews as was done here or develop them empirically out of specific
cases. A systems scientist would suspect that by formally and explicitly applying
the techniques of system analysis to the problem of constructing such
frameworks, a more holistic, comprehensive approach could be developed and
confidence in its ability to provide a more complete means for understanding
cognition phenomena in specified settings would be increased. Such an effort
will be undertaken in Chapter III of this work for the specific case in focus, crisis
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control centers, but first a review of literature relating to the setting of that focus
must be accomplished.

A Review of Crisis Management Literature - Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this portion of the literature review is to develop an
understanding of how the onset of crisis conditions might impact cognitive
phenomena within organizational control centers. To that end a survey of crisis
management literature is undertaken with two objectives in mind: first, to distill an
working definition of what constitutes a “crisis” from an organizational
perspective, and second, to develop a listing of themes prevalent in the literature
that characterize crises in general. Chapter III will then use a systems analysis
methodology to integrate ideas from the two major focus areas of this literature
review, distributed cognition and crisis management, into the proposed
conceptual framework at the center of this work. A review of crisis management
literature can lead one to broadly categorize works into two categories: first,
declarative “how-to” popular management literature describing experiences and
developing prescriptive approaches to dealing with crises situations, with a
prevalent focus on organizational public and media relations, and second,
literature focused on development of overarching frameworks for describing and
rigorously understanding a crisis situation. Many of the reviewed works mention
the need for control centers and describe cases involving organizational control
centers during periods of crises but the general perspective is to provide
organizational leaders with guidance and not as is the focus of this work to focus
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intently on the control centers themselves. Nevertheless, they still do provide
fertile ground for meeting the specified objectives here.

Prescriptive Approaches to Crisis Management
The term crisis management is a bit of a “buzzword” in today’s popular
management literature as organizations deal with the uncertainty of modern
environments. Perhaps as a result, a variety of works exist marketed to
managers who have to face such situations. Generally speaking, such works
focus on descriptive story telling to illustrate knowledge gained from experience.
A brief review of such works provides a flavor for the nature of most crisis
management literature.
Meyers et al (1986) in the dramatically titled When It Hits the Fan describe
nine types of modern business crises including sudden market shifts, product
failures, cash crises, and labor relations by retelling various stories then listing
points or lessons learned within the story. In many cases the stories are
summed in catch phrases. For example, after citing numerous case stories
relating to product failures the reader is instructed briefly to “redesign it or retire
it.” Similarly, Lerbringer (1997) presents six general types of crises organizations
may have to confront: natural, technological, confrontation, malevolence,
management, deception, and misconduct and then describes examples of each
citing areas where mistakes occurred and improvements could be made.
Unzucker (2002) distills crisis response into five general areas: investigation,
restoration of normal operations, preparation for litigation, restoration of staff and
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public confidence, and reduction of political impact; then goes on to identify the
seven personality traits of good crisis managers: being stable under pressure
and public exposure, being firmly anchored in company and corporate position,
being believable as company spokesman, being able to handle ad hoc
assignments well, being a team player, and being able to deal with uncertainty.
Bernstein (2003) identifies eight general public relations mistakes made by
organizations: playing ostrich or not addressing a growing crisis, waiting to
respond to a crisis only after it has gone public, assuming a good reputation will
speak for you, treating the media like an enemy, remaining trapped in a
reactionary mode, over-relying on technical jargon in media communications,
assuming the truth will triumph, and ignoring personnel’s emotions.
The point of these citations is to provide a general flavor for the approach
most works on the subject take towards crisis management; they provide a
review of crisis cases citing lessons learned followed by a declaration of a set of
steps or principles that can be used by organizations responding to crises.
Lessons learned and typologies of crisis cases are doubtless very useful in
developing a knowledge base for organizational managers but for purposes of
developing a holistic view of crises, they provide little more than a background on
which to further develop more rigorous concepts.

Developing a Working Definition of a Crisis Environment
In more conceptually rigorous approaches to the subject matter of crisis
management, a variety of authors begin by distilling out of their cases a
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generalized definition of what a crisis is and what crisis management is. Figure
2.5, Definitions of Crisis and Crisis Management, provides a review of theses
definitions.
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Figure 2.5: Definitions of Crisis and Crisis Management
Crisis
“a turning point for better or worse” - Fink (1986)
“A situation characterized by surprise, high threat to important values, and short decision time.”
Hermann, (1971).
“a m ajor occurrence with potential negative outcome affecting an organization, company, or industry.
As well as its publics, products, services, or good name.” Feam-Banks (1996)
“a m ajor unpredictable event that has potentially negative results. The event and its aftermath may
significantly damage an organization and its employees, products, services, financial condition, and
reputation.” - Barton (1993).
“an event that is an unpredictable, major threat that can have a negative effect on the organization,
industry, or stakeholders, if handled improperly.” - Coombs (1999).
“Extreme events that cause disruption and put lives and property at risk. These Require an immediate
response and application o f resources beyond regular application.” - National Research Council (1996).
Originally a medical idea: “a Hippocratic concept: all illnesses reach a turning point. From here some are
fatal, some go on to recovery, all others develop to another form, and take on a different constitution.”
Dab (1993).
“a fit o f uncertainty, and distress where everything is in suspense in anticipation o f imminent resolution o f
the illness.” Bolzinger (1982).
“Crisis: a situation in which numerous organizations are faced with critical problems, experience both
sharp external pressure and internal tensions, and are then brutally and for an extended period thrust to the
center stage and hurled against one another, all in a society o f mass communication, in other words in
direct contact with the certainty o f being at the top o f the news on radio and television and in the press for
a long time.” Lagadec (1984)

Crisis Management
“Set o f factors designed to combat crises and lessen the actual effects o f the crises. Put another way, cm
seeks to prevent or lessen the negative outcomes o f a crisis and thereby protect the organization,
stakeholders, and/or industry from damage. (Coombs 1999)
“The set o f concepts, principles, analysis, and working methods, that apply specifically to the very
particular situation known as a crisis.” (Ogrizek, Guillery 1999).
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Three general themes emerge out of these definitions. First, crisis events
are considerably more significant and negative to organizations than normal
events in terms of their impact on organizational survival in its current state.
Second, they may have components of surprise, unpredictability, and difficulty
relative to the normal events organizations are ideally postured for. In light of
the prior discussion of a key theme from distributed cognition and organizational
learning literature, environmental complexity, this notion can be thought of as
crisis environments being composed of a level of complexity for which the
organization is not ideally prepared. Third and finally, these authors all point to
the internal organizational and emotional stress caused by crises.
Bringing these themes together an working definition can be proposed:
crisis environments are those with potential for significantly more negative
organizational outcomes and of a significantly greater level of complexity than
organizations are usually prepared for and in turn cause significant internal
organizational stress. While a definition such as this one lays the foundation for
gaining a conceptual understanding of a crisis environment, further review is
necessary to more completely characterize that environment.

Characterizations of the Crisis Environment - Emergent Literature Themes
and an Operational Specification of Complexity
In reviewing crisis management literature three general approaches of
characterizing crisis environments emerged: developing typologies of crises,
describing varieties of complexity associated with crises, and developing
characterizations of various periods of the life of a crisis within an organization.
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Discussion of the first two of these themes leads to the idea that they can be
merged into the general idea of characterizing the nature of a crisis’s complexity
while discussion of the latter stresses the importance of understanding the
dimension of time as it relates to conceptualizing crisis environments.
As was previously discussed, Meyer et al (1986) identified ten types of
crises affecting business enterprises: these include crises in labor relations,
public perception, market shifts, product failures, management succession, cash
flow, organizational relationships, hostile takeovers, adverse international events,
and governmental regulation. Similarly, Nudell and French (1988) propose five
types of crises typically occurring within governmental and political circles:
natural disasters, accidents, terrorism, criminal acts, and disruptive actions, i.e.
strikes, boycotts, and protests. Lerbringer (1997) identifies seven slightly more
general types of crises with which organizations may find themselves confronted:
natural, technological, confrontation, malevolence, skewed values, deception,
and management misconduct. Given the definition proposed earlier, each of
these types of environmental events constitute crises for organizations because
they meet the specified criteria, they pose significantly negative consequences
for the organization and their complexity is of a nature for which the organization
is not usually prepared.
These typologies spring from those underlying complexities. Natural
disasters present a volume of requirements outside the normal range for
governments. Technological crises may require larger or different knowledge
bases than organizations previously had.

Criminal acts may be outside the
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normal plans of organizations. Each of these types of crises represents an
underlying degree or nature of complexity with which the organization must come
to deal. In terms of conceptualizing crisis environments then it is this underlying
nature of the crisis’s complexity that first drives the organization’s stress and not
the emergent typology itself.
Some authors address this underlying nature of the complexity within
crisis environments. The National Research Counsel (author unidentified 1996)
cites five characteristics of crisis environments: 1) magnitude or the sheer
volume of information, events, and demanded responses, 2) dynamic urgency or
the short time period required for understanding and action, 3) infrequency and
unpredictability of events, 4) credibility of sources, and 5) multidimensionality or
the breadth of differing ways in which events impact the organization.

Lerbringer

(1997) focusing on the time dimension of crises cites suddenness, uncertainty,
and urgency. Meyer et al (1986) cite multidimensionality, ability to control, and
urgency.
Because complexity fills a key portion of the developed working definition
of a crisis environment for purposes of this work, its own further operational
specification is required. In general terms ‘‘level o f complexity” can be expanded
to encompass as Carlisle and Rebentisch (2003) suggest 1) the amount of
novelty introduced by the environment into to the control center, 2) the demands
of the environment on the control center in terms of the amount of dependence
between specialized sources of knowledge required to develop successful
responses, and 3) the demands of the environment on the control center in terms
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of the amount or type of specialization required to successfully respond. This
characterization of complexity and its demand on organizational learning entities
is reflective of the discussions of specialization, integration, horizon of visibility,
and intersubjectivity discussed in the literature review. The novelty side of
complexity itself can further be characterized by the sheer number of entities
involved, the pace of events, and high degrees of uncertainty (Jackson, 1991;
Beer, 1979).
In meeting the objective of this work, developing a conceptual framework
for understanding distributed cognition phenomena within organizations, it will be
important to define these underlying aspects of crisis environments in terms of
the perspective of the proposed framework. For example, Boyd may view a
crisis situation’s urgency in terms of a challenge to his organizations ability to
observe, or sample, and orient itself to a changing environment fast enough to
make decisions and act. Similarly, Ocasio may view crisis magnitude as a
challenge to organization’s ability to enact a large enough representation to
encompass the volume of detail necessary to act within such an environment.
Also importantly, such a framework must provide a means of understanding the
impact of crises on its systemic structure as it passes through times of normalcy,
crisis, and return to normalcy.
Several authors approach the problem of framing crisis situations from the
perspective of time, that is, breaking down the life of an organization functioning
through times of crisis into separate phases. Taking the organization’s
perspective the National Research Council (1997) identifies four main phases of
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time during a crisis: preparation, avoidance, response, and recovery. Fink, as
cited by Coombs (1999) use a medical illness metaphor as a means to frame the
life of an organization in a crisis situation: the prodromal period, when clues that
a crisis exists begin to emerge; the breakout period, a triggering event with
attendant damage; the chronic period, when lingering effects must be addressed;
and the resolution period, when the crisis issue is no longer a concern. Mitroff
(1994) characterizes the issue thusly; a period of signal detection, one of probing
and prevention, one of damage containment, and one of recovery, followed by
one of learning. Coombs (1999) attempts to simplify these ideas suggesting that
crisis management is composed of times of prevention, preparation,
performance, and then learning. The fact that a variety of authors choose to
focus on the timelines of crisis situations suggests their importance to framing
crisis problems. These characterizations of crisis situation phasing will be
synthesized and used in Chapter III of this work to ground the proposed
framework in the time dimension as well as to provide a means to understanding
the impact a crisis has, as it initially develops, exists, and fades, on learning
phenomena within organizations.

Summary of Literature Review relating to Crisis Management
Reviewing and integrating the work of several authors, the view of crisis
environments as those “with potential for significantly more negative
organizational outcomes and of a significantly greater level of complexity than
organizations are usually prepared for and in turn cause significant internal
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organizational stress,” lays the foundation for developing a conceptual
understanding for the impacts of such environments on organizational learning
systems. Similarly such a framework must also capture the various
characterizations of the natures of complexity within crisis environment and their
impact on an organization. Finally, the emergent and recurrent focus within the
literature on the time phases in the life of crisis situations suggests the
importance of incorporating such phases into any constructed conceptual
framework which has the purpose of providing a means of understanding the
impact of crisis on an organization’s learning systems. Figure 2.6, Crisis
Management Literature Review Summarization, provides a summary of the
literature review relating to crisis management.
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Figure 2.6 - Crisis Management Literature Review Summarization
C ris is E n v iro n m e n t D e fin e d :

Environments and events with potential for
significantly more negative organizational
outcomes and of a significantly greater level of
complexity than organizations are usually
prepared for and in turn cause significant internal
organizational stress

Dominant Literature Themes Characterizing Crisis Environment
Crisis Typologies

Characteristics of
Crisis Complexity

Natural Disasters,
Accidents, Terrorism,
Criminal Acts,
Disruptive Actions
(strikes, boycotts,
protests). (Nudell and
French 1988)
Public Perception,
Market Shift, Product
Failure, Management
Succession, Cash,
Relationships, Hostile
Takeover, Adverse
Int’l events,
Regulation/Deregulatio
n
(Meyer 1986)
Natural,
Technological,
Confrontation,
Malevolence, Skewed
Values, Deception,
Management
Misconduct.

Magnitude, Urgency,
Infrequency/Unpredict
ability, Credibility Of
Info/Resources,
Information Demand,
Multidimensionality,
Context. (National
Research Council
1996).
I

W

Suddenness,
Uncertainty, Time
Compression,
(Lerbringer 1997).
Dimension, Control,
Time options. ( Meyers
1986).

Crisis Phases
Preparedness
(planning and
training), Avoidance,
Response, and
Recovery. (National
Research Council,
1996).
Illness Metaphor:
Prodromal, Breakout,
Chronic, Resolution
Fink (1988).
Signal Detection,
Probing And
Prevention, Damage
Containment,
Recovery, Learning.
(Mitroff, 1994).
Prevention,
Preparation,
Performance, And
Learning. (Coombs,
99)
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The Purpose of Control Centers in Times of Crisis
Control centers in various forms have been the focus of many studies
relating to distributed cognition (Johanssen et al 2001, Fields et al 1999, Artman
and Garbis 1988), the underlying reason for which is that the primary focus of
such centers is to serve as the central nerve-center or “brain” of larger
organizational groups, collecting observations from the outside world, interpreting
them, and developing responses. Indeed it can be said that the implicit purpose
of such control centers is primarily to facilitate an organization’s distributed
cognition (Artman and Garbis 1988). When one thinks of the existing
organizational learning frameworks from the literature discussed thus far one can
picture all the functions occurring in the control centers.
This commonality between the working definition of an organizational
cognition system and a crisis control center represents an intersection of the two
areas of focus in this literature review. Specifically it allows for the, for purposes
of this work, definition of a crisis control center as an organization’s centralized
establishment for facilitating distributed cognition in the event the organization
encounters a crisis environment.
Having identified one of the two main areas of gaps in the reviewed
literature as a lack of a systemic understanding of the impact of crisis conditions
on distributed cognition control centers and the other being the lack of use of
systems engineering methodologies in constructing distributed cognition
frameworks in general, it is important to ensure that the control centers to be
studied and to serve as the object of focus for the proposed framework are
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indeed functioning in crisis environments. Specifically, as a matter of condition in
the proposed definition of a crisis environment it is required that such
“environments and events” have “potential for significantly more negative
organizational outcomes and...significantly greater level of complexity than
organizations are usually prepared for and in turn cause significant internal
organizational stress”. The question to be answered is “does the posturing of an
organization in fielding a control center, sometimes complete with contingency
plans, emergency checklists, myriads of communication systems, and other such
artifacts constitute being ‘prepared for’ and thereby eliminate the ability to claim a
crisis environment exists?” The answer lies primarily in the word “usually” in the
proposed definition. The organization, not the control center, is postured for
some sort of daily set of expected occurrences. The fact that organizations take
steps to mitigate crisis environments does not mean crises can still not occur in
terms of degree of complexity and in terms of the internal stress they may cause.
A normal 911 call reporting an individual’s heart attack to a city’s emergency call
center would not constitute a crisis for the city; however a mass casualty event,
such as plane crash, would most certainly still qualify as a crisis even though its
control center might have a contingency plan for such an event.

Air Force Unit Control Centers
The study of control centers functioning in such crisis environments and
the impacts of those environments, relative to ones for which the organizations
are usually prepared, on the distributed cognition phenomena within such control
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centers are the focus of this work. Air Force Wing Unit Control Centers
functioning during simulated wartime operational readiness exercises and
inspections meet the requirement of functioning in crisis conditions. The specific
cases used validate and adjust the proposed framework will be Air Force
Squadron Control Centers participating in operational readiness exercises
simulating wartime conditions in preparation for formal Operational Readiness
Inspections being conducted by the Air Force’s Air Combat Command’s
Inspector General team.
One of the many internal functions of The United States Air Force’s Air
Combat Command (ACC), headquartered at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
and comprised of 18 active duty and over 50 reserve component reporting
installations located mostly in the continental United States, is that of its
Inspector General’s (IG) directorate. One of the responsibilities of the IG, and his
or her team of about 150 officer and senior enlisted personnel, is to conduct
Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI) in order to provide senior ACC
leadership with a measure of a subordinate unit’s capability to accomplish its
wartime mission. ORIs, in their usual form, involve the IG team with augmenting
inspectors traveling to the installation to be inspected and conducting round-theclock, basewide-oriented, scripted scenarios for about eight days. Generally, the
first three days of inspection, Phase I of the ORI, focus on the installation’s ability
to mobilize, or prepare and package, personnel and equipment for expedient
travel to a forward location. During Phase II, the remainder of the inspection and
the focus of this research, the entire installation is simulated to be at a forward
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location from which units are conducting offensive and defensive wartime
operations.
Over many years a rigorous set of criteria, ACC Supplement 1 to AFI 90201, Operational Readiness Inspection Criteria, has developed and evolved to
evaluate the common fighter or bomber wings within ACC (ACC 2002). The
Phase II portion of this criteria is broken down into three major graded areas; the
Employment and Mission Support criteria evaluate the flying mission, aircraft
maintenance, and base functions pretty much along hierarchical organization
lines with a few sections of criteria dedicated to evaluating systemic processes
such as communication security and command and control; the Ability to Survive
and Operate (ATSO) portion of the criteria breaks down and evaluates the
emergent behavior of the wing in response to conventional and chemical attacks
upon the base, mass casualties, and a variety of other negative occurrences
expected to occur during wartime.

Falling within the Mission Support portion of

this criteria organization is the installation’s Civil Engineering function, usually of
squadron strength, approximately 100 to 400 personnel and accompanying
vehicle, equipment, and material, responsible for maintaining the base’s facilities
and infrastructure. Civil Engineering squadrons for purposes of readiness
exercises and inspections are composed of smaller elements, or flights,
responsible for accomplishing engineering design, environmental management of
base activities, resource management of materials, and general operations
including road, airfield, and earthwork, interior and exterior electrical-systems
work, interior and exterior water, gas, and sewage utilities work, carpentry and
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structural work, entomological work, contingency generator maintenance and
servicing, and heating, ventilation, and air condition systems work. In total Civil
Engineering Squadrons are large, complex organizations of diversely skilled
experts responsible for maintaining the technologically intensive systems
required to support a modern Air Force wing in times of war.
A central portion of the inspection criteria (see Appendix 1) related to
evaluating a base’s Civil Engineering function in an ORI is dedicated to the
Squadron’s Control Center (SCC), the central nerve center responsible for
processing incoming data relating to facility and infrastructure conditions from all
the various units on base, developing an understanding of events, developing
solutions and presenting them to Squadron leadership for review and decision
making, then relaying and coordinating response actions with field units. The
SCC, housed in a fielded control center or contingency headquarters facility type
of setting, is composed of personnel representing the various sub-organizational
flights within a Civil Engineering Squadron. Typically each of these individuals is
accompanied with two or more means of communication with their field
counterparts dispersed across the base. SCC layouts themselves involve banks
of phones, status boards, and workstations centralized around a single SCC
director, the squadron’s senior leadership. Figure 2.7, Sample Floor Plan of an
AF Unit Control Center, is a typical floor plan for an Engineering SCC.
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Figure 2.7: Sample Floor Plan of an AF Unit Control Center
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During the ORI, inputs in the form of scripted actions performed by actors
(inspector personnel or assistants), input cards, or material and equipment
placements are dropped or enacted at various locations around the base. As
units in the field respond to inputs such as chemical agent detection, ground
intruder alerts, mortar blasts, fires, craters and building damage, information is
channeled to the SCC for repair efforts to be prioritized and responsive strategies
decided upon and implemented. For the engineering function of an Air Force
Wing, the SCC is the squadron’s crisis control center.
ORIs are high-pressure events hopefully mirroring the pressures of
wartime. Most wings train anywhere from a year to six months for an ORI, by
conducting in-house Operational Readiness Exercises (ORE) if they know an
impending for ORI is scheduled. Grades for all sections of the criteria are given
on a five-point scale (Outstanding, Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal and
Unsatisfactory) and superior performers and teams are specifically identified.
Individual, squadron, functional, and overall wing success will almost definitely
find its way into personnel appraisals. On occasion, poor performance does
result in reassignment of personnel. At the conclusion of the ORI the inspection
team, usually composed of 50-100 functional air force experts and led by a team
chief with the rank of colonel, will spend two days writing its report, according to a
rigorous specified format based on established criteria (ACC 2002). Before
departing the installation, the IG team chief will be the primary speaker at a mass
briefing to the base populace, usually in the base theater and televised to other
large facilities, in which the various sub-section performance assessment ratings
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are revealed, via high-tech slideshow with music and action pictures for all to
see, and “rolled-up” into the ratings for the major graded areas after which the
final overall wing grade is revealed.
Air Force Wing Engineering Squadron Control Centers functioning during
operational readiness exercises and inspections exist to facilitate the expedited
recovery of continued function of wing facilities and infrastructure.

In order to

accomplish their mission these centers must by definition facilitate the distributed
cognition of a host of players including personnel and subsystems responsible for
airfield and navigation systems, back up generator systems, utility systems,
squadron security and personnel-equipment-vehicles-materials accountability,
tracking of chemical agent exposure, tracking of damage, and facility repair.
Making their task even more difficult is the crisis environments in which they are
asked to perform: environments full of potential adverse outcomes relating to
personnel and system survival, and full of foreseen and unforeseen complexity
sometimes exceeding the capability of the centers to fully and adequately
process and act within.

Summary of Literature Review
Table 2.1, Summary of Literature Review uses Figure 2.2, Literature
Coverage Areas and Gaps, introduced at the beginning of this chapter, as a
basis for summarizing the location of gaps in the subject matter of the existing
literature that this work is attempting to fill.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Literature Review (based on Figure 2.2, Literature
Map)_______________ ____________________________ _________________
Non-Intersecting Subject
Matter from Literature
Review

Gap 1: Distributed
Cognition and Crisis
Management

Gap 2: Distributed
Cognition Literature
Using Systemic
Approaches
Gap 3:
Crisis Management
Literature Using Systemic
Approaches
Gap 4:
Systemically Framing
Distributed Cognition
Phenomena in Crisis
Environments

Coverage Area 1: Distributed
Cognition Literature
- Literature Themes (see Fig 2.3):
Learning Loops
Functional Breakdowns, Artifacts,
Representations
- Existing Frameworks (see Fig. 2.4):
March (2000), Dhar (2000), Argyris
and Schon (1978), Crossan, Lane,
and White (1995)
PARTIALLY FILLED
- Literature Themes (see Fig 2.3):
Specialization, Volume/Complexity,
Errors, Contextual Characterizations
- Existing Frameworks (See Fig. 2.4):
Boyd (2002)
PARTIALLY FILLED
- Existing Frameworks (See Fig. 2.4):
Ocasio (2000) and Boyd (2002) to
greater extent
No Intersection

Coverage Area 2: Crisis
Management Literature
- Anecdotal Summaries
and Prescriptive
Approaches
- Frameworks: Crisis
Typologies,
Characteristics of Crisis
Complexity, Crisis
Phases.
PARTIALLY FILLED
- Characterizations
describing uncertainty
and unknowability

PARTIALLY FILLED:
Existing Frameworks (See Fig. 2.4):
Boyd (2002) begins to approach

UNFILLED

No Intersection

UNFILLED

The primary purpose of this literature review was threefold in reaching
toward the overall goals of this research. First, academic literature relating to
distributed cognition and organizational learning was reviewed and synthesized
in order to gain perspective on the general definitions, characterizations, and
themes relating to these fields of study. Second and similarly, crisis
management literature was also reviewed to support the development of an
understanding of the topic and to develop specific characterizations of crisis
environments and their impact on organizations and their control centers.
Finally, Air Force organizational literature relating to the function of fielded
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squadron control centers was reviewed to gain an understanding of official,
organizational perspectives relating to these organizational entities.
Specifically within the first area of focus, distributed cognition, review of
the academic literature relating to the field was accomplished with the interim
objectives, along the way to supporting the framework development of Chapter
III, of: 1) developing a formalized working definition of organizational cognition, 2)
developing a listing and an understanding of the themes within the literature
relating to the study of distributed cognition, and 3) understanding existing
frameworks others have used to support a comprehensive, holistic understanding
of distributed cognition.
Crisis Management literature was summarized to support meeting the
interim objectives of: 1) developing an overarching characterization of exactly
what constitutes a crisis situation, which in turn lead to 2) developing a further,
more specific, listing of detailed characterizations of a crisis situation which will
then be used in conjunction with the body of knowledge gained in the area of
organization cognition to develop the proposed conceptual framework in Chapter
III.
The researcher identifies six main gaps in the literature reviewed thus far.
First, addressing Gap 1 in Figure 2.2, in terms of distributed cognition literature
little exists on attempting to capture the impacts of a crisis environment on the
phenomena. The notion is hinted at in discussion of certain literature themes: 1)
specialized expertise being inadequate to the task at hand, 2) volume and
complexity and the challenges they place on cognition, 3) sources of errors made
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in learning processes and 4) contextual characterization discussed in this chapter
which limit cognition. Boyd (Coram, 2002) begins to systemically approach ways
to create crises to confound an opponent’s learning process. The specific goal of
understanding crisis impacts upon distributed cognition phenomena is not the
focused objective of the frameworks and themes existing in the literature though.
Second, addressing Figure 2.2’s Gap 2, within crisis management literature, little
is found that focuses on learning in general or distributed cognition specifically.
The subject matter is approached obliquely in discussions of unknowability and
uncertainty in the environment but not with the specific goal of looking at
organizational cognitive processes.
Third, the construction of the existing cognitive frameworks reviewed,
seems to be based on the authors’ raw synthesis of literature and experience.
Boyd (Coram, 2002) and Ocasio (2000) begin to approach a systems view of the
phenomena by capturing the interaction of constructs but they don’t set out with a
systemic methodology in mind to develop their work. Fourth, and as a result
Boyd’s (Coram, 2002) work also begins to approach a systems view of a crisis
environment’s impacts on learning, but it remains difficult to actually track the
systemic impact of differing crisis characteristics on learning phenomena. Fifth
and alternatively, within crisis management literature, the researcher could find
no work even reaching the point of capturing interrelationships between
constructs to capture crisis impacts on a given set of phenomena. Sixth and
finally, the author similarly could find no crisis management literature attempting
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to systemically frame the impact of a crisis environment on distributed cognition
phenomena.
Separately from this discussion, in order to support the focused efforts on
the specific case of fielded UCCs functioning in wartime environments, a
summarization of the existing Air Force literature relating to the staffing,
equipping, operational functions, assessment, and interaction with units outside,
of an SCC was undertaken with the interim objective of developing an
understanding of specific characterizations of the cases to be studied.
Not found in depth in this discussion is the researcher’s view that a
systemic structural view of the subject matter would yield substantial benefit in
understanding the phenomena in the setting in question. This notion is
developed and addressed in the next chapter.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

Purpose and Organization of Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, using a systems approach,
a theoretical framework will be developed that will 1) synthesize the information
developed in the literature review, 2) describe the systemic structure of
distributed cognition occurring in control centers, and 3) capture the effects of
changing crisis intensity on the distributed cognition occurring in control centers.
Second, the appropriateness and suitability of using exploratory case study
methodology to validate a portion of the constructed framework will be discussed
in detail: 1) a general critique of case study methods will be presented followed
by 2) a discussion of the challenges associated with integrating qualitative and
quantitative data gained from case analysis to be followed then by 3) further
discussion of the limits of statistical approaches for the given research material
and lastly 4) discussion of the challenges for the case researcher who is close to
the cases being studied. Finally, some discussion is presented to explain why
the term “theoretical framework” is used to describe the central product that is
presented in this chapter and that is to be validated using the research design in
the next chapter. Chapter IV, Research Design, will then follow where the
specific design of the case study protocols and database will be made explicit.
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Why a Systems Analysis Methodology is Needed
One of the main points of this work is the suggestion that the problem of
understanding the impact crisis environments have on control centers is naturally
suited to a systems approach. While a systems thinking approach has many
strengths, this proposition that the focus of this work is especially suited to it,
stems from the idea that the problem has the following four attributes
characteristic of those for which systems analysis has a lot of promise: 1) as
seen from the literature review the problem is inherently complex, driven by the
complexity of the crisis environment as well as the contextual, technological, and
specialization demands placed on control center systems: 2) successful
distributed cognition necessarily calls for multi-disciplinarity amongst control
center participants and sub-systems: 3) the complexity inherent in the problem as
well as the diverse views, perspectives, and constructs of both crisis
management and distributed cognition cited in the literature view suggest that
any proposed theoretical framework addressing the problem must take a holistic
approach to ensure all relevant ideas and constructs are captured and accounted
for: 4) finally and more specifically, the focus of this work is on capturing the
impacts of a changing crisis environment on the phenomena of distributed
cognition occurring in control rooms, thus a systemic structural approach is
needed to capture interrelationships between the outside environment and
subsystem constructs. Checkland (1981) captures the strength of systems
thinking in his definition,
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“Systems thinking is an epistemology which when applied to human
activity is based upon the four basic ideas: emergence, hierarchy,
communication, and control as characteristics of systems. When
applied to natural or designed systems the crucial characteristic is
the emergent properties of the whole” (p. 318).
The inherent complexity associated with distributed cognition systems
cited above and in the literature review coupled with the challenge of
understanding the impacts of complex crisis environments on such systems
implies that a simplistic, one-track reductionist approach by itself will not work
(Flood and Carson, 1993). The approach must be one that looks for emergent
properties and constructs arising out of the complexity. Systems analysis
methods are based on the understanding that knowability is inherently limited in
analyzing complex systems and proceed accordingly to focus on emergent
properties (Checkland, 1981).
Another key principle of a systems analysis approach to a problem is one
of complementarity. Systems thinking recognizes that multiple perspectives of a
problem will provide different knowledge about the problem and this knowledge
will not be entirely independent or in congruence (Clemson, 1984). The principle
of complementarity applies to this work in two ways: 1) the multiplicity of existing
perspectives relating to the topics of distributed cognition and crisis management
cited in the literature review and 2) the inherent multiplicity of views that must be
synthesized to develop and adjust representations within distributed cognition
systems. A theoretical framework attempting to describe such processes must
be constructed using a method that takes such complementarities into account.
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Closely tied to the first two motivations discussed for using a systems
approach in the work is the overarching goal of developing a holistic view of the
situation. Systems thinking recognizes that the whole of a system is greater than
the sum of its parts. Reductionist approaches must be accompanied by ones
accounting for this holism (Flood and Carson, 1991). Keating (2000) suggests
that
“the primary strength of the systemic perspective for structural
analysis is the holistic perspective, which examines the entirety of
the structure within its operational context. As such a holistic
approach examines formal and informal relationships between
entities, as well as emerging patterns” (p. 181).

In attempting to capture a description of distributed cognition in control
centers in times of crisis an approach that accounts for both the whole of existing
knowledge as well as describes the whole of the actual process must be used if
the theoretical framework is to have sufficient breadth.
As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, a key
focus of this work is on capturing the effects of a changing crisis environment
upon distributed cognition phenomena. Most of the constructed representations
of distributed cognition phenomena discussed in the literature review
acknowledge the environment in which the system they have bounded exists.
Some address the environment as interacting with the distributed cognition
system along a single transitional phase. While continuous interaction with
subsystems may be implied, not much depth is provided on how such interaction
occurs and what its emergent impacts are on the system as a whole. In order to
gain this ability a systems analysis method must be chosen which accounts for
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understanding the structure of the system in question and the impact of a
changing environment upon that structure.

Beer’s Viable Systems Model
The focus of this work is on developing a means for understanding the
impact of crisis environments on distributed cognition phenomena in control
centers. To accomplish this goal with any rigor a means of describing the
impacts of environmental influences on the structure of the system under study
must be achieved. As was previously discussed, the proposed structures
analyzed in the literature review do not facilitate tracing environmental changes
into the sub-elements or structure of the distributed cognition phenomena
occurring in a control center. For example, a simple but sudden increase in the
pace of events might represent the onset of or an increase in intensity of a crisis
situation that a control center must attempt to manage. With the existing
structures discussed in the literature review it is difficult to articulate directly how
such an event pace increase will impact the distributed cognition system other
than to point out that the system must simply respond faster itself. Systems
thinking though suggests that sub-systems making up the whole distributed
cognition system may be impacted differently or not in parallel. Subsequent
interactions with other subsystems may feedback positively or negatively leading
to emergent properties the existing proposed structures might not predict. The
level of simplicity of the existing proposed structures does not inform the
understanding of the cognitive processes in the system.
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An approach that is both focused on the systems structure and facilitates
the understanding of outside environmental structural impacts on sub-systems is
Beer’s (1979, 1984) Viable Systems Model (VSM). Developed by Beer based on
an organic perspective of systems as well as the view that such system structure
is recursively seen repeatedly at different levels of hierarchy within systems, the
VSM is, “...flexible and robust - both prerequisites in fast-changing
environments” (Espejo et al, 1996). Keating states that the VSM offers “a
comprehensive systems perspective of structure (Keating 2002) and further
offers that it can be used as a “template against which operational structures can
be ‘diagnosed’” (Keating 2000). Espejo et al. cites the VSMs substantial use in
companies and non-profit organization as means for understanding organizations
(Espejo, 1996).
As Beer’s Viable System Model serves is key to the framework central to
this research, scholarly criticism of the VSM must be reviewed and discussed in
terms of its practical impacts in this context. Addressing such criticism as well as
delineating the extent to which Beer’s themes are incorporated in the framework
follows later in this chapter after the framework is developed.
Beer identifies five basic functional or structural subsystems required if
any system is to remain viable. Presented here and in Figure 3.3, The Viable
System Model, as developed by Beer (1979, 1984), Espejo (1996), and Keating
(2000), these five systems are:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100

System 1 - operations: produces the products or services that are the
essence of the operation. The primary function of System 1 is to implement the
organization’s will as it performs task in the outside environment. A variety of
System 1’s or autonomous may exist within an organization focused on
implementation a particular purposeful, sub-specialty of the organization.
System 2 - co-ordination: the primary function of this system is to provide
for system stability by synchronizing the System 1’s within the organization,
preventing unnecessary oscillation between the other systems and promoting
integrated responses and actions.
System 3 - control/monitoring: maintains operational performance on a
daily basis, by focusing internally on executing policy, distributing resources, and
ensuring accountability. Beer identifies a separate function of System 3, socalled “System 3*” focused exclusively on monitoring the state of operations by
routine or sporadic audits.
System 4 - intelligence: the primary function of this system is to capture
information about the external environment and assess it’s meaning for future
implications. A natural tension exists between System’s 3 and 4 as they focus on
their individual functions and generate demands upon each other.
System 5 - policy/identity: this system is responsible for the strategic,
broad decisions and direction associated with the very identity of the overall
system itself. Also this system monitors and seeks to maintain balance between
the inward focus of System 3 and the outward focus of System 4.
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=igure 3.1: The Viable System Model (adapted from Beer, 1979)
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A Methodology for Implementing VSM
In applying the ideas of the VSM to the initial development of a theoretical
framework for understanding the structure of distributed cognition phenomena in
control centers operating in crisis environments a systems-based methodology,
stemming from Keating’s (2002) and Checkland’s (1981) approaches was used
as is detailed in Figure 3.4, Viable System Model Application Methodology.
First, the actual focus area of this work, the system of interest, as has
been described before, must be specified concisely and delineated accordingly.
This function serves to bound the area of investigation. Second, the relevant
environment must be specified; a key function in this work as the focus is on
specific environmental impacts upon the system of interest. This work will be in
two steps: 1) a generalized approach to defining a crisis environment in this
chapter and 2) a specific delineation of the crisis environments expected to be
observed in the selected case studies in Chapter IV. Third, the structure to be
studied must operate within a specified context that enables and constrains the
structure of the system of interest. In order to rigorously specify this context,
again a general approach discussing contextual elements developed in the
literature review will be used followed by a detailing of contextual elements
specific to the cases to be studied. Fourth, using the knowledge and
understanding developed through the specification process above a general and
case specific definition of the structure of the system of interest will be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103

developed. Discussion will also follow of the interrelationships between system
structural elements themselves as well as with the outside environment.
Fifth, in later chapters, in order to remain within the scope of this
investigation portions of the developed structural definition will be selected for
validation by developing protocol for selecting and studying specific cases of
control centers functioning within crisis environments. Sixth and finally the
understanding gained from the case analysis will be applied, iteratively, to update
the theoretical framework as its being developed. The resulting framework can
then be used to support future study, analysis, tools, assessment methods,
doctrines, and implementation methodologies relating to control centers
functioning in crisis environments: the original motivation for this research.
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Figure 3.2: Viable System Model Application Methodology
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DC5 Development: System of Interest General Specification
In general the system of interest for this research is the system
established within an organizational control center to facilitate cognition of the
outside environment. As described in Chapters I and II, control centers
functioning in dynamic, complex environments necessarily are characterized by
diverse, specialized personnel, leadership personnel, technological subsystems,
and other artifacts making the cognitive process a distributed one. In terms of
providing a general physical bounding, the facility housing the control center
could be thought of as serving the purpose. Examples of such control centers
include aircraft cockpits, 911 call centers, fire department alarm rooms, military
control centers, shipboard navigational control centers, and mobile incident
response centers. Given advances in information technology perhaps some
organizations would attempt to disperse or to allow dispersal of the personnel
and subsystems composing the essential functions of the control center.
Considerations of advantages and disadvantages to such setups aside, a topic to
be discussed in system contextual specification, the bounding by facility skin
becomes less useful in such situations. In these cases it would simply involve
those involved in centralizing information flow, constructing organizational
representational understanding, decision-making, and action planning. The
bounding is presented here in general terms because a central assumption of
this work is that the basic concepts involved in describing and framing distributed
cognition in control centers is generally universal with analogous constructs in a
variety of settings. As such, understanding gained in one setting is assumed, if
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contextual and environmental factors are appropriately accounted for, to have
external validity or transferability to other settings. A rigorous specification of the
settings of the specific cases to be studied will be provided in Chapter IV.

DC5 Development: Crisis Environment Specification
Before proceeding with a general specification of the relevant environment
for this research a general reservation should be noted. Keating (2000) suggests
that the,
“linkage between the system structure and environment is in
constant flux. Therefore it is unrealistic, particularly where
environments are complex and turbulent to assume that the
environment will remain stable once identified. Throughout the
analysis as new discoveries and understanding of the environment
emerge, the environmental ‘model’ must be constantly updated” (p.
188).
With this in mind the following specification is approached with the
understanding 1) that it must capture the complexity and dynamism of the
expected crisis environment and 2) that as part of this research effort an iterative
process of updating the environmental specification must be undertaken.
As developed in the Literature Review, a crisis environment can be
defined those, (a) with potential for significant negative organizational outcomes
(note: from a pessimistic perspective, crisis outcomes, even those that may be
potentially tremendously positive, can be thought of as negative, a dominant
theme in the literature review, because such outcomes represent great
opportunities that might be missed, i.e. failing to get a new product to market on
time and capturing the subsequent market share and financial windfall) and (b) of
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a significantly greater level of complexity than organizations are usually prepared
for and as a result of either or both of these elements (c) can cause significant
internal organizational stress. In general terms “level of complexity” can be
expanded to encompass as Carlisle and Rebentisch (2003) suggest 1) the
amount of novelty introduced by the environment into to the control center, 2) the
demands of the environment on the control center in terms of the amount of
dependence between specialized sources of knowledge required to develop
successful responses, and 3) the demands of the environment on the control
center in terms of the amount or type of specialization required to successfully
respond. This characterization of complexity and its demand on organizational
learning entities is reflective of the discussions of specialization, integration,
horizon of visibility, and intersubjectivity discussed in the literature review. The
novelty side of complexity itself can further be characterized by the sheer number
of entities involved, the pace of events, and high degrees of uncertainty
(Jackson, 1991; Beer, 1979). Figure 3.3 captures this general specification of
the crisis environment. Once a contextual specification of the system of interest
and its structural definition is completed, this relevant environment specification
can be used to inform a discussion of the impacts of a crisis environment on
control center distributed cognition phenomena. As before, a case specific
relevant environment specification will be undertaken in the next chapter.
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Figure 3.3: General Specification of the Crisis Environment
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DC5 Development: Contextual Identification
Contextual identification, perhaps more than the other portions of this
methodology, is the most highly setting-dependent factor for consideration.
Specific local enabling and constraining contextual factors have the potential to
have significant impact positively or negatively on the performance of control
centers and their cognition processes. Furthermore the variety of such
contextual factors represents a challenge to the transferability of this research to
control center settings different than those cases selected for actual analysis in
Chapters IV and V. Therefore it is imperative that setting specific contextual
factors be made explicit so that they may be taken into account when
generalizing about results.
The literature review however, did identify several general
characterizations of factors influencing distributed cognition phenomena that
would be considered contextual rather than structural. Such emergent properties
that can significantly impact control center system performance include staff
competence, leadership, intersubjectivity, horizon of information visibility,
flexibility, and redundancy. Any investigation into control center performance
must take the competence of the personnel and their ability to function as a team
into account. As documented in the literature review several authors cite this
contextual factor key analyzing control center performance. Somewhat related to
staff competence but somewhat lightly addressed within the reviewed literature is
the idea of leadership within an organization influencing cognition performance.
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Perhaps because it is a highly subjective term and difficult to apply
quantitative measure to, and perhaps because it can be included under the
overarching heading of staff competence, many authors do not directly cite it as a
property influencing performance, but it does seem obvious that good
organizational leadership would directly impact performance. Quality of
leadership within an organization is a contextual property that must be suspected
of having a direct bearing on cognition system performance and as a minimum
on some level a subjective characterization must be attempted in order to at least
document it as confounding factor impacting other analyses.
A variety of authors discussed the impact of intersubjectivity on system
performance by noting how the capability to appreciate another players place
within the system resolves errors quickly and distributes assistance quickly,
allowing representations to be sharpened and actions to be coordinated (Decortis
et al 2000, Vidaillet 2000,). For intersubjectivity to play a role in influencing the
propagation of representations through a distributed cognition system, potential
sympathetic players must be in a position to know what is occurring to other
players. In general terms an investigatory approach into distributed cognition
must attempt to capture the level of intersubjectivity at which the sub-systems
and players within a control center are operating.
Similarly horizon of visibility is also a defining contextual characteristic of a
control center. By making information flow visible to many players with
intersubjective understandings of one another, representations can be molded
and adjusted quicker and with less iteration. A variety of authors in the literature
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review identified horizon of visibility as playing a large role in performance.
Intersubjectivity and horizon of visibility correspond directly to the nature of the
complexity within a crisis environment discussed in the previous section, in that
they directly impact the organization’s ability to meet the demands of integrating
the knowledge of specialized subsystems in interdependent situations to
construct and adjust cognitive representations. A research design must attempt
to capture and detail a characterization of these contextual elements in order to
understand their impact on control center cognitive performance.
Two additional contextual properties that obviously would be suspected of
impacting system performance are redundancy and integratability. Redundancy
in communications, information storage, computational ability, visual
representations, observations, and in other subsystems is cited by numerous
authors as increasing a system’s ability to detect errors and calibrate responses
(Hutchins 1994, 1996, Decortis et al 2000, Fields et al 1999, Tamuz 2000).
Similarly, subsystems must accept, process, and produce representations in
such a manner that they can be used and understood by other subsystems and
players. Integrateability or flexibility is key if representations are to propagate
accurately across subsystems and must be designed into distributed cognition
systems (Hutchins 1994, 1996, Fields et al 1999). These characterizations
similarly directly impact the ability of control centers to respond to complex
environments demanding the integration of specialized knowledge bases to
support successful response.
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These general contextual characterizations of control center cognition will
be integrated directly into the actual structural definition of the process in the
following section.

DC5 Development: Structural Definition
The purpose of this portion of the methodology is to use the VSM in
conjunction with the knowledge gained in the literature review, to develop a
theoretical, conceptual framework of the distributed cognition phenomena
occurring within crisis control centers. Again, the major motivations for using the
VSM are 1) to provide a more rigorous description of the structure of the
phenomena specific to the setting of control centers than present frameworks
and 2) to provide a means of identifying relationships between a crisis
environment and the developed structural framework. Figure 3.4, DC5
Theoretical Framework, attempts to capture 1) the existing proposed structures
discussed in the literature review within a VSM framework, 2) contextual
elements influencing distributed cognition processes, and 3) the relationship of
environmental complexity to the cognition structure.
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Figure 3.4: DC5 Theoretical Framework
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Discussion of Internal DC5 Structure

System 1: Autonomous Units
System 1 in the internal structure of the DC5 structure is composed of the
individual autonomous sub-systems making up the control center’s distributed
cognition system. Such systems would include the personnel and systems
responsible for receiving inputs from the outside environment and transmitting
that information around the control center accordingly, the experts representing a
variety of specialized knowledge bases, and sub-system artifacts responsible for
storing, retrieving, and presenting data and representation. While each of these
units has its own specialized purpose, the general base level functions of
observing, storing, presenting, retrieving, and transmitting information as
discussed in the literature review occur here (Boyd from Coram, 2002; Argyris
and Schon, 1996; Ocasio, 2000; Crossan et al. 1995). The autonomous units
are controlled and monitored by System 3 to regulate performance.

System 2: Coordination
System 2 plays a very important role in the DC5 framework. As a key
characterization of the crisis environment is the integration of dependent
specialized knowledge bases to construct and maintain representations leading
to continued successful responses, coordination of such expertises is vital. This
function of the system is controlled by System 3 when it instructs specialized
subsystems to work together to generate knowledge. Close coordination is key
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in these respects to ensure that the entire system does not oscillate back and
forth as cycles through the process of learning lead to actions and subsequent
reactions based on serial uncoordinated knowledge creation, decision, and
action (Carlisle, 2003). Boyd’s (in Coram, 2002) constructs of feed forward
expectations and implicit guidance represent the systems instruction to its
autonomous units of what to expect from a set of actions based on the present
representation of the outside environment. On a simplistic level an example of
coordination in an aircraft cockpit would be a pilot discussing a loss of power with
a first officer monitoring instruments indicating loss of fuel pressure to an engine.
Working together they are able to create a picture of the trouble with the aircraft.

System 3: Control and System 3*: Monitoring
The control system within the DC5 framework corresponds to 1) the
continuous operational control of the center itself as well as 2) basic single loop
(Argyris and Schon, 1996) or experiential learning. The basic control functions
of monitoring and auditing subsystem performance are the same as in other
systems not specific to distributed cognition; additionally, the control function in
this respect takes care of basic planning, equipping, and training as well as
implementing actions based on representations, decisions, and policies flowing
from the remainder of the system. Crossan’s (1995) “institutionalization” of
learning is the ground responsibility of the control function. Base level learning,
what Argyris and Schon (1996) describe as single loop learning and Dhar (2000)
describes as experiential learning are placed here because they generally are
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composed of the system acting on a given representation that is not being
adjusted or is not perceived to need to be adjusted; the system is reacting based
on its internal picture of the outside environment, gaining experience, but not
having to adjust its perspective.

System 4: Intelligence
While System 2, Coordination, is responsible for ensuring the right
specialized sub-systems are brought together and work in concert to develop and
adjust representations, the actual act of creating new knowledge is structural
function of Intelligence. This is where observed information, converted from data
by autonomous units, is brought together and oriented (Boyd in Coram 2002),
compared to existing representations (Argyris and Schon, 1996), interpreted
(Dhar, 2000), information converted into knowledge (Ackoff, 1989), and
representations selected or enacted (Ocasio, 2000; Weick, 1979).
Similarly expectations of response acts are developed based on
constructed representations (Argyris and Schon, 1996). These are compared
with information flowing back to the control center after responses have been
implemented and representations iteratively adjusted accordingly. The natural
tension Beer (1984) describes between the Control system and Intelligence
System is reflective of 1) March’s (2000) suggested balance a learning system
must maintain between exploitation and more exploration and Argyris and
Schon’s (1996) comparison between observations and expectations. Double loop
learning occurs when the tension between these systems reveals a gap in the
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implemented responses and the forecasted expectations and subsequently
representations are adjusted accordingly.
A couple notes revisiting the process of system of interest specification
and definition are necessary here. First, it can be pointed out that the VSM
intelligence function of a control center could be thought of from two
perspectives. One being the functional act of creating knowledge from incoming
information as discussed here and the other being that this functional subsystem
represents the collective intelligence of the control center itself as it tries to
forecast and plan only for the control center’s continuing operations in the outside
environment, rather than that of assembling and adjusting representations and
plans of action for the outside organization as a whole. The literature on this
work implicitly assumes that such a function of creating knowledge and courses
of action is part of cognition. Thus for purposes of this work this intelligence
function within the DC5 framework will be assumed to cover both functions: 1)
the primary job of creating knowledge for actionable response for the outside
organization as well as 2) the additional job of focusing on the future job of the
distributed cognition system of the control center itself. As will be seen in the
discussion of System 5, an analogous issue with specification and definition also
exists.
A second issue of fine specification and definition must be discussed with
regard to the difference between coordination and intelligence as it applies
specifically to a distributed cognition system. As was seen in the literature review
a key aspect of distributed cognition systems is that they require the integration
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of diverse specialized expert knowledge bases in order to create knowledge from
the information flowing into the system; i.e. it may easy to blur the actual creation
of knowledge across both Systems 2 and 4. For purposes of this work
coordination will be viewed as the work of bringing the right expert subsystems
together at the right time given a set of inflowing data and the actual creation of
knowledge or representations once those expert subsystems are together is the
act of intelligence.

System 5: Identity
The identity of the DC5 system is bound up in its intended purpose to
facilitate distributed cognition for the organization. Closely tied to this identity is
the overall purpose of the organization (i.e. putting out fires for the fire
department alarm room or successfully flying the aircraft for an aircraft cockpit).
Some mention here should be made of system thinking with regards to system
purpose, which can be thought of as irrelevant to intended purpose. Expressed
simply a system’s purpose “is what it does” (Beer, 1979); the system can only
accomplish what its structure allows it to accomplish; to the extent the structure is
inadequate the system for the environment in which it functions the system will
not accomplish its intended purpose. System 5 is where the heart of learning
takes place when broad strategic decisions (Boyd in Coram, 2002; Argyris and
Schon, 1996) based on constructed representations are made. In addition to
occurring at the ground level within System 3, Crossan’s (1995) institutionalizing
of representations begins at this policy level. This function also monitors the
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natural tension between Systems 3 and 4 ensuring, providing guidance, and
breaking ties between demands for more exploration and more action.
As was discussed with regard to System 4, System 5 also recursive set of
perspectives to address. The identity of the distributed cognition system of a
control center may be viewed as referring to the identity, policy level, or senior
leadership of the outside organization the control center supports as well as the
identity of the control center itself. Again, using the dominant paradigm
developed in the literature review, this work will take the primary function of
System 5 to be the central identity of the outside organization the control center
is supporting while recognizing that secondarily it also represents that of the
control center itself. As was discussed in the literature review crisis
environments tend to directly impact the heart of an organization driving these
functions into convergence as crisis intensity increases.

Discussion of Interactions between the Crisis Environment and the Internal
DC5 Framework
The purpose of using the VSM to capture the structure of distributed
cognition processes in control centers was to be able to identify and systemically
understand how various characteristics of a crisis environment structurally impact
those processes. Table 3.1 and the following discussion detail the
interrelationships identified in the DC5 framework.
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Table 3.1: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance
R eal Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcomes +
inducem ent
of stress)
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systems
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General System Wide Impact of Crisis Pressure
Two of the three portions of the crisis environment definition developed in
the literature review have system wide effects on the framework, impacting every
one of the structural subsystems in the framework, impacting the identity of the
system, and impacting the general context in which the overall system operates.
In order for an environment to fulfill the definition developed in the literature
review for a crisis, it must have potential for negative organizational outcomes.
As human beings in the organization become aware of this potential, stress is
induced as the gravity of the situation begins to weigh on the actions of those
personnel. This organizational stress can lead to poor performance as task
focus is distracted by thoughts of the negative outcomes.
Because crises have the potential for significant negative organizational
consequences they strike at the heart, System 5, of any organizational system.
For distributed cognition systems this can occur in three ways: the overarching
strategies the system employs to facilitate the construction of representations
and responses come under more pressure, the pressure to successfully manage
the tension between Systems 3 and 4 is increased, and the actual decisions
themselves also come under greater pressure. First, in order to comprehend the
outside environment distributed systems are constructed to receive information
and construct meaning. The methods used to accomplish this task represent
strategic deployments of assets and capabilities for distributed cognition
systems. The responsibility for successfully adapting these strategies over time
to a dynamic crisis environment weighs heavier because of that environment
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itself. Second, as the negativity of potential outcomes of a crisis rises, it is
expected that System 3 will demand increasingly more accurate and timely
updates of representations, expectations, and alternatives for implementation
from System 4. Similarly, System 4 will demand that System 3 generate more
data and information from the autonomous units. This tension can be expected
to grow as the pressure of a crisis environment rises on the human beings
functioning in such systems; System 5 bears the responsibility of managing this
tension and balancing the need for more understanding with the need for timely,
implementable, actionable alternatives. Third and finally, the nature of the actual
decision-making-the decisions themselves carry more weight in terms of
organizational outcomes.
As was discussed above, the pressure of a crisis situation impacts the
tension between Systems 3 and 4, but it also strikes at the specific internal
functions of all the DC5 subsystems. System 4 has the responsibility to generate
and maintain representations that become increasingly crucial to the future
viability of the organization and the DC5 system itself. System 3 has the
responsibility of generating accurate and precise data and information on the
outside environment so that System 4 can fulfill its function. System 3 also must
ensure information is transmitted around the control room, presented, stored, and
retrieved successfully. The impact of errors in these functions is heightened by
the pressure of the crisis situation. System 3 also bears the responsibility for
monitoring the performance of the human beings and sub-systems functioning in
the crisis situation and deciding when action must be taken if performance does
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not meet standards. System 1, autonomous units, namely functional specialized
expert human beings, will fill the pressure of the crisis as they bear the individual
responsibility for applying their expertise to get data and information and provide
initial alternatives. Because an inherent aspect of crisis complexity may involve
the need for coordinated interpretation of information, System 2 will also bear the
weight of bringing the right subsystems together to generate understanding;
crisis pressure will impact system accordingly.
Because it strikes at the functional responsibilities of all DC5 subsystems,
crisis pressure may be thought of as being inherently contextual. Additionally,
however, the pressure of a crisis environment impacts some of the general
contextual characterizations developed in the literature review. Staff competence
and leadership play a key role in responding to the pressure of a crisis situation.
The difference in level of performance between inexperienced, poorly trained,
less competent, or poorly led personnel and their opposites can be expected to
increase as the pressure of a crisis environment is increased. Error and failure
rates can be expected to rise accordingly. System artifacts being used by such
personnel to facilitate the control centers distributed cognition processes will
become less useful as the personnel begin to fail.
The potential for negative outcomes and the awareness of that potential
raise the pressure on the human beings making up a DC5 system. As such all
subsystems of the DC5 system, the heart of the DC5 system, and some
contextual characterizations of the DC5 system are impacted.
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The General System Wide Impact of Crisis Complexity
Similar to the potential for negative outcomes and in a general way,
complexity can also raise the pressure on all DC5 subsystems. The knowledge
that the relevant environment is complex, difficult, hard to predict, or unknowable
stresses the human beings involved in attempting to understand it. As such the
pressure for performance on all DC5 subsystems is raised. Complexity when
broken down as in the literature review also has specific impacts on various
individual DC5 subsystems and contextual characterizations.

The Specific Challenges of Complexity for the DC5 Framework: Integrating
Specialized Knowledge Bases
Complex environments may demand the integration of more than one or
perhaps several diverse specialized expert knowledge bases in order for
actionable, accurate representations to be constructed by a distributed cognition
system (Carlisle, 2003). This aspect of complexity impacts the subsystems of
the DC5 framework in specific ways: coordination, System 2, becomes the key in
developing an understanding of the environment and as actual understanding is
pursued by coordinated work, intelligence, System 4 is impacted as meaningful
representations are successfully or unsuccessfully formed. Complex
environments may require diverse expertises to be both understood and
successfully acted within. As such it becomes imperative that the right
personnel, subsystems, and artifacts are brought together to develop
representations and actionable alternatives. The intuition to look at initial
information and make and educated guess about what knowledge is necessary
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to apply to the information to create understanding is a function of System 4,
intelligence. Maintaining the specialized knowledge bases and the systems
required to bring them together to create understanding is the province of System
3. Once knowledge is created by coordinated expert systems, System 4 is
fulfilling its intended system purpose.
In addition, to the DC5 subsystems impacted by the demands for
integration of specialized knowledge bases, contextual characterizations of the
control center play a key role in responding to such demands. The extent of the
horizon of visibility within a distributed condition system and the degree of
intersubjectivity amongst personnel and subsystems play a key role in
constraining or enabling the diverse coordination of specialized knowledge
bases. If the information flowing in, through, and out of a control center has a
high degree of visibility to personnel and subsystems within the center, then the
likelihood of timely coordination of knowledge assets is increased. The ability to
monitor the chatter of other players doing their functional jobs, status boards and
maps, slide presentations, read files and reports, and access to databases are
examples of such visibility enablers. To the extent they are used and monitored
they increase the likelihood of successful coordination. If personnel within a
control center operate in hushed tones, are stationed so they do not look at each
other or interact, do not access stored data, or have it easily presented then the
coordinating ability is inherently constrained. Similarly, intersubjectivity is a key
contextual enabler or constrainer in coordinating knowledge bases. To the
extent that personnel within a control center are familiar with each other, have
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practiced their functions together as a team with little turnover and know enough
of each other’s function and knowledge base to empathize with their portion of
the organizational mission then the likelihood of successful coordination is
enabled. If control centers are assembled with players who have not worked
together before and have little knowledge or appreciation for each other’s
specialty area then the likelihood of successful coordination is constrained.

The Specific Challenges of Complexity for the DC5 Framework: The
Specialized Knowledge Bases Themselves
A crisis environment may challenge a distributed cognition system by
demanding a degree, amount, or type of specialized knowledge base to which
the existing system would be challenged to meet internally (Carlisle, 2003). As
such autonomous units, System 1, would be pushed near or perhaps beyond
their abilities to derive meaning from inflowing information. In such cases the
purposeful learning, as defined by Rulke and Zaheer (2000) accomplished prior
to crisis by the autonomous specialized expert becomes of lesser value and
relational learning, that is knowing where information can be obtained becomes
more important. The knowledge base of the specialized expert autonomous unit
must be conceived to encompass such relational knowledge. As will be
discussed in a later section, pace of events may significantly inhibit the ability to
retrieve knowledge outside of expertise housed within the control center.
System 3 is also impacted by this potential characteristic of crisis
complexity as it holds the responsibility for staffing personnel and maintaining
systems housing such knowledge. A crisis environment can quickly exceed the
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ability of System 3 to perform these functions. Additionally System 4 is impacted
because the ability to create representations is inhibited by the constraints of the
lack of expertise of the autonomous units. Finally in terms of contextual
interrelationships, staff competence captures the degree of ability of the
autonomous units to do their job. Crisis demands for specialized knowledge
impact distributed cognition systems directly and simply because they demand,
or can create requirements for, knowledge that does not exist within the
distributed cognition system or is beyond the ability of the system to provide.

The Specific Challenges of Complexity for the DC5 Framework: Novelty
Carlisle (2003) develops three aspects of the novelty of complexity,
separate from the two aspects of complexity and their relationships to the DC5
structure already discussed, which challenge organizational learning: the
unknowability of complex environments, the number of entities involved in
complex environments, and the pace of events. These aspects are novel in that
they represent changes from the norm for which the organization is postured. To
some extent the organizations DC5 systems can be postured for increased
degrees of novelty in these areas but these too can be exceeded.
Distinct from the sheer requirement for a greater extent of specialized
knowledge than a DC5 system can provide, is the unknowability of a complex
environment. Unknowability refers to the idea that the environment may simply
be unpredictable or even if the relational knowledge sourced could be reached in
a timely manner to raise knowledge levels, the effort would still be fruitless. As
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such, unknowability impacts the autonomous specialized expert within a
distributed cognition system because he may be rendered helpless to develop
representations and work with others. Coordination is limited to the extent
unknowable aspects of a problem cannot be used to help augment knowable
aspects into actionable representations, thus Intelligence, System 4’s ability to
create representations, is impacted. In unpredictable environments System 4 is
unable to provide System 3 with alternatives or future expectations. System 5
must posture itself for the fact that such environments do exist and seek to
develop strategies of action, and representation construction that allow the
unknowable portions of problems to be isolated so that action alternatives can be
developed leveraging the knowable portion of the environment and hedging the
unknowable portion.
The contextual descriptors that interplay with unknowability are the
flexibility of the subsystems within the distributed cognition system and the staff
competence and leadership of the personnel in the control center. To the extent
that the subsystems and personnel composing a control center can handle new,
unforeseen environments, deal with the fact that portions of the problem will be
unknowable, and isolate them accordingly, then cognitive performance can still
be increased in the face of the tremendous challenges of unknowable
complexity.
Autonomous specialized expert units individually or in coordination with
each other may have it within their knowledge base to construct an actionable
representation of an environment and generate alternative response; however,
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the sheer number of entities or scale of the problem may exceed their ability to
process the information and produce required products. The scale of incoming
information may lead to errors in the basic control functions of receiving,
transmitting, storing, retrieving, tracking, and presenting information. As
autonomous units become overwhelmed in the deluge of information the ability to
monitor all their actions and performance may also be impaired. Contextually,
the horizon of visibility subsystems have on the information flow through the
control system may become cluttered with the abundance of information. Also in
a contextual sense, redundant systems for tracking, storing, and retrieving
information may serve to help catch and reduce errors caused by the scale of
inflowing information.
In a similar way to the scale of complexity in terms of the number of
entities that must be understood in order to develop accurate actionable
representations, the pace of events can also overwhelm the subsystems of the
DC5 framework. Autonomous units, coordination of those units, control of
operations, and the ability to generate representations rising from these
foundations may well be within the capability of a distributed cognition system in
developing an understanding of a single event. If, however, the pace of events
begins to increase, autonomous units can be overwhelmed, availability for
coordinated work will not be timely and system stability will be compromised,
representations will not be timely, and System 3 will be demanding better
understanding and forecasts and not getting them, raising the tension between

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130

System 3 and System 4. System 5 will be forced to impose strategic limits to
what they system can adequately handle and performance will be degraded.
Contextually, staff competence, leadership, horizon of visibility and
intersubjectivity can all be harnessed to enable faster processing of inflowing
information. Additionally, redundant systems can reduce errors or mitigate their
impact.

Criticism of Viable System Model and Its Use in this Context
As Beer’s Viable System Model serves is key to the framework central to
this research, scholarly criticism of the VSM must be reviewed and discussed in
terms of its practical impacts in this context. The criticism reviewed by the
researcher seems to coalesce around three main themes: 1) a supposed,
hierarchical rigidity implicit to the VSM, 2) a supposed implicit assumption in the
VSM of unity of effort, particularly in the area of information flows, amongst the
individuals bounded within a system of interest, and 3) it is difficult for some
practitioners to understand and apply. These topic areas will be discussed first,
in terms of the substance of the criticism, and second, in terms of the practical
implication it has on this research context. Additionally, some of Beer’s
consistent themes present in his development of the VSM are less prevalent in
use in this work; this lack of complete intersection must also be delineated.
Specifically, these themes include, 4) Beer’s focus on recursion as central to his
perception of systemic functional structure, and 5) Beer’s description of
environmental interaction with system structure. These themes will be presented
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and complemented with a discussion of how they are subsumed within in the
DC5 framework.
The first major theme of criticism of the VSM noted by the researcher is
the notion that model implies a hierarchy amongst its functional components, i.e.
the autonomous sub-units, S1, are controlled by S3, led by S4 by being provided
with intelligence and environmental expectations, and in turn S3 and S4 and the
tension between the two are managed by S5 the identity of the organization most
likely embodied by its senior leadership (Jackson, 1986; McEwan, 2001). As a
result, some organizations, that may exist without any explicit or implicit hierarchy
established, may prove difficult for applying VSM to as a tool (Andersson, 1998).
Beer’s response to such criticism would be two fold. Superficially, Beer
would argue that over the longer-term time all systems develop some form of
hierarchy driven by the need for concentration of responsibility (Beer, 1984).
More deeply though, this criticism may represent a misunderstanding in applying
the VSM to an organization as practitioners may simply try to fit VSM functional
components to hierarchical organizational charts. This is not Beer’s intention
(Beer, 1984; Espejo, 1996; Keating 2002). Beer would point out that over the
long term organizations develop an identity and institute policies to govern their
actions. They also necessarily must control and coordinate their processes in
order to exist or be viable in the outside environment. Any individual or sub
grouping in an organization may serve as an autonomous unit, a controlling unit,
a coordinating unit, may develop environmental intelligence, a my draft or
implement policy. The key is in understanding that the VSM is a structural
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breakdown of the functions of a system, not necessarily a guide for organizing a
particular system.
For purposes of this work the criticism does not apply on the superficial
basis because the system being observed has been established, it has matured,
and it exists within the hierarchical context of a military control room; i.e. the
system of interest is hierarchical in nature so such critics could not argue that the
VSM would not be applicable. On the deeper level, in developing and applying a
framework for observing, describing, and critiquing control center performance it
is understood such actions must be interpreted on functional system basis and
not necessarily on a charted organizational basis.
The second major noted area of criticism stems from the notion that
because the VSM is derived from set theory and intended to specify the
functional structure of any system occurring in nature, biological, machine,
organizational, etc. that it implicitly assumes that all functional sub-elements work
in unity toward system goals (Checkland, 1980; McEwan, 2001). As a result, the
fact that individuals may act in their own self-interest, disrupting processes and
information flows, rather than in the interests of the system, is difficult to
contemplate using VSM constructs. Beer would argue that his ‘S3’ control
function implicitly acknowledges incorrect sub-element action outside of system
interest and works to counter it and would further counter that even within
biological systems, sub-structures require regulation; tired muscles screaming for
rest are still used to accomplish an athlete’s goals and cancerous cells may be
attacked by immunity systems. Implicit in Beer’s Viable System Model is the
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coercive power of systems over sub-elements to act with system interests in
mind. In the crisis control center setting being researched in this work, the
example of stressed personnel acting to relieve their own stress rather than
focusing on mission requirements springs readily to mind. This criticism provides
a deeper understanding for the VSM practitioner who must understand the idea
of diverse motivations, account for them, identify them, and attempt to explain
them through the control systems of the VSM. Any framework and methodology
built on VSM must be cognizant of such potential.
The third major area of criticism of the VSM reviewed in the literature
focuses on its difficult nature to comprehend and understand. Such critics point
out that Beer’s use of set theory, cybernetics language, and systems knowledge
make it difficult to understand and apply (Checkland, 1980, 1981; Andersson,
1998; Malik, 2002; Keating 2002). One must first understand systemic ideas of
recursiveness, minimum critical specification, variety, requisite variety, and
holism, homeostasis, and complexity to understand VSM and, as discussed
above, the practitioner must be careful to avoid the pitfall of overlaying the VSM
onto the organizational chart.
In the researcher’s view this is a valid criticism of the VSM. For the
immediate purposes of this work it does not present a problem, as the researcher
is thoroughly familiar with both Beer’s work and its critics. For longer term
however if the proposed DC5 framework is to serve as a basis for developing
organizational wide approaches to assessment and design then individuals in
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those organizations will need to be educated accordingly. Without such
knowledge the benefits of using DC5 would be limited.
Beer (1984) points out that in addition to considering interactions between
the system in focus and the exterior environment, the VSM practitioner should
also consider that viable systems are inherently recursive; that is, they reside
within larger viable systems and are composed of smaller viable systems. Beer
suggests that the practitioner must consider and comprehend the setting of the
viable system of interest by understanding where it resides within, at least, one
level of recursion greater than itself and one level of recursion less than itself, in
other words, the viable systems of which it is composed. In the case of the
system of interest of this work, the Air Force control center, this viable system
resides within the larger Air Force unit being observed, an Air Force Wing
survival recovery center functioning within the larger context of the entire Wing.
The survival recovery center primarily exists to control the defensive, groundresponse operations of the wing and to lesser extent to facilitate coordination
between outside wing functions, to monitor performance of those functions, and
in some cases to house and express the identity of the wing as contained in its
senior leadership. Similarly, going down one layer of recursion, the center is
composed of the individual humans staffing the center, each his or her own
viable system interacting with the same environment. Also the center is
composed of sets of individuals and artifacts serving functional purposes, for
example the processing of casualties by communications systems, medical
systems, and personnel systems. In term of distributed cognition, the cognitive
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functions of each of these bounded systems, the Air Force Wing, the human
individuals in the control center, and the sub-functions of the control center are
also recursively in play processing incoming information and being impacted by
crisis elements at their own respective levels. This recursion described here is
not made explicit in the diagrams and tables specifying the DC5 development
that follows, as they are limited to the system level of interest, but the researcher
tacitly acknowledges there existence.
Beer (1984) also develops the connections between the outside
environment and the operational, non-management structure of a viable system.
Specifically, he highlights the fact, that viable systems are structured for the
management o f complexity within an external environment. Beers measure of
such complexity is the systems concept of variety. Systems deal with the level
of variety in their environments by managing it in relation to their own internal
capability’s limits to manage variety. If they do not have the requisite variety
internally to interpret data streams flowing from the environment they are forced
to attenuate the inflowing information into something more manageable. If the
inflowing information they are being provided is not specific enough for an
acceptable level of regulated response then viable systems attempt to amplify
the existing variety and obtain greater detail. In the development that follows the
DC5 tacitly captures these notions by characterizing the level of complexity in the
crisis environment. In terms of information that must be processed and turned
into usable knowledge through distributed cognition such ideas are captured by
characterizing the crisis environment by its pace of events, scale of events,
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unknowability, demand for high degrees of specialized expertise, and demand for
high degrees of integrated expertise. This research is limited by its attempt to
broadly conceptualize and frame distributed cognition phenomena as a whole;
further study into the specifics by which control centers amplify and attenuate
incoming information, based upon this work, could be promising for future
research.
Finally Table 3.2, Incorporation of Viable System Model Themes, is a
listing of these and other themes from Beer’s Viable System Model as
condensed from his Diagnosing the System for Organizations (1984) coupled
with a description of the extent to which the particular theme is reflected in the
DC5 framework just developed. The Table is reflective of the detail in the Viable
System Model as well as the initial broad generalness of the DC5 framework.
Future research could build upon this work to further refine and deepen the DC5
framework.
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Table 3.2: Incorporation o :Viable System Model Themes
Status of Incorporation In DC5 Framework
Viable System Model
Theme (as presented by
Beer, 1984)
Captured in discussion above one level of recursion
Recursion
above and below the system of interest: the control
center. Not made explicit in DC5 figures and
Tables.
Implicitly captured in discussion of system wide
Self Reference
impacts of general crisis pressure and stress.
Not explicitly used in DC5 figures and Tables.
Homeostasis- internal
system stability

Invariance
Environment, Requisite
Variety, Attenuation, and
Amplification
Channel Capacity
Transducer
Oscillation
Comparator
Feedback
Convergence
Autonomous Subsystems
Algedonic Responses
Coordination Subsystems
Metasystems
Control Subsystems
Monitoring/Audit
Subsystems
Cohesion

Intelligence
Identity

Implicitly captured in describing the internal tension
between S4 (DC5 System Intelligence) and S3 (DC5
System Control). Not explicitly used in DC5 figures
and Tables.
Not used/referenced in DC5 Framework.
Captured in discussion above. Tacitly recognized in
characterizing complexity in the crisis environment.
Not directly used in DC5 Figures and Tables.
Implicitly captured in discussion of horizon of
visibility, and characterization of complexity.
Not used/referenced in DC5 Framework.
Captured in discussion of DC5 Framework System 2
Not used/referenced in DC5 framework
Captured throughout discussion of DC5 framework
Not captured as defined/developed by Beer in the
DC5 framework
Captured in the S1 systems of the DC5 framework
Captured in discussion of DC5 framework above
Captured in the S2 systems of the DC5 framework
Captured in discussion of recursion above
Captured in the S3 systems of the DC5 framework
Captured in the S3* systems of the DC5 framework
Implicitly captured in discussion of recursion above
and in discussion of general crisis pressure/stress in
the DC5 framework
Captured in the S4 systems of the DC5 framework
Captured in the S5 systems of the DC5 framework
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In Summary: Usefulness of the DC5 Theoretical Framework:
Understanding Capability and Performance
The DC5 framework will be useful because it synthesizes the constructs of
other authors covered in the literature review capturing the structure of a
distributed cognition system, the structure provides a means to trace the impacts
of crisis environments to their effects on distributed cognition systems, it captures
contextual enablers and constraints inherent in any control room, and most
importantly it provides a systemic means of theoretically framing the problem. If
the validity of the framework can be established through study of distributed
cognition in actual real-world control centers functioning in crisis environments,
then the framework can serve as a foundational doctrine that (1) could aid in the
implementation of new strategies, designs, methodologies, and technologies in
crisis control centers for complex, technically oriented organizations, (2) could
improve the systemic design of and confidence in the assessment of
mechanisms and subsystems designed to facilitate distributed cognition within
organizations, (3) could improve the general understanding of how distributed
cognition takes place within organizational control centers, and (4) could lead to
a better understanding of the systemic effects crisis conditions have on the
structures within control centers designed to facilitate distributed cognition.
Additionally, (5) the framework could also be transferable to distributed cognition
systems, other than those of control centers, functioning in crisis environments.
In order to validate the framework it is proposed that a control center
described in the literature review be analyzed in context as it functions in a crisis
environment, a formal air force exercise or inspection, using exploratory case
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study techniques. In order to fit within the scope of this work, the research
design and validation effort will focus on an open case study exploration of a
control center functioning in three of a specific Air Force Wing’s operational
readiness exercises as it prepares specifically for a formal outside operational
readiness inspection. During the initial exercise the focus of the case study will
be on using the developed DC5 framework 1) to generally understand the
distributed cognition phenomena occurring in a control center to see if does
indeed provide a useable basis for framing issues and 2) to develop a distributed
cognition system fitness assessment. This assessment will be a detailed
descriptive characterization of the strengths and weaknesses of the control
center’s distributed cognition using the DC5 framework. One of the challenges
facing an Air Force Wing preparing itself for a formal operational readiness
inspection is to develop scripted scenarios within its preparatory operational
readiness exercises that will prepare the various wing organizations to perform at
a high level during the inspection. The usefulness and validity of the DC5
framework could be shown if the assessment method described above could
then in turn be used to develop specific crisis environments within scripted
scenarios designed to suitably stress a control center’s distributed cognition
system in order to train the individuals and involved subsystems for better
performance. The focus of two remaining AF Wing operational readiness
exercises will be just that; the deployment of scripted scenarios based on the
initial fitness assessment designed to stress and subsequently train the system
and improve system performance.
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The analogy of a college freshman athlete and a track coach helps explain
this second approach which also informs a greater understanding of the
framework itself. The coach will typically run his or her new athlete through a
battery of tests or trial runs to gain an initial measure or characterization of
various attributes of the runner. In the world of track athletes, such attributes
may include useable oxygen intake, the ability to process and dispose of lactic
acid in the athlete’s muscles, the athlete’s heart rate, the athlete’s stride
characteristics, and the athlete’s body structure and composition. The coach’s
job is then to design and implement a training regime to suitably stress these
various areas so that improvements can be gained. Certain types of running,
training approaches, and even diets induce certain physiological improvements.
A key constraint on coaches is that there is only so much time or mileage that
runner can actually accomplish before injury or burn out. Thus the coach must
optimize the training regimen for a specific upcoming race or track meet. The
athlete’s performance is a reflection of the coach’s training regimen and even the
underlying theory used to design it.
Stepping aside from the coach and athlete analogy to put this concept in
more rigorous academic terms, the DC5 framework could be used by an
observer to characterize a given crisis scenario as it impacts a distributed
cognition system. Let [CE], full of descriptions and characterization of the
various aspects of the scenario based on the crisis environment specification
detailed in the DC5 framework represent the framework’s formal capture of a
given scenario. Let (DC5F), full of descriptions and characterizations of the
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various structural subsystems detailed in the DC5 framework represent the
framework’s formal capture of the capability or fitness level of a given control
center.
The DC5 framework implies that given specific knowledge about a crisis
environment and given specific knowledge about a distributed cognition system’s
fitness [DC5F], predictions can be made as to the systems performance, i.e.

[P] = [CE][DC5F]

If a measure of system performance, [P] can be gained objectively as
possible, then an initial measure or characterization of DC5 fitness can be
obtained, i.e.

[P]/[CE] = [DC5F]

This initial assessment can the in turn be used to design scenarios, i.e.
[CEj’s, to further train the distributed cognition system for other crisis
environments it will face.
Returning to the real world, the challenge, to assert that the DC5
framework is useful and has validity, then becomes one of finding a suitable
means of measuring, capturing, describing, or characterizing system
performance or [P], Returning to the analogy of the track athlete this
performance is captured in a raw form in his or her elapsed time in an event.
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The corresponding raw measure of a control center’s performance is the rating
assigned by evaluating expert judges using long-established criteria. This
further discussion and development of this research approach further informs the
development of the DC5 framework. Figure 3.5, DC5 Theoretical Framework
Adjusted to Capture Fitness Capability and Performance, captures this further
refinement of the framework.
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Figure 3.5: DC5 Theoretical Framework Adjusted to Capture Fitness Capability and Performance
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Second, addressing the idea of the uncertainty principle - that is
measuring or assessing any system necessarily also alters the system to some
degree; for example, control center systems or members may change their
approach if they know they are being measured for such purposes. Also using a
crisis scenario as an initial means to capture [DC5F] necessarily trains the
system itself, positively or negatively for subsequent scenarios. Third, a training
regime is constrained by the amount of scenarios a control center can suitably
work through given the constraints of an individual operational readiness
exercise itself as well as the limited number or scheduling of exercises a wing
may conduct before a formal inspection. Fourth, the idealistic, mathematical
conception of,

[P] = [CE][DC5F]

described above and the analogy of the objective measures a track coach may
use, i.e. timed events, heart rate, lung capacity, are not realizeable in the
complex world of characterizing environments, distributed cognition system
fitness, and performance. Thus the researcher is inherently limited to
qualitatively attempting to reach such characterizations or assessments. As such
qualitative techniques, specifically those of the case study are best suited to such
efforts.
The first three of these challenges will be addressed in Chapter IV,
research design. The fourth, using qualitative, exploratory, case study
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techniques is central to the soundness of this research thus a formal review of
such methodologies is undertaken next.

Case Study Research
Due to the initial development of the DC5 theoretical framework in the
preceding section as well as its specific focus on both control centers and crisis
environments, any investigation into its validity is necessarily initial and
exploratory. Yin (1994) suggests case study methodologies are ideally suited for
such problems. Before proceeding with the development of an actual case study
research design, the actual capabilities and weaknesses of such an approach
must be weighed. To inform the process of the actual case study research
design to follow in Chapter IV, first a general critique of such methodologies is
undertaken; second, because case data is expected to be both quantitative and
qualitative in nature the inherent challenges in using differing means of
measurement is discussed; third, the limitations of sample space on using
inferential statistics in the proposed research design are discussed; and fourth,
potential criticisms associated with researcher closeness to cases researched, a
potential are of bias for this research, are discussed.

A Critique of Case Study Research
Within the study of organizational behavior, case study is just one of many
general methods for accomplishing research. Surveys, histories, grounded
theory, simulation, and controlled experimentation are other approaches. When
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selecting a general approach as a research basis for subsequent development
into a methodology, researchers 1) must determine which approach is best
suited to the subject matter being investigated and 2) must develop a thorough,
sophisticated, scholarly understanding of that approach in order to ensure the
soundness of the research. The goal of this section is to present just such a
scholarly critique of case study research which can then eventually be used to 1)
defend its selection as a research approach for certain topics as well as to 2)
establish it as a basis for developing a specific detailed, methodological research
design.
To meet this goal, (1) the philosophical and “canons of science”
underpinnings of case study research are presented followed by a (2) description
of the types of research inquiries it is best suited too as well as those to which it
is not. This description is then amplified by (3) pointing out the important
distinctions between case study research and other research designs
accompanied by a (4) detailing of the strengths weaknesses, assumptions, and
limitations of case study research. (5) The scholarly criticisms most prevalent in
literature and most likely to be encountered by case study researchers are then
detailed. (6) These criticisms are then traced into four goals relating to the
nature of validity and reliability specific to case study design and strategies and
safeguards for addressing these design goals are discussed.

The Philosophical and Scientific Foundations for Case Study Research

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

147

The variety of methodologies available to the researcher focusing on a
particular topic or set of research questions can be divided into two primary
categorizations: quantitative approaches and qualitative approaches (Creswell,
1994; Yin, 2003). The dichotomy that exists between these typologies is driven
by the underlying paradigm or operational worldview of the researcher with
regard to his or her topic (Patton, 1991; Creswell, 1994). These paradigms
spring from general philosophical perspectives the researcher holds of the topic
area that can be characterized by the basic ontological, epistemological, and
methodological assumptions made by the researcher (Guba, 1990). As a basis
for critiquing case study research, generally a qualitative approach to research
although it may also contain quantitative elements, its ontological and
epistemological underpinnings should be contrasted with those of strictly
quantitative approaches. Additionally, the methodological means by which case
study research approaches and addresses accepted canons of scientific inquiry
must also be understood.
Ontology is concerned with the question of what is the nature of what
exists (Guba, 1990; Patton, 1991; Potter, 1996). The quantitative approaches
dominant in the natural sciences assume that the fundamental reality of the world
consists of physical objects and processes that exist independent of the
observer. Also referred to as positivism, this view when applied to the study of
human behavior holds that social facts exist in an “objective reality apart from the
beliefs of individual persons” (Patton, 1991, pp 390); natural and human
processes and outcomes can be reduced and traced to physical, causal
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antecedents in a Newtonian fashion. Alternatively, qualitative approaches rest
on the ontological view that the world exists within the mental conceptions of
individuals and groups (Patton, 1991; Potter, 1996; Bonoma, 1985). This
assumption focuses the qualitative researcher on determining what is that people
believe and the constructs they apply in their world.
Epistemology is concerned with the question of how do we know what is
that we know or how do we arrive at conclusions about our world (Guba, 1990;
Patton, 1991; Potter, 1996).

For those with a positivistic view of the world,

quantitative research approaches ensure that the researcher maintains
objectivity and does not interfere with that which is being studied. Theories are
developed and compared to observable facts, which are assumed to exist
independently, and scientific knowledge is created. Epistemologically, qualitative
approaches assume a constructionist view of nature in which meaning is
developed by viewing what is “presented and...worked by [the observer] into a
re-presentation” (Baldano, 1955 as quoted in Patton, 1991). As a result
qualitative researchers select and develop methodologies suited 1) to describing
the processes and constructs people use to create meaning in their world as well
as 2) to allowing the researchers to actively interpret the world for themselves.
A few caveats and comments are in order on these philosophical
underpinnings of the research methodology selection and development process.
First, the importance to the researcher of understanding the ontological and
epistemological bases of paradigms is that it ensures logical consistency is
maintained throughout their work and places logical limits on the conclusions that
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can be postulated (Guba, 1990). Case study researchers must acknowledge the
subjectivity of the work and the fact that it is limited to the interpretations and
mental representations of the humans involved in the research. They must
develop their methodologies accordingly to ensure that such limits are
acknowledged and addressed. Second, these paradigms of the world are
presented here as dichotomously for purpose of explanation. In reality a
spectrum of worldviews exists between the two extremes (Potter, 1996; Guba
1990). The case study researcher finds himself more on the relativistic and
constructionist side of these philosophical continuums, but acknowledges the
need to minimize subjectivity springing from the more positivistic assumptions.
Third, what drives case study researchers to the paradigm of qualitative
research are assumptions about human behavior. Where natural scientists may
view nature as separate and reducible and can maintain objectivity, social
scientists assume that humans are inherently complex; their actions and
thoughts are describable but not mechanistically reducible to basic physical laws
and causes; their actions can only be understood through the lenses of other
humans (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders, 1990). Thus, qualitative
methods may be more suited to developing an understanding of certain human
behavioral phenomena.
In order for qualitative research, in general, to be methodologically sound
it must ensure that the basic canons of scientific investigation are addressed.
The traditional canons of science include the concepts of significance, theoryobservation compatibility, generalizability, consistency, reproducibility, precision,
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and verification (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Douglas,
2004). Significance and theory observation compatibility are applicable to all
kinds of research; the research must not merely restate what is obvious to
everyone and what is proposed as theory must correlate to what is observed
(Weick, 1974).
The remaining canons listed above have become operationalized within
the natural sciences into the terms internal validity, external validity, reliability,
and objectivity. Because these traditional terms evolved from the positivist view,
Lincoln and Guba (1985) have suggested analogous constructs, expounded
upon by others (Douglas, 2004; Marshall and Rossman, 1995), specifically to
guide qualitative research. 1) Analogous to internal validity, the validity of
inferences about the relationship of dependent variables to independent
variables, is credibility, the accurate inferring of relationships within the collected
case data. 2) Analogous to external validity, the generalizability of the research
propositions to other settings and contexts, is transferability, the applicability of
the research to similar contexts; Stake (1978) refers to the similar concept of
natural generalization and Patton (1991) uses the term extrapolation. Because
the qualitative researcher’s paradigm of human behavior is not positivistic, it
assumes context to be of significant importance in developing an understanding
of human behavior, thus the generalizability to other contexts sought after in the
natural science is implicitly limited for social science researchers (Yin, 2003;
Douglas, 2004). 3) Analogous to reliability, the assurance that if done in the
same way and manner multiple repetitions will lead to the same results, is
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dependability, the taking into account and detailing of the dynamic conditions
inherent to each human situation under study. 4) Lastly, analogous to objectivity,
the researcher’s goal to remain separate and not influence what is being studied,
is confirmability, the idea that another researcher reviewing his data would agree
that it was arrived at as proposed. Because the qualitative researcher frontally
acknowledges his own human limitations in interacting with his subject matter,
objectivity, in the positivist sense is not realizable. Rather, the method such a
researcher uses to collect data through interaction if adequately described should
be auditable by others.
Because assumptions about human behavior drive a qualitative
researcher to a different philosophical paradigm than a natural scientist to his
research interest, the methodologies each chooses to accomplish their research
must be inherently different. Logical consistency lies at the base of sound
research; a thorough understanding of the ontological and epistemological bases
for a methodology allows a researcher to understand the advantages and
limitations of that methodology and develop logical conclusions. The differing
worldviews of the qualitative and quantitative researcher lead them to different
understandings of the canons of science. These understandings must be made
explicit in order to know the capabilities and limits of the methodology they
support. Lastly, 1) more specific discussion of case study research, 2) the nature
of its relation to the traditional scientific canon constructs of reliability and validity
and 3) techniques for addressing them, will follow later in this critique. First,
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though, is a more descriptive characterization of which research questions are
suited to case study research.

Appropriate and Inappropriate Research Questions for the Case Study Design

Yin (2003) takes issue with a common view (Isaac and Michael, 1981;
Shavelston and Townes, 2002) within social science circles, that case study
research is most suited to initial exploratory inquiry into a subject area when little
is known about a given behavioral phenomena. This common view supposes
that as research into a subject area matures into a descriptive phase, that
surveys or histories, become more appropriate, and further investigation into
explanatory or causal inquiry is best suited to controlled experimentation. Yin
(2003, p 3) questions this hierarchical view of preferred research strategies by
citing several famous examples of case studies that were explanatory or
descriptive in nature and also points that controlled experiments are readily
adaptable to exploratory inquiry. He alternatively argues for a more pluralistic
view of research strategy selection based on three other conditions: 1) the type
of research question being posed, 2) the extent of control an investigator has
over actual events, and 3) the degree of focus on contemporary events.
Research inquiries focused on answering “what” in terms of what may be
initially learned about a subject area are indeed asking the exploratory questions
that some consider case study research ideally suited for. Whereas questions
regarding what outcomes might have occurred as a result of something else may
be best suited to surveys or archival research. Similarly questions of “who”,
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“where”, and “when” in terms of observed outcomes are more suited to
experimentation or surveys. If, however, these same questions desire to know
“how” or “why” such outcomes occurred then explanation is being sought and a
variety of methods may be best suited.
The remaining two of Yin’s conditions, extent of control and
contemporariness of events, further guide the researcher in considering case
studies in these instances. If little control exists over the context within which the
phenomena is being studied, boundaries between the two are not evident, and
events are happening concurrently as they are being studied, then case studies
become much more suitable. If the events have already occurred and
participants are unavailable then histories are preferred. If some element of
control exists and contextual variables can be separated then field or laboratory
experimentation is better.
Mintzberg (1979) suggests that the best way to know how a manager
spends their time is simply to sit down and talk with them and observe them over
time. He cites several examples from literature that managers are poor
estimators of time allocation and surveys may be impacted as a result. Douglas
(2004, p64) similarly suggests that concerns regarding “complexity, context,
opaqueness, interdependencies, time frames...necessitates applying research
methods that elucidate interpretive understanding.” If these issues can be
eliminated then the researcher has other means available, but the “case study
method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics
of real life events” (Yin, 2003). The lack of control the researcher has on these
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real life events and the fact that they may be occurring concurrently with the
research is what suits them to case study research.

Assumptions, Limitations. Strengths and Weaknesses of Case Study Research
Designs
The inherent assumptions, limitations, strengths, and weaknesses of case
study research can be categorized into the three main theme groups: those
relating to the researcher himself, those related to the researcher’s perspective of
the subject matter, and those related to the data being collected by the case
study researcher. Before discussing these in detail a note is in order; practical
weaknesses will be presented in this section while more general weaknesses
frequently cited in scholarly literature will be discussed in a later section.
Inductive analysis, personal contact and insight, design flexibility, and
empathetic neutrality are all general themes relating to qualitative research
(Patton 1990) that play particular roles in characterizing case study research
because they relate to the researcher himself. Inherent in these themes are the
ontological and epistemological assumptions the researcher has about the topic
being studied. Further assumptions involved in case study research relate to
researcher himself. The case study researcher assumes that he has the skills
and knowledge to conduct case research, a frequent mistake according to Yin
(1981, 2003) and Mintzberg (1979). The extent of the case study researcher’s
competency enhances and limits the quality of the research. Case study allows
good researchers to bring their familiarity with the case to bear (Yin 2003,
Mintzberg, 1979; Eisenhardt 1989). It permits them to conduct inductive
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reasoning, allowing them to explore in search of patterns and causes in open
analysis; observations can be generalized to underlying causes by the
researcher’s own expertise as well as the effort he or she puts into soliciting the
expertise of those involved in the case (Patton, 1990; Whitt, 1991).
Methodologies, case selection, and research focus can adapt and change as the
researcher uncovers previously unidentified trails of inquiry (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Dyer and Wilkins).
Similarly, case study research is inherently limited by the researcher’s
qualities. The biases and influences on the case of the researcher inherently
limit the quality of the case study (Yin, 2003; Poplin, 1987) if not accounted for
and designed for properly (Yin, 2003). The open-endedness of case study
research, cited as an advantage above, also can prove a difficulty as there may
no “clear-cut rules on how to proceed” (Patton, 1980, p 389) and the researcher
is required to use his own judgment and intuition. Yin (2003) cites length of
documentation as a frequent and valid complaint about case study research as
leads may have to be followed endlessly and accounted for in detail. Poor
interviewing, note taking, and data collecting skill also directly limit case study
quality (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989).
Patton’s (1990) general themes of naturalistic inquiry, holistic perspective,
case uniqueness, and context sensitivity also relate to the basic ontological
assumptions and epistemological assumptions the researcher has about his topic
areas. Because the nature of topics may be complex, highly dependent upon
and highly inseparable from context, it is assumed that quantitative methods may
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not capture these complexities. Case study research does not require the
isolation of the laboratory (Mintzberg, 1979). It allows organizations and people
to be studied concurrently with ongoing events (Yin, 2003; Patton, 1990).
Because case study research can provide thorough documentation of context it
provides for generalizability to underlying theory (Eisenhardt, 1990).
The context dependency and uniqueness of individual cases also results
in a lack of generalizability frequently complained about (Isaac and Michael,
1981) and provided by other methods. As stated above the richness of detail
provided by case studies (Dyer and Wilkins, 1989) also may lead to difficulty with
time and length research constraints.
Finally, the theme of qualitative data (Patton, 1990) itself characterizes
case study research. As previously stated richness of data has both advantages
in terms of capturing context and disadvantages, length and time commitment.
The researcher assumes that he can capture data wholly and interpret it
accurately to support the soundness of the research. Case studies, in particular,
allow for the collection of a variety of data types (Yin, 2003, Dyer and Wilkins,
1989) and allow them to be used together to triangulate and reach conclusions.
Yin (2003) also points to the strength of case studies in holistically capturing
context in data noting that the method is suited to situations where many more
variables exist than data points. Because case data may be highly qualitative or
categorical it is not amenable to the objectivity and verifiability of traditional
quantitative methods (Kerlinger 1986).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

157

The purpose of this section was to present the practical limitations,
strengths, and weaknesses that flow inherently from case study methods and
their underlying assumptions. A more thorough discussion of some of the
frequent scholarly criticisms and more general weaknesses of case study
research will follow but first is a description of what distinguishes case study
research from other approaches.

Distinctions from Other Research Designs
Case study research differs from traditional quantitative methods in terms
of its overall goal, its assumptions about researcher interaction, and the differing
aspects of breadth each form sees as ideal. Case study also differs from other
qualitative methods in its focus on contemporaneous research and again on
research purpose.
Quantitative methods attempt to bring explanation to observed
phenomena by measuring it relative to controllable variables. Case study
researchers are interested in developing an understanding of behavior by
observing it, capturing and understanding the perspectives of others, and
developing their own perspectives (Yin, 2003). Experimenters seek to remove
themselves as much as possible from the subject matter under inquiry, so they
can claim with confidence that they themselves did not influence the outcomes or
supply their own interpretations. Case study researchers believe that the best
way of achieving an understanding of human behavior is to get up close with the
actual humans; case study researchers accept the limitations associated with
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their interaction as a cost of developing such an understanding (Patton, 1990;
Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Quantitative researchers seek breadth in terms of
sampling logic; if they focus only on specific variables, isolate them, and sample
them across a variety of contexts, logically then they can generalize their findings
broadly. Case study researchers are focused on issues that may involve many
dependent and independent variables, which may not be isolatable from
interacting with each other or from surrounding context. As a result, case
researchers seek depth within limited cases in order to develop rich
understandings of issues and generalize their data to theory. They acknowledge
the lack of generalizability to other contexts and strive instead after replicability
by thoroughly documenting their efforts.
As Yin (2003) points out, case study distinguishes itself from other
qualitative methods in that it can focus on events as they unfold. Histories gain
their data from archival research or begin to overlap with case study methods
when they focus on more recent or current events. Case study differs from social
experimentation and field trials in acknowledging its subject matter’s
uncontrollability and not attempting to establish such control. Finally, case study
differs from ethnography, the goal of which is primarily description, in that it
assumes more explanatory value can be created. To the extent case studies
seek to be solely descriptive or ethnographies begin to search for causal links the
forms begin to overlap (Yin, 2003).

Scholarly Criticisms of Case Study Research Designs
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The distinctions of case study from other designs, particularly from
traditional quantitative approaches, frequently give rise to a set of scholarly
criticisms of the method. These criticisms can generally be grouped into two
broad categories: those concerned with the generalizability of scientific research
and those concerned with the rigor of scientific research.
Scholars generally complain that case studies are too narrow in focus and
therefore not useful or significant (Patton, 1990). They argue that case study
results and findings cannot be applied or reproduced in other cases (Shavelson
and Townes, 2002) or in other contexts (Isaac and Michael, 1981; Mintzberg,
1979). These criticisms are valid and to the extent case study researchers
attempt to promote their achievement in terms of sampling rigor much deserved.
The case study researcher must acknowledge this as an inherent limitation of his
work. Case study researchers respond to such arguments by questioning
whether anything can be learned at all from their study of complex, human, highly
contextually dependent cases and answer yes (Mintzberg, 1979; Eisenhardt,
1989; Dyer and Wilkins, 1989; Patton, 1990) citing the many advantages of case
study. They point out that generalizability while important is not at the core of
explanatory scientific inquiry, but the process of developing and refuting
“plausible-rival-hypotheses” is (Campbell in Yin, 2003 p. ix; Poplin, 1987). As
has been previously discussed, to address these valid criticisms some (Lincoln
and Guba, 1985; Yin 2003) have sought to redefine the traditional scientific
canon of generalizability by stressing replication logic as an alternative construct
or by pointing out that generalizability to theory by adding weight to accepted
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propositions is still possible. These concepts as they are operationalized into
case study design will be discussed in greater depth in a later section. In final
summary though, the generalizability a quantitative researcher gains through
sampling rigor cannot be matched by case study methods.
Remaining scholarly criticism of case studies seems to fall into the
category of discomfort with the lack of scientific rigor assumed to be inherent in
the method. Quantitative variables, on some scale whether it be categorical,
ordinal, rational, can be assigned numeric value removing subjectivity by opening
up the statistical tool box (Kerlinger, 1986). Qualitative constructs do not have
this advantage, although even quantitative methods of coding and measure imply
some level of subjectivity too. Scholars point out that the removal of numerical
methods opens the research up to the bias of the researcher; divergent data sets
can easily be twisted, perhaps subconsciously, by the researcher (Whitt, 1991) to
fit preconceptions. The required judgment of the researcher for case study
cannot but introduce subjectivity into the process (Yin, 2003; Stake, 1978). The
response given by case researchers to these criticisms of lack of rigor is that
while these concerns do have merit and must be acknowledged, their downsides
can be mitigated by effective case research design.

Case Study Research Design Strategies and Safeguards
As was previously discussed, some of the traditional canons of science
have been operationalized within quantitative research into objectivity, internal
validity, external validity, and reliability. Additionally, as has been discussed,
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qualitative researchers have proposed analogous alternatives to these terms
specifically to guide their specific efforts (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Strauss and
Corbin, 1990). This focus on definition has led to specific design goals for those
developing case study methodologies. These goals in turn have led to specific
strategies and safeguards that should be incorporated into case study designs to
ensure such objectives are met. Table 1, Validity and Reliability in Case Studies,
synthesizes the work of Lincoln and Guba (1987) and Yin (2003) in detailing
these goals and the respective tactics a researcher may employ to meet them.

Table 3.3: Validity and Reliability in Case Studies (Lincoln and Guba 1985,
Yin 2003)_____________ ______________________ _____________________
Qualitative Research
Traditional Research
Case Study Design
Goal
Goal
Tactics
Construct Validity (also
Confirmability
- Detail Researcher
referred to as objectivity)
Background
- Detail Access
Requirements
- Triangulate
- Establish Chain of
Evidence
- Informant Review
- Pattern Matching
Internal Validity
Credibility
- Explanation Building
- Address Rival
Explanations
- Use Logic Models
- Multiple Reviewers
External Validity
Transferability
- Generalize to Theory
- Seek Replication
Reliability
Dependability
- Develop and Use Case
Protocol
- Develop and Maintain
Case Database

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162

Construct validity refers to the idea that the quantitative researcher should
attempt to be objective with regard to the variables in question (Lincoln and
Guba, 1985; Yin, 2003; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002). The means by
which he measures variables should be as accurate and precise as possible.
Scholarly criticism with regard to case studies stresses the bias, subjectivity, and
weaknesses of the human researcher. Case study researchers acknowledge
this as a potential pitfall and attempt to mitigate its effects by 1) thoroughly
detailing the background, demographic and experiential, of the researcher so that
the audience can assess his potential biases as well as familiarity with case
issues, 2) thoroughly detailing the means by which access to case data sources
was gained, again for the purpose of allowing reviewers to assess potential
biases 3) triangulating data and conclusions by seeking confirmation from
multiple sources of evidence within the case, 4) establishing a chain of evidence
that a reviewer can follow to determine what support a given finding had, and 5)
having the actual informants review the descriptions and conclusions of the
researcher (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt ,1989; Patton, 1990; Creswell, 1994, Marshall
and Rossman, 1995). These steps allow the researcher to provide the audience
with a means of confirming the work’s findings and conclusions.
Internal validity is the notion that the quantitative researcher should be
separate from the variables being studied in order that his interaction does not
create unintended effects. Additionally, the variables should be isolated from
their surrounding context and their interactions with other variable minimized so
that the logic supporting inferences regarding interrelationships is not misguided.
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Scholarly criticism of case studied points to the interaction of the researcher with
the subject matter and the inability to remove context from the situation. Case
study researchers acknowledge the potential weakness and try to address it by
1) identifying recurring patterns within cases to trace causality, 2) using their
expertise and that of their informants to build explanations for observations, 3)
identifying, detailing, and addressing rival explanations for observations, 4) using
logic models or attempting to fit collected data to proposed rival cause-event
chains (Yin 2003, Patton 1990) and 5) using multiple reviewers or case analysts
to confirm each others work and conclusions. These efforts allow the researcher
to ensure his findings are credibly based on the data collected.
External validity is the notion within quantitative research methods that the
research is significant because it is generalizable to a broad set of contexts
outside that of the existing study. As previously discussed, towards this criticism,
case studies do not have a valid answer. Case study researchers must
acknowledge that sampling logic is outside of their grasp given the contextual
depth of their work on small numbers of cases. Rather it has been proposed that
case study findings can be generalized to existing theory (Yin 2003; Eisenhardt,
1989). Additional case studies may allow for replication of the findings to add
weight to theoretical propositions (Yin, 2003). The findings of the case study
should be transferable to other similar contexts.
Finally, reliability refers to the notion within traditional quantitative research
that experiments may be followed and repeated and results should be
reproducible. Again because of the dependence of case studies on contextual
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depth they’re inherently limited in their ability to be reproduced in other settings.
This too is acknowledged by the case study researcher who offers in return the
ability to audit his results by developing and using a rigorous case protocol and
maintaining a case database so that other researchers can agree that had they
done the research the same findings would have been reached (Yin, 2003;
Eisenhardt, 1989). In this sense the case study becomes dependable from an
academic research point of view (Lincoln and Guba, 1987).
The traditional scholarly criticisms of case study research flow from the
operationalized notions of the traditional canons of good scientific inquiry. With
one exception, case study researchers can acknowledge these criticisms and
attempt to address these concerns through a variety of strategies and establish
rigor in their designs. Generalizability outside of case context to broader
samples is not a feature of case study research; however, for inquiries into
context-rich, contemporary, real-world environments involving humans and highly
interactive variable sets, case study may be the method most suited to the
problem.

Critique Conclusion
The goal of this section was to present a scholarly critique of case study
research which can then eventually be used to defend its selection as a research
approach for certain topics as well as to establish it as a basis for developing a
specific detailed, methodological research design. Understanding the
philosophical underpinnings of case study research, its basis in the canons of
science, its inherent strengths and weaknesses, what distinguishes it from other
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research methods, and its means for addressing the frequent scholarly criticisms
it encounters, allows the case study researcher to develop his design from an
informed perspective and helps to ensure the soundness of his research.

Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Data in Case Study Research
One of the advantages of case study research is that it allows the
researcher to use both quantitative and qualitative measures to assemble data
(Yin, 1981, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). This characteristic open-endedness of the
method enables the corroboration of observations and findings and thus supports
construct validity (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1990; Creswell, 1994,
Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Sieber, 1973). Yet integrating qualitative and
quantitative measures also brings a set of challenges to the data analysis effort.
The purpose of this section is to detail the data analysis implications associated
with using different scales of measurement and to describe methods available to
the researcher to address these challenges.

Implications of Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Methods
Mintzberg capture’s the motivation of the researcher who decides to mix
both qualitative and quantitative methods in his research design:
“Theory building seems to require rich description, the richness that
comes from anecdote. We uncover all kinds of relationships in our
“hard” data, but it is only through the use of this “soft” data that we
are able to explain them, and explanation is, of course, the purpose
of research” (1979, p 587).
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Rossman and Wilson (1985) present three primary reasons for
endeavoring to capture both types of data: corroboration, elaboration, and
initiation. Corroboration refers to the triangulation of findings by relying on more
than one method. Elaboration focuses on establishing greater depth to findings
developed primarily from another data set. Using another form of data also
prompts initiation, which allows the researcher to develop new explanations for
observations or to counter existing explanations adding rigor and
comprehensiveness to the research. Similarly, in their review of 57 mixedmethod research designs, Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) distilled five
major purposes behind mixing qualitative and quantitative analysis: 1)
triangulation, 2) complementarity, analogous to elaboration, 3) development, the
iterative use of one design after another to develop and test theory, 4) initiation,
and 5) expansion, seeking to extend the breadth and range of existing inquiry.
Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders (1990) used in depth interviews to “get a
qualitative feel for the gestalt of [an organization’s] culture,” then used that
information to follow with successive phases of surveys to continue developing
and demonstrating their conclusions.
The additional validity gained by using both qualitative and quantitative
data within a research design enhances the completeness and soundness of the
research; however, incorporating both types of data comes with challenges to the
researcher also. These challenges include 1) the fact that research approaches
are driven by different philosophical underpinnings or paradigms (Creswell, 1994;
Rossman and Wilson, 1985) 2) the practical constraints of time, funds, and
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researcher ability limitations to take on the additional burdens of analyzing more
than one type of data (Creswell, 1994, Morse, 1991) and 3) the practical
problems arising with analyzing different data sets.
Rossman and Wilson (1985) describe three perspectives with regard to
mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches in a research design. Purists
focus on the differences and paradigms supporting the research approaches and
argue that using mixed designs is logically inconsistent. Situationalists, tolerate
the use of both approaches in a study, but believe that certain situations call for
certain methods. Neither of these first two perspectives “foster” (Rossman and
Wilson 1985, p.85) the integration of methods; however, a pragmatic perspective
also exists. These researchers choose not to focus on the “false dichotomies”
(Denzin, 1970, p 119) of the different types of research but choose instead to
attempt to capture the strengths of each approach; that is because these
differences are based on strongly held philosophical differences, that are in
essence a given for scholars reviewing their work, the pragmatic researcher can
do little to assuage such concerns other than to understand them and recognize
the limits they place on the research.
On the practical side numerous authors, (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989;
Patton, 1990; Creswell, 1994, Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Sieber, 1973), point
out that adding a different methodology to a research design also adds work.
Mixed designs require the researcher to become adept at both methodologies,
thus the impact of the researcher’s own abilities weighs on the design (Sieber,
1973; Greene et al 1989; Yin, 2003). The study can be expected to take longer
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as both designs must be implemented and both data sets analyzed according to
different regimes (Sieber, 1973; Greene et al 1989; Yin, 2003, Creswell, 1994).
Finally adding a methodology also adds cost; the researcher must be both
funded and given the access to accomplish both portions of the design (Mitchell,
1986; Morse, 1991). Again, to these implications, the researcher has little
response other than be sure he has the capabilities and assets to accomplish the
design he develops. Sieber (1973) and Greene et al (1989) suggest that
researchers attempting to implement mixed-method designs have limited
numbers of cases that are well-bounded, with manageable amounts of
participants.
A final area, and focus of the remaining of this section, is the practical side
of analyzing the multiple data sets generated by mixed designs. Once a
researcher has collected both sets of data he is faced with integrating his
analysis of them. Frequent problems cited within the literature include: 1) the
difficulty of merging numeric and textual data, 2) the interpretation of divergent
results, 3) the lack of delineation, or oppositely, the incorrect merging together of
concepts and 4) the weighing of information from different data sources in
reaching conclusions (Mitchell, 1986). The researcher must recognize these
pitfalls and develop his research design accordingly.

Addressing Data Analysis Challenges through Research Design
To the problem of combining textual and numeric data, two alternatives
are available to mixed-design researcher, both relating to converting one type
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into the other (Mitchell, 1986). In order to give raw text numeric meaning the
researcher is left with development of coding and frequency techniques (Mitchell
1986, Denzin 1970). Statistically, then the problem becomes one of applying
multivariate statistical analysis techniques including multiple regression, cross
classification analysis, and multiple analysis of variance (Mitchell, 1986) to the
larger, combined data sets; the researcher must ensure, in this case, that the
variables in question are rigorously delineated and their intercorrelation is not
significant.
Alternatively, the researcher can attempt to conceptually integrate all
available data in a confirmatory approach. Such an approach involves searching
for logical causal trails, building explanations, and pattern matching in an attempt
to develop a richer conceptual understanding of the subject matter (Yin, 2003;
Mitchell, 1986; Morse, 1991; Sieber 1973). Tactics that support this analysis
strategy include constructing displays of data that facilitate the researcher’s
ability to detect patterns and links. Such displays include event sequences,
arrays based on dimensions suggested by informants or literature, critical
incident charts tracing causes, networks detailing linkages between informants
and systems, taxonomies, and time ordered matrices tracking information flow
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003; Voss, Tsikritsis, and Frolich, 2002).
Each of these tactics can incorporate both qualitative and quantitative data. The
objective is to become familiar with the case as it stands alone and to allow its
patterns to emerge to support the development of findings and conclusions
(Eisenhardt, 1989).
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Mitchell’s (1986) problems of divergent results and overlapping of
constructs are not so much problems of combined research designs as they are
problems with the underlying theoretical framework which are now being
highlighted by the combined design. To the extent that divergent results exist the
researcher must attempt to rationalize them or change or discard the underlying
theoretical constructs, assumptions, and propositions, or reconstruct and more
accurately delineate variables and propositions. Greene et al (1989) cite such
divergence as a strength encouraging the initiation of new conceptual constructs
and relationships.
Lastly, the weighing of importance of data sources, as opposed to
confronting divergent results, in reaching conclusions is a fact of mixed designs
and a point of valid criticism. To this problem the researcher is left only with the
hard work of interpreting findings within the context of present knowledge;

“...it is not accomplished using a mathematical formula to weigh the
findings from each method, rather it is an informed thought process,
involving judgment, wisdom, creativity, and insight and includes the
privilege of creating or modifying theory. It is an exciting part of
every research project...” (Morse, 1991, p122).

The researcher must be aware of these limitations and the opening to
criticism in this area. Some guidance for the weighing of results is given within
the literature.
Greene et al (1989) use the five purposes they identified in the their study
of mixed-designs to develop corresponding design objectives. If the primary
purpose of pursuing a mixed design was to gain triangulation of observations and
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findings, methods should be should be different from one another in terms of
their biases: methods designed to uncover or discover patterns and trends
should be countered by those seeking to disprove such correlation or logical
relation. Then the methods should b applied to the same research questions.
Applying them to different sets of research questions does nothing to enhance
triangulation. In this case it is suggested the qualitative and quantitative portions
of the research are weighed equally (Greene et al, 1989; Creswell, 1994; Sieber,
1973, Rossman and Wilson, 1985).
If the pursuit of a mixed design is motivated by an attempt to enhance
complementarity, then some overlap of the methods to examine different facets
of a single phenomenon is in order (Green et al, 1989; Rossman and Wilson,
1985). It is further suggested that the two research methods be accomplished
simultaneously rather than in sequence so that results are more truly
complementary and not gained through prior bias (Green et al, 1989; Creswell,
1994).
The primary design guidance flowing from the motivation to pursue
development is the sequential implementation of the different methods (Greene
et al, 1989; Creswell, 1994). This was precisely the goal of Hofstede et al (1990)
in conducting long interviews to develop a feel for understanding organizational
culture constructs and people’s perspectives before incorporating their results
into successive surveying phases. As with triangulating designs, methods should
be dissimilar and of equal weight (Greene et al, 1989).
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The aim of designing for initiation is uncover paradox and divergence.
Contradiction is valuable in that it can produce learning by motivating the
rejection of misguided conceptualizations, the development of a means to explain
divergence, or the suggestion for further analysis. In this case research based
on stricter positivist paradigms, controlled experiment, should be pursued to
counter stricter relativist paradigm bases and produce conflicts (Greene et al,
1989; Rossman and Wilson, 1985).
Mixed method research designs seeking to provide expansion on existing
theory and constructs tend to be more wide open in terms of weighting and type
of method. In many cases the researcher is attempting to add
comprehensiveness or breadth to his work and supplementing a dominant
method with a less dominant one (Greene et al, 1989; Creswell, 1994). Green et
al (1989) also found that expansion was frequently one of multiple design goals
usually complementing attempts to achieve triangulation or complementarity.

Conclusion
The open-endedness of case study research provides the researcher with
a means to incorporate multiple research methodologies in pursuit of improving
the validity and soundness of his work. Mixed method designs do come with a
variety of challenges associated with criticism of using different philosophical
paradigms, practical additional workload constraints, and practical data analysis
challenges. The researcher selecting such methods must be aware of their
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inherent limitations and the problems associated with data analysis and then
develop his research design accordingly.

The Limits of Statistical Approaches for this Research Setting
Researchers seeking to develop an understanding of how an
institutionalized organizational control center expediently learns about and acts
within in its environment, may find that research methods similar to that of the
case study are well-suited to the constraints of the subject matter (Johannsen,
Artman, and Waern 2001; Coombs 1999; and Vidaillet, 2001). If one seeks to
further understand the relationships between 1) conceptual learning constructs
based on academic literature and 2) performance measures of control centers
within specified crisis environments, the strengths of case study method may be
even more attractive. Such strengths include 1) the likelihood of building novel
theory as the researcher must capture and analyze the various perspectives of
participant informants in comparison with conceptions based on literature, 2) the
capability of developing and following up on emergent theory patterns as they
may reveal itself during the data collection process, and 3) the inherent theory
building process in case-study methods driven by the researcher’s search for
patterns, linkages, and causality, and 4) the capability to holistically capture the
richness of contextual information (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin 2003; Creswell, 1994;
Dyer and Wilkins, 1989; Mintzberg, 1979).
The case study researcher may seek to add breadth, comprehensiveness,
and additional rigor to the work by augmenting the qualitative data collected with
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quantitative data and with quantitative analysis (Greene, Carricelli, and Graham,
1989; Creswell, 1994). Relating control center performance variables, that is the
likely dependent variables in such a study, statistically to constructs developed
from the literature, the likely independent variables in the study, within the
confines of a small number of individual cases also has an inherent set of
problems. The contextual focus of case study work, seen as a strength to
researcher, also holds within it the potential effects of a large number of potential
independent variables that may or may not be captured by the researcher. The
purpose of this section is to discuss such problems, discuss the statistical
approaches available to the researcher to uncover the relationships between
such variables, and to discuss the implications such approaches may have on
the selection of cases for study.
Before proceeding with this discussion, it is important for the researcher to
explicitly call attention to a key practical underlying assumption regarding the
nature and limitations of the subject matter proposed for study by the researcher.
In the cases proposed for study, control centers functioning in crisis
environments, the specific control centers in question are typically composed of
no more than 10 personnel on a given time shift; this is in congruence with
control centers studied thus far in the literature (Johannsen, Artman, and Waern
2001; Coombs 1999; and Vidaillet, 2001). Completely surveying both night and
day shifts and possibly overseeing commanders and even possibly formal
organizational evaluators will lead to a sample size no greater than 30
respondents, even assuming 100% response. Furthermore the number of cases
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to be studied is expected to range somewhere between two and seven at the
absolute extremes. For both within-case and cross-case analysis this inherent
sample size limitation, in terms of number of respondents and cases respectively,
has profound ramifications on the type of statistical approaches, descriptive
versus inferential, suitable for analytic use. These ramifications apply particularly
to establishing relationships between independent variables and formally
assessed measures of what is essentially team performance. This issue will be
discussed further in the section that follows. It should be said at this point that
there still remain key methodological design objectives that can be drawn from
traditional quantitative statistical perspectives to guide the process of case
selection; this issue will also be addressed in the discussion that follows.

Challenges Associated with Extracting Information from Case Studies
The problems associated with extracting information from the specific
case studies in question to determine the effects of independent variables on
dependent variables can be grouped into three main categories: 1) problems
associated with sample size requirements for quantitative statistical inference,
and 2) problems associated with the expected large number of potential
independent, contextual, and interacting variables on qualitative inference and 3)
the resulting problems arising from subjectivity inherent in coding qualitative data
from the cases.
Quantitative statistical analysis offers a variety of tools that the analyst can
use to infer relationships between variables. In order to quantitatively draw
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statistical inference about the effects of independent variables on dependent
variables, particularly in cases with potential large numbers of independent
variables, requisite sample sizes are in order. Widely used rules of thumb
include: 1) for surveys in general 51 respondents plus the number of variables
specified in the model being researched, 2) for exploratory factor analysis at least
150 data points are required 3) and for confirmatory factor analysis at least 200
are required (Guadagnoli and Velicer, 1988; Hoelter, 1983). Similarly, small
samples impact the measures of confidence, measures of fit and measures of
interaction involved in other multivariate analysis techniques including
correlation, regression, and analysis of variance (Kachigan, 1991, Nachmias and
Nachmias, 1976). As previously described and also encountered in similar
research (McFadden, 2000) such inferential statistical methods cannot be
applied to case study approaches involving limited numbers of participants or
limited numbers of cases themselves.
With specific regard to an organization’s formal performance assessments
of its control centers during an operational exercise and inspection scenario, the
resulting metrics will be limited to a few characterizations of that performance
rolled up into a single data point. This operational conflict, between the sample
sizes involved in case study research and the use of inferential statistical
methods to determine relationships between variables, is reflective of conceptual
paradigms supporting the suitability of case study methods to qualitatively induce
patterns and linkages within case data. This discussion however does not
preclude the use of descriptive statistics to enhance the qualitative portion of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

177

research design in a dominant-less dominant mixed method design (Creswell,
1994; Greene et al, 1989).
A second problem for the researcher involved in a highly, contextually
dependent case study is the large potential of independent variables that could
influence other variables of interest. Traditional quantitative statistics captures
this notion by classifying four types of variables, 1) the explanatory variables,
those dependent and independent variables in which the researcher wishes to
find relationship, 2) extraneous controlled variables, those which the researcher
seeks to control in order to limit their effects on the dependent variables 3)
extraneous uncontrolled variables which may confound relationships between
explanatory variables, and 4) extraneous uncontrollable variables or noise, the
effects of which the researcher attempts to control through random sampling of
sufficient size (Kish, 1959; Creswell, 1994). Additionally, the researcher may
also expect interaction between any and all of these variable types (Kish, 1959;
Cresswell, 1994). The subjectivity involved 1) in the qualitative definition of
constructs in terms of construct validity and 2) in qualitative inference in terms of
internal validity is another problem associated with the high volume of expected
independent variables in a contextually rich case. While inferential statistics may
not be applicable to some qualitative inquiries, the basis of quantitative methods
can aid in understanding and addressing the problems of ascertaining
relationships between variables. This application shall be discussed in a later
section.
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Approaches from Quantitative Statistical Analysis for Analyzing Effects of
Independent Variables on Dependent Variables
While the transformation of qualitative data into quantitative forms for
purposes of using inferential statistical methods is inhibited by sample size
constraints, descriptive statistics can be used to supplement the qualitative
development of constructs as well as the qualitative development of inferences of
relationships between variables. Such methods include the familiar mean,
median, standard deviation, and range. These can be used to augment
qualitative data regarding informants’ perspectives and for characterizing
informants experientially and demographically. Additionally, frequency counts
associated with words spoken in control centers and artifacts repetitively used in
control centers can provide valuable quantitative data.
Perhaps an even greater strength associated with using statistical
methods is the sharpening of constructs involved in the coding of qualitative data
into quantitative information. This conversion process can address some of the
concerns relating to the interaction of variable types that was cited as a problem
in the previous section. Mixed method researchers (Mitchell, 1986; Morse, 1991)
suggest that delineation of separate concepts, and oppositely, the merging of
concepts is a significant challenge of the work. Focusing on the types of pitfalls
specified by the definitions of variable types, as detailed in the previous section,
will help to force the researcher to enhance construct and internal validity. This
enhancement will come from expecting the interaction of variable types as coding
is accomplished. Use of textual coding methods and Likert scale survey
methodologies will provide more precision in definition of constructs, as well as
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the development of ordinal levels for quantifying constructs (Nachmias and
Nachmias, 1976). The quantification of qualitative data can serve to enhance
construct validity; the use of descriptive statistics can augment the qualitative
inference of variable relationships. Additionally, the researcher familiar with
quantitative approaches can be wary of the pitfalls associated with interacting
variables and develop his constructs accordingly. The traditional perspective of
quantitative statistical approaches also has implications in case selection for the
qualitative researcher.

Implications of Statistical Approaches on Case Selection
The approach statistical analysis takes with regard to understanding
variable types can guide the case study researcher in his case selection process.
In reviewing the literature and developing frameworks and constructs, the
researcher should be cognizant of the variety of variable types that may be
encountered. Accordingly, type 2 or so called “extraneous but controllable”
variables (Kish, 1959, p 329; Creswell 1994, p 63) should be identified by the
researcher prior to data collection. To the extent case selection can eliminate or
mitigate the impact of such variables on the work it should be done (Pettigrew,
1988), for example, a control center that for one reason or another will
experience a high degree of personnel turnover just prior to data collection efforts
may introduce confounding factors into the work. As such the researcher may
want to eliminate such a case from consideration. Alternatively, a specific case’s
characteristics may present an opportunity to observe a key variation in a
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explanatory independent variable or perhaps an interaction in explanatory
independent variables (Pettigrew, 1988). Such cases represent a chance at
initiating the further development of existing conceptualizations or the
construction of new ones (Greene et al, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989).

Conclusion
Quantitative approaches can be useful in designing approaches for case
studies involving smaller amounts of participants as well as limited numbers of
cases. While the small sample size of participants and cases involved in
studying crisis control centers precludes the use of inferential statistics,
descriptive statistics can serve to augment the qualitative measurement of
constructs and the qualitative inference of relationships. The perspective of
traditional statistics with regard to defining variable types can also guide the case
researcher in these areas as well as in case selection.

Addressing the Challenge of Researcher Closeness
One of the advantages of case study research is that it allows the
researcher to bring his personal expertise and familiarity to the subject matter
(Yin 2003; Creswell, 1994; Hofstede, 1990; Dalton 1959). Such researchers may
have years of experience in working in their case settings, may be familiar with
the jargon in use, may themselves have previously studied such settings, may
have unique access for collecting case data, and may be familiar with the
dominant aspects of organizational history and culture in such settings. Such
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assets may enhance the researcher’s ability to develop and test propositions and
hypotheses. This degree of closeness to the phenomena under study, however,
opens the case researcher to a variety of scholarly criticisms. The purpose of
this section is to detail the scholarly criticisms associated with such familiarity as
well as to describe methodological design strategies that can be employed to
address such criticisms.

Scholarly Criticisms Associated With Researcher Closeness to Subject
Matter
Scholarly criticisms focused on the researcher tend to be concerned with
the validity and reliability of the work. The traditional canons of science include
the concepts of significance, theory-observation compatibility, generalizability,
consistency, reproducibility, precision, and verification (Strauss and Corbin,
1990; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Douglas, 2004). Significance and theory
observation compatibility are applicable to all kinds of research; the research
must not merely restate what is obvious to everyone and what is proposed as
theory must correlate to what is observed (Weick, 1974).

In pursuit of

incorporating rigor into scientific research, the remaining canons have become
operationalized into constructs of validity and reliability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985;
Douglas, 2004; Marshall and Rossman, 1995). When the researcher is very
close to the material and human behavior being studied as was described in the
introductory paragraph to this section they should be prepared for scholarly
criticisms to stem from these bases.
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Criticism towards a researcher that is close to inquiry subject matter
springs from the notions of construct validity, internal validity, and reliability,
Construct validity refers to the notion that a sufficient operational set of
measuring tools must be employed to ensure subjective judgments are not being
made during data collection (Yin, 2003; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Voss,
Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002). Criticisms in this area tend to be of researcher
bias in collecting data; the ’’close” researcher has preconceived notions of the
nature of the subject matter and may consciously or unconsciously impose his
subjective judgment in collecting and interpreting data. Furthermore the data
collection process may be skewed because the researcher has had to gain
access to the case participants and material; such access may result in
participants telling the researcher what he wants to hear (Cresswell, 1994).
Internal validity refers to the notion that relationships that researcher
concludes exist within collected data are correctly inferred (Yin, 2003; Lincoln
and Guba, 1985; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich; 2002 Marshall and Rossman,
1995). Again, scholarly criticism stemming from this underlying basis, focuses on
the inherent bias of the researcher that may be too familiar with his subject
matter. Biased researchers may consciously or unconsciously reach conclusions
based on their preconceived notions. They may assign more weight to data
confirming their conclusions and less or none to data not confirming their
conclusions. They may choose to ignore altogether or not seek out disconfirming
evidence. Because they have not conceived of other types of causal
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explanations they may not structure their research designs to uncover such
explanations (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 1994).
Lastly, reliability refers to the notion that research results should be
reproducible; later researchers should be able to duplicate original findings (Yin,
2003; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002; Douglas
2004). From this basis of perspective, perhaps the harshest critics maintain that
the “close” researcher merely goes through the case data looking for evidence to
fit his working, pre-conceived framing of the problem. As a result of such
problems stemming from issues of construct and internal validity, the work will
not be reproducible by other researchers (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 2004).
Tracing these frequent criticisms to their underlying bases within the
traditional canons of science improves the depth of understanding of the
criticisms. Furthermore, it allows such a researcher to take such criticisms into
account by creating objectives to guide the methodology design process. These
objectives in turn lead to the development of specific design strategies to address
these problems.

Design Strategies to Address Concerns Regarding Researcher Closeness

First and foremost, the case study researcher who has an intimate
familiarity with his cases, must recognize the validity of the criticism regarding
closeness to the subject matter. To this extent, the researcher must ensure he
has the skills required for good case study. Yin (2003, p 59) describes these as
1) being able to “ask good questions and interpret” the answers in a meaningful
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and unbiased manner, 2) being a “good listener and to not be trapped by
preconceptions”, 3) being “adaptive and flexible so that unexpected observations
are seen as opportunities and not threats” and 4) being “unbiased by
preconceived notions” that may exist by being “sensitive and responsive to
contradictory evidence.” To the extent that critics may not be convinced by the
altruistic intent of the “close” researcher other tactics exist which can enhance
the validity and reliability of the research design.
Qualitative researchers have proposed and expounded on analogous
constructs to the traditional notions of validity and reliability (Lincoln and Guba,
1985; Douglas, 2004; Marshall and Rossman,1995; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and
Frolich, 2002; Rubin and Rubin, 1995). To the idea of construct validity they offer
the notion of confirmability or transparency (Rubin and Rubin, 1995), the ideas
that another researcher reviewing case data would agree that the correct
observations were made when the case study process took place. Now as a
design objective the researcher can pursue confirmability by 1) using multiple
sources of evidence to triangulate observations, 2) establishing chains of
evidence to support specified observations, 3) having informants review drafts of
case data and case report and documenting their subsequent comments 4)
documenting the demographic and experiential background of the researcher so
that a reviewer can judge if bias was involved in data collection and 5)
documenting the steps required to gain access to the case material and
informants again so the reviewer can assess possible biases and 6) commenting
about sensitive issues such as confidentiality of data and anonymity of
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informants (Yin, 2003; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002; Rubin and Rubin,
1995; Creswell, 1994). Incorporating these tactics into research design will allow
the researcher to respond to the criticisms of bias in data collection.
With respect to the idea of internal validity, qualitative researchers have
offered the analogous notion of credibility, the accurate inferring of relationships
within the collected case data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Douglas, 2004; Marshall
and Rossman,1995; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002; Rubin and Rubin,
1995). As a design objective a number of strategies can be employed to
enhance credibility within the research: 1) identifying recurring patterns within
cases to trace causality, 2) using their expertise and that of their informants to
build explanations for observations, 3) identifying, detailing, and addressing rival
explanations for observations, 4) using logic models or attempting to fit empirical
data to proposed rival cause-event chains and 5) using multiple reviewers or
case analysts to confirm each others work and conclusions (Yin 2003, Patton
1990; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002; Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Creswell,
1994). Incorporating these measures into research design will provide the
researcher who has a close familiarity with the research subject matter to
address accusations of bias in the conclusions and findings he reaches from
analyzing the case data.
With respect to the idea of reliability, qualitative researchers have offered
the analogous notion of dependability, the taking into account and detailing of the
dynamic conditions inherent to each human situation so that a reviewer may
audit the researcher’s work and conclude that had the work been done someone
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else the same conclusions would have been reached (Lincoln and Guba, 1985;
Douglas, 2004; Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich,
2002; Rubin and Rubin, 1995). With dependability as a design objective the
case study researcher can 1) develop and use a rigorous case protocol and 2)
maintain a detailed case database (Yin 2003, Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich,
2002; Creswell, 1994). These tactics will allow the case study researcher to
counter criticism that his work is not repeatable because his preconceptions and
bias lead him to skew data; the establishment and use of a rigorous case
protocol helps in ensuring that credibility and confirmability is maintained, that
another researcher can trace conclusions by following the processes developed
by the original investigator. Maintaining a case database allows another
researcher the opportunity to view the manner in which the protocol was applied
in the case.

Conclusion
A researcher who is very familiar with and close to the issues involved in
the subject matter of the research and subsequently endeavors to pursue a case
study will doubtless be exposed to criticisms focused on his preconceptions and
biases regarding those issues. The researcher must acknowledge these
criticisms as valid concerns, endeavor not to allow his experiences and
preconceptions to influence his work, and design strategies, detailed in the
literature, into his research methodology to address these criticisms accordingly.
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Framework, Model, or Theory?
A brief discussion is necessary explaining why the term theoretical
framework is applied to the work at the beginning of this chapter and prepared for
partial validation in the next. The selection of the term theoretical framework as
opposed to others might be considered somewhat arbitrary but some rigor
applied to defining this term was fruitful to understanding what DC5 proposes to
be. The terms framework, model, and theory, very frequently chosen to be in the
titles of research documents from a variety of fields, are used interchangeably
and without rigorous definition (Sutton and Straw, 1995; Heals, Jean, and
Gibson, 1992; Bacharach, 1989; Adam, 1985). As Sutton and Straw (1989, p
371) put it,
“There is lack of agreement about whether a model and a theory
can be distinguished, whether a typology is properly labeled a
theory or not.”
Freese (1989, p 189) in seeking to define and describe formal theorizing
described,

“an incredible anarchy of language, conceptions, proposals,
interpretations, and results of formal theorizing.”
Finally, Homans (in Weick, 1989, p 517) makes the complaint,
“ ...much official sociological theory consists of concepts and their
definitions; it provides the dictionary of a language that possesses
no sentences.”
The purpose of this section is to develop some working definitions of the terms
framework, model, and theory that can be used to guide the researcher to ensure
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that he is speaking in complete “sentences”, or at the least is aware of when he
is not.

Theories, Models, and Frameworks: Definitions and Distinctions
As suggested by the introduction, common use of the terms framework,
model, and theory overlaps significantly, thus any set of definitions should be
treated as operational. The motivation for pursuing such working definitions is to
guide the researcher in development of methodology for confirming the idea he
has developed and to ensure that he does not suggest that the idea is anything
more than what he has actually shown.
As each of these terms is focused on the construction of meaning about
the world it is informative to understand conceptions about how individuals create
meaning within their world. First, distinction must be made between what
constitutes data, information, knowledge, and perhaps intelligence. Ackoff (1989)
develops a hierarchy of these concepts: data is nothing more than raw symbols
differentiating various states of the universe; information is data processed into a
useful form with some level of meaning answering the basic questions “who”,
“what”, “when,” and “where”; knowledge represents information applied to begin
answering “how”. Ackoff goes on to define understanding as the appreciation of
knowledge when one begins answering “why” and compares the distinction
between knowledge and understanding to the distinction between memorizing
and learning. Finally, Ackoff, defines wisdom separately from the other four
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concepts, which are focused upon the past. Wisdom is the ability to project
understanding for predictive purposes.
An individual’s first act in learning about the world involves perceiving
data; the five senses take care of this act. The next step in creating meaning is
in defining what it is that has been observed. This is the act of framing the data
by asking and answering the key questions of “who", “what”, “when,” and
“where.” Heals, Jean, and Gibson (1992) citing Chauncey and Miller suggest
that frameworks accomplish such acts by providing their users with language
specific to characterizing what has been observed; framing includes the acts of
definition and assumption. For purposes of an operational definition, frameworks
are the key definitions a researcher constructs regarding to his subject matter.
For example, Newton had framed his work on the basics of physics by
developing the constructs of gravity and force to use in concert with those
familiar to humans in general, time, distance, and speed. Frameworks involve
the development of constructs for understanding phenomena.
In moving on to higher levels of meaning the next question the individual
must ask is “how." In this sense constructs must be linked, describing through
abstraction the sequences of events, or the order in which constructs are
observed. In order to mentally capture such events for further development, the
researcher must limit the amount of constructs he considers and thus bounds his
conceptualization of the subject matter. In the classical science sense, Galileo
acted in such a manner when he developed what came to be known as the
heliocentric model of the solar system describing the orbits of the planets around
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the sun; creating a model or perspective in which to view observed constructs.
For purposes of operational definition, models are abstract linkages of observed
constructs that describe how a phenomenon is taking place.
It should be noted within the literature that some make no distinction
between models and theory (Whetten, 1989; Dubin, 1976). Descriptive models
can be used for predictive purposes and they can identify interactions between
constructs. For others (Sutton and Staw 1995; Freese (1980); Eisenhardt, 1989;
Creswell, 1994; Yin, 2003; Adam, 1985) the key distinction is that theories
explain why relationships exist. Newton advanced the heliocentric model by
postulating the theory of gravity.
It should be noted that as constructed here these terms represent a
hierarchy of meaning. Researchers must first frame constructs, describe
interactions amongst them, and then logically suggest a reason why this
interaction is observed. Thus all theories as defined here are both models and
frameworks; models are frameworks themselves. Some frameworks, such as
taxonomies, and listings of variables are not models or theories and some
models such as diagrams and flowcharts, in and of themselves, are not theories
(Sutton and Staw, 1995).
A note should be added here about where the subject matter of this work
distributed cognition in the specified setting fits in the larger scheme of relatively
new field of cognitive engineering. A review of literature relating to cognitive
engineering shows that it is focused on developing a variety of disparate systems
addressing the various critical processes involved in learning about an outside
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environment. In a sense these efforts represent the engineering or application of
scientific principles, in this case those related to cognition. Engineers proceed
with their design based on these principles that are sometimes grouped together
into overarching perspectives or frameworks of the outside environment. This
work is focused on constructing such a framework of diverse principles. Its intent
is to frame the existing science so that future engineered applications can be
made while using it.
It should also be mentioned again, that in terms of common usage
researchers have used these terms interchangeably. As a result such a
construction of these concepts may find dispute. But it does provide the
researcher with a means of understanding to what extent he has created
meaning with his work. In the case of DC5 the term theoretical was chosen
because interrelationships are proposed and described and explanation is given
to why they exist. Framework is added because the researcher acknowledges
that the DC5 construction was the construction of a perspective for which a
complementarity of views may exist. Validating, at least partially, the DC5
theoretical perspective is the focus of the next chapter.

Conclusions on Methodology
This chapter had three main purposes. First, using a systems approach, A
theoretical framework was developed that 1) synthesized the information
developed in the literature review, 2) described the systemic structure of
distributed cognition occurring in control centers, and 3) captured the effects of
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changing crisis intensity on the distributed cognition occurring in control centers.
Second, the appropriateness and suitability of using exploratory case study
methodology to validate a portion of the constructed framework was reviewed in
detail. Finally, a brief discussion was presented to explain why the term
“theoretical framework” is used to describe the central product that is presented
in this chapter and that is to be validated using the research design in the next
chapter. Chapter IV, Research Design, will follow where the specific design of the
case study protocols and database will be made explicit.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN

Purpose and Organization of Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a means for validating the DC5
framework developed in Chapter III. As discussed in Chapter III, this validation
will be sought by two general approaches guiding the efforts of this research
design. First, cases will be explored to find out the degree to which DC5 indeed
does provide a general overall means of framing an understanding of observed
distributed cognition phenomena. To this end, collected data will be synthesized
to comprehend if the constructs and interactions of the DC5 framework are
readily apparent in the data and lead to a deeper understanding of the
phenomena. To the extent that the data is readily interpreted by the DC5
framework constructs these portions of the framework will be considered to be
partially validated. To the extent that various constructs are not readily
identifiable in the data or new constructs may be inferred from the data the
framework will be adjusted accordingly on an iterative basis between the three
Operational Readiness Exercises and one Operational Readiness Inspection.
The second general approach to seek validation of the framework will be
to observe if the framework can serve as a basis for an initial assessment of the
fitness of a crisis control center’s distributed cognition system and subsequently
as a basis for devising and implementing a training plan for a control center. To
the extent performance increases in subsequent iterations of action in the case
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studied the framework will be considered validated. To the extent performance
improvements are slow to be seen or are not seen at all the framework will be
adjusted accordingly again on iterative basis between the operational readiness
exercises and inspection.
As discussed in Chapter III, four primary challenges are inherent in the
general approach described above. First, a sound means of measuring or
characterizing control center performance must be developed. Second, similar
sound means, using qualitative case study methods, must be employed to
characterize the nature of a given scenario within an exercise or inspection in
terms of the crisis environment. The characterizations of these constructs and
their sub-elements can be no more than categorical or perhaps ordinal in nature
and more likely just descriptive. Consequently, convergence from multiple data
sources must be sought. The third challenge described previously is to design a
training regimen of future exercise scenarios within the constraints that exist that
will facilitate the performance improvement of the control center. A fourth
challenge also discussed in Chapter III is that of general case study
methodological soundness.
To meet these objectives, approaches, and challenges this chapter will
develop and discuss a case study protocol guiding the overall case data
collection and analysis effort. The protocol itself is presented in outline form in
Appendix III where the research design is broken down into its various elements.
A significant sub-portion of the case study protocol presented here will be the
development of the individual data collection instruments supporting the
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subsequent analysis. The functions and objectives of these instruments will be
presented in this chapter while the actual instruments themselves are presented
in Appendix III. In broad terms, the research will be accomplished over two case
data sets. The first case is an Air Force unit conducting two internal operational
readiness exercises in preparation for a final formal external operational
readiness inspection. This first case involves three data collection opportunities.
Additionally, this case presents the chance to intervene, as described previously,
by developing a performance assessment from the first iteration and using it to in
turn support the development of an exercise script for the second exercise. The
second case data set will be collected during a formal operational readiness
inspection involving another unit. Figure 4.1 Research Design Approach
summarizes the discussion above. Figure 4.2, Iterative Approach, condenses
the presentation in Figure 4.1 and stresses the iterative design of the research in
which successive updates, after analysis of collected data from each ORE and
the ORI, are made to the DC5 framework and if necessary the protocol, data
collection instruments, and data analysis approach themselves.
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Figure 4.1: Research Design Approach
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Figure 4.2: Research Design Approach
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Organization of Data Collection and Analysis Protocol
Following the prescriptions of Yin (2003) and Creswell (1994) in order to
address Research Design Challenge 4, first, general research soundness, and
as previously discussed in Chapter III, the general case requirements, suitability,
and selection methods must be made explicit. Second, also addressing the
same design challenge, general access requirements, availability requirements,
and any existing rules of engagement with case data sources requirements must
also be made explicit. Third, a general description of the available data sources
must be accomplished to serve as a basis for development of the subsequent
data collection instruments. Fourth, integrating the described research design
challenges with the available case data sources will serve as a basis for design
guidance for developing the data collection instruments. Fifth, a discussion of
how collected data will be analyzed and employed to validate or adjust the
framework will be presented.

Case Requirements, Suitability, and Selection
The two most important general requirements to support framework
validation are 1) that the case be that of a control center in which distributed
cognition, as has been defined in Chapter II, occurs, and 2) during the period of
observation the control center experiences and is challenged by a crisis
environment, again as defined in Chapter II. In order to meet the first
requirement, control centers 1) must be staffed by people with variety of
expertise’s, 2) must experience scenarios and environments that sometimes
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require these people to integrate their knowledge in order to develop and adjust
representations of that external environment, and 3) must be equipped with some
variety of artifacts, again as described in Chapter II, which are used to facilitate
distributed cognition.
In order to meet the second requirement of a crisis environment, a
scripted test or drill is most suited to this type of research. A key component of a
crisis environment is unpredictability. Thus researchers trying to ensure they are
on site (i.e. control center) to observe a case and collect data in a real world
situation that fits the developed definition may find that they are waiting
interminably for such an ideal crisis to be reported into the control center. To
observe a real world situation that fits the developed definition would be desirable
from the research point of view of capturing data reflecting the true stresses of
such scenarios. Additionally, access to scripted events meeting the developed
crisis environment definition, allows the researcher to know what is coming, thus
enhancing the ability to capture relevant data in the control center. Furthermore,
formalized scripted events, if developed through some institutionalized process,
provide some standardization that facilitates comparison across sets of events
and across control center cases. Lastly, institutionalized drills are generally
followed by formalized, institutionalized processes focused on building an
assessment of the performance of the control center based on the opinions of
institutional observers and experts. Access to the thoughts, opinions, and
discussions of such experts could serve to enhance the analysis of data collected
from such cases.
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Thus in order to meet the requirements for this research a case must
involve a control center staffed by a diverse group of functional experts who have
to integrate their knowledge as well as use control center artifacts to construct
and maintain representations of the environment and should involve a control
center being examined through a formalized test, exercise, or drill simulating a
crisis.
Additionally, there are other desirable case attributes that can serve to
enhance the research. Control centers developed in order to function in crisis
environments generally require and facilitate the rapid flow of information through
the use of specialized systems, artifacts, jargon, language, institutionalized
processes, methods, and cultures. While familiarity with and closeness to
subject matter is an area of concern for the researcher, as discussed in Chapter
III, it is essential that the researcher be able to understand and comprehend the
flow of information and the construction of the resulting representations, as well
as, to keep up with such flows to capture case data for analysis. Thus, cases
suitable for research must be ones for which the researcher has the experience
and capability to collect and analyze data.
Further desirable characteristics for cases suitable for this research
include 1) a documentable, or scripted, variation in crisis intensity that the
researcher can access, 2) the scripted variations of the crisis intensity includes a
variety of different crisis scenarios that are repeated over time, 3) the case
occurs over of a limited amount of time allowing the case data to be processed
and analyzed within a suitable amount of time thereafter.
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The cases of Unit Control Centers (UCC) functioning during Air Force
Operational Readiness Exercises and Inspections (ORE and ORI) described in
the literature review in Chapter II meet these requirements and have the
described desirable characteristics as well. They are staffed by anywhere from 6
to 15 personnel of a variety of expertise’s from various base organizations (for
example; engineers, security forces, transportation, medical services, explosive
ordnance disposal, flying squadrons, personnel systems, fire department,
chemical weapons detection, etc.) who have to integrate their efforts, as well as,
utilize their systems and tools to understand and act within their environment.
ORIs are rigorous, standardized, institutionalized, scripted events designed to
test the unit being inspected against established, institutionalized assessment
criteria. The event scripts meet the requirements of implementing crisis
conditions as described in the DC5 framework. Additionally, the functional
expertise and experience coupled with the inspecting experience of the
inspection team provide standardization and rigor to the process. As described
previously, the researcher is familiar with the format, jargon, processes, and
systems used in such inspections having experienced approximately 20 OREs
both as a player and inspector. With the appropriate caveats discussed in the
previous chapter regarding researcher closeness to subject matter, these cases
are suited to the research in question.
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Research Soundness and Data Sources
The case study design strategies reviewed in Chapter III (see Table 3.1)
serve to guide the development of this protocol as do the research design
challenges discussed in the first part of this chapter. The primary objectives of
the protocol will be to satisfactorily address the research goals, in terms of rigor,
namely: confirmability, credibility, transferability, and dependability. The purpose
of the data collection and analysis protocol is to answer the research questions
developed in the previous chapters and to confirm the validity of the developed
DC5 framework. The protocol accomplishes these tasks by developing specific
guidance for selecting, collecting, and analyzing case data. The data types
available surrounding a Unit Control Center (UCC) in an Operational Readiness
Exercise (ORE) include: 1) pre-ORE interviews with UCC players, 2) ORE scripts
that allow the researcher to characterize the crisis nature of the UCC
environment, 3) Detailed researcher field notes capturing the unfolding
interaction of players and UCC artifacts, 4) Post-ORE interviews with UCC
players, 5) Post-ORE interviews with evaluators, and 6) ORE reports and ratings
of UCCs inspected.
It should be noted here that the use of surveys was precluded because
the number of personnel involved in manning the control centers and evaluating
the control centers was small, no more than a dozen total. Thus, it was assumed
that a direct capture of any survey questions could be accomplished through the
interview process resulting in a higher return rate than the use of surveys.
Furthermore, any statistical numeric data captured would necessarily be
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descriptive in nature rather than inferential given the small sample space of
respondents.
The developed protocol will then serve to guide the process of collecting
and assimilating the case data. Figure 4.2, adapted from both the nature of the
case to be studied and Yin (1993), captures the multiple data sets available in
the case of this research, which can be used to capture and analyze information,
as the researcher seeks convergence around common themes and postulates
from the framework. The formal iterative analysis discussion leading to
successive adjustments to the framework will be accomplished in a prospective
Chapter V, Case Analysis, once the data collection and analysis phase of the
research begins.
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Figure 4.3: Data sets to be used for convergence
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Lastly, the goals of achieving research soundness and rigor specific to
case study research, as discussed in the literature review, guide the research
design development process in terms of data collection and analysis. Table 4.1,
Case Study Tactics, adapted from Yin (2003) and Saunders (1998) captures
these design strategies.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

206

Table 4.1: Case Study Design Tactics (adapted from Yin, 2003 and Lincoln and
Guba, 1985)

Traditional Research
Goal
Construct Validity or
Objectivity

Qualitative Research
Goal
Confirmability

Internal Validity

Credibility

External Validity

Transferability

Reliability

Dependability

Case Study Design
Tactics
- Detail Researcher
Background
- Detail Access
Requirements
- Triangulate
- Establish Chain of
Evidence
- Informant Review
- Pattern Matching
- Explanation Building
- Address Rival
Explanations
- Use Logic Models
- Multiple Reviewers
- Generalize to Theory
- Seek Replication
- Develop and Use Case
Protocol
- Develop and Maintain
Case Database

Of these tactics several can be addressed directly. The background of the
researcher conducting this investigation can be found in Appendix IV, Supporting
Documentation. Access requirements are detailed in the next section. Samples
of correspondence relating to gaining case access are also provided in the
Appendix IV with the full set of correspondence relating to access and rules of
engagement provided in the case database. Samples of informant reviews will
be provided in Appendix IV with the full set in the case database. Multiple
outside observers and reviewers in addition to the researcher of this investigation
were not allowed by the case agency in order to limit footprint on their exercises;
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however convergence can be sought on several objectives using the multiple
data sources available. Generalization to theory (i.e. to the DC5 framework) is
inherent to this research design. Finally, replication is gained by the fact that the
research approach involves returning to the same case system three times to
gauge improvement of the control center as it prepares through successive
exercises.

Availability, Access, and Rules of Engagement
The initial portion of this research protocol is built around meeting the case
study design goal of confirmability. Analogous to the traditional research goal of
construct validity, the focus of this objective is to remove or mitigate the
subjectivity, biases, and weaknesses of the researcher. Case study researchers
acknowledge this pitfall and seek its mitigation by 1) thoroughly detailing the
background, demographic and experiential, of the researcher so that the
audience can assess his potential biases as well as familiarity with case issues,
2) thoroughly detailing the means by which access to case data sources was
gained, again for the purpose of allowing reviewers to assess potential biases,
and 3) having the actual informants review the descriptions and conclusions of
the researcher (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt ,1989; Patton, 1990; Creswell, 1994,
Marshall and Rossman, 1995). These steps allow the researcher to provide the
audience with a means of confirming the work’s findings and conclusions.
To support these objectives 1) the researcher’s military resume is included
in the case database along with 2) detailing his experience in working in and
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running unit control centers in both operational readiness exercises and
inspections, as well as, 3) his experience serving as an inspector on the Air
Force’s Air Combat Command Inspector General’s (ACC/IG) Team evaluating
such control centers. Additionally, all the correspondence, mainly email and
staffing packages, involved in gaining access to the case data is included in the
case database. Essentially in order to gain access to the control centers being
evaluated by the ACC/IG team 1) the researcher agreed, as an exchange for the
case access, to augment the team as a non-inspector supporting the team’s
script implementation process on an inspection not used for purposes of this
research, 2) the researcher developed a staffing package, provided in the case
database, seeking and securing approval from the ACC/IG team leadership
detailing the research objectives and approaches to be used, 3) the researcher
developed a staffing package, provided in the case database, seeking and
securing approval from leadership of the organization being inspected detailing
the research objectives and approaches to be used and finally, 4) the researcher
and the IG team developed rules of engagement, provided in Appendix IV
governing the researchers conduct and interaction with inspectors and players
while collecting case data. The ACC/IG team agreed to allow the researcher to
conduct this research during four Operational Readiness Exercises and
Inspections. This documentation is provided in the case database with samples
in Appendix IV.
With regard to this last measure the rules of engagement were designed
to support two main goals, 1) ensuring the soundness of the research as
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discussed in this section and secondly 2) complying Air Force regulation and
policy interpretation regarding the release of inspection information. Essentially
these rules of engagement are centered on establishing and maintaining
anonymity for units and personnel being inspected, as well as, providing
participants a chance to review collected case data, analysis, and conclusions;
again both of these efforts are mutually supported by the desire for research
soundness and the Air Force’s rules for information release.

Data Sources and Research Challenges
A critical task of this investigation is to incorporate these design objectives
and constraints into a data collection and analysis protocol that also meets the
remaining research design challenges that have been specified in Figure 4.1.
The remainder of the protocol with regards to the data sources thus becomes
design guidance for developing the data collection instruments themselves, then
and analyzing the resulting data. As described previously, the goals of the data
collection efforts are, 1) to observe if the DC5 framework provides a means for
framing the distributed cognition phenomena occurring in the control center, 2) to
observe if the DC5 framework can serve as a basis for providing an initial
assessment of distributed cognition fitness, 3) to observe if the DC5 framework
can serve as a basis for developing training scenarios for future exercises that
will improve performance, 4) to develop a means of characterizing performance
of the distributed cognition system, 5) to develop a means of characterizing the
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crisis environment of a given scenario within an exercise and 6) to account for
measurement influences on distributed cognition system fitness.
Table 4.2 serves to inform the development of the protocol design
guidance for the data collection instruments by detailing which data sources can
be used to address which research design objective. These subsequent
intersections of data source and research design objective can in turn be used to
develop specific interview questions as well as guidance to orient the researcher
as he observes the UCC in action during exercises and inspections.
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Table 4.2: Data Sources vs. Design Objectives = Protocol Guidance for Data Collection Instruments
Data Sources
A) P re -O R E P layer
Interviews

B) O R E Scripts

C ) R esearcher
O bservations

D ) P ost-O R E P layer
Interviews

E ) Post O R E Evaluator
interviews

F) O R E P erform ance
Reports

B1
- Can scenarios be
characterized in terms
of D C 5, specifically
Crisis Environment
[CE]?

C1
- C an observations be
coded readily into the
constructs of D C 5?
- Is further ordering and
understanding of
observation gained by
using D C 5?

D1
- Are failures or successes
readily characterized in
term s of D C 5?
- Are scenarios readily
characterized in term s of
DC 5?

E1
- A re failures or
successes readily
characterized in term s of
D C 5?
- A re scenarios readily
characterized in term s of
D C 5?

F1
- Can formal w rite-ups
be readily captured
within D C 5 constructs?

B2
- Capturing [CE] in
conjunction with
Performance [P] is key
to using D C 5 to
assess D C O G F

C2
- C an interpreting
observations in term s of
[P] and [CE] yield a
good characterization of
[D C O G F ]?

E2
- Asking evaluators for
their assessm ents of
perform ance in light of
crisis conditions. Are
their answ ers readily
interpretable in term s of
D C 5?

F2
- Can formal w rite-ups
be readily captured
within D C 5 constructs?

A3
- W hat kind of
scenarios do players
think they need to
work on?
A4
Not Applicable

B3
- Use in developing
scripts

C3
- W h a t kind of scenarios
do observations indicate
that require work?

D2
- Asking players for there
own assessm ents of
perform ance in light of
crisis conditions. A re their
answers readily
interpretable in term s of
D C5?
D3
- W hat kind of scenarios do
players think they need to
work on?

E3
- W h at kind o f scenarios
do evaluators think they
need to work on?

B4
Not Applicable

C4
- D escribe general
feeling of how U C C
perform ed? In light of

D4
- Capture feelings of how
players thought their U C C
performed in light of
conditions

E4
- C apture feelings of
how evaluators thought
their U C C perform ed in
light of conditions

F3
- Do formal write-ups
lead to scenario
developm ent for future
training?
F4
- Capture formal write
ups
Are they interpretable in
light of [CE1?

5) Can [CE] be
captured/
characterized

A5
Not Applicable

B5
- Characterize scripted
scenarios [CE]
explicitly in term s of
DC5

D5
- C apture players view of
scenarios

E5
- C apture evaluators
view of scenarios

F5
- Capture any form al
discussion of scenarios
that m ay exist in report

6) Does resultant
D C O G F account for
m easurem ent influence

A6
- S eek to determ ine if
research is
influencing player’s
actions

B6
Not applicable

D6
- S e e k to determ ine if
research is influencing
player’s actions

E6
- S e e k to determ ine if
research is influencing
evaluator’s actions

F6
Not applicable

R esearch Design
Objectives
1) Is D C 5 a valid set of
constructs for
describing distributed
cognition phenom ena?

2) C an D C 5 serve as a
basis for providing an
initial assessm ent of
distributed cognition
fitness?

3 ) Can D C 5 serve as a
basis for developing
training scenarios to
facilitate improvement?
4) Can [P] be captured/
characterized?

A1
- C apture contextual
attributes o f players
- Capture
expectations of
players, possibly in
D C 5 term s
- Capture
preconceptions of
players regarding
D C O G F , possibly in
terms o f D C 5
A2
Not Applicable

fC El
C5
- C h aracterize scenarios
as they occur [CE]
explicitly in term s of D C 5
C6
- S e e k to determ ine if
researcher presence is
influencing actions of
players

Additionally, the constructs of the DC5 framework will guide the substantive
matter involved in the questionnaires, observation guidance, and evaluation
reports review.
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It should be noticed at this point that an additional design objective will be
discussed and implemented also in Appendix III. The additional design objective
is to incorporate practical design guidance relating to long-interview
questionnaire development based on the experience of other researchers.

Data Collection and Analysis: Protocol’s Development to Support
Determination of DC5 Suitability for Distributed Cognition Fitness
Assessment
The primary challenge governing the development of the data collection
instruments is that each instrument attempts to collect data in such a way that it
lends itself to being processed easily into a formal assessment of the fitness of
the distributed cognition system. The researcher will have to gauge if indeed the
subsequent data collection effort is complete in capturing relevant data to the
health of the system. To the extent that data observed does not lend itself to
being readily assembled into the constructs of the DC5 framework, the
framework will require adjustment. The primary data sources for this effort will be
researcher observations, evaluator observations, and formal report write-ups.
Additional triangulation, pattern matching, and evidence-chain supply may be
found from pre- and post-player interviews by essentially asking them to explain
how they think they performed after an exercise. A key facet of the DC5
framework in this case, captured conceptually as [DCOGF] = [P]/[CE] in Chapter
III, is interpreting performance in light of the given crisis conditions of a particular
scenario. Thus observations will have to be geared for looking for such
interpretations as will interview questions. To the extent observations and
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answers do not fit readily with this approach, the framework will have to be
adjusted.

Data Collection and Analysis: Protocol’s Development to Support
Determination of DC5 Suitability as a Basis for Developing Training
Scenarios

Although data collection instruments, such as the evaluator interviews,
player interviews, and researcher observations can be designed with this design
objective in mind (i.e., to Support Determination of DC5 Suitability as a Basis for
Developing Training Scenarios), the aim is primarily oriented to the analysis
stage of the effort. Specifically, the assessment will identify areas of strengths
and weakness within the control center. Scenarios with [CEj’s specific to these
attributes can then be developed and scripted for the next operational readiness
exercise which will stress the areas needing improvement. Assessments can
then be made again to characterize improvement and validate the framework in
terms of this objective. Given exercise constraints and limited time, scenarios
will have to be prioritized to facilitate optimal performance improvement (i.e., the
weak areas will have to be prioritized for training and iterative repetition).

Data Collection and Analysis: Protocol’s Development to Support
Capturing Performance

This research design objective primarily impacts data collection.
Performance is readily captured in report ratings, the interpretations of evaluators
and the researcher, and can be triangulated by eliciting the thoughts of the
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players after an exercise. Of a practical note here is the 5-tier ordinal,
categorical grading construct used in the Air Force: Outstanding, Excellent,
Satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory. The formal definition of these terms
from Air Force regulations is supplied in Appendix I, but because they have been
used recurrently for so long, and not just in operational readiness
exercise/inspection setting, within the Air Force these terms have become
institutional vocabulary. It will not be difficult to elicit responses from evaluators
relating to performance. The key will be following up on such pronouncements
by having personnel explain their assessments in the context of the crisis
environment occurring at the time as DC5 suggests.
An additional and important means of descriptively characterizing
performance will be by comparing the representations being used by the UCC
over time to the true state of the outside environment, which the researcher will
have by virtue of having the exercise script. To the extent that representations,
the so-called heart of cognition discussed in the literature review, displayed,
discussed, and acted upon deviate from the existing real world environment,
performance can be descriptively characterized as degraded. It should be noted
that defining performance in this way necessarily scopes out of consideration the
decision and action portions of most of the reviewed frameworks. The reason for
this scoping in the context of this research is one of simply bounding
accomplishable work. Decision analysis and strategy development and
implementation are sciences unto themselves and go beyond the scope of this
research. Focusing on representations themselves allows for the simpler
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definition of performance. To the extent the other constructs, decision and action
compromise performance even in the presence of well-maintained, accurate
UCC representations the research will be complemented by the converging
means of characterizing performance discussed in the previous paragraph.
Given this representational basis for capturing performance a key focus of the
researcher will have to be on capturing the explicit and implicit representations
used by the UCC and its individual players using converging data sources.

Data Collection and Analysis: Protocol’s Development to Support
Capturing the Crisis Environment

The focus in this section will be on developing questionnaires and being
prepared to observe and capture data in terms of the crisis environment specified
in the DC5 framework. The script itself can be reviewed by both researcher and
evaluators to gain a characterization of crisis intensity as proscribed by the
framework. Player interviews after the fact can be used to triangulate such
interpretations. Once [CE] is captured using the framework it can be used to
interpret performance characterizations in terms of distributed cognition system
fitness.

Data Collection and Analysis: Protocol’s Development to Ensure
Distributed Cognition Fitness Assessment Does Not Lead to Measurement
Influence

The key to meeting this objective, primarily one of data collection as
opposed to data analysis, is for the researcher to follow practical guidelines
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based on the vast experience of other researchers in the development of
questionnaires to ensure that measurement is as precise and accurate as
possible. A review of such methods is undertaken in Appendix III where the
questionnaires themselves are presented.

Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a research design that will
attempt to validate the proposed DC5 framework, specifically addressing focused
objective 4 developed in Chapter I. To this end, a description of data sources
was provided. They were subsequently integrated with specific case study
design strategies developed to enhance research rigor and soundness. The net
result was the development and presentation of a research design protocol
detailing the guidance for developing and deploying design instruments that will
be used to capture, consolidate, and analyze case data. The instruments
themselves that flow from this research design and the resulting protocol are
provided in Appendix III. A final note on data collection is in order. The case
database will be maintained by the researcher on CD-ROM and, in the case of
field notes, in a filing system.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS

Purpose and Organization of Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to 1) present the data gained from the
cases, and 2) to present a discussion of the data that leads to the validation or
modification of the proposed DC5 framework. As discussed in Chapter IV, the
research approach involved 1) a case study involving an Air Force unit
conducting two successive operational readiness exercises in preparation for a
final formal operational readiness inspection, for a total of three case data
collection iterations, and 2) a second case involving an Air Force unit
participating in a single operational readiness inspection. Each case and
iteration presented the opportunity to validate or refine the DC5 framework in
terms of its usefulness for understanding the distributed cognition phenomena
occurring in the unit’s control center. Furthermore, the time between the
successive operational readiness exercises in the first case presented the
opportunity to further test the framework’s usefulness as a basis for intervention
by developing an exercise script designed to train control center systems and
personnel to improve the center’s performance.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 from the last chapter summarize the research design.
The organization of this chapter will be 1) a brief overview of the case data from
the first operational readiness exercise involving the first case, 2) a summary of
findings based on this data, 3) the subsequent refinement of the DC5 framework,
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4) development of the intervening script for the second operational readiness
inspection, 5) a brief overview of the case data from the second operational
readiness exercise, 6) a summary of findings from this second exercise, 7) the
subsequent refinement of the DC5 framework, 8) a brief overview of the case
data from the operational readiness inspection for the second case, 9) the
subsequent step of refining the DC5 framework, 10) a brief overview of the case
data from the final operational readiness inspection for the first case, and 11) the
subsequent and final iterative refinement of the DC5 framework. The second
case is inserted between the second and third iterations of the first case in the
discussion here because that is the position longitudinally in time in which the
case occurred. The detailed results of the data collection instruments from the
case iterations upon which the overview summaries presented in this chapter are
based can be found in the case database.
In the brief overviews of case data for each Operational Readiness
Exercise or Inspection suggested above, only the key raw findings from the data
collection instruments relating to distributed cognition will be discussed. Many
raw findings will have little to do with distributed cognition; for example, data from
evaluators, participants, and other sources may converge showing that the unit
being inspected has significant problems across personnel, even control center
personnel, with safe handling and care of weapons. Such a finding has little to
do with distributed cognition and will not be presented here. Alternatively, other
findings will be initially listed and detailed in their raw form in these overviews
because they represent emergent manifestations of underlying issues relating to
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distributed cognition. Explanation of why such raw findings relate to distributed
cognition will be provided in the subsequent sections as their impact on the DC5
framework is presented.
In addition to the narrative discussion that follows, after the review of each
Operational Readiness Exercise or Operational Readiness Inspection, the
iterative refinement of the DC5 framework will be captured by 1) rewriting Table
3.1, Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance and 2)
redrawing Figure 3.4, DC5 Theoretical Framework. The former captures the
specific impacts of the crisis environment on distributed cognition phenomena
while the latter captures the interrelationships and definitions key to the
framework’s development.
Finally, as the case data is analyzed and used to validate each individual
cell within the progressively refined tables that follow, the researcher will provide
a qualitative assessment regarding the degree to which the data converges with
the proposed theory. The intent is to distinguish, only at the ordinal level, the
degree of such convergence within the case database; it became apparent as
analysis began, that in some instances such convergence was of a much greater
degree than in others in which it was indeed still present, and in others still where
little or no convergence was noted. This assessment will be based on the 1)
degree to which the data converges itself; that is a variety of data sources concur
that a finding is accurate and 2) the degree to which that finding confirms the
impact of the crisis environment on distributed cognition phenomena as
suggested by the DC5 framework. An assessment rating of “Considerable
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Convergence” will be given those cells in which 1) a large majority, that is at least
2/3rds of informants who have insight into the particular issue, agree that a
particular issue was noteworthy and 2) the noted effect aligns with that predicted
by the DC5 framework. An assessment rating of “Notable Convergence” will be
given those cells in which 1) a simple majority, that is more than 50% of
informants having insight into an issue, find it noteworthy and 2) it aligns with
some of the particular effect suggested by the DC5 framework but not all of it, in
other word the data suggests some but not all predicted effects as well as some
non-predicted effects. If the data suggest some non-predicted effects according
the fractions of observing informants suggested above the appropriate level of
convergence will be noted and appropriate modification to the DC5 framework
will be presented. Finally, in many instances there may be no intersection
between the predicted effects and the given case scenarios; a particular crisis
element may not be experienced during the evaluation or inspection. In this case
the provided assessment will be “no intersection with DC5 constructs.”

Overview of Data from Case 1 , 1st Operational Readiness Exercise
This overview of the case data from the first operational readiness
exercise (ORE) will include 1) an introduction to the specific setting in which the
ORE occurred and a description of the unit participating in the ORE, 2) a listing
describing the key events of the ORE as seen by the researcher and other
evaluators, 3) and a summary of the raw findings obtained after an analysis
performed by the researcher and other evaluators. Afterwards, in subsequent
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analysis, this information will be analyzed as suggested by the research
methodology and design.

The Setting of the First Case
In developing a schedule and plan of preparation for their April 2006
formal Operational Readiness Inspection to be conducted by Air Combat
Command’s (ACC) Inspector General (IG) team, the executive officer, who works
directly for the wing commander - the head of the unit to be inspected, was
referred by members of the inspector general team to the researcher. The unit
was seeking 1) someone who could aid in developing and implementing ORE
scripts similar to those the IG would use in the formal inspection and 2) someone
who could aid specifically in improving the performance of the wing’s Survival
Recovery Center (SRC). The entire wing had originally been inspected in May
2005 and two specific functional component performance areas were found to be
below ACC standards, one of those being the performance of the survival
recovery center. As a result, the deficient areas were scheduled for the re
inspection in a limited (i.e., not the entire wing) ORI scenario by the IG in May
2006.
With regard to the deficient performance of the SRC in the original May
2005 ORI, the formal inspection report cites the following recommended areas
for improvement: 1) the SRC did not have redundant procedures for sector chiefs
during relocation operations causing a 1-hour and 30-minute delay in post attack
reconnaissance team release, 2) Lack of status boards to track contaminated
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personnel and equipment did not allow a quick reference for the Wing Operating
Center commander, 3) the SRC did not have all functional squadrons
represented in the SRC halting critical post-attack assessments, 4) the SRC did
not utilize appropriate functions during post-attack assessment to advise the
commander, 5) Sector representatives in the SRC did not retrieve and report
post-attack assessments to readiness representative, 6) the SRC did not
prioritize facility damage IAW Base X-Plan priority list, 7) the SRC did not track
Airfield Damage Repair or status of repairs on the airfield, 8) Unexploded
Ordnance (UXO) prioritizing and plotting was confusing and took too much time,
holding up the mission, 9) the Base went alarm green MOPP 2 general release
without UXOs identified on the base grid map, 10) the SRC plotted one UXO four
times and held up recovery operations, 11) the SRC was unaware of a cleared
UXO until 9 hours after clearance, and 12) the SRC relied heavily on the base
attack recovery tracking system (BARTS) computer message board not utilizing
functional representatives in the SRC.
It was in light of these difficulties and the desire to correct them that the
wing sought help from the IG as they prepared for their May 2006 re-inspection.
Thus the researcher and the wing executive officer, acting in his position as head
of the wing’s exercise evaluation team, met prior to the ORE in November 2005
and scripted the exercise. After some discussion, it was decided that given the
extent of the deficiencies in the SRC and another completely separate, functional
area with problems cited by the IG, the primary focus of the script should be first,
on allowing the wing to start slowly and begin to re-learn basic task-executional-
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proficiency in these areas and 2) provide enough intensity to gain a measure of
where these areas stood in terms of performance that assessments and future
training regimens could be established. To generalize, the operative analogous
phrase used to describe this idea was “you have to walk before you can run.”

The Key Events of the First Case: The Script as Implemented
In terms of the intensity of the script, suggestive of the pace of events and
scale of events of the DC5 framework developed in Chapter III, on the first day of
the exercise this amounted to 1) a false alarm of an inbound enemy missile to
allow the unit to begin slowly and gain a feel for executing wartime response
procedures, 2) an inbound missile attack resulting in a broad range of differing
impacts across the base play area, 3) a small narrowly focused small ground
based aggressor attack with minimal damage 4) a focused missile attack
resulting in extensive damage to a single building/organization while the rest of
the base remained unscathed, and 5) relatively limited damage from a nighttime
missile attack. On the second day of the exercise the script consisted of 1) one
widely impacting missile impact, 2) one focused, limited missile attack and 3) one
limited small ground attack by aggressors. It should be noted that after reaching
a consensus with evaluators at the end of the first day, the evaluator team chief
and the researcher scaled the script back even further as another area of unit
performance outside of command and control was found to be significantly
deficient in terms of performance as to require near remedial training by
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evaluators. Training which was determined could best be accomplished with a
very light script intensity in terms of attack intensity.
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The Raw Results of the First Case - First ORE
Drawing on the case data from the data collection instruments described
in Chapter IV, specifically the interviews/discussions with players and evaluators,
the final exercise report, and the researchers notes, convergence seemed to
emerge around the following raw findings to be discussed in further detail below:
1) contextually, the deficient performance of a key area outside that of command
and control, the focus of this research, limited to a degree the ability to stress the
survival recovery center, 2) control and tracking of Post-Attack Reconnaissance
(PAR) teams was weak and non-expeditious, 3) the unit’s implementation of an
innovative computerized message board system greatly facilitated command and
control while introducing some novel challenges to control center, 4) some
improvement in the use of visual aids would facilitate a quicker processing of
information by control center personnel and 5) distribution of imminent attack
information could be improved. Further description and elaboration on these
points is provided below in raw terms as they emerge from the collection
instruments. Actual refined discussion of their interpretation in terms of the
proposed DC5 framework will follow in the next section. A more exhaustive
review of the data collected during the case and the degree, or lack of thereof, of
data convergence on particular issues is presented in summary form in Appendix
V, Case 1 Data Results using the questions of the data collection instruments as
a means of presenting and summarizing the results of each individual data
collection effort.
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As described in the discussion on the setting of the exercise, a key area of
unit performance separate and outside that of the survival recovery center was
found to be deficient during a formal inspection in May of 2005. As a result,
when the terms of evaluation were negotiated for the re-inspection to take place
in May of 2006, the vast majority of the unit’s functions that were found to meet
or exceed Air Force standards were eliminated from the re-inspection. Therefore
contextually, the value of the exercise to training the control center, and as result
to this research was somewhat limited because 1) the amount of participants,
organizations, buildings, and infrastructure involved in the exercise and therefore
available to be damaged stressing command and control was limited and 2) the
other deficient area referred to here required enough significant attention from
senior leadership and evaluators that the ability to focus on the control center
was limited. This point was 1) noted by the researcher throughout preparation
and execution of the exercise, 2) was specifically cited by several players in the
control center as well as senior leaders during the exercise in the course of
conversation and during post-exercise interviews, 3) and was noted by several
evaluators during and after the exercise. Convergence on this point is clear.
Following any type of attack on an air base, including missile, bomb, or
mortar impact or physical or small arms ground attack by combatants, a post
attack reconnaissance (PAR) sweep of the base land area and assets is
conducted. In general, a PAR sweep involves the release of teams in sectors of
the base who then sweep there area of responsibility looking for damage,
casualties, accounting for personnel, unexploded ordnance and any other areas
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or causes for concern. As the PAR teams complete their sweeps and upchannel the information the SRC collects and assembles the information into
displays, messages, and prioritized visual aids eventually assembling a picture of
the base for senior leadership to act on in terms of returning some normalcy to
operations. Both the researcher based on experience and senior evaluators
agreed PAR information was 1) not being collected fast enough 2) not flowing to
the control center fast enough and 3) the PAR teams were not being controlled or
perhaps pushed or motivated to accomplish their tasks quickly and proficiently
enough. The impact of this general slowness was that unit leadership was
unable to return the unit to some sense of normal operations, or launching of
aircraft, in an expeditious manner. The observations of the researcher and
evaluators were made both during and following the exercise. Similar
convergence on the issue was noted in the discussion of control center
personnel as they waited for an extended period for information to flow. Some
improvement was seen over the course of the exercise but the deficiency was
significant enough to see the issue repeatedly cited in the final report.
The unit had developed a computerized message board system that
allowed the survival recovery center, subordinate unit control centers, and indeed
anyone with limited password-controlled access to the base network the ability to
monitor any information being posted throughout the unit. Such information
included attack damage, threat intelligence, recovery operations, unit status,
personnel accountability, and other general information wing leadership or others
wished to communicate. The speed with which the information was posted and
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read, in the judgment of the author, was much faster than typical verbal, phone
and radio based communication and limited only by the speed and diligence by
of the posters and readers. Convergence on the strength of this artifact of the
unit’s command and control system was of lesser degree than other key findings
cited here, primarily because other evaluators lacked the command and control
evaluation experience to compare it to general standards of performance of other
units and their systems. To the extent evaluators other than the researcher
observed the system in action they were positive. Unit leadership was both
happy with the capability of the system and its performance and considered its
innovation and development a point of pride. It should be noted that when the
survival recovery center was formally evaluated by the ACC IG team in May
2005, some areas for improvement relating to the system were noted.
Specifically cited was an over-reliance on the system to the negation of using
control room personnel to distribute, interpret, and analyze information. In the
researcher’s opinion this observation, also noted in the November 2005 ORE,
represents implementation issues associated with the system more than a lack of
convergence on the attributes of the system as positively or negatively impacting
performance. As more detailed discussion of the specific issues cited by the IG
team lends itself to framing questions associated with the DC5 framework, it will
be covered in the next section.
The control room visual aids could have been improved. Cited by both the
researcher and the evaluation team chief, these included 1) adding a large base
map in the survival recovery center with damage plotted by type for easy referral
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by unit leadership and control center personnel would have led to quicker more
accurate understanding of events and reaction times and, 2) a visual aid with an
easily readable listing of damage prioritized for response should have been used.
While noted primarily by the researcher in his observations, some convergence
on this point in discussions with control room personnel and wing leadership
existed.
Finally, executing key command and control functions in disseminating
essential imminent attack and threat information needed improvement. These
mistakes in the execution included general slowness or ineptness in using
information distribution systems to indicate changes in threat/alarm conditions
from the control center to the unit at large. Specifically, outdoor loudspeakers
were slow in passing on key timely information regarding attack, frequently the
speaker stumbled on her words or misspoke, and use of flags to indicate threat
condition was slow and incorrectly executed. The researcher’s notes,
observations of other evaluators, the final exercise report, and to a lesser extent,
discussion with control center and leadership personnel, all converged on the
importance and accuracy of these observations.

Analysis of First Case Key Findings
The analysis of the case data from the first case will consist of three parts.
As discussed in Chapter IV, the research design/analysis will follow two tracks: 1)
the first being interpreting the emergent converging themes of the case data into
those supporting the DC5 framework as the theory was developed in Chapter III
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and those supporting modification of or incongruity with the framework. This first
track analysis will then be applied by modifying the DC5 framework accordingly.
2) The second track of the research design will involve using the DC5 framework
and the case data to characterize the crisis environment in order to develop a
fitness assessment based on the DC5 framework. This assessment in turn will
be used to develop the crisis environment for the second ORE, for the unit in
question with the hope that the framework will prove its usefulness by serving as
training tool for such control centers.
Before either of these discussion tracks begins some critical reflection on
expectations developed regarding the research versus the reality of what was
found and the resulting impact on the research is in order and follows thusly.

Researcher Expectations vs. Case Realities
The gap seen by the researcher between prior expectations for the
research and the reality of the first case after reflecting upon it, focus around the
impact of the limitations of the ORE setting on the ability to completely apply the
developed research design for validating the DC5 framework. As discussed in
the previous section, the ACC/IG team inspected the unit that was the subject of
the case in May of 2005 and two key areas of performance, one being the SRC,
were rated as below standard and scheduled for re-inspection in May of 2006.
This re-inspection would involve only those portions of the unit that had been
rated poorly and as a result a significant fraction of the unit would not be playing
in the retake. This scenario, which would also be used for the OREs conducted
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by the unit in preparation for the formal ORI, then necessarily impacted the ability
to stress the SRC because a significant fraction of the information flow generated
during the exercise would disappear or be greatly minimized by the lack of
playing sub-units.
This lack of play impacted the research in three ways. 1) Because only
one other significant section of the unit was playing in the ORE, the diversity of
sources and disciplines generating information was limited. Specifically, this
limited the ability to collect data relating 1) to the DC5 construct of coordination
as a key system of the control center and 2) to the ability to create a crisis
environment demanding the integration of diverse expertises in the control
center. As a result, in the analysis that follows, relating to the interpretive
research approach, track one, of the research design, interpretation in terms of
DC5 constructs, little is postulated in this area. In addition to limiting the ability to
create a crisis environment testing integration of diverse information flows, the
limited size of the scenario, to a lesser extent, also limited the ability to stress the
SRC with information overflow. Although the SRC was stressed and case data
indicates such, this additional source of stress was not available. Finally, as a
result of the scenario limitations, track 2 of the research design, developing a
fitness assessment and subsequent training crisis environments, was also
impacted.
Despite these limitations specifically detailed above and given that their
impact upon the research is precisely cited, the case data and the research
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design remains viable for interpreting, testing, and validating the remainder of the
DC5 framework as well as for proving the remainder’s usefulness.

Track 1: Interpretation of Case Data: Emergent Converging Themes and the
DC5 Framework
The first track of the research design seeks to show the actual usefulness
of the DC5 framework for interpreting the observed distributed cognition
phenomena. To the extent emerging observations readily converge with
suggested theory the framework has demonstrated its holistic (i.e., nomological)
validity as well as its specific construct validity. To the extent emerging
observations do not readily converge with the suggested theory then the
framework has demonstrated the need for modification or further study. Table
5.1, mirroring Table 3.1, Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem
Performance, which described in detail the theoretical impacts of crisis conditions
on distributed cognition phenomena, provides the organization for the detailed
discussion which follows regarding: 1) the areas in which emergent observations
from case 1 converged with suggested framework constructs and their
interaction, 2) diverged from the suggested theory, 3) required modification to the
suggested theory, or 3) remained ambiguous with regards to the suggested
theory. Table 5.2, Case 1 Implications for DC5 Framework, based on the
framework of Table 5.1 summarizes the researcher’s assessment of the case
data and its implications for the DC5 framework. An exhaustive discussion of
how these assessments were reached for each cell in Table 5.2 is provided in
Appendix VI.
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Table 5.1: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance (Reprint of Table 3.1)
S 1. Autonomous
Units

S 2. Coordination

S3. Control

S 3 *. Monitoring

S4. Intelligence

S 5. Identity

Context

R eal Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcomes +
inducem ent of
stress)

- System self
doubt might
increase
- Sensitivities to
stimulus
increased
-Focus changes

- Differences amplified
- A cquiesce to
consensus
- M a y not seek
consensus

- Pressure S1 to
provide more
information and S 2
to process m ore
information
- Increase
dem ands on S 4 for
im plem entable
solution

- Must determine if
S 1 ’s are handling
pressure
appropriately

- Dem and m ore
information to get
representation
right

- S e e k more
confidence in
representation before
selecting alternatives
- Selection/
decision/action goes to
the organization core
so balance is less
routine

- Increase
focus/pressure
m ay cause H O V
to be ignored
- Increase
pressure on
individual systems
m ay cause loss of
IS with other
systems
- S ta ff
com petence
directly impacted
- Leadership
directly impacted

Complexity:
D em and For
High Levels O f
Specialized
Expertise

- Ability to
correctly inquire
about data
increasingly
challenged

- Possible increased
dem and between
system s

- Must ascertain
when S1 has
becom e
overwhelm ed

- Must ascertain
w h en S1 is no
longer up to
environmental
dem ands

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

Complexity:
D em and for
Integrated
Expertise

- Ability to
correctly inquire
about data
increasingly
challenged
- Ability to
correctly inquire
about data
increasingly
challenged
- Ability to track
and process data
challenged
because of
volume
- Ability to
receive and
process data
challenged

- C hallenged with
knowing who needs to be
involved in processing
information

- Must ensure
coordination is
functional

- Must ascertain if
S 2 is no longer
capab le of meeting
requirem ents

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

-S ta ff
com petence up to
the task
- Leadership
increasing S1
performance
- H O V and IS
crucial
- S C and
Leadership also
important

- C an recognize
w hen more d ata
collection is
fruitless

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge
- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

Com plexityNovelty
unknowability

Com plexityNovelty
num ber of
entities
Com plexityNovelty
pace of events

- Can recognize
when m ore data
collection is
fruitless
- Ability to
coordinate/assim ilate
d ata challenged because
o f volum e

- Can recognize
when systems
becoming
overwhelm ed

- M ust ascertain if
S 1 ’s and S 2 up to
task/replaceable

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- Ability to process data
challenged

- Increase dem and
for a tim ely plan of
action

- M ust ascertain if
S 1's and S 2 up to
task/replaceable

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- S enses need to act
quickly

- Flexibility key
- R edundancy
m ay prevent
processing errors
- Redundancy
m ay prevent
processing errors
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Table 5.2: Case 1 Results: Convergence between DC5 Framework and Emergent Themes

Real Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcomes +
inducement
of stress)
Complexity:
Demand For
High Levels
Of
Specialized
Expertise
Complexity:
Demand for
Integrated
Expertise
ComplexityNovelty
unknowability
ComplexityNovelty:
number of
entities
ComplexityNovelty
pace of
events

S1.
Autonomous
Units
Notable
Convergence

S2. Coordination

S3. Control

S3*. Monitoring

S4. Intelligence

S5. Identity

Context

Insufficient Data

Considerable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence and
Modification
needed

Considerable
Convergence
and
Modification
needed

Considerable
Convergence

Not Validated/
Insufficient
Data

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient Data

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence
and
Modification
needed

Insufficient Data

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient Data

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Considerable
Convergence
MODIFICATION
NEEDED

Notable
Convergence

Insufficient Data

Insufficient
Data
Considerable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Considerable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED

Considerable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence
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Track 1, Case 1: Summary of Case Data versus DC5 Framework
The key points seen arising from the first case in terms of validating the
DC5 framework are 1) the limitations of the narrowness of the scenario resulted
in a significant portion of the framework not being able to be validated, as
detailed in the discussion and Table 5.2, positively or negatively, 2) A significant
portion of the framework was indeed validated; case data and key findings were
readily interpretable by DC5 constructs and relationships, again as detailed in the
discussion and in Table 5.2, 3) the case readily demonstrated that as crisis
conditions intensified the ability for the S3 control sub-system to perform the
audit, fire, and replace functions became less realistic of an option; because of
the crisis constraints, the distributed cognition system is stuck with the
subsystems it enters the crisis with to great extent, and finally 4) assessing the
relative importance of incoming information, distinguishing signal from noise, is a
vital part of the intelligence function, S4, of distributed cognition system functions
in crisis conditions.
Table 5.3 captures the modifications suggested by the latter two points
above as does Figure 5.4. The functions of S3* are reflected in S3 as they still
represent real responsibility for S3 but as the ability to performed detailed audit
like investigations become limited, the separate functional subsystem is
eliminated. Additionally, the S4 system is updated emphasizing the importance
of assessing the relative importance of incoming information as crisis conditions
intensify.
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The next step in applying the research design will be initiating track 2,
attempting to use the framework to characterize crisis environment, control
center fitness, performance, and develop a script accordingly for the next ORE,
all in an effort to demonstrate the usefulness of the DC5 framework.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

238

Table 5.3a: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - Modifications from Case 1, Track 1 First ORE
Real Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcom es +
inducem ent
of stress)

S1. Autonomous Units
- System self-doubt
might increase
- Sensitivities to stimulus
increased
- Focus changes

S 2. Coordination

S 3. Control

S 4. Intelligence

S 5. Identity

Context

- Differences
amplified
- Acquiesce to
consensus
- M a y not seek
consensus

- Pressure S1 to provide
m ore information and S 2
to process more
information
- Increase dem ands on
S 4 for im plementable
solution
- Must determ ine if S 1 ’s
are handling pressure
appropriately
- Must ascertain when
S1 has becom e
overwhelm ed
- Must ascertain when
S1 is no longer up to
environmental dem ands
- Must ensure
coordination is functional
-M ust ascertain if S 2 is
no longer capable of
meeting requirements

- D em and more
information to get
representation right
- Heightened
aw areness of need
to assess the
relative importance
of information

- S e e k m ore
confidence in
representation before
selecting alternatives
- S election/
decision/action goes
to the organization
core so balance is
less routine

- Increase focus/pressure
m ay cause H O V to be
ignored
- Increase pressure on
individual system s m ay cause
loss of IS with other system s
- Staff com petence directly
impacted
- Leadership directly
impacted

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision m aking
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

- S taff com petence up to the
task
- Leadership increasing S1
performance

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision m aking
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

- H O V and IS crucial
- S C and Leadership also
important

- Can recognize when
m ore data collection is
fruitless

- Can recognize
when more data
collection is
fruitless
- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged
- Heightened
aw areness of need
to assess relative
im portance of
information
- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged
- Heightened
aw areness of need
to assess relative
im portance of
information

- Required to adjust
decision approach
based on known lack
of knowledge
- Required to adjust
decision m aking
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

Complexity:
D em and For
High Levels
Of
Specialized
Expertise
Complexity:
D em and for
Integrated
Expertise

- Ability to correctly
inquire about data
increasingly challenged

- Possible
increased dem and
betw een system s

- Ability to correctly
Inquire about data
increasingly challenged

- C hallenged with
knowing who
N eed s to be
involved in
processing
information

Com plexityNovelty
unknowability

- Ability to correctly
inquire about data
increasingly challenged

Com plexityNovelty
num ber of
entities

- Ability to track and
process data challenged
because of volume

- Ability to
coordinate/assim ila
te data challenged
because of volum e

- Can recognize when
systems becoming
overwhelm ed
- Must ascertain if S1's
and S 2 up to
task/replaceable

Com plexityNovelty
pace of
events

- Ability to receive and
process data challenged

- Ability to process
data challenged

- Increase dem and for a
tim ely plan of action
- M ust ascertain if S1 ’s
and S 2 up to
task/replaceable

- S enses need to act
quickly

- Flexibility key
- R edundancy m ay prevent
processing errors

- R edundancy m ay prevent
processing errors
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Figure 5.4a: Updated DC5 Theoretical Framework after Modifications from analysis of Case 1, Track 1 - First ORE
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Demand for amount,
type and degree of
specialized knowledge
Novelty
o
o
o

Unknowability
Number of
entities
Pace of
events

Results
System
Context
H o rizo n of
Visibility
Intersubjectivity
S ta ff
c o m p e te n c e
L e a d e rs h ip

te n s io n :

Demand for integration
of dependent
m
specialized
g ffe
knowledges
^

“m o r e

" e x p lo r a tio n

in fo r m a tio n

vs.

e x p l o i t a t i o n ”,

v s . t i m e l y a l t e r n a t i v e s ”,

Flexibility
Redundancy

“r e s p o n s e / e x p e c t a t i o n s ”

s (see

3.1)

3. Control: Intended Purpose: Operational
control of control center

n formation flow
1. Autonomous Units: Specialized
Expertises, Communicators, Technologies,
Artifacts.

i

Coordination
Bringing
together
diverse
incoming data
sets and
appropriate
expertises.
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Track 2: Using the DC5 Framework for Training
Track 2 of the research design focuses on demonstrating the usefulness
of the DC5 framework for developing training scripts over time for successive
OREs to improve the performance of an SRC. Specifically a characterization of
a scripted crisis environment, [CE], in DC5 terms can be drawn from an ORE
script and compared to a characterization of the performance [P] of an SRC
during that ORE and a DC5 fitness assessment [DC5F] can be generated. The
DC5F in turn then can be used to develop the next script specifically targeting
areas of the control center for improvement.
The analysis that follows is organized first, into characterizing the crisis
environment from the script of the first ORE, second, around developing a
characterization of the performance of the SRC observed in the ORE, third,
around comparing these first two characterizations to develop the fitness
assessment of the Case 1 SRC and lastly, into developing a script for the next
ORE specifically designed to maximize the training value of the ORE to the SRC.
If performance improvements are seen overtime in the unit’s final ORI, then
some credit could be given to the use of DC5 framework for scripting purposes.
Before accomplishing this analysis and after reflecting upon the case data
from the first case, the researcher believes a few critical comments are in order.
First, this approach, similarly to Trackl is impacted significantly by the limitations
of the setting and second and more generally, the merits of the criticism that the
approach is overly sophisticated for the problem of developing training scripts.
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The narrowness of the overall ORE setting, specifically the large fraction
of the unit not participating in the ORE, as previously discussed, limits the ability
to develop scenarios fully testing the SRC. As such, any qualitative crisis
environment [CE] characterization will be also be narrow and in turn comparison
with performance [P] characterizations will lead to narrow fitness profiles [DC5F]
and narrow successive ORE scripts. The two responses to such criticism are 1)
that it is valid, but if such limitations are used in developing conclusions and
modifications to the DC5, then the best that can be done with the given case is
being done, and 2) the effort of going through the process suggested by Track 2
should develop a more sophisticated and refined understanding of distributed
cognition, the DC5 framework, and its implications. Further discussion along
these lines and the researcher’s lessons learned regarding case selection are
provided in Chapter VI.
More generally, some may argue that a degree of sophistication is being
applied to a problem that doesn’t merit it or require it. A good script can be
developed by an experienced evaluator simply by reviewing a previous exercise
report and applying that experience rather than going through such steps. The
researcher wholeheartedly agrees with this statement but argues that the
process being applied tacitly by such an experienced evaluator, if made more
explicit, essentially becomes the process of track 2. The sophistication being
applied in articulating such a process allows for a better understanding of
distributed cognition phenomena by more people and thus facilitates better script
writing.
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Characterizing the Crisis Environment in the First Case
The crisis environment as specified in the DC5 framework is shown in
Figure 5.5: Crisis Environment Specification. Qualitatively characterizing the
crisis environment in the first case requires detailing the individual crisis
scenarios according to the DC5 framework.

Figure 5.5: Crisis Environment Specification

Crisis Environment
Potential for Negative
Outcomes/Induces
Organizational
Stress
Challenging Levels of
Complexity:
Demand for integration
of dependent
specialized knowledge
Demand for amount,
type and degree of
specialized knowledge
Novelty
o

o
o

Unknowability
Number of
entities
Pace of
events

As described in the section on the Case 1 ORE setting the script on the
first day of the exercise amounted to: 1) a false alarm of an inbound enemy
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missile to allow the unit to begin slowly and gain a feel for executing wartime
response procedures, 2) an inbound missile attack resulting in a broad range of
differing impacts across the base play area, 3) a small narrowly focused ground
based aggressor attack with minimal damage 4) a focused missile attack
resulting in extensive damage to a single building/organization while the rest of
the base remained unscathed, and 5) a relatively limited damage from a
nighttime missile attack. On the second day of the exercise the script consisted
of 1) one widely impacting missile impact, 2) one focused, limited missile attack
and 3) one limited small ground attack by aggressors. As detailed in the setting
description the second day’s script was altered mid-course as it was decided by
the evaluating team chief and a consensus of evaluators that a deficient area of
unit performance outside of command and control in the SRC required urgent
attention and training time. Thus only the first day’s events will be characterized
here.
In terms of potential for negative outcomes, the pressure was constant
once an attack and recovery phase was underway. UCC personnel were aware
that when an attack started, the potential for making errors that would lead the
unit astray, disappoint leadership, or disappoint themselves was much more
likely. As a result organizational stress was induced. In the larger in-depth and
in-breadth attacks more such stress was induced due to awareness that the
potential for error was higher than anticipated.

Interpreting performance

characterizations must be done in terms of the timing of the key events from non-
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stress inducing, to some stress inducing, to significant stress inducing in the
script leading to the performance observations.
As detailed in the description of the setting of the ORE in Case 1, the
demand for integration of multiple disciplines and the demand for a high degree
of expertise in any single discipline were limited by the lack of unit sub
organizations participating in the exercise. The SRC provided a means of
processing scenarios that were rather simplistic for the control center personnel.
The complexity involved in the ORE however, was due to the pace of
events involved in the exercise. The attacks in breadth proscribed by the ORE
script relate well to the specification in the development of the DC5 framework of
complexity due to pace of events. Essentially an attack, missile or ground threat,
that struck in small measure across the play area led to a series of rapid fire
phone calls being made to the SRC as organizations called in damage impacts
and then called in resulting secondary events, casualties, fuel spills, etc. This in
turn required the SRC to juggle the posting and understanding of more events
and do it more rapidly. More stress was also generated as personnel had to
focus stronger attention on assessing importance of inflowing information and
notifying the wing commander accordingly.
Complexity also arose out of the scale of events involved in “in-depth”
attacks. In these attacks, missile or ground, a single localized impact would be
extensive, (i.e. resulting in fires, craters, casualties, unexploded ordnance,
mission impacts aircraft damage, and local evacuations). As it was noted in the
previous section, a key difference seen in the cognitive processing of these
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events, as opposed to those more characterized as being complex as result of
the pace of events, is the required amount of sorting information out from
overlapping reports as opposed to merely juggling issues and responses. In
evaluating the coming characterization of DC5 performance, it must be specified
which type of attack, pace dependent or scale dependent, was incurred.
As described in the previous discussion, no scenarios were provided by
the scripted events that represented complexity characterized by unknowability;
researcher and evaluators agreed all scenarios were imminently understandable
given time and reasonable study given the exercise constraints. The unit
personnel themselves generated some temporary unknowability for the
leadership due to the slowness of the PAR teams.
Figure 5.7, Crisis Environment Characterization for Case 1, summarizes
the characterization of the crisis environment from Case 1.
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Figure 5.7: Crisis Environment Characterization for Case 1

Crisis Environment
Potential for Negative Outcomes/Induces
Organizational Stress: Generally, elevated stress
throughout the exercise, due to stress of inspection
training, previous poor results, and embarrassment that
may result from errors
Challenging Levels of Complexity:
Demand for integration of dependent
specialized knowledge: none
Demand for amount, type and degree of
specialized knowledge: none to little
Novelty
o
o
o

Unknowability: none to little
Number of entities: during in “in-depth”
attacks
Pace of events: during in “in-breadth
attacks”
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Case 1 Performance Characterization
As it was previously discussed in the section on the raw findings of the
first case, characterizations of SRC performance converge around four main
points: 1) the message board system, BARTS, developed and implemented by
the unit to transfer, present, and store information, proved valuable in allowing
the unit to develop a timely understanding of post-attack environments while
presenting interesting challenges to control center personnel, 2) control and
tracking of Post-Attack Reconnaissance (PAR) teams was weak and nonexpeditious and needed improvement, 3) use of visual displays in the SRC could
use improvement, and 4) the expeditious and accurate distribution of imminent
attack information needed improvement. Overall, evaluators, the researcher, and
team members agreed the performance would have barely been satisfactory in
the eyes of ACC’s inspector general team.

DC5 Fitness Assessment
The objective of this portion of the research design is to understand these
responses in light of the crisis environment characterization to gain an overall
assessment of the UCCs DC5 fitness. As such, each of the DC5 subsystems will
be discussed in terms of the four raw findings and in terms of the crisis
environment characterization.
Table 5.6, S1 DC5 Fitness Assessment, illustrates the assessment of the
S1 subsystems in light of the crisis environment and observed findings.
Specifically, future exercises will need to create environments that force the STs
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to aid in assessing the relative importance of information and environments that
stress the specific S1’s that were cited for not performing proficiently.
Table 5.7, the S2 DC5 Fitness Assessment, illustrates the assessment of
the S2 subsystem in light of the crisis environment and observed findings.
Specifically, future exercises will need to create environments that motivate the
SRC to build and maintain better displays of information facilitating coordinated
understanding of and response to emerging circumstances. BARTS, in particular
makes the actual act of coordinating much easier by ensuring the same post
attack data is readily available to all responsible for understanding such data and
acting on it.
Table 5.8, the S3 DC5 Fitness Assessment, illustrates the assessment of
the S3 subsystem in light of the crisis environment and observed findings.
Specifically, future exercises will need to create environments that force S3 to
ensure information importance is being assessed, PAR teams are performing
well, and better displays are being used.
Table 5.9, the S4 DC5 Fitness Assessment, illustrates the assessment of
the S4 subsystem in light of the crisis environment and observed findings.
Specifically, future exercises will need to create environments that force S4 to
assess information importance, to insist on more timely response from PAR
teams, and to insist on better displays.
Table 5.10, the S5 DC5 Fitness Assessment, illustrates the assessment of
the S5 subsystem in light of the crisis environment and observed findings.
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Specifically, future exercises will need to create environments that force S5 to
continue to pressure for better proficiency from S1’s.
Of interesting note, is that when a similar type of process of interpreting
the raw performance findings to assess the performance of the DC5 system
contextual factors in light of the particular crisis environment found in the case 1
ORE was attempted, it was quickly seen that these attributes of the DC5 system
being studied were subsumed in the assessment of the other subsystems. For
example, the staff competence and leadership attributes are readily seen in the
assessments of the S1 and S3 systems respectively. Similarly, flexibility and
redundancy are captured in the assessment of the impact of BARTS in terms of
coordinating responses. The lesson learned is that the contextual elements of
the DC5 framework express themselves through the operation of the systemic
functions of the framework.
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Table 5.6: S1 (Autonomous Units) DC5 Fitness Assessment

CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT

General Crisis
Pressure

Number of
Entities

Pace of Events

S1 Assessment:

S1
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION
PERFORMANCE OF THE UNIT
Poor
Need for Better Communication
Slow PAR
Use of
teams
Visual Displays of Alarm
BARTS
Condition
- General
- Displays help
- Alleviated
- General
ineptness may be
manage the
slowness
pressure by
attributable to
assessment of
reducing
really not
crisis pressure,
attributable to relative
data
second guessing
importance of
processing
crisis
information
of himself/herself
errors
pressure,
- Without them
by siren/giant
teams were
- Raised
voice operator
just weak in
such
pressure by
assessment
presenting
terms of
competence
becomes more
more
information
difficult
for
processing
-Allowed
larger number
of entities to
be processed

- Allowed
processing
time of
information
bits to be
greatly
reduced

- General
slowness
really not
attributable to
attack scale,
teams were
just weak in
terms of
competence
- General
slowness
really not
attributable to
pace of
events,
teams were
just weak in
terms of
competence

- Better displays
would have
allowed for
broader
understanding
of post-attack
information

- General
ineptness really
not attributable to
attack scale,
personnel were
just weak in
terms of
competence

- Better displays
would have
allowed for
better paced
understanding
of post-attack
information

- General
ineptness really
not attributable to
attack scale,
personnel were
just weak in
terms of
competence

- STs need continued training on aiding in assessing the relative
importance of information
- Specific STs just need more practice at performing their basic
function proficiently
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Table 5.7: S2 (Coordination) DC5 Fitness Assessment

CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT

General Crisis
Pressure

Number of
Entities

Pace of Events

S2 Assessment:

S2
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION
PERFORMANCE OF THE UNIT
Poor
Use of
Slow PAR
Need for Better Communication
BARTS
teams
Visual Displays of Alarm
Condition
- Increased
- No interaction
- Displays help
- No
with S2
interaction
manage the
HOV due to
with S2
assessment of
BARTS
relative
ensures all
see the same
importance of
data ensuring
information
all act with the
allowing
different S1’s to
same data in
coordinate
mind.
Coordination
responses
much better
- Increased
HOV allows
for increased
coordination
in responding
to larger scale
attacks

- No
interaction
with S2

- More timely
HOV allows
for increased
coordination
in responding
to faster
paced event
streams

- No
interaction
with S2

- Better displays
would have
allowed for
broader
understanding
of post-attack
information and
better
coordination of
responses
- Better displays
would have
allowed for
better paced
understanding
of post-attack
information and
more timely
coordination of
responses

- No interaction
with S2

- No interaction
with S2

-S2 was generally satisfactory throughout the exercise. Event
streams demanding better displays of information may make this
deficiency more noticeable
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Table 5.8: S3 (Control) DC5 Fitness Assessment

CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT

General Crisis
Pressure

Number of
Entities

Pace of Events

S3 Assessment:

S3
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION
PERFORMANCE OF THE UNIT
Poor
Slow PAR
Need for Better Communication
Use of
Visual Displays of Alarm
BARTS
teams
Condition
- No interaction
- S3 must
- S3 must do
- S3 must
better job of
ensure better
with S3
ensure that
tracking and
specifically other
displays are
assessment
built and
than more
pressuring
of relevant
PAR teams
maintained to
pressure to get
importance of
to perform to
eliminate error
announcements
information is
and ensure
done correctly
being
address
accomplished
pressure for
proficient
information
responses
due to larger
flowing from
HOV
S4

- S3 must
ensure that
assessment
of relevant
importance of
information is
being
accomplished
due to larger
HOV
- S3 must
ensure that
assessment
of relevant
importance of
information is
being
accomplished
due to larger
HOV

- No
interaction
with S3

- S3 must
ensure better
displays are
built and
maintained to
accommodate
larger
information
flows

- No interaction
with S3
specifically other
than more
pressure to get
announcements
done correctly

- No
interaction
with S3

- S3 must
ensure better
displays are
built and
maintained to
accommodate
larger
information
flows

- No interaction
with S3
specifically other
than more
pressure to get
announcements
done correctly

- Scenarios should be designed which force S3 to ensure information
importance is being assessed,
- PAR teams are performing well, and
-Better displays are being used
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Table 5.9: S4 (Intelligence) DC5 Fitness Assessment

CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT

General Crisis
Pressure

Number of
Entities

Pace of Events

S4 Assessment:

S4
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGA RDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION
PERFORMA MCE OF THE UNIT
Poor
Slow PAR
Need for Better Communication
Use of
Visual Displays of Alarm
BARTS
teams
Condition
- No interaction
- S4 pressures
- S4
- More
with S4
pressures for S3 for better
pressure for
displays
more timely
intelligence to
PAR
assess
information
relevant
importance of
information
due to larger
HOV
- S4 must
assess
relevant
importance of
information
due to larger
HOV
- S4 must
provide more
timely assess
relevant
importance of
information
due to larger
HOV

- No
interaction
with S4

- S4 for must
pressure S3 for
more detailed
displays

- No interaction
with S4

- S4 must
pressure for
more timely
PAR
information

- S3 must
pressure for
more timely
displays

- No interaction
with S4

- Scenarios should be designed which force S4 assess information
importance, and which force S4 to insist on more timely response
from PAR teams and insist on better displays
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Table 5.10: S5 (Identity/Policy) DC5 Fitness Assessment

CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT

General Crisis
Pressure

Number of
Entities

Pace of Events

S5 Assessment:

S5
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION
PERFORMANCE OF THE UNIT
Poor
Slow PAR
Need for Better Communication
Use of
Visual Displays of Alarm
BARTS
teams
Condition
- Balances
- Balances
- Balances
- Greater
pressure
pressure
pressure
HOV due to
between S4
between S4 and between S4 and
BARTS
S3 to ensure
S3 to ensure
and S3 to
provides
more proficient
ensure more
greater
more proficient
proficient
action
action
confidence in
action
crucial
decision
making
- No relation
- Greater
- No relation
- No relation
between
between
between
HOV due to
constructs
BARTS
constructs
constructs
provides
greater
confidence in
crucial
decision
making
- No relation
- No relation
- No relation
- Greater
between
between
between
HOV due to
constructs
constructs
constructs
BARTS
provides
greater
confidence in
crucial
decision
making
Scenarios needed that require S5 to continue to pressure for better
proficiency from STs
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Table 5.11: System Context DC5 Fitness Assessment

CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT

General Crisis
Pressure

Number of
Entities

Pace of Events

System Context:

System Context
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION
PERFORMANCE OF THE UNIT
Poor
Slow PAR
Use of
Need for Better Communication
teams
BARTS
Visual Displays of Alarm
Condition
Greater staff
Greater staff
Greater staff
Improves
HOV,
competence,
competence
competence
intersubjectivity, needed
needed
eliminates
and leadership
processing
needed
errors
Improves
No relation
No relation
No relation
HOV,
between
between
between
eliminates
constructs
constructs
constructs
processing
errors
No relation
Improves
No relation
No relation
HOV,
between
between
between
eliminates
constructs
constructs
constructs
processing
errors
Need Scenarios which stress expeditious use of PAR teams and better
displays and facilitate more practice for alarm condition announcers
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Summary of DC5 Fitness Assessment and Criticism of DC5 Fitness
Assessment Research Design Track
In summary, consolidating the work above, the DC5 fitness assessment
calls for the development of a crisis environment that exerts crisis pressure, with
sufficient number of entities, and pace of events, so that 1) the need for
assessing the relevant importance of information is stressed to all subsystems, 2)
S1’s gain more practice at performing and becoming more proficient at their
basic tasks and 3) other systems feel the need to pressure and help improve
STs task proficiency.
These objectives, along with those generated by other portions of the post
exercise unit evaluation report outside the scope of this work, were incorporated
into the script for the February ’06 Operational Readiness Exercise. Specifically,
1) attacks were scripted close to scheduled aircraft launch times so that the
impact of PAR team slowness in returning the unit to a general, normal
operational level is clearly seen, 2) several attacks were scripted close in the
schedule so that alarm condition announcers would be stressed, and 3) attacks
were designed to be of larger scale or greater depth to further stress the need for
quick, reliable processing of information, assessment of its relative importance,
interpretation and action.
In retrospect, after working through the second track of the research
design described above, the researcher notes two areas of potential criticism
applicable to using the approach: 1) it can be argued, in a general sense, that the
approach is simply overly sophisticated for the problem of training a control
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center team, 2) the approach, in the more narrow sense of this particular case, is
significantly limited by the case context.
After conducting the case study, the researcher to some degree feels the
approach may be an overly sophisticated tool to use for the purposes of training
Air Force control center staffs and systems. While the technique of analyzing
performance in terms of crisis intensity and DC5 subsystem provides a holistic
method of developing an assessment, indeed one more comprehensive and
usable than current inspection criteria, the objective of precisely characterizing
the crisis environment using qualitative means is difficult to reach. As a result,
such imprecision, may be amplified as a DC5 fitness assessment is made and
further amplified as future crisis environments are scripted to optimize their
training value. It is difficult to argue that the resulting training value will be much
better than the traditional approach of merely using seasoned evaluators to cite
areas for improvement and to have players review their reports before the next
exercise.
More narrowly, the approach is inherently limited by the restrictions of the
case context. As discussed in the description of the case setting, a significant
portion of the unit in the case was not participating in the exercise, thus the ability
to script a variety of crisis environments and tailor them with any level of
precision beyond simply attacks-in-breadth, attacks-in-depth, or high-pacedevent-streams was very difficult.
In response to these valid criticisms some important points are worth
noting. First, the relative newness, of this approach being applied in the general
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setting of developing a training system for Air Force control centers, necessarily
means that first attempts will uncover difficulties not fully anticipated. Such
difficulties are also lessons learned and can be used in further iterations of the
research. Future work, methodologies, and designs can be deployed with these
limitations in mind to better account for them. Further work can include focusing
on development of a means to more precisely and rigorously characterize and
specify crisis environments. Cases can be more rigorously selected and planned
to ensure a broader range and more tailorable range of scenarios are achievable.
Data collection instruments can then be better tailored to the specific scenario
from which they wish to capture information regarding DC5 fitness.
Second, in terms of research value to understanding distributed cognition
in crisis environments, the second track of the research design still retains
significant value. It further highlights issues seen in track one’s interpretive
approach to the case. Specifically, that assessment of the relative importance of
information grows in importance, first, as information technologies increase the
horizon of visibility and second as crisis intensity increases in terms of
complexity. The second track approach more readily focused interpreting the
relative importance of the S4 functions in terms of crisis intensity and added
converging weight to this research theme. This reinforcing convergence with the
results of track 1 is highlighted in Table 5.3b and Figure 5.4b on the next pages.
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Table 5.3b: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - Modifications from Case 1, Track 2 First ORE
R eal Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcomes +
inducem ent of
stress)

S1. Autonomous Units
- System self-doubt
might increase
- Sensitivities to stimulus
increased
- Focus changes

S 2 . Coordination

S3. Control

- D ifferences
am plified
- A cquiesce to
consensus
- M a y not seek
consensus

- Pressure S1 to provide
more information and S 2
to process m ore
information
- Increase dem ands on
S 4 for im plem entable
solution
- Must determ ine if S 1 's
are handling pressure
appropriately

S4. Intelligence
- D em and more
information to get
representation right
- H e ig h te n e d
a w a re n e s s o f ne ed
to a s s e s s th e
re la tiv e im p o rta n c e
o f in fo rm a tio n

Complexity:
D em and For
High Levels O f
Specialized
Expertise

- Ability to correctly
inquire about data
increasingly challenged

- Possible increased
d em and betw een
system s

- Must ascertain when
S1 has becom e
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain when
S1 is no longer up to
environmental dem ands

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged

Complexity:
D em and for
Integrated
Expertise

- Ability to correctly
Inquire about data
increasingly challenged

- C hallen ged with
knowing who needs to
be involved in proc
essing information

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged

Com plexityNovelty
unknowability

- Ability to correctly
inquire about data
increasingly challenged

- Must ensure
coordination is functional
-M ust ascertain if S 2 is
no longer capable of
meeting requirements
- Can recognize w hen
more data collection is
fruitless

Com plexityNovelty
num ber of
entities

- Ability to track and
process data challenged
because of volume

- Ability to
coordinate/assim ilate
d a ta challenged
b ecau se of volume

- Can recognize when
systems becoming
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain if S 1's
and S 2 up to
task/replaceable

Com plexityNovelty
pace of events

- Ability to receive and
process data challenged

- Ability to process
data challenged

- Increase dem and for a
timely plan of action
- Must ascertain if S 1 ’s
and S 2 up to
task/replaceable

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged
- H e ig h te n e d
a w a re n e s s o f ne ed
to a s s e s s th e
re la tiv e im p o rta n c e
o f in fo rm a tio n
- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged
- H e ig h te n e d
a w a re n e s s o f ne ed
to a s s e s s th e
re la tiv e im p o rta n c e
o f in fo rm a tio n

- C an recognize when
m ore data collection
is fruitless

S 5. Identity
- S e e k m ore
confidence in
representation
before selecting
alternatives
- Selection/
decision/action
goes to the
organization core
so balance is less
routine
- R equired to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

Context
- Increase focus/pressure
m ay cause H O V to be
ignored
- Increase pressure on
individual system s m ay
cause loss o f IS with other
systems
- Staff co m p etence directly
im pacted
- Leadership directly
im pacted
- S taff co m p etence up to
the task
- Leadership increasing S1
perform ance

- R equired to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge
- Required to adjust
decision approach
based on known
lack of knowledge
- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

- H O V and IS crucial
- S C and Leadership also
important

- S en s es need to
act quickly

- R edundancy m ay prevent
processing errors

- Flexibility key
- R ed und an cy m ay prevent
processing errors
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Figure 5.4b: Updated DC5 Theoretical Framework after Modifications from Case 1, Track 2 - First ORE
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Overview of Data from Case 1, Operational Readiness Exercise No.2
This overview of the case data from the second operational readiness
exercise (ORE) will include 1) an introduction to the specific setting in which the
second ORE occurred, 2) a descriptional listing of the key events of the ORE as
seen by the researcher and other evaluators, 3) and a summary of the raw
evaluational findings of the researcher and other evaluators. Afterwards, in
subsequent analysis, this information will be analyzed as suggested by the
research methodology and design.

The Setting of the First Case—Second Operational Readiness Exercise
The second ORE observed as part of this research, involved the same
subject unit from the first ORE. The general setting in terms of time of day,
overall scenario, was all the same. In this iteration, before the actual exercise
the researcher met with the evaluation team chief and other senior evaluators to
develop a script for the ORE partially based on the analysis above. As in the
previous ORE, the unit was training for upcoming ORI and hoping to improve
upon the lessons learned and analysis form the first ORE. Also, as in the
previous ORE, only those portions of the unit that had performed below
standards in the prior year’s inspection were participating, thus a major portion of
the unit was not involved. Finally, as previously noted, in addition to the need to
evaluate and improve the performance of the SRC, a second major area of the
unit’s performance outside the scope of this research was the focus of the
exercise and the resulting script development.
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Though the evaluation team scripted out a complete two-day exercise, the
entire second day of the actual exercise was pre-empted by a severe winter
blizzard. The unit commander made the decision to cancel the remainder of the
exercise in the early morning a few hours before the start of the second day’s
events and notified the unit and evaluation team personnel by a telephone recall
system. Thus the remainder of this script description and indeed the remainder
of this analysis were limited to the activities of just the first day of the exercise.
There were four scripted attacks on the first day. The first, initiated right at
the beginning of the exercise simulated a severe, multiple-missile impact attack
with major damage to three facilities, one fire requiring complete evacuation,
multiple wounded and killed casualties, and four unexploded warheads. As
discussed in the previous discussion the severity of the attack was designed to
generate substantial amounts of information forcing control center personnel to
assess the relative importance of information, as well as stressing the basic S1
response functions of the control center.
Although the second attack was a ground-mortar attack, it was also a
severe multiple-impact attack designed for the same purposes as the first attack.
Four unexploded ordnance responses were required, two buildings were left in
flames requiring evacuation, and three wounded casualties required response.
The third attack was a small missile attack designed primarily to test a
response area outside of the scope of this research although a single
unexploded warhead inhibited a key delivery route for munitions requiring the
control center to develop a workaround quickly.
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The final attack of the first day, and what turned out to be the entire
exercise, as a result of the weather, was a ground attack involving several
unexploded munitions inhibiting response and mission capability and requiring
the development of alternative measures to return to mission operations.
Additionally, horizon of visibility was purposefully severely restricted by jamming
the radio networks of a key sub-unit organization.

The Raw Results of the First Case - Second Operational Readiness Exercise
Drawing on the case data from the data collection instruments described
in Chapter IV, specifically the interviews/discussions with players and evaluators,
the final exercise report, and the researcher’s notes, convergence seemed to
emerge around the following raw findings to be discussed in further detail below:
1) as in the first ORE contextually, the deficient performance of a key area
outside that of command and control, the focus of this research, limited, to a
degree, the ability to stress the survival recovery center, 2) the unit incorporated
lessons learned during the first ORE, specifically, a) PAR team execution,
tracking, and control was improved, b) distribution of imminent attack information
was improved, and c) use of more intuitive visual aids in the SRC facilitated
representation construction, and 3) the unit improved in managing the increased
horizon of visibility provided by the BARTS message board system. In general,
the SRC performed exceedingly well. So well, in fact, that the research value of
the second ORE is called into question. Specifically, the question arises if a
crisis environment was ever attained.
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Detailed Analysis of First Case, Second Operational Readiness Exercise
The greatly improved performance of the control center coupled with the
exercise scenario limitations, significantly constrained the ability to create and
raise crisis intensity for the evaluators. This situation in turn, inherently limited
the research value of the second ORE in terms of directly, iteratively, improving
the DC5 framework as was done in the first ORE as part of track 1 of the
research design. Similarly, track 2 was also limited some extent in terms of
research value for DC5 iterative improvement. While iterative improvement at a
subsystem level by either track was impacted by the results of the exercise, a
generalist retrospective view yields some increased understanding of distributed
cognition in the proscribed setting.
In general, during the limited duration of the exercise due to the winter
storm, the unit performed well, errors were small S1-type mistakes, non-trending
or noteworthy, and were quickly captured and corrected by control center
personnel. In what the evaluators thought would be a very difficult time period,
while the jamming of key radio networks was ongoing, the unit implemented
work-around procedures proficiently and continued with very little impact to
operations. In another case, designed to test control center capability to rapidly
assess relative importance of information and then work together to develop a
new workaround, all DC5 systems performed well. In this case, at nighttime as
the beginning of the winter storm was setting-in, an impact crater in one location
and unexploded ordnance in another location rendered vehicle haul routes for
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both jet fuel and munitions useless. Control center personnel realized the
mission impact of these occurrences while information was still flowing in from
observers and quickly developed and implemented one expedient work around
for immediate use while developing another more permanent response for
longer-term operations.
The unit had obviously learned from the previous exercise and
incorporated feedback from the evaluation team. The limits of the exercise
constrained the ability of the scripters to raise crisis intensity; indeed, two senior
evaluators, several SRC players, and the researcher concurred that because of
the improved performance of the control center it would have been difficult to call
even the most intense of the attacks a crisis. Specifically, articulating in terms of
the crisis definition proposed in this work, the scenarios, though full or potentially
full of negative consequences for the unit, was not complex enough to confound
the improved control center systems and thus did not generate significant stress
levels in those systems. As a result, the step-by-step analysis used in track 1 of
the research design for the first ORE will not be duplicated in this analysis. The
SRC implemented the lessons they learned in the first exercise, incorporating the
feedback of evaluators to such an extent that it is difficult to say a crisis even
occurred from the perspective of the control center, rendering analysis for
purposes of improving the DC5 framework dubious. Implications of this fact for
the research and researcher are discussed in further detail in the upcoming
section on lessons learned from the second ORE.
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Retrospectively, because of the limits to crisis intensity during the second
ORE discussed above, it is also difficult to use track 2 of the research design to
iteratively improve the DC5 framework. In the rigorous terms of the research
design, the unit’s performance reflected a high degree of proficiency, a crisis
environment was hardly realized, and thus a DC5 fitness assessment is 1)
beyond the measuring capacity of the research design approach and, 2) yields
little information to iteratively improve the DC5 framework on a detailed surface
level. Returning to the analogy of the sophisticated track coach and the new
athlete, the situation would be reflective of one in which the coach gives the
athlete a performance test to measure the athlete’s fitness and the athlete finds
the test so easy that nothing is gained in terms of measuring fitness. While track
2, and track 1 as discussed previously, proved unfruitful in terms of iteratively
improving the DC5 framework, some more general conclusions about the
distributed cognition are still realizable and some important lessons were still
learned by the researcher.

General Analysis of First Case, Second Operational Readiness Exercise
Though frustrating in terms of not providing the expected improvements to
the DC5 framework, reflection on the second ORE, 1) highlights a key aspect at
the center of this research, the crisis environment and 2) leads the researcher to
a suspicion worthy of further research relating to the interaction of information
technologies, increasing horizons of visibility, inter-subjectivity, and performance.
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The second ORE reinforced the notion that the DC5 framework is specific
to the case of crisis environments. Without sufficient crisis intensity, the ideas
postulated and framed by DC5 are not readily applicable to other situations. The
constructs and interactions raised in Beer’s (1984) VSM are still applicable to
normal environments, but the DC5 framework depends on a crisis environment to
understand and gain insight into the distributed cognition phenomena occurring
in control centers as expressed in Table 3.1.
As seen in track 1 of the research design and even more readily in track 2,
the DC5 fitness level of the control center is inherently tied to the ability of
different scenarios to raise crisis intensity. More specifically, the DC5 fitness of a
control center is a key factor in terms of 1) what constitutes sufficient complexity
or how complex a problem may be and 2) how stressed a control center may get.
Indeed, it could be argued that when fitness rises to certain levels in terms of the
ability to deal with complexity, the potential for negative outcomes either
decreases or rises to levels where it stops introducing additional stress. For the
DC5 framework then it can be said that the crisis environment does not exist
independently of the control center but must be expressed in terms of the fitness
level of the control center. A crisis environment is one in which 1) the potential
for negative outcomes is beyond that of the one in which the control center is
used to regularly operating, 2) the complexity exceeds that of the one in which
the control center is used to regularly operating, and 3) in turn the environment
produces additional stress in the control center.
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In terms of track 2, this notion of interaction between the state of fitness of
the control center and what constitutes a crisis environment expresses itself in
terms of measurement uncertainty. First, if the intensity in the environment is
readily manageable by a fit control center then no crisis exists. Second, a given
set of events may constitute different levels of crises for control centers of
different fitness levels. Third, it’s not possible to gain insight into the DC5 fitness
of a given control center without a crisis environment of sufficient intensity for that
particular control center at that time. Finally, as discussed previously in Chapter
III, and demonstrated by the improvement between the first and second OREs,
the act of measuring the DC5 fitness level of a control center as proscribed in this
work necessarily changes, in this case for the better, the fitness level of that
control center.
One additional general area noted by the researcher and other evaluators
in the second ORE was the continued success of the BARTS message board
system. The unit readily used the system as an effective, alternative means of
communication when key radio nets were jammed during the exercise. In
discussions with other evaluators about the success of BARTS, converging
agreement was reached that the resulting increase of horizon of visibility
provided by the system alone wasn’t sufficient to explain the continued good
performance of the command and control functions of the wing. The inter
subjectivity control center personnel had with outside unit personnel was key to
understanding, assessing, and interpreting the large information flow facilitated
by BARTS. The unit in whole, beyond the SRC, was characterized by having a
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large fraction, relative to otherwise similar units, of personnel who had known
and worked with each other over many years and through many exercises,
enhancing the ability of control center personnel to understand nuances in
communication and assess relative importance. While inter-subjectivity between
control center personnel and personnel beyond the boundary of the control
center is beyond the scope of this work, the researcher and other evaluators
thought this attribute was of significant importance in wringing the additional
benefit out of the increased horizon of visibility provided by the information
technology.

Lessons Learned and Conclusion from Case Study 1—Second Operational
Readiness Exercise

In conclusion, the limitations of the setting for the second ORE, specifically
the lack of a scripted environment of sufficient crisis intensity and the unexpected
shortening of the exercise due to inclement weather limited the value in terms of
validating and modifying the DC5 framework. More generally, however, these
same limitations raised awareness to the need for a key caveat to be introduced
into the framework, the crisis definition proposed in Chapter II, and the specific
detailing of the crisis environment in the DC5 framework. As discussed in the
previous section, the crisis environment should be expressed and characterized
in terms of the perceived fitness of the control center being studied. Finally, the
lesson learned after the first ORE, regarding the importance of case selection to
the work was once again reinforced. The limits of the case setting impacted the
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ability to stress the control center inhibiting the value of the research. Still both
OREs and both research tracks applied during this case provided significant
insights that led to key improvements in the DC5 framework, and turn into better
understanding of distributed cognition phenomena.
Thus in summary Table 5.3c and Figure 5.4c capture the next iterative
development of the framework, the qualification of what constitutes a crisis
environment is relative to the distributed cognition fitness of the control center
under study.
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Table 5.3c: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - Modifications from Case 1, Track 1
Second ORE - (Changes highlighted in bo d)

R eal Crisis Pressure
(Potential for
adverse organization
outcomes +
inducem ent of
stress) relative to

the dcog fitness
level o f the control
center (RTDF)

S1.
Autonomous
Units
- System self
doubt might
increase
- Sensitivities to
stimulus
increased
- Focus changes

S2. Coordination

S 3. Control

S4. Intelligence

S 5. Identity

Context

- Differences
amplified
- Acquiesce to
consensus
- M ay not seek
consensus

- Pressure S1 to provide
m ore information and S2
to process more
information
- Increase dem ands on
S 4 for im plementable
solution
- M ust determ ine if S 1 ’s
are handling pressure
appropriately

- D em and m ore
information to get
representation right
- Heightened

- S eek more
confidence in
representation before
selecting alternatives
- Selection/
decision/action goes
to the organization
core so balance is
less routine

- M ust ascertain when
S1 has becom e
overw helm ed
- M ust ascertain when
S1 is no longer up to
environm ental demands
- M ust ensure
coordination is functional
-M ust ascertain if S 2 is
no longer capable of
m eeting requirements

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

- Increase focus/pressure
m ay cause H O V to be
ignored
- Increase pressure on
individual systems m ay
cause loss of IS with other
systems
- S taff com petence directly
im pacted
- Leadership directly
im pacted
- S taff com petence up to
the task
- Leadership increasing S1
perform ance

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged

- H O V and IS crucial
- S C and Leadership also
important

- C an recognize when
m ore data collection is
fruitless

- C an recognize when
m ore data collection
is fruitless

- Can recognize when
system s becoming
overwhelm ed
- M ust ascertain if S 1 ’s
and S 2 up to
task/replaceable
- Increase dem and for a
tim ely plan of action
- M ust ascertain if S1 ’s
and S 2 up to
task/replaceable

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge
- Required to adjust
decision approach
based on known lack
o f knowledge
- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge
- S enses need to act
quickly

- R edundancy m ay prevent
processing errors

Complexity:
D em and For High
Levels Of
S pecialized (RTDF)

- Ability to
correctly inquire
about data
increasingly
challenged

- Possible increased
dem and between
systems

Complexity: Dem and
for Integrated
Expertise relative to
the dcog fitness level
of the control center
C om plexity-Novelty
unknowability

- Ability to
correctly Inquire
about data
increasingly
challenqed
- Ability to
inquire about
data increasingly
challenqed
- Ability to track
and process
data challenged
because of
volume

- Challenged with
knowing who N eed s
to be involved in
processing
information

- Ability to
receive and
process data
challenged

- Ability to process
data challenged

(RTDF)
C om plexity-Novelty
num ber of entities

(RTDF)

C om plexity-Novelty
pace of events

(RTDF)

- Ability to
coordinate/assimilate
data challenged
because of volum e

aw areness o f need
to assess the
relative im portance
o f inform ation
(HANTARIi)

- (HANTARII)

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged
- (HANTARII)

- Flexibility key
- R edundancy m ay prevent
processing errors
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Figure 5.4c: Updated DC5 Theoretical Framework after Modifications from Case 1, Track 1 - Second ORE
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Overview of Data from Case 2, Operational Readiness Inspection
Longitudinally, the second case study, a formal operational readiness
inspection of another Air Force unit separate and different than the subject unit of
the first case study, occurred before the third and last iterative portion of the first
case study and will be reviewed here. The second case was limited to a track-1
approach, seeking to validate and enhance the interpretive value of the DC
framework. As discussed in the research design and specified in the research
protocol the same data collection instruments were used here as were used in
the first case. This overview of the case data from the formal ORI will include 1)
an introduction to the specific setting in which the ORI occurred and a description
of the unit participating in the ORI, 2) a descriptional listing of the key events of
the ORI as seen by the researcher and ACC/IG inspector, 3) and a summary of
the raw inspection findings of the researcher and the inspectors. Afterwards, in
subsequent analysis, this information will be analyzed as suggested by the
research methodology and design.

The Setting of the Second Case
The researcher contacted members of the IG team and the unit to be
inspected and requested permission to collect data as specified in the research
protocol. Both organizations agreed and granted the researcher the additional
access to players and inspectors as requested. As opposed to the two OREs
composing the portion of the first case discussed thus far, the second case was
composed of just one formal ORI being conducted by the IG team. While the first
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case involved a flying wing training during OREs for an eventual ORI, the subject
unit of the ORI in the second case was a heavy construction/engineering unit
consisting of 400 personnel commanded by an Air Force Colonel with a
complement of 10 officers participating in the inspection. The unit had prepared
for the ORI by conducting two OREs itself.
The overarching scenario involved the simulated air transported
deployment of the unit to a forward point of debarkation, followed by actual overthe-road convoy to an austere location, where the unit bedded itself down and
established operations. The actual location could be described as field-like
terrain with wooded perimeters, dirt roads, with little-to-no improvements, and
clearings designated to be future expedient construction sites. No utilities of any
kind were physically available; the unit had to demonstrate established levels of
self-sufficiency by bringing in and constructing all of its own supporting
infrastructure (i.e. the power generator, mobile communications, and field
plumbing). The unit had to demonstrate the ability to internally respond to an
established ground threat level thus all troops were supplied with appropriate
small-arms weaponry with a small complement of heavier arms. Ground threat
engagements were simulated by firing blanks and responses were evaluated by
IG security forces inspectors. As the actual location was austere, facilities
consisted of expedient shelters known as “TemporTents” approximately
30x20x10 ft in size. The unit provided its own organic sleeping and dining
arrangements. The unit arrived with a complement of 42 vehicles, 30-day food
supply, 5-day fuel supply, and 5-day water supply. Contact with theater higher
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headquarters was simulated by mobile communication technologies with IG
personnel.
The unit’s mission during the ORI was multi-faceted: among other
directives, 1) it was required to establish self-sufficient organic operations, 2)
demonstrate the ability to produce its potable water from a non-potable source,
3) establish secure perimeters and defend itself against an established ground
threat level, 4) protect itself during missile attacks, and 5) accomplish the design
and construction of several expedient construction projects. Such projects
included the repair of cratered runway, road construction, power line installation,
hard wall expedient facility construction, small-bridge construction, concrete pad
installation, aircraft revetment construction, and various earthwork projects.
Additionally the unit was required to provide engineering designs, siting, and
logistical planning for a variety of other projects including the complete beddown
of an Air Force wing of 4000 personnel and 100 aircraft at a hypothetical austere
bare forward base presently consisting of only an airfield and a potable source of
water.
The phase II, or deployed-wartime, scripted activities of the inspection
took place over 4 days. Seven hours each night were reserved as no-play time
as proscribed by Air Force regulation applicable to such exercises. The focus of
the research was on the unit control center (UCC) that oversaw the operations
and responses of the unit. The UCC consisted of a single tent, with an alternate
back-up, manned by nine personnel including the acting commander and
executive officer, a log keeper and alarm announcer, a plotter for the visual aids,
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the units senior non-commissioned officer, a representative of the units
engineering section, a representative of its operations section, one of its logistics
section, and one of its support and admin section. The layout of this UCC tent is
provided in the appendices.

The Key Events of the Second Case: The Script as Implemented
The script for the first day of the inspection, actually called transition day
when inspecting units of this type, involved no outside attack. The unit merely
had to convoy to the austere site establish operations as described previously.
Command and control was established, the UCC tent was erected, equipped,
and manned but because no hostile action was simulated and therefore no crisis
environment existed. Transition day was ruled out as a source for observational
data by the researcher for purposes of this work.
The first actual day of hostile action play began with scripted instructions
for the unit to begin design and construction of 8 projects while the scripted
events included 1) a scenario involving a defector with a white flag trying to enter
the units primary cantonment area, 2) a false alarm of an inbound missile, 3) a
mortar attack resulting in cantonment area generator damage, 4) a non
impacting sniper attack, 5) a potentially chemically armed missile attack requiring
the 30 minute wear of gas mask and chemical gear until the presence of no
chemicals was verified, 6) and a second non-impacting sniper attack.
In addition to the projects ordered the first day, 3 more construction
projects were ordered on the second day. Hostile action on the second day
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consisted of, 1) a mortar attack involving more generator damage, vehicle
damage, and unexploded ordnance left in the cantonment area, 2) another non
impacting sniper attack, 3) a mortar attack resulting in three casualties, air
conditioner loss for cold storage, a vehicle workcenter being destroyed, 4) a low
intensity ground engagement resulting in the capture and detainment of an
enemy prisoner of war 5) a mortar attack resulting in no damage, and 6) a
chemical missile attack requiring wear of gas mask and chemical ensemble by
personnel for two hours but no further damage.
The scripted events of the third day of the exercise involved a single
chemical missile attack requiring wear of mask and chemical ensemble for two
hours, causing two casualties, enflaming the UCC tent and requiring UCC
relocation to an alternate tent, missing personnel.

Researcher’s General Thoughts on the Second Case
Some general notes are worthy of discussion before proceeding with the
detailed analysis that follows. First, in comparison with the script for the subject
unit in the first case study, this script was much more challenging for the UCC
because all reporting parties were playing in the exercise, thus stressing all S1
systems in the UCC. Second, the scenario called for wear of chemical mask and
suit, which inhibits movement, breathability, communication, vision, and is
generally hot and uncomfortable. Capturing the impact of this burden on UCC
personnel in terms of the DC5 framework was a key to the interpretive value of
the case to this research. Third, while the scenarios were more intense for the
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UCC, as will be seen in the discussion of the case results, the UCC in the eyes of
inspectors, the researcher, and even some players performed poorly. This weak
level of performance limits the value of the case for the research; performance
was poor regardless of crisis intensity so some impacts of crisis environment
upon distributed cognition phenomena are difficult to interpret in terms of the
DC5 framework. These will be discussed in further detail in the analysis of the
case.

The Raw Results of the Second Case
Drawing on the case data from the data collection instruments described
in Chapter IV, specifically the interviews/discussions with players and inspectors,
the final inspection report, and the researcher’s notes, convergence seemed to
emerge around specific raw findings to be discussed in further detail next.
Further description and elaboration on these points is provided ahead in raw
terms as they emerged from the collection instruments. Actual refined discussion
of their interpretation in terms of the proposed DC5 framework will follow in the
next section. A more exhaustive review of the data collected during the case and
the degree, or lack of thereof, of data convergence on particular issues is
presented in summary form in Appendix V-Case 2 Data Results. The questions
of the data collection instruments were used as a means of presenting and
summarizing the results of each individual data collection effort.
The key findings upon which considerable convergence was seen
between data sources, including the players themselves, the four inspectors
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evaluating UCC performance, and the researcher regarding UCC performance
noted during the exercise were 1) the UCC failed to engage and reallocate
manpower and resources when a variety of real-world and exercise inputs
brought certain projects to a halt, 2) simple procedures for backing up information
in redundant locations and ensuring congruity in information sets were not
implemented resulting in confusion, 3) simple procedures for accounting for
personnel, vehicles, and equipment were not implemented, 4) project status
boards were not used or updated in a timely fashion, 5) rigorous facility
evacuation procedures were not established or followed resulting in significant
information loss, 6) untimely, inaccurate, or no alarm/attack notification during
every attack, and 7) poor, untimely PAR team performance.
As previously discussed, these findings represent poor performance below
written standards. Indeed, the unit received a rating reflective of this fact from the
IG team. Given how far behind the unit was throughout the exercise, it is difficult
to draw conclusions on how a crisis environment may have impacted
performance that was already sufficiently poor in situations of what were
considered prior to the inspection to be of little to no crisis intensity. Still,
interpreting these findings in terms of DC5 constructs and interactions as follows
is to some extent beneficial for this investigation.
Additionally, attempting to interpret the impact of the wear of the chemical
mask and ensemble on distributed cognition phenomena in terms of the DC5
framework also serves to enlighten the analysis and will be undertaken in the
next section.
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Key Findings in the Analysis of the Second Case - Operational Readiness
Inspection

As in the track 1 interpretive analysis of the first case’s first ORE the
objective will be to interpret the emergent converging themes of the case data
using the constructs and interactions specified by the DC5 framework validating
the framework where possible and modifying it if necessary. As discussed in
analysis of the first case, to the extent emerging observations readily converge
with the suggested theory, then the framework has demonstrated its holistic
validity as well as its specific construct validity. To the extent emerging
observations do not readily converge with the suggested theory then the
framework has demonstrated the need for modification or further study. Table
5.4, mirroring Table 3.1, Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem
Performance, which described in detail the theoretical impacts of crisis conditions
on distributed cognition phenomena, provides the organization for the detailed
discussion which follows regarding the areas in which emergent observations
from case two converged with suggested framework constructs and their
interaction, diverged from the suggested theory, or remained ambiguous with
regards to the suggested theory. Again, as described in the previous section, the
general overall poor performance of the UCC is an overarching theme that
significantly limits the value of the data for interpreting crisis environment effects
upon control center cognition. This fact is reflected in the large portion of Table
5.4 detailed as not validated by the insufficient case data. Table 5.3d and Figure
5.4d, summarize the case data and its implications for the DC5 framework. An
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exhaustive analysis of the case data based on Table 5.4 on a cell-by-cell basis is
provided in Appendix VII.
As mentioned in the previous section, of particular interest in this case
was the wear of the chemical protective gear by participants in the unit control
center; in the first case the control center was simulated-chemically-protected
and thus wear of chemical defense gear was not required. Air Force personnel
are familiar with the varieties of degradation in performance at a variety of tasks
resulting from wear of this gear. Capturing and articulating the impact of such
effects upon control center distributed cognition using DC5 constructs can also
demonstrate its usefulness as working framework.
Personnel chemical gear, formally known as the Mission Operating
Personal Protective (MOPP) ensemble, consists of rubber overboots, a charcoal
lined over suit composed of paints and jacket, rubber gloves and glove liners,
and a rubber hooded gas mask. After receiving notice of possible impending
chemical attack or the possible presence of chemical agents, the user must don
the mask first, ideally within eight seconds, and then the remainder of the
ensemble, ideally within two minutes. The immediate personal physical effects of
the suit are 1) it does not breathe, causing the user’s perspiration to condense
onto the skin causing discomfort, 2) it is extremely insulating causing the user to
become hot and perspire even more, 3) the gas mask greatly reduces visibility,
especially to the periphery, creating a sense of Closter phobia in most users
anecdotally, 4) the gas mask muffles the ability to annunciate clearly as well as
listen to others speaking and greatly reduces the ability to use telephone and
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radio communication devices, and lastly 5) other normal bodily functions cannot
be undertaken while the suit is on.
In terms of DC5 constructs, the ensemble primarily impacts distributed
cognition phenomena contextually in terms of horizon of visibility and
intersubjectivity. Because sounds are muffled and vision is impaired, the horizon
of visibility previously available to control center personnel is greatly reduced.
Personnel in Case 2 were observed becoming significantly more focused on their
immediate tasks of processing information flowing into them and less able to
monitor the background chatter of the room and the updating of artifacts such as
status boards. Additionally, since the ensemble isolates the wearer from his or
her fellow control center workers, intersubjectivity is greatly reduced; the ability to
monitor personal cues that amplify communicative capability amongst
participants that have grown together as a team over time is greatly reduced. As
a result timeliness of responses and processing of information was delayed
significantly in the control room greatly increasing the susceptibility of the control
center to crises involving increasing paces of events or larger scale events.
Additionally the ability to respond to scenarios requiring integrating expert
knowledge bases was also reduced. Finally, in terms of primary effects the
discomfort of the suit and the knowledge of its impacts on performance further
stress the control center participants. Secondary interactions relating to
ensemble wear seemed to impact on a contextual basis also. First, more
experienced personnel, “staff competence” as captured in the DC5 framework,
seemed to be impacted less by the discomfort of the suit and as is generally
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thought in Air Force, and demonstrated in the case, leadership could act to
mitigate some of the impact of the suit on performance and motivate personnel to
press on with their duties. Wear of the ensemble represents an opportunity for
further in-depth research into the impacts of changing levels of horizons of
visibility and intersubjectivity directly upon distributed cognition performance
potentially using a variety of methodologies, but such work is beyond the scope
of this research and would require further study of cases involving such setting
specifics.

Case 2: Summary of Case Data versus DC5 Framework
The key points seen arising from the second case in terms of validating
the DC5 framework are 1) the limitations of the case, in terms of research value,
due to the general overall poor performance of the UCC in all respects, 2) a small
portion of the framework was moderately validated; case data and key findings
were interpretable by DC5 constructs and relationships, again as detailed in the
discussion and in Table 5.4, and 3) the case readily demonstrated the opposing
response to the key conclusion generated from the second ORE in the first case.
In that ORE the DC5 fitness of the SRC was of such degree to render the
scripted environment a mere series of non-crisis events. In the second case, the
DC5 fitness level of the UCC was so inadequate it turned any scenario involving
minimal information processing into a crisis. This aspect of the case reiterated
the notion that in characterizing the crisis intensity of a given set of events for a
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control center, one must take that the DC5 fitness level of that control center into
account.
Table 5.3d captures the modifications suggested by the last two points
above as does Figure 5.4d on the following pages.
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Table 5.3d: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - After Case 2 (reinforcing convergence
S1. Autonomous Units

S2.
Coordination
- Differences
amplified
- Acquiesce to
consensus
- M ay not seek
consensus

Real Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcomes +
inducem ent of
stress) relative
to th e dcog
fitn e s s level o f
th e co n tro l
c e n te r (R T D F )

- System self-doubt
might increase
- Sensitivities to stimulus
increased
-Focus changes

Complexity:
Dem and For
High Levels Of
Specialized
Expertise (R T D F )

- Ability to correctly
inquire about data
increasingly challenged

- Possible
increased
dem and
between
systems

Complexity:
Dem and for
Integrated
Expertise (R T D F )

- Ability to correctly
inquire about d ata
increasingly challenged

- Challenged
with knowing
who needs to be
involved in
processing
information

ComplexityNovelty
Unknowability (R T D F )

- Ability to correctly
inquire about d ata
increasingly challenged

ComplexityNovelty
num ber of
entities- (R T D F )

-A b ility to tra c k an d
process d ata
ch alle n g e d b e c a u s e o f
vo lu m e

- A b ility to
c o o rd in a te /a s s 
im ila te data
ch a lle n g e d
because of
v o lu m e

Com plexityNovelty
pace of events (R T D F )

- A b ility to re c e iv e an d
process d ata
ch alle n g e d

- A b ility to
p ro c ess d ata
ch a lle n g e d

S 3. Control

S 4. Intelligence

S 5. Identity

Context

- Pressure S1 to provide
more information and S 2
to process m ore
information
- Increase d e m ands on
S 4 for im plem entable
solution
- Must determ ine if S1 's
are handling pressure
appropriately

- Dem and more
information to get
representation
right
- H eig h te n e d
a w a re n e s s o f
ne ed to assess
th e relative
im p o rta n c e o f
in fo rm a tio n
(H A N T A R II)

- S eek m ore confidence in
representation before selecting
alternatives
- Selection/ decision/action
goes to the organization core
so balance is less routine

- Increase focus/pressure
m ay cause H O V to be
ignored
- Increase pressure on
individual system s m ay
cause loss of IS with other
systems
- S taff com petence directly
impacted
- Leadership directly
impacted

- M u st a s c e rta in w h e n
S1 has b e c o m e
o v e rw h e lm e d
- M u st a s c e rta in w h e n
S1 is no lo n g e r up to
e n v iro n m e n ta l
de m a n d s
- Must ensure
coordination is functional
- Must ascertain if S 2 is
no longer capab le of
meeting requirem ents

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- R e q u ire d to a d ju s t d e c is io n
m a k in g a p p ro a c h b a s e d on
k n o w n lac k o f k n o w le d g e

- S ta ff c o m p e te n c e up to
th e ta sk
- L e a d e rs h ip in c re a s in g
S1 p e rfo rm a n c e

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust decision
making approach based on
known lack o f knowledge

- H O V and IS crucial
- SC and Leadership also
important

- Can recognize w hen
more data collection is
fruitless

- Can recognize
w hen more data
collection is
fruitless

- Required to adjust decision
making approach based on
known lack o f knowledge

- C an re c o g n iz e w h e n
s y s te m s b e c o m in g
o v e rw h e lm e d
- M u s t a s c e rta in if S1 ’s
an d S 2 u p to
ta s k /re p la c e a b le
- In c re a s e d e m a n d fo r
a tim e ly p lan o f a c tio n
- M u s t a s c e rta in if S1 ’s
an d S 2 u p to
ta s k /re p la c e a b le

-A b ilit y to
in te rp re t d ata
in c re a s in g ly
ch alle n g e d
- (H A N T A R II)

- R e q u ire d to a d ju s t d e cisio n
m a k in g a p p ro a c h b a s e d on
kn o w n lac k o f k n o w le d g e

- F le x ib ility k e y
- R edundancy m ay
p re v e n t p ro c e s s in g
erro rs

-A b ilit y to
in te rp re t data
in c re a s in g ly
ch alle n g e d
- (H A N T A R II)

- S e n s e s n e e d to a c t q u ic k ly

- R e d u n d a n c y m ay
p re v e n t p ro c e s s in g
erro rs
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Figure 5.4d: DC5 Theoretical Framework with Modifications after Case 2 - Reinforcing convergence underlined
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Overview of Data from Case 1, Final Operational Readiness Inspection
The third and final portion of the first case was the subject unit’s formal
ORI conducted by ACC/IG inspectors. In terms of this research the data
collection effort relating to this ORI occurred longitudinally after the second case
which involved one, single ORI of an Air Force heavy construction unit. This
portion of the case was limited to the track 1, interpretive research design
approach. The applied research of track 2 could not be undertaken because the
researcher did not have input into script production for the ORI, which was
closely held by the IG team and not released to the researcher until after the ORI
was conducted. Additionally as no subsequent, exercise was scheduled
following the ORI little use in terms of training value for subsequent scripting
could be gained by undertaking the applied research approach. This overview of
the case data from the formal ORI will include 1) a descriptional listing of the key
events of the ORI as seen by the researcher and ACC/IG inspector, and 2) a
summary of the raw inspection findings of the researcher and the inspectors.
Afterwards, in subsequent analysis, this information will be analyzed as
suggested by the research methodology and design.
It should be noted that a description of the setting of the ORI is not
provided here as it matches that used in both previous OREs. In this case the IG
team developed and implemented the script. The researcher stood out of the
way in the control center for the duration of inspection and compiled
observations.
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The Key Events of the First Case. Final Operational Readiness Inspection: The
Script as Implemented
The script called for two twelve-hour days of hostile play for purposes of
the inspection. The first days activities consisted of 1) two false-alarms of
inbound missiles, 2) three separate individual ground aggressor attacks, 3) a
ground-based mortar attack resulting in the relocation of the unit’s fuel storage
control center, damage to bulk fuel storage tanks, fire in an aircraft maintenance
shop, two instances of unexploded ordnance, and three casualties, 4) another
ground based mortar attack resulting in damage to an aircraft maintenance
control center and a communication antenna and 5) an additional ground based
mortar attack coupled with three aggressors infiltrating the flightline area resulting
in one instance of unexploded ordnance.
The second days scripted activities consisted of 1) the offline loss of the
BARTS message board communication system for eight hours during which, 2) a
missile attack occurred resulting in relocation of a maintenance operations
control center due to building damage and damage to a key refueling vehicle, 3)
two separate ground aggressor attacks occurred resulting in three friendly
casualties, and 4) a ground based mortar attack occurred in concert with an
attack by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber resulting in damage to two aircraft
maintenance shop buildings and three casualties. After BARTS was restored
another 5) ground based mortar attack occurred in concert with a sniper attack
resulting in two casualties and two instances of unexploded ordnance and finally
6) a false alarm of a missile attack occurred.
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Researcher’s General Thoughts on the First Case. Final Operational Readiness
Inspection

As presented in the previous discussion of the OREs associated with the
first case study, the limits of the setting of the ORI inherently extend to the value
of the research. Specifically, the limited amount of playing sub-units in the
organization inherently limited the ability of the IG team to stress the unit as a
whole and subsequently the SRC. In contrast to the motivation behind script
construction for the ORE evaluators, the IG had no goal of giving the poorly
performing unit subarea outside of the UCC a chance to improve. The IG merely
wished to see if this separate subarea met standards. Thus, script intensity,
specifically in terms of pace of events, was slightly greater for the ORI than the
OREs. The researcher and evaluation team had strived to develop scenarios to
both maximize training value to the unit, as well as, mimic what we thought the
IG team would provide in its script. Generally, the ORE scripts and ORI scripts
were close in terms of intensity though the IG tended to have a few more attacks
per day of lesser intensity than those orchestrated by the evaluators during the
OREs.

The Raw Results of the First Case. Final Operational Readiness Inspection
Drawing on the case data from the data collection instruments described
in Chapter IV, specifically the interviews/discussions with players and evaluators,
the final inspection report, and the researcher’s notes, convergence seemed to
emerge around specific raw findings to be discussed in further detail below.
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Actual refined discussion of their interpretation in terms of the proposed DC5
framework also follows in the next section.
The key findings upon which considerable convergence was seen
between data sources, including the players themselves, the two inspectors
evaluating SRC performance, and the researcher regarding SRC performance
noted during the exercise were 1) the generally superior performance of the SRC
characterized by “smooth, accurate, and timely communications” facilitating
“quick reaction” (quoted from the final inspection report) by senior leadership to a
rapidly changing environment, 2) the successful implementation of BARTS into
all command and control functions and its subsequent rewards, and 3) two small
S1 type errors involving use of the wrong facility priority list by some SRC
personnel during two attacks and lack of rigorous adherence to checklists by two
SRC personnel on the first day of the inspection. The inspection was a success
as far as the SRC was concerned. The inspection received a rating of Excellent
by the IG. One of the SRC inspectors commented that he would have even
considered awarding the rarely used Outstanding rating had the scenario not
been so limited. This inspector also commented that “I’ve thrown everything I can
at them, including taking down BARTS, and it doesn’t phase them.”
After the inspection, the researcher and ORE evaluators were gratified to
see that their assessment following the second ORE, that the fitness of the SRC
was simply beyond the ability of the environmental setting to generate a crisis,
was validated by the inspection team during the ORI when it counted. As with
the second ORE, it is of little use to conduct the stepwise analysis through the
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DC framework because a crisis environment from the perspective of the SRC
was simply not realized. The IG assessment reiterates the importance of
characterizing crisis intensity in terms of DC5 fitness. What constitutes a crisis
for one UCC does not necessarily constitute a crisis for another UCC.
The S1 miscues noted by the IG and detailed above were corrected during
the inspection after the S3 function engaged and ensured proper artifacts were
used. Senior leadership also engaged and motivated SRC members to refocus
for the remainder of the exercise. It is also important to note that IG inspectors
captured the UCC’s ability to facilitate rapid reaction following attack by senior
unit leadership. This implies accurate representation construction on the part of
the SRC.
Unfortunately the success of the SRC in the ORI and second ORE limits
the value of the data for the research somewhat. As discussed, crisis intensities
were not reached because of the proficiency of the SRC. Thus, further iterative
development of the DC5 framework is not possible and it remains as captured in
Table 5.3e and Figure 5.4e on the following pages.
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Table 5.3e: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - After Case 1, ORI (reinforcing
Real Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcomes +
inducem ent of
stress) relative
to th e d c o g
fitn e s s level o f
th e co n tro l
ce n te r (R T D F )

S 1. Autonomous Units
- System self-doubt
might increase
- Sensitivities to stimulus
increased
-Focus changes

Context
- Increase focus/pressure
m ay cause H O V to be
ignored
- Increase pressure on
individual system s m ay cause
loss of IS with other systems
- S taff com petence directly
im pacted
- Leadership directly
im pacted

S 2. Coordination

S3. Control

S 4. Intelligence

S5. Identity

- Differences
amplified
- A cquiesce to
consensus
- M a y not seek
consensus

- Pressure S1 to provide
more information and S 2
to process more
information
- Increase dem ands on
S 4 for im plem entable
solution
- Must determ ine if S 1 ’s
are handling pressure
appropriately

- D em and more
information to
get
representation
right
- H eightened
aw areness of
ne ed to assess
the relative
im portance of
information
(H A N T A R Il)

- S eek m ore confidence
in representation before
selecting alternatives
- Selection/
decision/action goes to
the organization core so
balance is less routine

- Must ascertain when
S1 has becom e
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain when
S1 is no longer up to
environmental dem ands
- Must ensure
coordination is functional
- Must ascertain if S 2 is
no longer capable of
meeting requirements

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

- S taff com petence up to the
task
- Leadership increasing S1
perform ance

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

- H O V and IS crucial
- S C and Leadership also
important

- Can recognize when
more data collection is
fruitless

- C an recognize
w hen m ore data
collection is
fruitless

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge
- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

Complexity:
D em and For
High Levels O f
Specialized
Expertise (R T D F )

- Ability to correctly
inquire about data
increasingly challenged

- Possible
increased dem and
betw een system s

Complexity:
D em and for
Integrated
Expertise (R T D F )

- Ability to correctly
inquire about data
increasingly challenged

- C hallenged with
knowing who
needs to be
involved in
processing
information

Com plexityNovelty
Unknowability (R T D F )

- Ability to correctly
inquire about data
increasingly challenged

Com plexityNovelty
num ber of
entities- (R T D F )

- Ability to track and
process data challenged
because of volume

- Ability to
coordinate/assim ila
te data challenged
because of volume

- Can recognize when
systems becoming
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain if S 1 ’s
and S2 up to
task/replaceable

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged
- (H A N T A R Il)

Com plexityNovelty
pace of events (R T D F )

- Ability to receive and
process data challenged

- Ability to process
d ata challenged

- Increase dem and for a
timely plan of action
- Must ascertain if S 1 ’s
and S2 up to
task/replaceable

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged
- (H A N T A R Il)

- S enses need to act
quickly

- Flexibility key
- R edundancy m ay prevent
processing errors

- R edundancy m ay prevent
processing errors
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Figure 5.4e: DC5 Theoretical Framework with Modifications after Case 1, ORI
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Summary of Framework Analysis
In summary, the track 1 interpretive analysis of the first case, first ORE
validated a significant portion of the DC5 framework. It also resulted in the
removal of S3* from the DC5 framework. Data showed that as crisis intensity
increased, the S3 function simply did not have the time or capital to invest in
detailed monitoring or auditing of S1 performance. Judgment had to be made
quickly and firing and training replacements became less of a viable option. The
control center was stuck with the competence of the staff with which it entered
the crisis. In a minor adjustment to the framework, this ORE also highlighted the
differing impacts of pace of events and scale of events. The first seemed to
generally result in the control center’s S4 or intelligence function struggling to put
pieces together to assemble an accurate representation of the outside
environment. The latter seemed to result more in the S4 function deconflicting
multiple information streams regarding the same event stream. Finally, the first
case highlighted the fact that as information technologies greatly increased the
control centers horizon of visibility it became an increasingly important function of
the S4~the intelligence function of the control center to assess the relative
importance of the incoming information.
The applied research, or track 2 approach to evaluating the first case’s
data from the first ORE, reiterated the finding from track 1 that assessing the
relative importance of information became a much greater portion of S4’s
systemic functions as horizon of visibility increased. Substantial improvement
was seen between the first and second OREs in the first case. This assessment
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of improved performance was reinforced by the data from the final ORI in this
case. While it’s tempting to try to point to track 2 as having some responsibility
for this improvement, this point cannot be sustained. The impact of track 2 would
not have been seen until the ORI, as it was first really applied in scripting the
second ORE. The SRC learned and improved as a result of the script of the first
ORE. To the extent that planning track 2 and applying the constructs and ideas
of the DC5 framework played a role in the scripting of this first exercise, then
some credit may be taken. It should be noted, however, that 1) the mere practice
value for personnel in the first ORE, 2) the use of the highly enabling BARTS
message board system, 3) unit leadership, and 4) SRC personnel competence
could also explain the increase in performance.
The first case’s second ORE proved of little value to iterative internal
framework validation and adjustment because the UCC’s performance was so
brilliant. It did however, highlight the importance of expressing crisis intensity in
terms of the DC5 fitness level of the control center under study. The importance
of this relative interaction between fitness and crisis definition was highlighted by
the opposite extreme in the second case when the most basic of control center
information processing proved to be a crisis for that particular control center.
' The second case did serve to further validate a portion of the DC5
framework as basic information processing requirements rose to crisis levels for
the subject UCC and some convergence with the framework was noted in terms
of the interaction between pace and scale of events and DC5 subsystem
impacts.
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Finally, the final ORI in the first case again reinforced the notion of the
relationship between DC5 fitness of a particular control center and
characterization of crisis intensity. As in the second ORE however, the superior
fitness of the SRC exceeded the ability of the environment to be viewed as a
crisis. Table 5.3e and Figure 5.4e represent the final iteration of the DC5
framework for purposes of this research.
The researcher has other significant conclusions, criticisms, reflections,
and lessons learned to discuss, specifically with regard to case selection and the
limits of research into distributed cognition but these will appear in Chapter VI,
along with discussions about the impact and potential benefits of the research
and potential for future research.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Organization of Conclusion
This final chapter of the dissertation will be organized around the primary
research question, motivations, and focused objectives presented in Chapter I.
Figure 6.1, Research Approach Overview is a reprint of Figure 1.3 and will serve
to guide the majority of this final discussion, specifically the degree to which the
work addressed the primary research questions and the resulting focused
objectives as well as the early motivations for the research. Additionally, the
researcher will also summarize his reflections, criticisms, and lessons learned
following the research effort and will follow up by discussing subject matter
relating to the research that may serve as a fruitful area of future research
inquiry. Lastly, one final summary of the key conclusions resulting from the
research will be provided as well as the researcher’s assessment of the
research’s key contribution to the body of knowledge relating to the subject
matter.
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Figure 6.1: Research Approach Overview
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Addressing the Primary Research Questions and Focused Objectives of
the Research
The first primary research question sought to determine the key constructs
and interrelationships one must understand to build a coherent, holistic
understanding of distributed cognition phenomena. Chapter II, a) reviewed
several existing frameworks (see Figure 2.3) in the literature identifying the key
functions of organizational learning phenomena seen by other authors and b)
attempted to distill out the common themes of focus from the literature (Figure
2.2). In so doing the focused objectives detailed in Chapter I were met: 1) an
understanding of the general themes and constructs relating to distributed
cognition in the existing literature was reached as was an understanding of how
these issues had been conceptually framed by other authors, 2) the general
themes and constructs of what constitutes crisis environments were distilled out
of existing literature, and 3) these were integrated to produce the DC5 structure.
Chapter III sought to provide this structure by capturing these constructs
and their interrelationships and by grouping them and then adapting them to
Beer’s (1979, 1984) viable system model. Once the first primary research
question was answered, the next primary research question’s motivation was to
see if this emergent structure of constructs, themes, and interrelationships
served to provide additional knowledge.
The structure provided by Beer’s VSM was sought by the researcher
because it was difficult to articulate the impact of a growing crisis environment on
distributed cognition phenomena. For example, how would a sudden increase in
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the pace of events outside a control center impact its ability to construct an
understanding of that outside environment? Such issues were the focus of the
second primary research question: developing a systemic understanding of the
impact of crisis conditions on distributed cognition systems. Chapter III
speculated on what such affects may be by developing and articulating the initial
DC5 framework (Figure 3.4 and Table 3.1) and Chapter V provided validation or
modification to a substantial part of the framework resulting in the final framework
at the time of research completion (Table 5.3e and Figure 5.4e). While the
selected cases did little to validate a key portion of the framework (i.e. the nature
of a crisis environment’s demands for the application and integration of
specialized expertise sets on distributed cognition in control centers) other major
portions of the framework were validated or improved, substantially answering
the second primary research questions. The interpretive, exploratory research
approaches, track 1, to the cases demonstrated the value of the framework as a
basis for understanding distributed cognition phenomena. The applied research
approach, track 2, similarly proved valuable by enhancing the understanding of
the phenomena and setting, indeed validating the need to modify the framework
by identifying the importance of assessing the relative significance of information
by the intelligence functions of a distributed cognition system as horizon of
visibility grows. Due, however, to the unanticipated improvement in the first case
in performance in the SRC between the first and second OREs it is difficult to
gauge the validating impact of this research design approach on the final
performance during the ORI and therefore on the framework. Further discussion
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of this shortfall can be found in the upcoming section on the researcher’s
reflections and criticisms. In general though, the primary research questions and
resulting focused objectives of the research introduced in Chapter I were
addressed.

The Potential Benefits of the Research
Chapter I introduced 5 potential benefits, PB1 - PB5 in Table 1.1, of the
research. PB3 and PB4 were clearly met through the conduct of the research.
The research did indeed provide for a better understanding of distributed
cognition phenomena in the systems within control centers (PB3). The research
provided a better understanding of the systemic effects of crisis conditions on
control center distributed cognition (PB4). The remaining benefits identified in
Chapter I require further explanation.
One of the anticipated benefits of the research (PB1) was that it would
provide a basis for better development of implementation strategies for adapting
new methodologies and technologies to support control centers. While the
researcher believes that full scale development and deployment of such
methodologies and technologies are good examples of future areas of research
inquiry based on this work, the track 2 research method is a key example of this
benefit.
Typically, training for an ORI involves an Air Force unit internally running
three to four successive OREs in preparation for the final test. Usually these
OREs are planned and evaluated by senior, experienced personnel within the
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unit who do not play in the ORE. The planning of these OREs, specifically the
scripting of events, is usually done with the unit’s key functions, such as
operating and maintaining aircraft, securing base perimeters, maintaining base
infrastructure, and other such functions in mind. In turn these events cascade up
and serve as the events that will generate information for the control center to
process. This bottoms-up approach to exercise scripting does not allow for
control centers to necessarily be hit with scenarios ideal to enhancing heir
effectiveness.
The applied research portion of this work, track 2, as developed in
Chapter IV is an example of an implementation strategy based on the DC5
framework. By using an early ORE to assess the existing fitness level of a
control center in a detailed, systemic manner based on the DC5 framework, an
ORE evaluation team can prepare a script specifically designed to train that
particular control center. Such focused design should prove more useful than the
more traditional method of repeating the same script over and over again with
minor changes to maintain surprise. The fact that it is difficult to gauge the
impact of this approach in the given case in which it was used is discussed in a
later section as is the prospect for using this approach in future research.
The paragraphs above identified potential benefits in using the DC5
framework in planning exercises, but it can also be of benefit in assessing (PB2)
the performance of control centers after such exercises. Specifically, using the
framework, as a basis for such assessment can yield much more useful
information than typical criteria. Typically, following an exercise, evaluators will
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use existing established Air Force criteria to evaluate a UCCs performance (see
Appendix 1). As evaluation reports are read and reviewed by players they
merely see their emergent errors identified, for example: “weak use of checklists
and visual aids,” and the players in turn focus on more rigorously using checklists
and visual aids in the next ORE. The track 2 approach, alternatively, allows a
reader to review an assessment in light of the specific environment that created it
and understand its impact on the UCCs mission of constructing and acting upon
representations. Again, using this approach to evaluating performance needs to
be further tested and could be the subject matter of future research.
The last potential benefit identified in Chapter I, is the notion that the
increased understanding provided by this research relating to distributed
cognition and crisis environments may find application outside the setting of Air
Force control centers. As was detailed extensively in Chapter Ill’s discussion of
qualitative case study research methodologies, the generalizability outside the
studied sample that is typically gained from strictly quantitative approaches is not
realizable. As Yin (1984) concludes however, case study data is generalizable to
theory. Chapters I and II identified many settings outside of those at the focus of
this work in which distributed cognition takes place: academic spheres, political
spheres, and organizational settings to name a few. These settings also
occasionally experience crisis environments in which learning must take place in
stressful periods. It is hoped that the increased understanding provided by this
work of crisis environment impacts on such learning and information processing
can provoke similar areas of interests and increase focus upon such phenomena.
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Further limits to such transferability are reflective of the limits of the selected
cases with respect to validating the DC5 framework as shall be discussed in the
next section.

Limitations
In retrospect, in viewing this work as a whole, four major limiting issues
are worthy of reflection. 1) The subject matter of the work was necessarily broad
impacting the results and the extent of its contribution to the body of knowledge;
2) while intuitively obvious, it should be said that the cases selected for study
necessarily limit the impact of the research; 3) as discussed in Chapter III, the
case study approach used here as means of validating the DC5 framework
inherently limits the validity of the research and 4) lastly, some argue that the
work represents application of a level of sophistication beyond that of the
problem it seeks to address. This section addresses these limiting factors and
potential criticisms.
The subject matter of this research, specifically framing distributed
cognition in crisis environments, was relatively broad in scope and coping with
this breadth was a key challenge to the research. Attempting to develop an
entire new framework meant not only the study and mastery of existing
frameworks relating to distributed cognition but the study and development of
systemic methods to be used in providing such a framework. Additionally, the
focus of the research lies at the intersection of two separate focus areas of
research, distributed cognition and crisis management, requiring the extensive
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literature review to support the framework’s development. Finally, a rigorous
review of case study methods, also added to the work required to support the
research.
The resulting DC5 framework was necessarily broad in the set of
circumstances covered, as demonstrated by the extent of detail in Table 5.13
and in the exhaustive cell-by-cell analysis discussions relating to this Table in
Chapter V. One may argue that such breadth yields little in the way of deep
insight and as will be addressed in the next few paragraphs makes validation
difficult to achieve in a holistic sense. Such criticism is valid but one must also
ask if such research should in turn be avoided altogether because of the issue of
breadth. The researcher found it difficult to apply the varieties of settings within a
crisis environment to the existing frameworks and understand their impact
explicitly on distributed cognition phenomena. Thus, necessarily in order to
proceed, a new structured perspective had to be developed and fielded. It is
hoped that future research can and will succeed in validating and sharpening the
framework and improve its usefulness and thereby the depth of the validity of the
work. Because little other work could be found addressing the research focus
area, a large initial increment of research had to be attempted before further
refinement could take place.
The primary weakness of the research in the researcher’s opinion is the
limited validation of the DC5 framework, specifically the lack of validation of the
DC5 framework in the areas of understanding the impact of a crisis environments
demands for specialized and integrated expertise on distributed cognition
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phenomena. The research necessarily required a rigorously observable crisis
environment. The researcher saw the analogy between crisis environments and
lightning strikes as expressed in a popular movie: “the problem is you never
know when and where lightning is going to strike.” Similarly, the strength of the
case category, Air Force OREs and ORIs, from a research perspective was that
the researcher would have access to a controlled, scripted, manipulatable,
observable crisis environment with performance being graded by experienced
personnel using established criteria. Such rigor was exceedingly rare in the
cases or stories frequently reviewed in the literature.
The limits of such cases, however necessarily limit the validating capability
they can provide to the framework being tested. In the case of the AF OREs and
ORIs, the researcher realized upon observing the first ORE in the first case that
they only require a surface level of learning or information processing. The
deeper or double loop learning referred to by Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996)
just wasn’t called for in such settings; indeed all the different types of scenarios
involved in the exercise and inspection scripts are scenarios that are often
discussed and even separately trained for repeatedly in Air Force settings. While
such settings require the application of specialized expertise and require
integrated, interdisciplinary responses from Air Force personnel, little on the spot,
in-crisis deeper learning is called for that causes subjects to reevaluate or
abandon basic underlying assumptions and foundations. Thus, a large portion of
the framework, specifically those rows of Table 5.13 relating to specialized and
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integrated expertise remains un-validated. Further discussion in this respect will
follow in the next section on future research focus areas.
The cases studied necessarily limited the impact of the research also in
the way the control centers performed relative to their environment. The DC5
framework necessarily defines itself as one in which a crisis is taking place.
Implicit in this definition is the assumption that it will be applied to a control center
functioning in such an environment. Upon reflection, this represents a narrow
envelope where the framework is applicable, that is when the proposed
distributed cognition fitness level of control center is just being exceeded by the
environment in which it is functioning. In iterations where the control center’s
proficiency is far beyond that of the environment, little validating effect can be
found. Similarly, in cases where the environment swamps what little proficiency
the control center does have only moderate validating value can be found. The
researcher speculates that even had he been aware of this issue of fitnessenvironment relevance to the degree these cases raised such awareness
beforehand, it would have been difficult to predict the suitability of the cases to
validating the framework. This suggests that it would have been difficult to predict
the fitness-environment relevance until after each control center had been seen
in action. Future work in this area may have to factor eliminating such cases into
the completion timelines for such research as well as the likelihood of finding
cases that fit the envelope for study.
Thirdly, as discussed in Chapter III, case study research necessarily limits
the validity of the work. The five steps cited in the literature in Chapter III to
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address construct validity or the problem of researcher objectivity were, to
review, 1) thoroughly detailing the background, demographic and experiential, of
the researcher so that the audience can assess his potential biases as well as
familiarity with case issues, 2) thoroughly detailing the means by which access to
case data sources was gained, again for the purpose of allowing reviewers to
assess potential biases 3) triangulating data and conclusions by seeking
confirmation from multiple sources of evidence within the case, 4) establishing a
chain of evidence that a reviewer can follow to determine what support a given
finding had, and 5) having the actual informants review the descriptions and
conclusions of the researcher. Such steps were taken in this research. Similarly,
3 prescribed steps from the case study methodology literature review were taken
to address internal validity or the problem of researcher interaction, those being
1) identifying recurring patterns within cases to trace causality, 2) using other
experts and informants to build explanations for observations, and 3) identifying,
detailing, and addressing rival explanations for observations. External validity is
the notion within quantitative research methods that the research is significant
because it is generalizable to a broad set of contexts outside that of the existing
study. As previously discussed, towards this criticism, case studies do not have
a valid answer. The researcher acknowledges that sampling logic is outside of
the grasp of the work given the contextual depth and small number of cases.
Rather it has been proposed that case study findings can be generalized to
existing theory (Yin 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). Adding the separate study of case
two and the second track methodology for case 1 adds weight to the theoretical
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propositions of the DC5 framework (Yin, 2003). The findings of the case study
should be transferable to other similar contexts but the work is inherently limited
only to the context of Air Force Control Centers and not generalizeable to other
settings. Pressing this notion even further, the generalizability of the research is
also limited by the artificialities of associated with exercises and inspections
relative to real-world Air Force crisis events. As documented in the case
description, operational readiness exercises and inspections are high-stress
events but casualties, material damage, and mission impacts are simulated and
at the end of a participant’s shift they return to their own homes or hotel rooms.
Such limitations are just that, limitations, the cases still represent quite an
opportunity for research not crisis environments as long as the limitations are
captured contextually.
Finally, reliability refers to the notion within traditional quantitative research
that experiments may be followed and repeated and results should be
reproducible. Again because of the dependence of case studies on contextual
depth they’re inherently limited in their ability to be reproduced in other settings.
This too is acknowledged by the case study researcher who offers in return the
ability to audit his results by developing and using a rigorous case protocol and
maintaining a case database, as was done in this work so that other researchers
can agree that had they done the research the same findings would have been
reached (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989).
Finally, some may argue that a degree of sophistication is being applied to
a problem that doesn’t merit it or require it. A good script can be developed by
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an experienced evaluator simply by reviewing a previous exercise report and
applying that experience rather than going through the process of rigorously and
explicitly understanding distributed cognition and applying it as in track 2 of the
research design, to training a control center to become more proficient. The
researcher wholeheartedly agrees that such experienced and talented
professionals exist that can provide such levels of expertise for training control
centers but argues that the process being applied tacitly by such and
experienced evaluator if made more explicit essentially becomes the process of
Track 2. The sophistication being applied in articulating such a process allows
for a better understanding of distributed cognition phenomena by more people
and thus facilitates better script writing, better performance, and better
assessments of performance.

Recommendations for Further Research
As suggested in the previous section the focus of this research was
necessarily broad because little could be found in the literature regarding the
interrelationship between distributed cognition phenomena and crisis
environments. It is hoped that the framework proposed here and validated to
some extent san serve as basis for outlining and mapping this focus area for
further research. The breadth of the DC5 framework leaves lots of room for
further validation, modification, or rejection of individual propositions of the
framework or categorical reframing of the subject matter itself. The researcher
sees four major areas of focus that might be immediately used in the next
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iteration of academic inquiry into the subject matter: 1) Portions of the DC5
framework can be isolated for further more extensive study and in-depth
validation and study; 2) cases can be more rigorously selected for study to avoid
some of the limitations in this work or accepted for study for just the portion of the
framework to which they have validating, modifying, rejecting, or impacting
content; 3) the applied research design of track 2 can be refined and applied over
several iterations to see if it indeed has validity as a training paradigm, and 4)
perhaps other settings in which distributed cognition occurs in crisis situations
can use the holistic, systemic approach used here to gain understanding of the
subject matter.
Future work could avoid the challenges of this work associated with the
breadth of establishing a new framework by focusing on specific portions of the
framework itself. Specifically, research into control centers implementing new
technologies like BARTS, might yield insights analogous to those seen here
where increased horizon of visibility increases demands on intelligence forming
systems. The impacts of sudden changes in horizons of visibility on various
performance measures may prove interesting. Measurements of intersubjectivity
may be applicable to performance metrics. Finally, the general approach tried
here of broad validation could be repeated to add weight to the theory.
As case characteristics were identified as a key limiting factor on the
research, it is recommended that future research that may use the DC5
framework, seek 1) to immediately rule out cases where the fitness-environment
relevance is not suited to the framework’s envelope and avoid spending precious
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research capital in such areas, 2) accept cases for their strengths as its difficult
to predict the individual attributes of a control center and validate the portions of
the framework they apply to, and 3) try if possible to seek out cases with
attributes that may validate un-validated portions of the framework or add weight
where its necessary.
Of particular interest to the researcher is utilizing applied research along
the lines of the track 2 training methodology proposed here to refine the
framework. The researcher supposes that if access can be gained to an Air
Force unit in the initial stages of training for an ORI before any exercises have
been conducted then more rigorous, thorough, and complete application of the
methodology can be attempted. Environment characterization, fitness
characterization, and performance characterization can be refined into a
sophisticated training paradigm that can be validated or can gain weight if it leads
to improvements in performance.
Finally, as the work was ongoing the researcher began to view many of
the ongoing stories in the news and in his area of academic interest through the
prism of the research. Distributed cognition takes place throughout our world, in
markets, in politics, in diplomatic and military affairs, in history, and in science.
Occasionally, it takes place in crisis environments. Sporadically, the deeper
learning of Argyris and Schon (1978, 1006) only takes place in crisis
environments. A key weakness of the cases used in this research is that they
didn’t present the opportunity for such learning to take place. While the
difficulties associated with knowing when a crisis may happen and capturing data
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in a rigorous manner will have to be overcome or addressed in studying such
matters the variety of contexts for gaining insight into how distributed cognition
can be improved in such circumstances is engaging.

Summary and Final Overview of Conclusions and Contribution the Body of
Knowledge

This work sought to develop an understanding of the impact of crisis
conditions on distributed cognition phenomena. To this end an extensive review
of both key focus areas of subject matter, crisis management and distributed
cognition, was undertaken. The key themes and constructs of both fields were
condensed into characterizing elements and sub-functions. The researcher
concluded that existing frameworks describing organizational learning and
distributed cognition proved unfruitful for articulating the impact of crisis
conditions on distributed cognition phenomena. To address this challenge the
researcher applied Beer’s Viable System Model to create a systemic, holistic,
structured framework out of the constructs and interrelationships of distributed
cognition research which could in turn be used to understand the impacts of a
variety of crisis conditions upon distributed cognition phenomena. This effort
produced the DC5 framework at the center of this work.
Two research methodologies were then proposed to attempt to validate
the framework. The first, an interpretive approach, involved using the framework
as a means of understanding case study observations. The second, an applied
research approach, involved using the framework as a means of assessing the
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distributed cognition fitness level of a control center and designing training
environments to maximize their performance enhancing value. Two case
studies, one involving three units of analysis and the other just a single unit of
analysis, were undertaken to apply these methodologies. The case studies
provided initial validation for a substantial portion of the DC5 framework. Repeat
case studies in future research can add further validating weight to the
framework and could potentially address those areas of the DC5 framework
unaddressed by the selected cases in this work.
The primary benefits of this research to the body of knowledge fall into
three main categories, that is, its contributions in terms of 1) synthesizing existing
literature, 2) theory, 3) methodology, and 4) in practice. First, in terms of the
literature, this work reviewed the existing constructs and frameworks as well as
general themes from two usually separate, non-intersecting areas of study,
distributed cognition and crisis management. It then further studied these
literature sets through the lens of systems analysis developing a structured
review of the literature and citing a gap existing in the literature. Second, this
work goes beyond existing theory by, 1) developing a systemic structured
framing of distributed cognition phenomena not found in the existing literature, 2)
using existing literary constructs to develop a theoretical means of characterizing
a crisis environment, and 3) integrating these two innovations into a single
overarching new framework capturing the systemic impacts of a crisis
environment upon distributed cognition phenomena. Third, the use of the
framework as a means of relating raw control center performance assessments

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

316

to characterizations of control center fitness and crisis environments represents
an innovative approach the methodologically applying the developed theoretical
framework. Fourth, the application in the first case, involving this methodology of
interpreting performance in terms of crisis environment and distributed cognition
fitness levels, to develop first and assessment and second an intervention, in the
form of a script, represents an innovation in terms of applied practice. These four
innovations represent the sum of the contribution of this work to the body of
knowledge and lay a broad, promising foundation for future more focused, in
depth research which can further, more rigorously 1) validate and refine the DC5
framework and 2) comprehend the phenomena at the center of the work.
In terms of guidance for practitioners, specifically Air Force personnel
involved in manning, training, and evaluating unit control centers, track two of the
research design represents a practical means of employing the theory developed
here. The assessment approach involved in this work provides more depth than
existing methods and lays the basis for more rigorous development of training
plans and script development. The key lessons for practitioners from this work
are 1) that crises come in different varieties which can be characterized by the
DC5 framework, 2) the cognition that occurs in control centers should be viewed
as a system of interacting constructs, 3) environmental impacts to the control
center affect its cognitive abilities systemically and the DC5 framework provides
a means for anticipating, understanding, and planning for these impacts, 4)
control center performance should be interpreted in light of this systemic view
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and 5) assessment and training regimens should be deployed with such a
framework in mind.
In terms of future research more specifically, this work provides a
structured framework for understanding the impacts of a crisis environment on
distributed cognition phenomena in the setting of control centers, the framework
could serve as a basis for developing strategies for integrating new technologies
or methodologies into control center operations. The framework can also serve
as a basis for developing new means of assessing control center performance
improving the precision and usability of such assessments of control center
performance. Finally and hopefully, though limited in its own inherent
generalizability, this work can spur thought and future work and research into
both similar settings and different settings in which distributed cognition takes
place under the stress of crisis conditions.
Lastly, in terms of contributions to the field of Engineering Management, 1)
the work represents an innovative application of Systems Engineering concepts
to a problem for which the researcher could not find a previous application. 2)
The subject matter involves the management of complex, technical infrastructure
and highly skilled engineers and technologists, under relatively unstudied
circumstances. 3) Finally, the work synthesizes and combines themes, crisis
stress and organizational learning, from the field of organizational behavior, a key
area of study within Engineering Management research. For Engineering
Managers the work represents an advancement of the field.
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APPENDIX I
SAMPLE OF EXISTING UCC INSPECTION CRITERIA
FROM AIR COMBAT COMMAND INSTRUCTION 90-201, ADDENDUM F

The following is the section of criteria used by the Air Force’s Air Combat
Command Inspection Team to evaluate and grade the Unit Control Center of a
squadron (in this case a RED HORSE, or heavy construction squadron of 400
personnel) during an Operational Readiness Inspection. One goal of this work
was to develop criteria based on an underlying, validated framework that would
provide for a more robust, comprehensive assessment of unit control center
performance during Operational Readiness Inspections:

5.2. Subarea-Command and Control. Unit command and control will be
evaluated to determine if appropriate actions were taken by command and
leadership to sustain, defend, survive, and recover.
5.2.1. Rated Items-Command and Control. The following items will determine
the overall rating for Command and Control:
5.2.1.1. Plans and Procedures.
5.2.1.2. Local Alarm System.
5.2.1.3. Execution.
5.2.2. Subarea Rating-Command and Control:
5.2.2.1. OUTSTANDING. Plans and Procedures and Execution
OUTSTANDING with Local Alarm System at least EXCELLENT.
5.2.2.2. EXCELLENT. Plans and Procedures and Execution at least
EXCELLENT with Local Alarm System at least SATISFACTORY.
5.2.2.3. SATISFACTORY. Plans and Procedures and Execution at least
SATISFACTORY with Local Alarm System at least MARGINAL.
5.2.2.4. MARGINAL. Plans and Procedures and Execution at least
MARGINAL.
5.2.2.5. UNSATISFACTORY. Does not meet other criteria.
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5.2.3. Item--Plans and Procedures. Evaluate integration, coordination, and
effectiveness of pre-, trans-, and post-attack measures and adequacy of
command and control systems. Evaluate the availability of charts, maps,
checklists, directives, information boards and reference documents necessary to
execute war, contingency response plans and unit emergency action taskings.
Evaluate unit’s ability to activate an alternate command center to ensure mission
continuation in the event of an evacuation/relocation.
5.2.4. Item-Local Alarm System. Evaluated for redundancy, appropriateness,
and effectiveness during conventional and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
(NBC) attack situations. Units must utilize the alarm signals specified by the host
theater. Units must be capable of implementing timely alarm notifications
through more than one medium.
5.2.5. Item-Execution. Ability to collect, display, report, and disseminate attack
data through clear lines of authority, rapid communication of data, unity of
command, and liaison with appropriate support agencies will be evaluated.
Additionally, the ability to track and manage non-attack data and information and
properly manage resources and priorities to accomplish taskings will be
evaluated. Prioritization of mission tasking to ensure the highest priority tasking
is met before lower priority tasking.
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APPENDIX II
GLOSSARY OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS

Crisis Control Center: an organization’s centralized establishment for
facilitating distributed cognition in the event the organization encounters a crisis
environment (p.81)
CE: abbreviation used in this work for crisis environment.
Crisis Environment: crisis environments are those with potential for
significantly more negative organizational outcomes and of a significantly greater
level of complexity than organizations are usually prepared for and in turn cause
significant internal organizational stress
Dcog: abbreviation used in this work for distributed cognition
Distributed Cognition: the ongoing accumulation, distribution, and synthesis of
knowledge across time, amongst personnel and systems, and at all levels within
a bounded organization, which leads to the development, adjustment, and
sometimes tearing down of shared mental representations of the outside world
within which the organization is trying to pursue its goals (p. 11, 33)
Distributed Cognition System: a system designed or used by organizations for
the intended purpose of facilitating distributed cognition as described above, (p.
33).
Distributed Cognition System Fitness: a qualitative characterization of the
fitness of a given distributed cognition system based on the DC5 framework.
(p. 130)
DC5: Abbreviation for the Distributed Cognition in Control Centers in Crisis
Conditions Framework developed in this research
DC5F: Abbreviation for DC5 Fitness
Organizational Cognition: a term used somewhat interchangeably throughout
the literature having the same general meaning as distributed cognition although
perhaps more focused around the occurrence of the phenomena in the context of
organizations as opposed to groups in general (p. 33).
UCC: Abbreviation for an Air Force Unit Control Center
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Unit Control Center: An Air Force specific term for crisis control centers for
various echelons within a typical wing organization functioning in wartime
environments or simulated wartime environments for exercise or inspection
purposes (p. 82)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

322

APPENDIX III
CASE PROTOCOL AND DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Case Protocol Organization
This protocol is presented in outline form. Its purpose is to serve as a
potentially auditable resource explaining how research data, analysis, and results
were developed. As such each protocol element is presented along with
development and discussion, or reference to where that development may be
found discussion may be found elsewhere in this text. The elements composing
this protocol are: 1) the overall research design, 2) case requirements, suitability,
and selection, 3) available case data sources, 4) case access and rules of
engagement

Case Protocol
I. Overall Research Design
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV, Figures 4.1 and 4.2
II. Case Requirements, Suitability, and Selection
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV
b) Correspondence with ACC/IG and Inspected Unit: See Appendix IV
III. Available Case Data Sources
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV, Figure 4.3
IV. Case Study Design Tactics
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV, Table 4.1
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V. Case Access and Rules of Engagement
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV
b) Supporting Correspondence: See Appendix IV
c) Researcher Rules of Engagement: See Appendix IV, Table 4.1
VI. Research Challenges for Data Collection Instruments
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV, Table 4.2
b) Data Collection Instruments: See later in this Appendix (III), Tables
A3.1 thru A3.6.
VII. Procedures for Analysis
a) Discussion and Development by element: See Chapter IV
b) Data Analysis Summaries: To be accomplished on an iterative basis in
prospective Chapter V, Case Analysis
VIII. Supporting Documentation
a) Researcher’s Resume: See Appendix IV
b) Researcher’s Background Narrative: See Appendix IV
c) Samples of supporting correspondence: See Appendix IV
d) Researcher subject verification and validation of data collection
instruments, analysis, and conclusions: To be included in Chapter IV.
VIII. Case Database
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV
b) All data sourcing correspondence, data itself collected from the
instruments, supporting documentation, and data summaries to be
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maintained on CD-ROM by researcher and, in the case of field notes,
maintained in a filing system.

Data Collection Instruments
The data collection instruments that follow are derived from the protocol
guidance developed in Chapter IV, expressed in Table 4.2. The constructs of the
DC5 framework guide the breakdown of questions and observation guidance
while the research challenges captured in Table 4.2 are detailed according to the
intersecting cell labels provided there. As the protocol suggests the data
collection instruments are geared to seek both convergence and triangulation as
well as rival explanation and divergence, thus many of the questions that follow
are repetitive seeking to focus responses from the interviewee to confirm or
reject various DC5 framework constructs.
The data gained from these six instruments along with the other materials
detailed in the protocol, researcher background, access correspondence, rules of
engagement regarding researcher/unit/evaluator interaction, and interviewee
follow-up correspondence, will comprise the case database. For each of the
three exercises and one inspection which are being observed, the researcher
expects 6 to 10 UCC participant pre- and post-exercise questionnaire responses,
two to four, one set of researcher observations, and one evaluation report for
review. This database may be made available by contacting the researcher.
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Table A3.1: Pre-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Participants
#

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
General
discussion in
their terms

Table 4.2
Cell
References
A1, A3

A1, A3

10

Potential for
negative
outcomes
Induces
Organizational
Stress
Demand for
Specialized
Expertise
Demand for
Integration of
Expertise
Novelty: Number
of Entities/Pace
of Events
Context: HOV

11

Context: IS

A1, A3

12

A1, A3

14

Context:
Leadership and
Staff
Competence
System 1

15

System 2

A1, A3

17

System 3

A1, A3

18

Demographics

NA

1

2

4

5

6

8

Question

What are your expectations of the upcoming exercise?
What is your position in the organization? How do think
you’ll do? In what areas do you think the UCC will excel
in, do poorly in?
How do you feel about the fact that you are being
evaluated? For having things go badly in the exercise?

A1, A3

What are you expecting in terms of stress in the
exercise?

A1, A3

What do you think of your expertise/qualifications to
respond to scenarios?

A1, A3

What do you think of the UCC’s expertise/qualifications
to respond to scenarios?

A1, A3

Do you feel you’ll be able to handle the amount of
information required and processed during the exercise?

A1, A3

Any thoughts on layout/general functioning of UCC? Are
you able to monitor information outside just the portion
you are focused upon?
How well do you know your fellow UCC personnel, their
jobs. How long have you worked together in a UCC?
Any observations relating to the apparent observed
Leadership and Staff Competence?

A1, A3

Can you describe the jobs of the various people in the
UCC? The purpose of the systems/artifacts?
How well do you think the UCC team will interact and
coordinate their action?
What did you think of the general operational control of
the UCC? Are personnel and systems being provided
with tools to accomplish their function? How is
performance being routinely monitored and feedback
being provided?
Age, rank, gender, race, time in service, time in career
field, experience in UCCs
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Table A3.2: Post-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Participants
#

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus

Table 4.2 Cell
References

Question

1

G e n e ra l
discussion in their

D 1 , D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D 5

H o w did you think the U C C p erform ed? R atin g . R e la tiv e to
others y o u ’v e s e e n . S c e n a rio specific? H o w w ould explain the
perfo rm ance s u c c esses/lap ses/failu res?

D 1 , D 2, D 3,
D4, D5

C a n you identify tim es during the e x e rc is e w h e n working
representatio ns d ep a rte d significantly fro m th e real w orld? If
so w hy do you think th e y occurred?

2

term s
R e p re s e n ta tio n s

3

P otential for
n eg a tiv e outcom es

D 1, D 2 , D 3 ,
D 4, D 5

Did you p erc e iv e kn o w led g e on the potential for n eg ative
outcom es, g ra d e -re la te d and scenario re la te d , im pacting

4

Induces

D 1, D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D 5

W h e re /h o w did you d ete c t signs of stress im pacting you, other,
personnel and system s in th e U C C ? S c e n a rio Specific.

D 1 , D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D5

Did you fee l a n y lack o f p erfo rm a n c e /e rro rs w e re d u e to the
C E ’s d e m a n d s for m o re specialized e x p e rtis e than existed in

perfo rm ance of th e U C C ? Specifically, w h e re ?
O rg a n iza tio n al
S tress
5

D e m a n d for
S p e c ialize d
Expertise

the U C C ? S c e n a rio specific.

6

D e m a n d for
Integration of
Expertise

D 1, D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D5

Did you fee l a n y lack o f p erfo rm a n c e /e rro rs w e re d u e to the
C E ’s d e m a n d s for m o re integrated e x p e rtis e than existed in
the U C C ? S c e n a rio specific.

7

Novelty:
U nknow ability

D 1, D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D5

Novelty: N u m b e r
o f Entities

D 1, D 2 , D 3 .
D 4, D5

Did you fee l a n y lack o f p erfo rm a n c e /e rro rs w e re d u e to the
fact that C E w a s sim ply unkno w able? S c e n a rio specific.
Did you fee l a n y lack o f p erfo rm a n c e /e rro rs w e re d u e to the
num ber o f entities having to be p ro cessed by the U C C ?
S cen ario specific.

N ovelty: P a c e of
E ven ts

D 1, D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D 5

10

Context: H O V

D 1, D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D5

Did you think la y o u t/g e n e ra l functioning o f U C C im pacted
o perations? If so, how ?

11

Context: IS

D 1 , D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D5

W h a t did you think ab o u t te a m m e m b e r interactions? W h a t
m otivated th e m ? H o w did th e y affect p erfo rm an ce

12

S y s te m 1

D 1, D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D 5

W h a t did you think o f th e personnel functions? A n d system
functions within the U C C ? H o w did th e y relate to
p erform ance?

13

S y s te m 2

D 1, D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D5

A n y thoughts on the coordination o f actio ns a m o n g s t U C C
elem ents?

14

S y s te m 3

D 1, D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D5

W h a t did you think o f th e g en e ra l o p e ra tio n a l control o f the
U C C ? A re person nel and system s being provided with tools to
accom plish th eir function? H o w is p erfo rm a n c e being routinely
m onitored and fe e d b a c k being provided?

15

S y s te m 3

D 1 , D 2 , D 3,

Did you o b s e rv e a n y tension relating to th e n e e d for m ore
inform ation v ersu s th e n ee d for im p le m e n ta b le action?
S cen ario specific.

8

9

D 4, D 5

Did you fee l a n y lack o f p erfo rm a n c e /e rro rs w e re d u e to the
p ace of e v e n ts having to b e p ro cessed by th e U C C ? S c e n ario
specific.

16

S y s te m 5

D 1 ,D 2 , D 3,
D 4, D5

A n y thoughts on is su es/ch allen g es th a t w e n t to the core o f the
o rg an izatio n, se n io r le a d e rs h ip , basic policies governing
conduct, actions, and w ork, addressing a n y tension existing
betw een U C C e le m e n ts ?

17

R e s e a rc h e r
Interaction
D em o g ra p h ic
Inform ation

D6

W h a t effect, if any, did you think th e p re s e n c e o f the
re s e a rc h e r h ad on th e actions of the U C C ?
A g e, rank, g en d e r, ra c e , tim e in service, tim e evaluating,
e x p e rie n c e in U C C s

18

NA
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Table A3.3: Post-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Evaluators
#

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus

Table 4.2 Cell
References

Question

1

G e n e ral
discussion in th e ir
term s

E 1, E 2, E 3,
E4, E5

H o w did you think the U C C perfo rm ed? R atin g . R e la tiv e to
others y o u ’ve seen. S c e n ario specific? H o w w ould exp lain the
p erfo rm an ce s uccesses/lap ses/failu res?

2

R e p re s e n ta tio n s

E 1 .E 2 , E3.
E4, E5

C a n you identify tim es during the e x e rcise w h e n w orking
re p resentatio ns d ep arted significantly from th e real w orld? If
so w h y do you think th e y occurred?

Potential for

E 1 , E 2, E 3,
E4, E5

Did you p erc e iv e the k no w ledg e on th e potential for n eg a tiv e
o utcom es, g ra d e -re la ted and scenario related, im pacting
perfo rm ance o f the U C C ? Specifically, w he re ?

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E 4, E 5
E 1 , E 2 , E 3,

W h e re /h o w did you d ete c t signs o f stress im pacting p ersonnel

E4, E5

C E ’s d em a n d s for m ore spec ia lize d e xp ertise than existed in
th e U C C ? S c e n ario specific.

E 1, E 2 , E3,
E4, E5

Did you feel an y lack of p erfo rm ance/errors w e re d u e to the
C E ’s d e m a n d s for m ore integrated e xp ertise than existed in
the U C C ? S cen ario specific.

3

n eg ative o u tc o m es
4

Induces O rg a n 
ization S tress

5

D e m a n d for
S p e c ialize d

6

Expertise
D e m a n d for
Integration of
Expertise

a nd system s in the U C C ? S c e n ario Specific.
Did you fee l a n y lack of p erfo rm ance/errors w e re d u e to the

7

Novelty:
U nknow ability

E1, E2, E3,
E4, E5

Did you fee l an y lack of p erfo rm a n c e /e rro rs w e re d u e to th e
fact that C E w a s sim ply u nkno w able? S c e n a rio specific.

8

Novelty: N u m b e r
o f Entities

E 1 , E 2, E 3,
E4, E5

Did you fee l a n y lack of p erfo rm ance/errors w e re d u e to the
n u m b e r o f entities having to be processed by th e U C C ?
S c e n ario specific.

9

Novelty: P a c e of
Events

E 1 , E 2, E 3,
E4, E5

Did you fee l a n y lack of p erfo rm a n c e /e rro rs w e re d u e to the
p ac e o f e v e n ts having to b e processed by th e U C C ? S c e n a rio
specific.

10

Context: H O V

E 1 , E 2 , E3,
E4, E5

Did you think layou t/g eneral functioning o f U C C im pacted
o peration s? If so, how?

11

Context: IS

E 1 , E 2 , E3,
E4, E5

W h a t did you think ab o u t te a m m e m b e r interactions? W h a t
m otivated them ? H o w did th e y affect p erfo rm ance

12

Context:
L ead ership and
S ta ff C o m p e te n c e

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

A n y o bservations relating to the a p p a re n t o b s e rv e d L ea d e rs h ip
and S ta ff C o m p ete n c e ?

13

Context: Flexibility

E 1, E 2 , E 3 ,
E4, E5

A n y description of U C C actions d em on stratin g flexibility o r lack
thereo f?

14

S ystem 1

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E 4, E 5

W h a t did you think of the p ersonnel functions? A n d system
functions within the U C C ? H o w did they relate to
perfo rm ance?

15

S y s te m 2

E1, E2, E3,
E4, E5

A n y thoughts on the coordination of actions a m o n g s t U C C
e lem ents?

17

S y s te m 3

E 1 , E 2 , E3,
E 4, E 5

W h a t did you think o f the g en e ra l operation al control of the
U C C ? A re personnel and system s being provided w ith tools to
accom plish th e ir function? H o w is p erfo rm a n c e being routinely
m onitored and fee d b a c k provided?

18

S y s te m 3

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

Did you o b serve an y tension relating to the n ee d for m ore
inform ation versus the n ee d for im p le m e n ta b le action?
S c e n ario specific.

19

S y s te m 4

N A - c o vered by question 2

20

S y s te m 5

E1,
E4,
E1,
E4,

21

R e s e a rc h e r
Interaction

E6

W h a t effect, if any, did you think the p re s e n c e o f the
re s e a rc h e r h ad on the actions of the U C C ?

22

E v a lu ato r
D em o g ra p h ic
Inform ation

NA

A g e, rank, g en d e r, race, tim e in service, tim e e valu atin g,
e x p e rie n c e in U C C s

E2, E3,
E5
E 2, E 3,
E5

A n y thoughts on is su es/ch allen g es th a t w e n t to th e c ore o f th e
o rg an izatio n, senio r leadersh ip, basic policies g overning
conduct, actions, and work, add ressing a n y ten sion existing
b e tw e e n U C C elem ents?
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Exercise Script and Exercise Script Review

The purpose of the script review is to evaluate the scenarios in terms of
the DC5 framework. As the script represents the environment in which the UCC
will be functioning, the CE attributes detailed in the DC5 framework should be
applied to the scripted scenarios in order to develop a descriptive
characterization in such terms for each scenario. This will facilitate further
discussion post-exercise to describing the impacts of the crisis environment on
the distributed cognition phenomena occurring in the control center. Additionally,
part of the descriptive characterization of each scenario will include a concise
statement describing the state of the outside environment. This will serve the
purpose of guiding the research observations as the control center builds and
maintains its representation of that environment. Two data documents will be
supplied to the case database for each exercise from this data source, the script
itself and the descriptive characterization.
The specific questions, flowing from the CE portion of the DC5 framework,
guiding the researcher in capturing the descriptive characterization of the outside
environment are:
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Table A3.4: Exercise Script and Exercise Script Review
DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Potential for
negative
outcomes

Table 4.2
Cell
References
B1, B2, B3,
B5

Induces
Organizational
Stress
Demand for
Specialized
Expertise
Demand for
Integration of
Expertise
Novelty:
Unknowability
Novelty: Number
of Entities

B1, B2, B3,
B5

Outside of the exercise environment itself, are there
specific elements of the scenario that have the potential
for outcomes potentially more negative than usual for
the UCC or for the Wing organization?
Are there attributes from the scenario that would be
expected induce stress into the UCC?

B1, B2, B3,
B5

To what degree does the scenario require a specialized
expert understanding to develop a suitable response?

B1, B2, B3,
B5

To what degree does the scenario require a specialized
expert understanding to develop a suitable response?

B1, B2, B3,
B5
B1, B2, B3,
B5

7

Novelty: Pace of
Events

B1, B2, B3,
B5

8

Representation

B1, B2, B3,
B5

9

DC5F impact

B1, B2, B3,
B5

Does the scenario present an unknowable challenge to
the UCC? Describe.
Does the scenario present a challenge to the UCC in
terms of the number entities that must be understood in
order to develop and maintain representations?
Does the scenario present a challenge to the UCC in
terms of the pace of events that must be processed in
order to develop and maintain representations?
Provide description (representation) of the specified
environment the scenario entails to compare with
observations made during the exercise.
Detail, by Systems 1 through 5, which portions of the
DC5F may be expected to be impacted by the scenario

#

1

2

3

4

5
6

Question
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Table A3.5: Researcher Observation Guidance
The purpose of this table is to give the researcher guidance on what to
look for in terms of validating DC5 as he takes notes. There may be key
observations outside of those anticipated here, however.
#

Table 4.2
Cell
References
C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5, C6
C1.C2, C3,
C4, C5
C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

Question

C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5
C1

Provide description of UCC actions demonstrating
flexibility or lack thereof
Capture and describe the various personnel functions
and system artifacts being used to process information
flowing through the UCC.
Describe the actions/performance at System 1 level

1

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Context: HOV

2

Context: IS

3

5

Context:
Leadership and
Staff
Competence
Context:
Flexibility
System 1

6

System 1

7

System 2

8

System 3

C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

9

System 3

C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

10

System 4

11

System 5

C1,
C4,
C1,
C4,

12

Rival
Explanations
Researcher
Interaction

C1,C2, C3,
C4, C5
C6

14

CE

C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

15

Representations

C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

4

13

C1,C2, C3,
C4, C5
C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

C2, C3,
C5
C2, C3,
C5

Provide description of UCC layout and systems
interaction within that layout
Monitor and provide description of how IS or lack thereof
impacts P
Describe observations relating to the apparent observed
Leadership and Staff Competence.

Capture and describe any actions relating to the
coordination of actions amongst UCC elements. What
precipitated the coordination? Its follow-through? Its
end?
Capture any actions relating to the ongoing control of the
UCC. Are personnel and systems being provided with
tools to accomplish their function? How is performance
being routinely monitored and feedback being provided?
Capture the interaction and any tension between this
function and S4 relating to the need for more information
versus the need for implementable action
Detail the ongoing processing of representations as they
are discussed, displayed, and eventually acted on.
Detail interactions in the UCC that approach or address
the identity of the organization. When does senior
leadership become involved? What basic policies exist
governing conduct, actions, and work? If a tension
exists between S4 and S3, how is addressed?
In capturing events as they unfold do other unifying
constructs present themselves?
Capture and describe any actual or perceived
interactions or issues relating to the researcher’s
presence
In addition to and in conjunction with the scenario
characterization of the CE, capture information as it
actually flows in and impacts systems.
Capture representations as they are processed,
discussed, displayed, and acted upon. Compare and
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contrast with actual state of the environment from script.
The difference here represents P.
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Table A3.6: Exercise Evaluation Report Guidance
For purposes of this report the goal of reviewing the formal exercise
reports is to capture any official judgments and supporting interpretations relating
to UCC performance. As such, basically this guidance involves seeking to apply
the DC5 framework to the report to see if convergence exists or if perhaps rival
explanations exist.
#

DC5 Construct
Focus

1

Context: HOV

2

Context: IS

3

5

Context:
Leadership and
Staff
Competence
Context:
Flexibility
System 1

6

System 2

7

System 3

8

System 3

9

System 4

10

System 5

11

Rival
Explanations
Representations

4

12

Table 4.2
Cell
References
F1, F2, F3,
F4, F5
F1.F2, F3,
F4, F5
F1, F2, F3,
F4, F5

Question

F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1.F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5

F3,

Does the report discuss this issue/construct?

F3,

Does the report discuss this issue/construct?

F3,

Does the report discuss this issue/construct?

F3,

Does the report discuss this issue/construct?

F3,

Does the report discuss this issue/construct?

F3,

Does the report discuss this issue/construct?

F3,

Does the report discuss this issue/construct?

F3,

Does the report discuss this issue/construct?

F3,

Does the report discuss this issue/construct?

Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
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APPENDIX IV
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION

This appendix provides some of the supporting documentation discussed
in the text. Specifically the following documentation is provided: 1) the
researcher’s resume is provided as a means of disclosing his personal
background, 2) also provided as a means of disclosing the researcher’s
background is a brief narrative containing the researcher’s demographics as well
as his experience relating specifically to the institutional processes used as a
data source in the research, (3) samples of the correspondence between the
researcher and the Air Combat Command Inspection Team, as well as, the wings
to be inspected, involved in securing access, to the case data resources, 4) the
proposed rules of engagement (RoE) governing conduct of the research and
interaction with the ACC/IG and inspected wing organizations and 5) samples of
correspondence with informants indicating their review of the researchers notes
and conclusions.
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Researcher Resume
CHRISTOPHER J. WEST
MAJ, USAF

Military Resume

AFIT/CIS

SSN: 243-35-4795

253 Mill Point Drive
Hampton, VA 23669
(757) 329-9044
email: chrisiwest@yahoo.com

DOR: 20Aug 2002
Clearance: Secret
Age: 36
Marital Status: Single

SERVICE HISTORY
D octoral Student in Engineering M anagement and System s Engineering, Old Dominion University,
Norfolk, VA, sponsored by A ir Force Institute o f Technology Faculty Pipeline Program: A ug 02 Present.
Civil Engineer Inspector; Headquarters A ir Combat Command Inspector General Squadron, Langley
AFB, VA: Jan 0 0 - A u g 02.
Inspects ACC Civil Engineer and RED HORSE squadrons during Operational Readiness Inspections, Unit
Compliance Inspections, and Nuclear Surety Inspections documenting performance for ACC/CE staff,
providing command-wide crosstell on program implementation, and educating personnel on wartime and
peacetime procedures and methods. Additionally, ensures security o f Nuclear Weapons through inspection
o f facilities and other supporting systems. Acted as effective CE Inspection Section C hief supervising 10
inspectors during 6-month position vacancy.
Readiness Flight Commander; 34 7 Civil Engineer Squadron, M oody AFB, GA; Oct 98 - Jan 00.
Managed 36 Civil Engineer, Support Group, and W ing Operational Response Plans and managed chemical
warfare defense training for 4000 base personnel in a composite wing o f A-lO ’s, F-16’s, HC-130’s, and
H H -60’s. Directed the Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force posturing and training, air base operability,
and disaster response programs. Supervises 8 personnel. Moved to this position in preparation for the first
wing ORI at Moody in nine years. Implemented W ing C C ’s idea o f integrating AEF concept into Phase II
Exercises. 347 CES received a grade o f “Excellent”. Cited by ACC/IG as a Wing Superior Performer for
developing bare base beddown plan in response to IG input in addition to serving as Survival Recovery
Center Commander.
D eployed M aintenance Engineering Flight Commander, 363 Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron,
Prince Sultan A ir Base, Kingdom o f Saudi Arabia; Jun 99 - Oct 99.
Managed 4-person work order planning shop, 3-person service contract quality assurance evaluator shop,
and 23-person service contractor force protection escort shop. Directed the planning o f $125,000 in CE inhouse accomplished work orders at Prince Sultan A ir Base. Developed and implemented 15 new base
service contracts worth annual value o f over $4 million including potable water supply, sewage removal,
refuse removal, grounds maintenance, alarms and suppression, etc).
Environmental Flight Commander; 347 Civil Engineer Squadron, M oody AFB, GA; Jan 97 - Oct 98.
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Led 13 personnel in overall management o f wing environmental programs valued at over $10.5M including
the largest base Installation Restoration Program, $9.3M, and Pollution Prevention Program, $ 186K, in Air
Combat Command.
Negotiated with regulators on policies, permits, and procedures. Ensured
Environmental Impact Analysis Process was completed on all major base actions including two separate
base mission changes and beddown o f new rescue mission. Partnered with federal, state, local, and civic
organizations to establish the Grand Bay/Banks Lake Council Ecosystem Management Cooperative and the
Georgia/DoD Pollution Prevention Partnership, the second o f its kind in the US. Managed the base
Environmental Compliance Assessment Management Program (ECAMP) including development o f
corrective action plans for follow up with MAJCOM and base agencies. Facilitated all aspects o f the wing
Environmental Protection Committee.
Graduate Student, Engineering and Environmental Management; A ir Force Institute o f Technology;
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH; A pr 95 - Jan 97
Project Engineer; 554 RED HORSE Squadron, Osan AB, Republic o f Korea; Apr 94 - A pr 95
Responsible for construction project design development and review, development o f accurate bills o f
material, coordination o f pre-construction meetings with applicable agencies, creation o f construction
schedules and served as on-site commander at all deployed locations. Chief RED HORSE Engineer on
contingency projects totaling S1.5M in one year including S160K dining hall renovation, S280K Army
storage facility, and $ 1 10K aircraft parking ramp. On short notice designed then deployed as leader o f 25man crew to accomplish 4 projects worth $392,000 at remote Korean air base in response to rising threat
conditions on the peninsula.
M aintenance Engineer; 2 7 Civil Engineer Squadron, Cannon AFB, NM ; Nov 92 - A pr 94
Responsible for developing and managing long term infrastructure maintenance programs for the CE
Operations Flight relating to the base electrical distribution system, natural gas distribution system, facility
generators, roads and airfield, water distribution system, and sanitary and storm sewer systems. Managed
$1.5M Natural Gas account ensuring Cannon purchased the cheapest gas available at spot market prices
saving the base over $200K in costs.
Project Engineer; 2 7 Civil Engineer Squadron, Cannon AFB, NM ; Feb 92 - Nov 92
Designed, advised, and provided contractor oversight on base electrical projects including SIM installation
o f new base communication system and $60K facility power system renovation.

EDUCATION

PME:

Squadron Officers School, Resident Air University

Civilian:

Master of Science in Engineering and Environmental Management, Air
Force Institute of Technology, 1996
Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Auburn University, 1991

AW ARDS AND DECORATIONS
2000 1999 1999 1998 1998 1997 -

ACC/IG Company Grade Officer o f the Year
363rd Wing Company Grade Officer o f the Month
347th W ing Operational Readiness Inspection Superior Performer
347th Support Group Company Grade Officer o f the Year
347th W ing Company Grade Officer o f the Quarter
347th Civil Engineer Officer o f the Quarter
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1996 - George K. Dim itroff Award for Best AF1T M aster’s Thesis Supporting Air Force Civil Engineering
Meritorious Service Medal
A ir Force Commendation Medal (3 OLC)
National Defense Service Medal

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

Institute o f Electrical and Electronics Engineers
American Society o f Engineering Managers
Society o f American M ilitary Engineers
Auburn University Electrical Engineer Alumni Association
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Researcher Background Narrative
The researcher is a 36 yr old, white male, born in Charlotte, North
Carolina and raised both in North Carolina and Alabama. He is single and has
not married. He presently lives in Hampton, Virginia. As described in the
preceding resume he is an US Air Force Officer with the rank of Major, with 14
yrs of experience on active duty in the Air Force’s Civil Engineering career field.
The researcher’s experiential relationship to the subject matter of this
research, specifically unit control centers functioning in crisis condition, stems
from two main sources. First, throughout his career, with the exception of his
education assignments, he has been assigned to Air Force bases that regularly
train for their wartime mission and operational readiness inspections by
conducting operational readiness exercises. Generally, these exercises occurred
on a quarterly basis, although two sets of four exercises each, were done on a
monthly basis in preparation for operational readiness inspections, both of which
the researcher participated in as a player. In these exercises and inspections,
the researcher served as: an assistant engineering officer in an engineering
control center, the officer in charge of an engineering control center, an
engineering representative in a base’s overall control center, and as officer in
charge of the base’s control center. The researcher estimates that he must have
participated in at least 15 operational readiness exercises as a player. He
participated in two operational readiness inspections as a player.
During his assignment on Air Combat Command’s Inspector General
team, the researcher served as both an assistant, as well as, lead engineering
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officer responsible for planning inspections, developing and implementing scripts,
and evaluating unit performance. During these inspections the researcher was
specifically responsible for evaluating the performance, based on published Air
Force regulation, policy, and doctrine of a variety of different types of unit control
centers. The researcher served as an inspector on 15 of these inspections.

Case Access Correspondence
This first set of email threads represents follow-ups to telephone
conversations with personnel representing a wing preparing for an operational
readiness inspection by conducting three operational readiness exercises. For
reasons discussed in the proposed rules of engagement for the research, which
follows later in this section, names and unit specific information has been deleted
or in some cases replaced by explanatory titles which have been underlined in
the text.

Date:
From:

Wed, 9 Nov 2005 11:28:39 -0800 (PST)
"Christopher West" <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>

View Contact Details

Add Mobile

Alert

Subject:Re: ORE preparation
To:

_________________

CC:

M a j________________________

Just got off the phone with Lt C o l____________ ,he agreed that a drive up Monday and return
after the ORE (I believe the 19th) is doable. Could you please send fund cite to cover gas and
motel or billeting. I've done the drive to several times and takes me around 5 hrs. If the wing
thinks it better for me to fly and rent a car I can do that too no problem. Will forward the fund cite
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to my supporting office at AFIT (Wright Patt) for orders and keep you in the loop and make sure
you get hard copies of orders when I arrive. Pis don't hesitate to write or call if you have any
questions.

-chris
wrote:
Hi Chris,
It's getting close to the ORE. We need get together to discuss scenarios.
Can you call me this afternoon? I'll be back in the office after 1400.
Work is. Or you can call my cell after 1200 at

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

CHRISTOPHER J. WEST, Maj, USAF
AFIT/CI PhD Student
chrisjwest@yahoo.com
757 329-9044

Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around
http://mail.yahoo.com

From:

Inspected Wing Commanding Officer

To:

'"chrisjwest@yahoo.com"' <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>

CC:

Other Inspected Wing Leadership Personnel

Subject:
Date:

FW ORI - Warlord
Thu, 6 Oct 2005 16:07:13 -0400

Thanks again Chris...It'll be great having you onboard to help guide us through the inspection.
The EET Team Chief Lead Inspected Wing Officer. His phone number is ________ or
_______ . He is putting together the EET members and developing a tailored scenario to meet
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our unique ORI focus - Maintenance Centric, Conventional Only War. I am including a few
attachments (maps, briefing slides, minutes, ORI Report, etc.) to get you somewhat indoctrinated
into what we have already done to prepare for this re-inspection. Please feel free to call me at
any time if you have any question. Again, thanks for volunteering to help support our efforts.
Signed by Inspected Wing Commanding Officer

Date:
From:

Wed, 19 Oct 2005 09:01:13 -0700 (PDT)
"Christopher West" <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>

View Contact Details

Add Mobile

Alert

Subject:
To:

Looking forward to it too, sir. My info's below. I have to finish up some work for
my dissertation committee today and tomorrow morning but I'll talk to my IG contacts and then
put some together some details explaining what I'm working on. As I said, I can keep the
research's footprint very small relative to your ORE's. Basically it involves designing/scripting
scenarios designed to maximize improvement/training value in UCC's and UCC’s - which should
fall in line with your wing's purposes of bringing me on board for script help and warlord duties.
As discussed, 1st week in November works great for me to get up there an meet with you guys in
person if necessary. Working via email also works great for me too.

-chris
Inspected Wing Exercise Officer mote:
Hi Chris,

Looking forward to working with you on the OREs and ORI. Per our conversation this
morning, here’s my info:
Contact Info for Inspected Wing Exercise Officer follows
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The following email threads are samples of the correspondence with Air
Combat Command Inspector General personnel involved in gaining access to the
case data. As discussed in Chapter IV, the researcher agreed to serve as an
inspector on an ORI to meet an IG manpower shortage requirement in exchange
to access to case data later. The ORI in which the researcher served as an
augmenting inspector was not used for data collection for purposes of this
research however the experience was used by the researcher to plan for the
research design involved in this work. For confidentiality purposes, names and
personal information have been masked and replaced with position titles. Such
alterations of the email text are underlined here.

Subject:

Package for IG Access

Date:

Thu, 30 Jun 2005 08:41:20 -0400

From:

ACC/IG Engineering Inspector O fficer

To:

"Christopher West" <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>

Chris,

I talked to one of the two Support Branch Chiefs. He says to put a package together addressing
the key areas: what you are doing, how you will collect data, what you will do with the data, level
of access required, trips you are interested, your status on those trips (i.e. permissive tdy or TDY
from AFIT), disclosure info, and anything else you think an 0-6 needs to know to grant you
access. I would also recommend a bio mentioning that you are a former IG member. The
suggested items are suggested, I am sure you have protocols that state how to approach
research subjects/gain access to data.

Address package to, the Inspection Squadron Commander.
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E-mail is ok. Send E-mail to me, which I will send to IG Branch Chief. His masters was AFIT/CI
and he will put a blurb on how important it is to have an AF related topic and access to data. He
will then forward up.

IG Branch Chief, wasn’t sure how well it would be received higher up. A lot depends on initial
presentation and he thinks concerns will be what data is collected, how data is used, who needs
to agree, etc. His other concern is that attending 110 FW may be a stretch; depending on how
well it is received.

My suggestions about how to approach the leadership are just my suggestions. If your training
and experience says otherwise, I am not offended. Let me know how I can help.

Signed ACC IG Engineering Inspector

From: Christopher West [ mailto:chrisjwest@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2005 7:56 AM
To: ACC IG Engineering Inspector
Subject: RE: Fomer IG Officer augmentee services in exchange for SRC/DCC Phase II
performance data for research

ACC IG Engineering Inspector.

Got your message - will work up a staff package explaining/asking permission with
attachments, talking paper etc. Proposal I'm working on for my prof is taking longer than
expected but should have staff package ready later this quarter.
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-chris

Sub'ect-

^ omer
Officer augmentee services in exchange for SRC/DCC Phase II
performance data for research

Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2005 01:16:28-0400
From: ACC IG Engineering Inspector Officer
To:

"Christopher West" <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>

Chris,
Good to talk to you today. First I will discuss upcoming unit to be inspected then your
research.
upcoming unit to be inspected - 8-18 Aug 05
I am looking for a warlord and greatly appreciate you volunteering. ACC/IG Branch Chief
Officer, the former CE section chief, left last week. His replacement, ACC/IG Branch Chief
Officer, does not arrive until the week before the ORI and we are not sure if he will be attending.
The Deputy IG, (his undergrad was CE), will be the team chief. For core CE IG officers, there is
myself and a new ACC/IG Engineering Inspector. He will have inspected only two NSIs and
two ORIs when we get to upcoming unit to be inspected. He is too green to be warlord. I
could be RH warlord, but since I will be lead CE, or number 2 but 1st IG trip for ACC/IG Branch
Chief Officer. I would rather be out and about. I have a couple of RH experienced officers as
auggies, but I do not want an auggie to be warlord because they do not have the full IG
background. You will be perfect. You have been warlord on RH before, know IG, etc. We will
have to bring you up to speed on some changes over the last couple of years, but it should be a
smooth transition. ACC/IG Engineering Inspector, suggested your name a couple of days ago
and when I told him you said yes, he gave a big thumbs up. Again thanks. Of course this trip will
be paid for by IG.
Research Trips
I do not have a big need for officer auggies in the next couple of months, but can always use
experienced help. I would be willing to take you as an auggie, with IG funding, as long as your
primary focus was being an inspector. I also would have no problem with you being with the
team during inspections and having full IG access to planning sessions, IG meetings, IG
discussions, etc. in support of you research. In the latter case, you would not have to focus on
being an inspector and would be free to focus on what you need to. I say I have no problem, but,
of course, I would have to run it up the chain. Funding on the other hand may be issue. Money is
tight for the rest of the fiscal year. ACC has cut 40% of its flying hours from 1 Jun to 1 Oct and a
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Guard ORI scheduled for Aug has been moved to the new FY. I will inquire about you coming
along for research at IG expense, but I can not make any promises.
I will be back in town next week and I will discuss more. Your research sounds exciting and you
have my support. Attached is the Form 117 required for auggies and our current inspection
schedule. The inspection scheduled is official for the rest of this calendar year. 2006 is not
official yet, is not visible outside the IG (most units know dates or at least window), and is subject
to change, especially the latter half of the year.
« F o rm 117 - Maj W est.doc»
« C u rre n t Inspections 2 .m h t»
Your name is very familiar, but also not sure why. I know we have not been stationed together,
but may have crossed paths somewhere. Below is where I have been....
Thanks,
Signed ACC/IG Engineering Inspector.

From: Christopher West fmai Ito :ch risiwest@va hoo .coml
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2005 3:17 PM
To: ACC/IG Engineering Inspector.
Subject: Fomer IG Officer augmentee services in exchange for SRC/DCC Phase II performance
data for research

Your name is ringing the CE officer bells in my head but I'm not sure we've met. My name is
Chris West - 1was your CE predecessor one or two iterations ago (2000-2002) on the IG team you may have seen my name floating around some of the old paperwork there in the Harbor
Center.

I went from the IG team to working on a PhD for AFIT at Old Dominion University. My research is
focused on how control centers perform in crisis environments. I can provide much more
specific/excruciating detail to you or whomever else may need it at a later time but basically
UCC’s and or DCC's in Phase ll's represent potential data sources for my work.
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To get to the point, I would like to offer my services as an augmentee inspector (when I was on
t h e t e a m w e w e 'r e a lw a y s lo o k in g fo r s u it a b le o ffic e r s - k n o w le d g e o f C E c rite ria , IG

methods/policies/procedures, etc. - it was a challenge) in exchange for the opportunity to
"observe" (at this point I'm still defining/negotiating what that means with my research committee ranging from copious note-taking and interviewing/surveying players to possibly transcribing
video taped sessions) a few (3 to 5) UCC’s or DCC's in action in Phase M's. Attending these
events as a Wing hosted "observer" is another potential route for me take but I think I'd prefer to
do it under IG auspices (and potentially travel funding) if possible - in order to be exposed to
inspector discussions (another data source) of performance as ratings are determined. Willing to
offer my augmentation services on any inspections you may need - even outside potential resea!
rch cases and am willing to travel as soon as you may need.

Again, this is a preliminary float of the basic idea to see if you or the team might potentially be
interested - 1can provide much more information on the research, the approach/acceptability to
getting/using data, discuss possible funding issues/options, augmentation requirements etc. I
talked to your office today on the phone and I understand you're on the road. If you would like to
discuss via phone please send a commercial number and a convenient time to call (I recall those
hours we used to work on the road) or I can wait to your back in Hampton Roads to discuss.

-Maj Chris West

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

346

Rules of Engagement for Researcher interaction with Inspected Wing, and
Inspector General Team

These rules of engagement serve to delineate what can be expected of
the researcher 1) as he collects data while the inspected wing prepares for an
operational readiness inspection by conducting three internal operational
readiness exercises and 2) as he collects data during the actual research
inspection. The researcher realizes his objective of collecting sound research
data to support his work must be subordinate to the institutional needs of the Air
Force, specifically the objective of the inspected wing to perform as well as
possible in the upcoming ORI and the objective of the ACC/IG team to properly
assess the performance of the inspected wing. These objectives of proper
assessment, strong wing performance, and the collection of sound research data
govern these rules of engagement. All three entities agree that the focus of the
research is in the Air Force interest and can be accommodated if the rules are
followed.
The researcher has identified six sources from which to collect data during
each of three internal wing operational readiness exercises and one formal
operational readiness inspection. These data sources in conjunction with the
objectives described above form the foundation of the rules of engagement which
follow.

Inspected Wing Operational Readiness Inspections
Data Source - Pre-Exercise Interviews:
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1) Inspected wing will allow researcher access to UCC players. Interviews
will be no longer than 30 minutes in length and will be based on questionnaires
submitted by researcher to unit for approval.
2) Interview notes and summaries will be submitted to players for review
and comment

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

348

Table A4.1: Researcher-Inspected Wing-IG Rules of Engagement

ORE/ORI

Data Sources and other
issues

Internal Wing Operational
Readiness Exercises

General

Objectives
ACC/IG: Proper
Assessment of Unit
Performance
ACC/IG has no interaction
with inspected wing other
than to agree to general
ground rules/planning
items relating to the
inspection.
ACC/IG and the
researcher will have no
interaction relating to unit
training and performance.

Inspected Wing:
Maximize Performance
During ORI
Unit coordinates with IG to
ensure basic inspection
planning items are agreed
upon so that OREs will
mirror ORIs.
Inspected wing seeks to
maximize ORI
performance by soliciting
researcher advice, review,
and recommendations
based on his research
constructs.
Inspected unit will have
access to all data
collection notes/summaries
and the right to remove
portions as necessary to
retain confidentiality for
institutional purposes.

Internal Wing Operational
Readiness Exercises

Pre-ORE Player Interviews

ACC/IG will have no
interaction at this level.

Inspected unit will have
access to all research
analysis and conclusions
and any comments will be
incorporated in the case
database.
Unit will make players
available for interviews

Researcher: Data
Collection and Research
Soundness
Researcher has no
interaction with IG
regarding unit training and
performance during OREs.
Researcher seeks to gain
data from data sources
discussed below as well as
work with wing to devise
ORE scripts suited to
train/improve UCC
performance based on
research constructs.
Researcher will remove all
references in edditted
collect case data to the
specific unit, as well as, to
specific personnel to retain
confidentiality for Air Force
purposes and anonymity
for research soundness

Researcher will submit
interview questions to unit
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ORE/ORI

Internal Wing Operational
Readiness Exercises

Internal Wing Operational
Readiness Exercises

Data Sources and other
issues

Internal Wing Exercise
Scripts

Researcher Notes

Objectives
ACC/IG: Proper
Assessment of Unit
Performance

ACC/IG will have no
interaction at this level.

ACC/IG will have no
interaction at this level.

Inspected Wing:
Maximize Performance
During ORI
based on questionnaires.

Researcher: Data
Collection and Research
Soundness
leadership for review and
conduct interviews as
discussed in data
collection instrument
guidelines.

Researcher will work with
unit to develop initial ORE
script based on experience
with what constitutes good
scenarios.

Researcher will submit
interview summaries to
players for review and
comment following
interview. Comments will
be incorporated in case
database.
Researcher will work with
unit to develop initial ORE
script based on experience
with what constitutes good
scenarios.

Researcher and Unit will
work together to develop
subsequent ORE scripts
based on research
framework constructs seeking to improve
performance.

Researcher and Unit will
work together to develop
subsequent ORE scripts
based on research
framework constructs seeking to improve
performance.

Researcher shall have
access to UCC during
OREs.

Researcher may keep
scripts for documentation
and analysis purposes.
Researcher will remove all
reference to specific
personnel/organizations
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ORE/ORI

Internal Wing Operational
Readiness Inspections

Internal Wing Operational
Readiness Exercises

Data Sources and other
issues

Post-ORE Player
Interviews

Post-ORE Evaluator
Interviews

Objectives
ACC/IG: Proper
Assessment of Unit
Performance

ACC/IG will have no
interaction at this level.

ACC/IG will have no
interaction at this level.

Inspected Wing:
Maximize Performance
During ORI
Unit will have opportunity
to review notes and
summaries and comment
accordingly. Comments
will be incorporated in the
case database.
Unit will make players
available for interviews
based on questionnaires.

Unit will make evaluators
available for interviews
based on questionnaires.

Researcher: Data
Collection and Research
Soundness
from notes for
confidentiality/anonymity
purposes.

Researcher will submit
interview questions to unit
leadership for review and
conduct interviews as
discussed in data
collection instrument
guidelines.
Researcher will submit
interview summaries to
players for review and
comment following
interview. Comments will
be incorporated in case
database.
Researcher will submit
interview questions to unit
leadership for review and
conduct interviews as
discussed in data
collection instrument
guidelines
Researcher will submit
interview summaries to
evaluators for review and
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ORE/ORI

Data Sources and other
issues

Objectives
ACC/IG: Proper
Assessment of Unit
Performance

Inspected Wing:
Maximize Performance
During ORI

Internal Wing Operational
Readiness Exercises

Post ORE Evaluation
Report

ACC/IG will have no
interaction at this level.

Unit will provide report to
researcher.

Formal Wing Operational
Readiness Inspection

General

Researcher shall be able
to observe inspector
discussion during and
following inspection.
Researcher will keep all
comments regarding
performance and
inspection to himself until
report is written to support
unbiased inspection.

Inspected unit will have
access to all data
collection notes/summaries
and the right to remove
portions as necessary to
retain confidentiality for
institutional purposes.

Researcher shall not
interact with inspected unit
other than to observe
performance and will not
interfere with inspection in
anyway.
IG will have access to all
data collection
notes/summaries and the
right to remove portions as
necessary to retain
confidentiality for
institutional purposes.

Inspected unit will have
access to all research
analysis and conclusions
and any comments will be
incorporated in the case
database.

Researcher: Data
Collection and Research
Soundness
comment following
interview. Comments will
be incorporated in case
database.
Researcher will
incorporate report into
database.
Researcher has no
interaction with IG
regarding unit performance
during ORI prior to report
writing completion other
than to observe discussion
Researcher will remove all
references in editted
collect case data to the
specific unit, as well as, to
specific personnel to retain
confidentiality for Air Force
purposes and anonymity
for research soundness
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ORE/ORI

Formal Wing Operational
Readiness Inspection

Formal Wing Operational
Readiness Inspection

Formal Wing Operational
Readiness Inspection

Data Sources and other
issues

Pre-ORI Player Interviews

ORI Exercise Script

Researcher Notes

Objectives
ACC/IG: Proper
Assessment of Unit
Performance
IG will have access to all
research analysis and
conclusions and any
comments will be
incorporated in the case
database.
ACC/IG will have no
interaction at this level.

Researcher shall not have
access to script until after
ORI has ended.
IG shall provide copy of
script to researcher for
research analysis
purposes following ORI.
Researcher shall confine
himself to no interaction
with inspected unit other

Inspected Wing:
Maximize Performance
During ORI

Researcher: Data
Collection and Research
Soundness

Unit will make players
available for interviews
based on questionnaires.

Researcher will submit
interview questions to unit
leadership for review and
conduct interviews as
discussed in data
collection instrument
guidelines.

Unit has no interaction at
this level.

Researcher shall have
access to UCC during ORI.

Researcher will submit
interview summaries to
players for review and
comment following
interview. Comments will
be incorporated in case
database.
Researcher may keep
scripts for documentation
and analysis purposes.

Researcher will remove all
reference to specific
personnel/organizations
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ORE/ORI

Formal Wing Operational
Readiness Inspection

Formal Wing Operational
Readiness Inspection

Data Sources and other
issues

Post-ORI Player Interviews

Post-ORI Inspector
Interviews

Objectives
ACC/IG: Proper
Assessment of Unit
Performance
than to take notes.
IG shall have access to all
researcher notes and
review/comment
accordingly. Comments
will be incorporated in case
database.
ACC/IG will have no
interaction at this level.

Inspectors involved in
evaluating UCC will be
available for interview
according to questionnaire.

Inspected Wing:
Maximize Performance
During ORI
Unit will have opportunity
to review notes and
summaries and comment
accordingly after ORI has
ended. Comments will be
incorporated in the case
database.

Researcher: Data
Collection and Research
Soundness
from notes for
confidentiality/anonymity
purposes.

Unit will make players
available for interviews
based on questionnaires.

Researcher will submit
interview questions to unit
leadership for review and
conduct interviews as
discussed in data
collection instrument
guidelines.

Unit has no interaction at
this level.

Researcher will submit
interview summaries to
players for review and
comment following
interview. Comments will
be incorporated in case
database.
Researcher will submit
interview questions to IG
leadership for review and
conduct interviews as
discussed in data
collection instrument
guidelines
Researcher will submit
interview summaries to
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ORE/ORI

Data Sources and other
issues

Formal Wing Operational
Readiness Inspection

ORI Report

Objectives
ACC/IG: Proper
Assessment of Unit
Performance

ACC/IG will make report
available to researcher
following completion.

Inspected Wing:
Maximize Performance
During ORI

Unit has no interaction at
this level.

Researcher: Data
Collection and Research
Soundness
inspector for review and
comment following
interview. Comments will
be incorporated in case
database.
Researcher will
incorporate report into
database.
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Samples of Correspondence relating to Informant Reviews of Field Notes
from Interviews

Below are two samples of email correspondence with informants
regarding their review of the author’s notes relating to the data collection
interviews. Additionally, the first sample highlights previous telephone discussion
of the researcher’s conclusions following the first case-first ORE as well as
formally solidifying the rest of the research plan as it related to the unit’s
subsequent OREs and ORI; the plan had not been formally reviewed/accepted
by unit leadership at that point; verbal approval had been given at lower levels of
leadership prior to the first ORE.

From:

<Officer from Case 1 First ORE> Q View Contact Details

To:

"'Christopher West"' <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>

f lAdd Mobile Alert

Subject: RE: Nov ORE - Informant Review
Date:

Fri, 17 Nov 2005 06:45:41 -0500

Hi Chris,
(Please call m e ________ )
My apologies if you’ve been trying to call my cell phone. Comm gave me a “new and improved”
phone. Enough said there. I have not been able to check voicemail for about a week.

1.

2.

I agree with your notes on the interview. Your comments <for inclusion on the unit’s
internal ORE report> are great. I will send you a copy of the ORE Report. There is a
problem locating the Fuels information. It is not where it is supposed to be and both of
our fuels inspectors (from Maryland) are TDY.
List is being finalized for <another unit officer> to take to the IG
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3.

As I mentioned at our last discussion at the base - most definitely! Yes, please start
scripting. I have already invited the same inspectors back for Feb. I will need to have
one two of the maintenance EET personnel come in ahead of time to give scripting for
the maintenance arena since neither you or I have that strength and we will need to
stress them with more complex maintenance issues (load config changes, simulated
problems, etc.)

P.S. Comm just called and said that my cell phone should be working so I guess I’m “back on
the air”
If I don’t get a chance to talk to you before hand, I hope you and your family will have a great
holiday weekend!

<sig block>

From: Christopher West [ mailto:chrisjwest@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2005 1:42 PM
To: <Qfficer from Case 1 First ORE>
Subject: Nov ORE - Informant Review

Sir,
Tried to call a couple times and I assume you're pretty busy. Was trying to follow up and
touch base before Thanksgiving -

1) Hope you found my notes on the Nov. exercise/interview satisfactory. If you do,
could you please send an email indicating such as w e discussed for filing in my database.
I would also like to get a copy o f your final ORE report if possible for my research
purposes. I will delete all names/unit references for purposes o f the research records - we
can discuss further if you like.

2) Was wondering if you (or others) had contacted the IG on the issues we discussed
requiring further clarification (i.e.: flightline aggressor artificiality, offline tasking o f the
SRC)
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3) I would like to return for further help if possible in your subsequent exercises (and for
more data collection for my purposes), any possible other ORI specific training the wing
may be doing, and for the ORI. I will use my notes, the N ov script, and your report to
start working on script planning for the next ORE if you like.

Please let me know if you might need further info.

Thx,
Chris
CHRISTOPHER J. WEST, Maj, USAF
AFIT/CI PhD Student
chrisjwest@yahoo.com

From:

"<Enqineerinq Officer from Case 2> BPView Contact Details

To:

'"Christopher West"' <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>

I Add Mobile Alert

Subject: RE: Need Review Acknowledgment for ORI notes
Date:

Mon, 13 Mar 2006 08:23:49 -0600

Chris,
I have read Major’s West’s notes re: our discussions during the ORI and they’re accurate.

H o w ’s th a t?

You're on the list. Stay out of the bars and finish your dissertation :)
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<sig block>

From: Christopher West [ mailto:chrisjwest@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, March 10, 2006 2:53 PM
To: "<Enqineerinq Officer from Case 2>
Subject: ORI observer request
Hi

,

Good talking to you this afternoon. Hope you’ve had a chance to review my notes from the ORI
interviews. As we talked about-for my research files, can you please reply with an
acknowledgment that they are inline with what we discussed?

-chris

CHRISTOPHER J. WEST, Maj, USAF
AFIT/CI PhD Student
chrisjwest@yahoo.com
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APPENDIX V
RAW DATA COLLECTION SUMMARY

The purpose of this section is to summarize the data in the case database
by case. The tool used to present this summary is the data collection instrument
tables presented Appendix III. The tables here represent the researcher’s
summary by instrument type of the individual data collection instruments
themselves. Where considerable convergence was seen that it’s verbally
indicated. On questions where less of a degree of convergence or no
convergence is seen that is also verbally indicated. In some cases individual
questions associated with the data collection instruments proved unfruitful in
gaining data as open interviews were conducted and that is also indicated. As
noted in the text, the second ORE in the first case resulted in limited data
collection due to partial cancellation of the exercise due to inclement weather and
more importantly due to the limited crisis environment relative to the fitness
increases gained by the unit; since that data is more generally discussed in the
text it is not included here. The tables and figures are labeled according to the
case they were associated with, i.e. the second numerical digit in the table or
figure represents the case number observed.
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Case 1- 1st ORE Raw Data Summary
Table A5.1.1.1: Data Summary for Pre-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC
Participants
#

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
General
discussion in
their terms

Table 4.2
Cell
References
A1, A3

A1, A3

10

Potential for
negative
outcomes
Induces
Organizational
Stress
Demand for
Specialized
Expertise
Demand for
Integration of
Expertise
Novelty: Number
of Entities/Pace
of Events
Context: HOV

11

Context: IS

A1, A3

12

A1, A3

14

Context:
Leadership and
Staff
Competence
System 1

15
17

System 2
System 3

A1, A3
A1, A3

18

Demographics

NA

1

2

4

5

6

8

A1, A3

A1, A3

A1, A3

A1, A3

A1, A3

A1, A3

Q uestion

8 personnel interviewed. Most expected to do better in
terms of performance than they had in the May ’05 ORI.
Most thought the IG inspectors were somewhat biased
against their reliance on the new electronic BARTS
system for message posting exercise information. A
smaller minority (two or three) weren’t sure how they
would perform in the ORE
Most expressed the desire to not have their performance
rated substandard again. All expressed their knowledge
of unit leaderships desire to see performance improve.
All expressed a desire to have the exercises and ORI
over with.
All thought they were experts in their respective career
field. A minority expressed reservations about applying
their expertise in a control room setting.
Most thought the group could work well together to apply
their disciplines. A minority were unsure because of the
May ’05 inspection.
Most were unsure how they would perform. One
thought it would be too hard.
All liked BARTS. Two thought layout was good. Majority
had not considered layout.
All new each other for more than a year. Most had prior
experience working together in the SRC. Three had not
worked in an SRC before the Nov ORE
None expressed reservations about leadership. All felt
competent with other personnel.

All could describe purpose of SRC displays, BARTS,
and jobs of other personnel.
All thought coordination would go well.
All thought they would function well, and would be ably
led.
All were Caucasian. 3 were female. 2 in 30’s. 4 in 40’s.
2 in 50’s. 5 enlisted: E5+. 3 Officer: 0-4, 0-5, 0-6.
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Table A5.1.1.2: Post-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Participants
DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
General
discussion in
their terms
Representations

Table 4.2
Cell
References
D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5

3

Potential for
negative
outcomes

D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5

4

Induces
Organizational
Stress

D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5

5

D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5

10

Demand for
Specialized
Expertise
Demand for
Integration of
Expertise
Novelty:
Unknowability
Novelty: Number
of Entities
Novelty: Pace of
Events
Context: HOV

11

Context: IS

12

System 1

13

System 2

14

System 3

15

System 3

16

System 5

17

Researcher
Interaction
Demographic
Information

#

1

2

6

7
8
9

18

D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5

Question

4 thought poorly. 3 thought satisfactory. 1 thought well.

None thought representations departed greatly from real
world in terms of accuracy. All thought time to gaining
accuracy could be improved.
All acknowledged pressure to perform with each attack,
especially initial attacks of the exercise. All said this
pressure lightened as the exercise continued - they got
used to executing during attacks. Three said prior
mistakes/slowness led to increased pressure to perform.
Most said they felt stress after errors/slowness in PAR
sweeps were reported by them to senior leadership, and
keeping up with incoming data. Two felt little stress other
than that of being in an exercise.
No concerns we’re voiced in this area.

D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5

No concerns we’re voiced in this area.

D1, D2,
D4, D5
D1, D2,
D4, D5
D1, D2,
D4, D5
D1, D2,
D4, D5
D1, D2,
D4, D5

D3,

No concerns we’re voiced in this area.

D3,

Most reported the breadth of the second attack was
daunting.
Most reported significant stress in managing the pace of
events associated with the MOC relocation exercise.
All felt BARTS helped tremendously and facilitated the
quick distribution of information across career fields.
All said nature of attack required interaction i.e.:
aggressors required security response and maintenance
response
Giant Voice and Flag indications were slow and errant.
All reported stress as a result of such errors and impact
Inconclusive responses

D3,
D3,
D3,

D1,
D4,
D1,
D4,
D1,
D4,

D2, D3,
D5
D2, D3,
D5
D2, D3,
D5

D1,
D4,
D1,
D4,
D6

D2, D3,
D5
D2, D3,
D5

NA

Most thought SRC director did a good job of directing
efforts. Some thought tendency to become over focused
was present.
All noted leadership’s dissatisfaction with slowness of
PAR information and the need to go to general release.
All noted the stress all felt as a result of the previous
inspection report
No participants expressed concerns in this area
See previous questionnaire
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Table A5.1.1.3: Post-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Evaluators
#

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus

Table 4.2 Cell
References

Question

1

G e n e ral
discussion in their

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

T h e re s e a rc h e r and th e eval te a m c h ie f w e re the only eval
te a m m e m b e rs evalu atin g the S R C thus th e c o m m en ts b elo w

term s

a re those of th e T e a m C h ie f

2

R e p re s e n ta tio n s

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

R ecurringly, only d u e to slow n ess in P A R te a m
com m u nication . In a cou ple c a s e d u e to locating errors

3

Potential for
n eg a tiv e o utcom es

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

4

Induces
O rg a n iza tio n al
S tress
D e m a n d for

E 1, E 2 , E 3,
E 4, E 5

S e e abo ve.

E 1 , E 2, E 3,
E 4, E5

N o n e p erceived .

asso c ia te d w ith U X O s
P e rc eiv e d stress associated with n eg a tiv e M a y 0 5 inspection
report. A lso with slow n ess o f g en e ra l re le a s e do to P A R te a m
slow ness

5

S p e c ialize d
E xp ertise
6

D e m a n d for
Integration of
Expertise

E 1 , E 2, E 3,
E 4, E 5

N o n e p erceived .

7

Novelty:

E 1 , E 2, E 3,

N o n -p e rce iv e d .

U nknow ability

E 4, E5

8

Novelty: N u m b er
o f Entities

E 1 , E 2, E 3,
E 4, E5

E xte n s iv e M O C attack/relocation m a d e keepin g up with
inform ation difficult and stressful.

9

Novelty: P a c e of
Even ts

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

E xtensive M O C attack/relocation m a d e keepin g up with
inform ation difficult and stressful.

10

C ontext: H O V

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,

F elt B A R T S h elp ed facilitated the q uick distribution o f

E4, E5

inform ation a cro ss c a re e r fields but a g re e d with IG
a s s e s s m e n t th a t it limits ch a tte r in th e S R C .

11

C ontext: IS

E 1 , E 2 , E3,
E4, E5

Did not think e x e rc is e w a s intense e n o u g h to m a k e the effects
o f good IS visible in perfo rm ance

12

Context:
L ea d e rs h ip and

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E 5

N o inform ation vo lu n te e re d .

S ta ff C o m p ete n c e
13

Context: Flexibility

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

N ot really.

14

S y s te m 1

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

R e p e a te d c o n cern s with G ia n t V o ic e and P A R te a m s s e e n
e ls e w h e re

15

S y s te m 2

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

N ot R eally.

17

S y s te m 3

E1, E2, E3,
E4, E5

T e n d e n c y to g e t o v e r focu sed on p ro b le m s b en e a th th e ir level
of m anagem ent

18

S y s te m 3

E 1 , E2, E3,
E4, E 5

R e p e a te d con cern s with P A R te a m s s e e n e ls e w h e re

19

S y s te m 4

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

N A - c o vered by question 2

20

S y s te m 5

E 1 , E 2 , E 3,
E4, E5

C ited g e n e ra l stress associated w ith previous inspection
failure.

21

R e s e a rc h e r
Interaction
E v a lu ato r
D e m o g ra p h ic
Inform ation

E6

N o n e.

NA

T e a m C h ie f is w hite m ale, 4 0 yr old, 0 - 5 .

22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

363

Table A5.1.1.4: Exercise Scrip and Exercise Script Review

8

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Potential for
negative
outcomes
Induces
Organizational
Stress
Demand for
Specialized
Expertise
Demand for
Integration of
Expertise
Novelty:
Unknowability
Novelty: Number
of Entities
Novelty: Pace of
Events
Representation

9

DC5F impact

#

1

2

3

4

5
6
7

Table 4.2
Cell
References
B1, B2, B3,
B5
B1, B2, B3,
B5

Question

First attack was designed to have breadth second to
have depth, designed to stress both unit and control
center.
Same as above.

B1, B2, B3,
B5

Not really in terms of command and control.

B1, B2, B3,
B5

Not so much expertise as information.

B1, B2,
B5
B1, B2,
B5
B1, B2,
B5
B1, B2,
B5
B1, B2,
B5

B3,

Not really.

B3,

B3,

MOC relocation attack represents an attempt to
challenge the processing limits of the SRC.
Breadth attack represents an attempt to challenge the
processing limits of the SRC.
See script in case database

B3,

See discussion Ch. 5

B3,
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Table A5.1.1.5: Researcher Observation Guidance
F

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus

Table 4.2 Cell
References

Question

1

C ontext: H O V

C 1, C 2, C3,
C 4 , C 5 , C6

T h e S R C s a t in front o f and b elo w a s c re e n e d off b attlestaff
room for se n io r leadership. Fou r displays w e re projected onto
s c re e n s re a d a b le by 8 S R C staff as w ell as battlestaff. T h e
staff consisted o f a director, a lo g k e e p e r/B A R T S u pd ater, an
en g in eerin g re p re s e n ta tiv e , a m ed ical rep re s e n ta tiv e , a security
forces re p re s e n ta tiv e , a com m unications re p re s e n ta tiv e , a
m a in te n a n c e re p re s e n ta tiv e , a logistics re p resen tative, and a
senio r enlisted chief. P erson nel w e re s e a te d a t a long
w ra p a ro u n d d e s k with laptops, phones, an d radio
com m u nication s. Displays included priority lists o f facilities,
actions, re c o n n a iss a n ce sw eep s, an d B A R T S inform ation (se e
F igure A 5 .1 , layout).

2

C o ntext: IS

C 1, C2, C3,
C 4, C5

3

Context:
L ea d e rs h ip and

C 1, C 2, C3,
C 4, C5

S ta ff C o m p ete n c e

IS w a s good b e c a u s e all p layers k n e w e a c h o th e r as local A N G
m e m b e rs but n eg a tiv e in th a t only 4 had w orked to g e th e r in the
M a y '0 5 O R I. In th e re s e a rc h e r’s opinion script did not stress
S R C p erson nel e n o ug h to note the im p act o f good o r poo r IS.
W o rk e rs ( S 1 ) w e re co m p eten t in jo b kn o w led g e. S o m e w h a t
w e e k in interaction d u e to lack of S R C w ork tog eth er. Criticism:
S R C le a d e rs h ip a n d m ultiple w orkers te n d e d to b ec o m e o ver
focused on solving singular, relatively m inor issues in
com pariso n , to the exclusion o f o th er issues.

4

C ontext:
Flexibility

C 1, C 2, C3,
C 4, C 5

N o t m uch in this a re a to observe although S R C resp on ded v e ry
w ell to loss o f B A R T S operation.

5

S y s te m 1

C1

S e e S R C layou t description a b o ve and discussion of B A R T S in
C h a p te r V .

6

S y s te m 1

C 1, C 2, C3,
C 4, C 5

S e e S R C layout description a b o ve and discussion of B A R T S in
C h a p te r V . O n e criticism is p erfo rm an ce of tracking P A R tea m s
and com m u nicating a la rm signals discussed in ch. 5.
A ccountability checks should h av e b e e n m ore regular.

7

S y s te m 2

C 1, C 2, C3,
C 4, C 5

C o ordin ation g reatly facilitated by B A R T S , alm o st becom ing
m indless.

8

S y s te m 3

C 1, C 2, C 3,
C 4, C 5

N o t m uch o f o bservatio n al note o th er than the n eed to apply
m o re p ressure for com pletion o f P A R sw eep s.

9

S y s te m 3

C 1, C 2, C 3,
C 4, C 5

S e e discussion o f slow P A R s w e ep s in Ch. 5

10

S y s te m 4

C 1 .C 2 , C 3,
C 4, C5

S R C for the m o st part a c curately c aptured a n d displayed the
v arie tie s o f a tta c k d a m a g e , im pact, prioritization. Script did not
significantly te s t the m en tal construction o f re p resentatio ns as
m ost w e re straightforw ard. A m ap disp lay w ould h a v e helped
processing o f incom ing d a ta , and action d e v e lo p m e n t in
response.

11

S y s te m 5

C 1, C 2, C 3,
C 4, C5

S e n io r le a d e rs h ip ’s significant interaction w ith S R C during the
O R E w a s to insist upon q uicker P A R sw eep s.

12

Rival
E xp lanatio ns

C 1, C 2, C3,
C 4, C5

E a s in es s o f script did not lead to observatio n s in this a re a .

13

R e s e a rc h e r
Interaction

C6

N o n e o b s e rv e d .

14

CE

C 1, C 2, C 3,
C 4, C5

S e e discussion in Ch. 5

15

R e p re s e n ta tio n s

C 1, C 2, C 3,
C 4, C5

S e e discussion in C h . 5
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Figure A5.1: UCC Layout
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Table A5.1.1.6: Exercise Evaluation Report Guidance

#

DC5 Construct
Focus

1

Context: HOV

2

Context: IS

3

5

Context:
Leadership and
Staff
Competence
Context:
Flexibility
System 1

6

System 2

7

System 3

8

System 3

9

System 4

10

System 5

11

Rival
Explanations
Representations

4

12

Table 4.2
Cell
References
F1, F2, F3,
F4, F5

F1,
F4,
F1,
F4,

F2, F3,
F5
F2, F3,
F5

F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5

Question

Yes in terms of BARTS. Provides wider view of actions
relatively quickly and retains messages improving HOV.
But tends to decrease chatter allowing for simultaneous
monitoring of issues.
NO
NO

F3,

Positively in terms of BARTS system loss response.

F3,
F3,

Negatively in terms of PAR sweeps, and Giant Voice
communication
NO

F3,

Negatively in terms of PAR sweep team motivation.

F3,

Negatively in terms of PAR sweep team motivation

F3,

Negatively in terms of PAR sweep team motivation

F3,

No

F3,

No

F3,

Negatively in terms of PAR sweep team motivation
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Case 2 - ORI Raw Data Summary
Table A5.2.1: Data Summary for Pre-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC
Participants
#

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
General
discussion in
their terms
Potential for
negative
outcomes
Induces
Organizational
Stress
Demand for
Specialized
Expertise
Demand for
Integration of
Expertise
Novelty: Number
of Entities/Pace
of Events
Context: HOV
Context: IS

Table 4.2
Cell
References
A1, A3

Question

A1, A3

Most expressed the desire to do well. Most expressed
their knowledge of unit leaderships desire do well.

A1, A3

All expressed a desire to have the ORI over with.

A1, A3

All thought they were experts in their respective career
field.

A1, A3

All thought the group could integrate their expertises.

A1, A3

A1, A3

14

Context:
Leadership and
Staff
Competence
System 1

Most thought they would handle the intensity well. Two
expressed reservations about not having enough
practice.
Most thought the layout was good.
All new each other for more than a year. Most had only
worked together in the SRC in one exercise before the
ORI.
None expressed reservations about leadership. Most
felt competent with other personnel. Three thought
more practice OREs would have been better

15

System 2

A1.A3

17

Systems 3, 4, 5

A1, A3

18

Demographics

NA

1

2

4

5

6

8

10
11

12

A1, A3
A1, A3

A1, A3

9 personnel interviewed. Most expected to perform
satisfactory

Most could generally describe purpose of SRC displays,
and jobs of other personnel although articulation of basic
procedures diverged significantly as more details were
discussed
Most thought coordination would go well. Three thought
it would be a challenge.
All thought they would function well, and would be ably
led.
Eight were Caucasian. One was African-American. 3
were female. 4 in 30’s. 3 in 40’s. 2 in 50’s. 6 enlisted: 1
SNCO, 3 NCO, 2 Airman. 2 Officer: 0-4, 0-6.
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Table A5.2.2: Postt-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Participants
#

1

2
3

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
General
discussion in
their terms
Representations

10

Potential for
negative
outcomes
Induces
Organizational
Stress
Demand for
Specialized
Expertise
Demand for
Integration of
Expertise
Novelty:
Unknowability
Novelty: Number
of Entities
Novelty: Pace of
Events
Context: HOV

11

Context: IS

12

System 1

13

System 2

1 4

System 3

15

System 3

16

System 5

17

Researcher
Interaction
Demographic
Information

4

5

6

7
8
9

18

T a b le 4 .2

Cell
References
D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5
D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5
D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5
D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5
D1, D2, D3,
D4, D5
D 1 ,

D 2 ,

D 4 ,

D 5

D1, D2,
D4, D5
D1, D2,
D4, D5
D1, D2,
D4, D5
D1, D2,
D4, D5
D1, D2,
D4, D5
D1, D2,
D4, D5

D1,
D4,
D1,
D4,
D1,
D4,
D1,
D4,
D6
NA

D2,
D5
D2,
D5
D2,
D5
D2,
D5

Q u e s tio n

All thought poorly.

All thought timeliness of information flow impacted UCC
direction of response actions.
All acknowledged pressure to perform with each attack,
Most said that IG feedback (negative) increased
pressure to perform.
Most acknowledged increased stress as a result of
negative IG feedback.

D3,

Most thought the UCC team had the required expertise
but lacked he practice of working with each other. Two
were unsure.
Most thought the UCC team had the required expertise
but lacked he practice of working with each other. Two
were unsure.
No concerns we’re voiced in this area.

D3,

Most thought the attacks involved lots of damage.

D3,

D3,

All reported significant stress in managing the pace of
events throughout the exercise.
All felt MOPP gear inhibited their ability to monitor
information flows outside their own,.
Some said MOPP gear caused them to focus more on
themselves and less on others.
Flag indications were slow and errant. Status Board
updates and accountability checks were untimely.
Checklist use was minimal. Errors were openly
acknowledged by most.
All thought more practice was required to sharpen
coordination skills.
Inconclusive comments. No convergence of opinion.

D3,

Inconclusive comments. No convergence of opinion.

D3,

Inconclusive comments. No convergence of opinion.

D 3 ,

D3,
D3,
D3,

D3,

No participants expressed concerns in this area
See previous table.
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Table A5.2.3: Poslt-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Inspectors
#

1

2
3

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
General
discussion in
their terms
Representations

Table 4.2
Cell
References
E1, E2, E3,
E4, E5

Q u e s tio n

E1,
E4,
E1,
E4,

Untimely across the board leading to numerous errors.

E2, E3,
E5
E2, E3,
E5

10

Potential for
negative
outcomes
Induces
Organizational
Stress
Demand for
Specialized
Expertise
Demand for
Integration of
Expertise
Novelty:
Unknowability
Novelty: Number
of Entities
Novelty: Pace of
Events
Context: HOV

11

Context: IS

E1, E2, E3,
E4, E5

12

E1, E2, E3,
E4, E5

14

Context:
Leadership and
Staff
Competence
Context:
Flexibility
System 1

15

System 2

17

System 3

19

System 4

E1, E2, E3,
E4, E5
E1, E2, E3,
E4, E5
E1.E2, E3,
E4, E5

20

System 5

4

5

6

7
8
9

13

E1.E2, E3,
E4, E5
E1.E2, E3,
E4, E5
E1.E2, E3,
E4, E5
E1,
E4,
E1,
E4,
E1,
E4,
E1,
E4,

E2,
E5
E2,
E5
E2,
E5
E2,
E5

E3,
E3,
E3,
E3,

E1.E2, E3,
E4, E5
E1, E2, E3,
E4, E5

E1, E2, E3,
E4, E5

Inspectors agreed unanimously that all aspects of
performance were poor.

Perceived stress associated negative feedback but also
thought lack of action/improvement indicated lack of
stress.
Perceived stress associated negative feedback but also
thought lack of action/improvement indicated lack of
stress.
Inspectors agreed inspection script did not call for any
group or single expertise not readily available to UCC
personnel.
Inspectors agreed inspection script did not call for any
group or single expertise not readily available to UCC
personnel.
Inspectors agreed all scenarios were easily discernable.
All Inspectors thought attacks were light in terms of
depth of impact to operations.
Inspectors agreed the pace of events was demanding
and constant except for the last day.
At researcher’s prompting, inspectors agreed HOV was
impacted by wear of chemical gear but thought
performance was already low enough to be able to really
comment on extent of impact.
At researcher’s prompting, inspectors agreed HOV was
impacted by wear of chemical gear but thought
performance was already low enough to be able to really
comment on extent of impact.
Inspectors chose not to comment directly but thought
more practice would have helped the unit

No convergence in this area.
Flag indications were slow and errant. Status Board
updates and accountability checks were untimely.
Checklist use was minimal. No information backup
procedures were used. Relocation procedures were not
written down/were informal at best.
Coordination was weak.
Performance deficiencies were not cited or looked to for
improvement.
Severely limited representation construction due to
untimely across the board processing of information
leading to numerous errors.
Inspectors chose not to comment in this area.
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21
22

Researcher
Interaction
Evaluator
Demographic
Information

E6

None.

NA

All inspectors were white male officers, 2-40 yr old 0-5s,
1-30yrold 0-4, 1 30yrold 0-3..

Table A5.2.4: Exercise Script and Exercise Script Review
#

8

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Potential for
negative
outcomes
Induces
Organizational
Stress
Demand for
Specialized
Expertise
Demand for
Integration of
Expertise
Novelty:
Unknowability
Novelty: Number
of Entities
Novelty: Pace of
Events
Representation

9

DC5F impact

1

2

3

4

5
6
7

Table 4.2
Cell
References
B1, B2, B3,
B5
B1, B2, B3,
B5

Question

Generally in terms of inspection report impact. Attacks
involved casualties and severe mission impact in terms
of completing construction requirements.
Pressure as described above.

B1, B2, B3,
B5

Not really required in terms of UCC personnel

B1, B2, B3,
B5

Not so much specialization/expertise as information
processing/specialization

B1, B2,
B5
B1, B2,
B5
B1, B2,
B5
B1, B2,
B5
B1, B2,
B5

B3,

Not required.

B3,

B3,

Attacks were really not large in scale or deep in mission
impact.
Event pace was challenging and constant except for last
day.
See script in case database

B3,

See discussion Ch. 5

B3,
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Table A5.2.5: Researcher Observation Guidance

1

DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Context: HOV

Table 4.2
Cell
References
C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5, C6

2

Context: IS

C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

Context:
Leadership and
Staff
Competence
Context:
Flexibility

C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

5
6

System 1
System 1

C1
C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

7

System 2

C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

8

System 3

10

System 4

11

System 5

C1,
C4,
C1,
C4,
C1,
C4,

12

14

Rival
Explanations
Researcher
Interaction
CE

15

Representations

#

3

4

13

C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5

C2, C3,
C5
C2, C3,
C5
C2, C3,
C5

C1, C2, C3,
C4, C5
C6
C1,
C4,
C1,
C4,

C2, C3,
C5
C2, C3,
C5

Question

The UCC consisted of a Temper Tent housing nine
people and communication equipment. Four displays
were projected onto screens readable by the staff. The
staff consisted of the commander and executive officer,
a logkeeper, a communications specialist, a plotter, a
SrNCO, an engineering representative, a logistics
representative, and an engineering representative.
Personnel were seated at a long desks with laptops,
field phones, and radio communications. Displays
included priority lists of facilities and generators, project
status, post attack actions, and accountability
information (see Figure A5.2, layout).
IS was good because all players knew each other as
local ANG members but negative in that they had
practiced together only once.
Workers (S1) were competent in job knowledge. Week
in interaction due to lack of practice. Poor performance
was not singled out and fixed.
No observations other than to wonder if better
procedures and implementation would have facilitated
better attack responses.
See SRC layout description above.
See SRC layout description above. Accountability
checks, status updates, alarm notification, basic
procedures should have been more timely.
Coordination week and untimely and accomplished only
in reaction to events going wrong. Coordination
severely inhibited by wear of chemical gear.
Poor performance was not singled out for action,
correction, or improvement.
Lack of timely processing of information severely
inhibited command and control of unit
Senior leadership and unit were unsure of themselves
and lacked confidence in the ORI setting - most likely do
to lack of practice.
General agreement amongst data sources that
performance was poor.
None observed.
See discussion in Ch. 5
See discussion in Ch. 5
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Figure A5.2: UCC Layout

F/x eon riv e O f f ie e r

Commander

Loader

Status
Boards

Engineering

Operations

Logistics

SrNCO

Plotter
Communicator
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Table A5.2.6: Inspection Report Guidance
#

DC5 C onstruct
Focus

1

Context: HOV

2

Context: IS

3

Context:
Leadership and
Staff
Competence
Context:
Flexibility

4

Table 4.2
Cell
References
F1, F2, F3,
F4, F5
F1, F2, F3,
F4, F5
F1, F2, F3,
F4, F5

Question

F1, F2, F3,
F4, F5

Yes, in terms of lack of rigorous procedures for
information back up and relocation inhibiting attack
response
Negatively in terms of PAR sweep management, Alarm
Communication, Lack of established procedures and
checklists, non-use or untimely use of status boards.
NO

5

System 1

F1.F2, F3,
F4, F5

6

System 2

7

System 3

8

System 3

9

System 4

F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5
F1.F2,
F4, F5
F1, F2,
F4, F5

10

System 5

11

Rival
Explanations
Representations

12

F3,
F3,
F3,
F3,

F1, F2, F3,
F4, F5
F1, F2, F3,
F4, F5
F1.F2, F3,
F4, F5

NO
NO
NO

Yes in terms of untimely response/reallocation of
resources to mission impacting conditions
No
Yes in terms of untimely response/reallocation of
resources to mission impacting conditions. Yes in terms
of untimely updating of status boards
No
No
Yes in terms of untimely updating of status boards
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APPENDIX VI
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF CASE DATA FOR CASE 1, FIRST OPERATIONAL
READINESS EXERCISE

The first track of the research design seeks to show the actual usefulness
of the DC5 framework for interpreting the observed distributed cognition
phenomena. To the extent emerging observations readily converge with
suggested theory the framework has demonstrated its holistic (i.e., nomological)
validity as well as its specific construct validity. To the extent emerging
observations do not readily converge with the suggested theory then the
framework has demonstrated the need for modification or further study. Table
A6.1, mirroring Table 3.1, Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem
Performance, which described in detail the theoretical impacts of crisis conditions
on distributed cognition phenomena, provides the organization for the detailed
discussion which follows regarding: 1) the areas in which emergent observations
from case 1 converged with suggested framework constructs and their
interaction, 2) diverged from the suggested theory, 3) required modification to the
suggested theory, or 3) remained ambiguous with regards to the suggested
theory. Table A6.2, Convergence between DC5 Framework and Emergent
Themes, based on the framework of Table A6.1 summarizes the researcher’s
assessment of the case data and its implications for the DC5 framework. An
exhaustive discussion of how these assessments were reached follows.
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Table A6.1: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance (Reprint of Table 3.1)
R eal Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcomes +
inducem ent of
stress)

S1. Autonomous
Units
- System self
doubt might
increase
- Sensitivities to
stimulus
increased
-Focus changes

S 2 . Coordination

S3. Control

S 3 *. Monitoring

S 4. Intelligence

S 5. Identity

Context

- D ifferences amplified
- Acquiesce to
consensus
- M a y not seek
consensus

- Pressure S1 to
provide more
information and S2
to process more
information
- Increase
dem ands on S 4 for
im plem entable
solution

- M ust determ ine if
S 1 ’s a re handling
pressure
appropriately

- Dem and m ore
information to get
representation
right

- S e e k m ore
confidence in
representation before
selecting alternatives
- Selection/decision/
action goes to the
organization core so
balance is less routine

- Increase
focus/pressure
m ay cause H O V
to be ignored
- Increase
pressure on
individual systems
m ay cause loss of
IS with other
systems
-S ta ff
com petence
directly impacted
- Leadership
directly impacted
-S ta ff
com petence up to
th e task
- Leadership
increasing S1
performance
- H O V and IS
crucial
- SC and
Leadership also
important

Complexity:
D em and For
High Levels O f
Specialized
Expertise

- Ability to
correctly inquire
about data
increasingly
challenged

- Possible increased
d em and between
system s

- Must ascertain
when S1 has
becom e
overwhelm ed

- M ust ascertain
w hen S1 is no
longer up to
environm ental
dem ands

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

Complexity:
D em and for
Integrated
Expertise

- Ability to
correctly inquire
about data
increasingly
challenged
- Ability to
correctly inquire
about data
increasingly
challenged
- Ability to track
and process data
challenged
because of
volume
- Ability to
receive and
process data
challenged

- C hallenged with
knowing who needs to be
involved in processing
information

- Must ensure
coordination is
functional

- M ust ascertain if
S 2 is no longer
capab le of meeting
requirem ents

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision m aking
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

- C an recognize
when more data
collection is
fruitless

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge
- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

Com plexityNovelty
unknowability

Com plexityNovelty
num ber of
entities
Com plexityNovelty
pace of events

- Can recognize
when m ore data
collection is
fruitless
- Ability to
coordinate/assim ilate
data challenged because
o f volum e

- Can recognize
when systems
becoming
overwhelm ed

- M ust ascertain if
S 1 ’s and S 2 up to
task/rep laceable

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- Ability to process data
challenged

- Increase dem and
for a tim ely plan of
action

- M ust ascertain if
S 1 ’s and S 2 up to
task/replaceable

- Ability to
interpret data
increasingly
challenged

- S enses need to act
quickly

- Flexibility key
- Redundancy
m ay prevent
processing errors
- Redundancy
m ay prevent
processing errors
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Table A6.2: Case 1 Resu ts: Convergence between DC5 Framework and Emergent Themes

Real Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcomes +
inducement
of stress)
Complexity:
Demand For
High Levels
Of
Specialized
Expertise
Complexity:
Demand for
Integrated
Expertise
ComplexityNovelty
unknowability
ComplexityNovelty:
number of
entities
ComplexityNovelty
pace of
events

S1.
Autonomous
Units
Notable
Convergence

S2. Coordination

S3. Control

S3*. Monitoring

S4. Intelligence

S5. Identity

Context

Insufficient Data

Considerable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence and
Modification
needed

Considerable
Convergence
and
Modification
needed

Considerable
Convergence

Not Validated/
Insufficient
Data

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient Data

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence
and
Modification
needed

Insufficient Data

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient Data

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Considerable
Convergence
MODIFICATION
NEEDED

Notable
Convergence

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient Data

Considerable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Considerable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED

Considerable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence

Considerable
Convergence
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The first row in Table 5.1 attempts to capture the general impact of crisis
conditions on a control center’s distributed cognition. The first cell in this row
suggests that the general pressure of a crisis may lead to basic mistakes by
autonomous units as they question themselves more intently as they perform in a
crisis, become more sensitive to outside stimulus, and focus on items relating
primarily to the needs of the crisis. Case observations relating to S1 systems
included the errors and slowness made by the alarm condition change
notification systems and the slowness of the PAR teams. The former seemed
fairly constant throughout the exercise and seemed to be the inadvertent
mistakes of a single set of individuals, these seemed to occur both during periods
of increased stress and periods of less stress. With regards to the latter, as the
unit leadership, through the SRC director, and the S1 representatives in the SRC
made clear its desire to speed up PAR team response and information, the
response indeed got better. Multiple case sources agreed that this pressure
resulted in better more focused performance and information. Thus, Case 1
supports the notion suggested by the DC5 framework of crisis impacting S1
focus and sensitivity to stimulus but provides little insight into its impact on
second-guessing oneself. The lack of extreme stressful environment resulting
from the limited ORE scenario provides little insight into a suggested fall off in
performance in terms of focus and sensitivity following an initial increase as
suggested by the framework. Notable convergence with the framework was
noted in this area.
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The second cell in the first row of Table 5.1 suggests that crisis pressure
impacts the ability of control center personnel and systems to coordinate the
construction of representations and responses. As cited in the description of the
ORE setting, the narrowness of the particular scenario in the case due to lack of
participation by many sub-units limited the ability to generate scenarios requiring
coordinated response and therefore interpretation in this portion of the
framework. Thus, it is concluded that this portion is “not validated.”
The third cell of the first row of Table 5.1 captures the framework’s notion
that crisis pressure impacts the S3 function of a control center by increasing the
demands on the S1 systems to generate accurate, quick information and to
quickly generate solutions. This reaction was readily seen in the case 1 data.
Slow PAR team sweeps were responded to with demands and prompting for
increasing speed. Similarly, communication errors in relaying alarm changes to
the unit populace were met with demands to “get it right next time.” S3 serves as
a conduit for transferring the pressure of the crisis impacting the organization as
a whole or in framework terms, its identity (S5), to the S1 control systems.
Considerable convergence between case data and framework postulates was
seen in this area.
The fourth cell of Table 5.1 captures the audit function of the control
function within a control center. While formalization on the level of an actual
operational audit as Beer suggests with his VSM did not take place, there simply
isn’t the time in a crisis for that degree of attention, much greater attention was
paid to poorly performing S1 systems, the PAR teams and alarm notification
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systems. Notable convergence between case data and framework constructs in
this area was noted. As suggested, the case data did illustrate the impossibility
of audit level interaction during crisis conditions suggesting a need to modify the
framework.
The fifth cell of the first row Table 5.3 suggests that crisis pressure will
result in the demand for more timely and more accurate information. This
construct is the raw expressed response of the intelligence function of a control
center to crisis pressure. Considerable convergence was noted in this area.
The sixth cell of the first row of Table 5.3, suggests that the crisis pressure
will directly impact the very identity of the control center in terms of balancing the
need for intelligence and the need for response. This was readily seen in the
case data as the unit leadership began to demand faster PAR team sweeps so
that the unit could return to normal flying operations, that is, the mission or
identity of the unit. Considerable convergence was noted in this area.
The last cell suggests the impact of crisis pressure on the contextual
elements of a control center. The narrowness of the ORE scenario again
impacted the ability to observe this construct; intersubjectivity breakdowns
amongst control center personnel, and increasing incompetence were not
observed. These relationships could not be validated using the case data.
The first and second cell of the second row of Table 5.3 suggests the
notion that an increasingly complex scenario may impact the ability of S1
systems to function as the demand for a single specialized expertise increases
and that those demands may impact the ability to coordinate actions.
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Unfortunately again, the narrow setting in Case 1 did not provide scenarios in
which such situations existed.
The third cell of the second row of Table 5.3 suggests the notion that the
demands for specialized expertise resulting from an increasingly complex
scenario may require the control function of the control center to determine when
such expertise has been exceeded and act accordingly. Though, as stated
above, scenarios did not exist in this ORE where “expertises” were exceeded,
the initial dullness of the PAR teams was noted by the control function and steps
were taken to improve their performance. Mild convergence was noted in this
area. Again, as stated above and referencing the fourth cell of the second row of
Table 5.3, a formal audit of individual PAR teams was impossible given the crisis
constraints thus while some investigation was done by the S3 function, the case
highlights that as crisis conditions intensify the S3*, audit function, must begin to
evaporate and S3 must internalize this effort into more simplistic controls.
The sixth cell of the second row of Table 5.3 suggests that the crisis’s
demands, in terms of specialized expertise to deal with the crisis’s complexity,
pressure organizational leadership to make decisions based on less data than
usual. While the scenarios in the case did not necessarily create situations in
which demands for different specialized expertise were exceeded, they were
challenged and PAR teams did not perform initially as they should have. In turn
leadership felt the driving need to go to general release and begin flying again
without having sweeps complete. Notable convergence between case data and
framework postulate was noted here.
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Similarly, as referenced in the last cell of the second row of Table 5.3, in
terms of system context, staff competence (again the PAR teams) was stressed
by the scenario and leadership responded accordingly. Notable convergence
was noted here.
With regard to the third row of Table 5.3, as discussed in the section on
the ORE setting, the limited scenario did not generate crisis situations in which
the demand for integration of disciplines was necessary therefore it was not
possible to validate this portion of the framework.
In terms of the fourth row of Table 5.3, in the researcher’s judgment and
that of other evaluators as well as the reflections of the participants afterwards,
no scenarios were really presented to the SRC that would have represented
crises because they were composed of simply unknowable events. All scripted
scenarios were imminently knowable given the time and expertise involved.
Thus most of the postulates relating to unknowability cannot be validated
positively or negatively by the case data. The exception being that when viewed
in isolation the leadership of the unit was confronted with decision making while
not knowing the full extent of the facts that should have been provided by the
less than expeditious PAR teams and felt the pressure to act anyway (i.e.,
release personnel back to normal operations). Thus some notable convergence
with the framework was noted here.
The first cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3 captures the framework’s
notion that the volume of information flow from a large number of entities may
challenge a control center’s ability to process the large amount information. The
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two “in- depth attacks” on a single facility described in the setting represent such
a scenario. Stress was noted as the amount of discussion in the SRC increased
immediately following the attacks and S1 units became hyper-focused on solving
individual problems rather than assembling a base-wide picture; that is while
each S1 unit may have been aware of the particular circumstances they were
focused on at the time, they were not actively working together demonstrating
cognition. Simply put, the amount of information generated by the scenario
impacted the functional representatives in the SRC and their ability to perform.
Considerable convergence was noted here.
In the second cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3, the notion that
coordination is impacted by the scale of events is postulated. While the
narrowness of the scenario limited the requirement for coordination, the scale of
the attack resulted in multiple sources calling in the same damage to the SRC,
creating the need for the SRC S1 and S4 systems to determine if reports
overlapped in constructing representations of the outside environments. This is
important in that the researcher suspected some convergence between the
constructs of pace of events and scale of events, but this overlapping
phenomena distinguishes the two constructs. Considerable convergence
between framework and data was noted in this area.
The third cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3, captures the notion that
the number of entities involved in a crisis will challenge a distributed cognition
system’s S3 function’s to ensure that S1 functions are not being overwhelmed.
While scenarios were limited by the setting of the ORE, the in-depth attacks did
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result in significant overlapping information flow and the case data reflects
heightened awareness of the this fact as expressed by the SRC director and
noted by the researcher. Notable convergence is noted in this area.
The fourth cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3, captures the notion that
the control function of a distributed cognition system must occasionally audit S1
systems in hopes of determining if they are up to the job at hand. What is again
illustrated by the case data, is that in crisis there becomes less time as the crisis
progresses to perform such auditing functions as well the ability to retrain, further
train, or replace. While this pressure to perform auditing type action was is
present in the control centers, and thus the notable convergence noted,
elimination of the audit function becomes increasingly mandated.
The fifth cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3 suggests that the increasing
number of entities that must be sorted through as a crisis intensifies, impacts the
ability of a control center to make sense of them. As described previously the
heightened sense of awareness noted immediately following the in-depth attacks
is reflective of this pressure felt by control center personnel as they sorted out
what happened, although the actual representation of what happened was
developed pretty easily. Notable convergence between case data and the
framework was noted here.
The sixth cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3 references the suggested impact
of large-scale events upon the identity of the organization. Again, heightened
awareness and increased stress levels were noted throughout the SRC and
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expressed by SRC leadership during the in depth attacks, so some convergence
between framework and data is noted here.
The final cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3 captures the notion that
redundancy of systems and visualization tools provide flexibility by making
tracking of data easier and more reliable thereby increasing the useable horizon
of visibility. It is in this area that the unit in the case demonstrated its strong point
with the use of the Base Recovery After Attack System (BARTS) message
posting network in the SRC and throughout the wing. BARTS put at the
fingertips of every SRC person a reliable, recorded posting of raw data as it
flowed and was refined and validated; turning it into usable information and
knowledge quickly. Questions posed by S4 and S2 in deconflicting rival
explanations of events were more readily researchable due to these systems.
Also demonstrating the importance of these constructs within the framework but
in an opposing fashion was the simple lack of a base map plotting damage and
issues as they raw data flowed in. Such a tool would also help in processing the
volume of data flowing from the in-depth attack. Considerable convergence
between framework and data was noted here.
In the final row of Table 5.1 the notion that sub-systems in the control
center may not be able to keep up with the rapid pace at which events are
occurring is captured. The in-breadth attacks described in the setting discussion
previously, resulted in rapid-fire updates being provided to the SRC. While the
SRC performed admirably in these cases, the breadth of information that had to
be “pieced-together”, rather than “sorted-out” after the in-depth attacks, resulted
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in heightened awareness across all subsystems. Repeating what’s been
described previously, individual representatives felt the urgency to collect and
verify information quickly before next set of data flowed in; what little coordination
had to be accomplished was done quickly; pressure flowed from S5 and S4
through S3 to motivate PAR teams to move faster, and finally, the positive impact
of BARTS and negative impact of not having mappable displays available were
noted. All construct interactions between system and crisis environment
postulated by the framework considerably converged with case data.
Not specifically postulated by the framework but requiring some grounding
in theoretical interpretation still, is the weakness noted by the IG in the May 2005
ORI and also noted by the researcher in the unit’s use of the BARTS system,
which is that it eliminated or reduced conversation in the SRC highlighting
important information requiring response and thus slowing response and a sense
of urgency by the SRC. Some discussion in terms of DC5 constructs presents
the need to sharpen the construct of Intelligence or S4. BARTS provided such
complete, easily accessible, readable, recordable, and redundant information
processing that it significantly widened the horizon of visibility and facilitated S1
actions to the point that human operators tended to sit back and let the system
deliver information out to the unit itself. As much of the information contained in
this widened horizon of visibility required simple actions that sub-units outside the
SRC could take care of themselves, no action was required by the SRC and it
could be easily lulled into a sense of ease. These simple, less important matters
amount to noise. Still at some point, significant information will flow through
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BARTS as a crisis intensifies (i.e. more signal than noise). This function of
distinguishing between signal to noise becomes of heightened importance as
more noise is introduced through growing information horizons and is a key
function of the intelligence, S4, subsystem not previously articulated to such
extent in developing the DC5 framework. Thus, in addition to constructing
representations a key portion of the S4 intelligence subsystem is distinguishing
between signal and noise or assessing the relative importance of incoming
information. To the extent the unit in the case was being lulled into a sense of
complacency by the ease with which BARTS processed the lesser important
items, then the S4 function was performing poorly. The case data suggests
adding to the S4 function in the DC5 framework the importance of assessing the
relative importance of information.
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APPENDIX VII
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF CASE DATA FOR CASE 2

As in the track 1 interpretive analysis of the first case’s first ORE the
objective will be to interpret the emergent converging themes of the case data
using the constructs and interactions specified by the DC5 framework validating
the framework where possible and modifying it if necessary. As discussed in
analysis of the first case, to the extent emerging observations readily converge
with the suggested theory, then the framework has demonstrated its holistic
validity as well as its specific construct validity. To the extent emerging
observations do not readily converge with the suggested theory then the
framework has demonstrated the need for modification or further study. Table
A7.1, mirroring Table 5.3c, Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem
Performance - Modifications from Case 1, Track 1 - Second ORE, which
captured in detail the impacts of crisis conditions on distributed cognition
phenomena according to the latest iteration of the DC5 framework , provides the
organization for the detailed discussion which follows regarding the areas in
which emergent observations from case two converged with suggested
framework constructs and their interaction, diverged from the suggested theory,
or remained ambiguous with regards to the suggested theory. Again, as
described in the previous section, the general overall poor performance of the
UCC is an overarching theme that significantly limits the value of the data for
interpreting crisis environment effects upon control center cognition. This fact is
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reflected in the large portion of Table A7.2 detailed as not validated by the
insufficient case data. Table A7.2 summarizes the case data and its implications
for the DC5 framework.
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Table A7.1: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - Modifications from Case 1, Track 1 -

Real Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcomes +
inducement of
stress) relative to

S1. Autonomous
Units
- System self-doubt
might increase
- Sensitivities to
stimulus increased
- Focus changes

S 2. Coordination

S 3. Control

S 4. Intelligence

S 5. Identity

Context

- Differences
amplified
- Acquiesce to
consensus
- M ay not seek
consensus

- Pressure S1 to provide
m ore information and S2
to process more
information
- Increase dem ands on
S 4 for im plem entable
solution
- M ust determ ine if S 1 ’s
are handling pressure
appropriately

- D em and more
information to get
representation right
- Heightened

- S e e k m ore
confidence in
representation
before selecting
alternatives

- Increase focus/pressure
may cause H O V to be
ignored
- Increase pressure on
individual systems m ay cause
loss of IS with other system s
- S taff com petence directly
impacted
- Leadership directly
impacted

- M ust ascertain when
S1 has becom e
overwhelm ed
- M ust ascertain when
S1 is no longer up to
environm ental dem ands
- M ust ensure
coordination is functional
-M ust ascertain if S 2 is
no longer capable of
m eeting requirements
- C an recognize when
m ore data collection is
fruitless

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision making
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

- Staff com petence up to the
task
- Leadership increasing S1
performance

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged

- Required to adjust
decision m aking
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge
- Required to adjust
decision m aking
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge
- R equired to adjust
decision m aking
approach based on
known lack of
knowledge

- H O V and IS crucial
- S C and Leadership also
important

- S en s es need to
act quickly

- R edundancy m ay prevent
processing errors

the dcog fitness
level of the
control center
(R T D F )
Complexity:
Dem and For High
Levels O f
Specialized
Expertise (R T D F )

- Ability to correctly
inquire about data
increasingly
challenged

- Possible increased
dem and between
systems

Complexity:
Dem and for
Integrated
Expertise (R T D F )

- Ability to correctly
Inquire about data
increasingly
challenged

- Challenged with
knowing who N eeds
to be involved in
processing
information

ComplexityNovelty
unknowability
(R T D F )

- Ability to correctly
inquire about data
increasingly
challenged

ComplexityNovelty
number of entities
(R T D F )

- Ability to track
and process data
challenged
because of volume

- Ability to
coordinate/assim ilate
data challenged
because of volum e

ComplexityNovelty
pace of events
(R T D F )

- Ability to receive
and process data
challenged

- Ability to process
data challenged

- C an recognize when
system s becoming
overwhelm ed
- M ust ascertain if S1 ’s
and S 2 up to
task/replaceable
- Increase dem and for a
tim ely plan of action
- M ust ascertain if S 1 ’s
and S 2 up to
task/replaceable

aw areness of need
to assess the
relative importance
o f inform ation
(HANTARII)

- C an recognize when
m ore data collection
is fruitless

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged

- (HANTARII)

- Ability to interpret
data increasingly
challenged
- (HANTARII)

S election/decision/
action goes to the
organization core
so balan ce is less
routine

- Flexibility key
- R edundancy m ay prevent
processing errors
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Table A7.2: Case 2 Resull :s: Convergence between DC5 Framework and Emergent T hemes

Real Crisis
Pressure
(Potential for
adverse
organization
outcomes +
inducement of
stress)
Complexity:
Demand For
High Levels Of
Specialized
Expertise
Complexity:
Demand for
Integrated
Expertise
ComplexityNovelty
unknowability
ComplexityNovelty:
number of
entities
ComplexityNovelty
pace of events

S2. Coordination

S3. Control

S4.
Intelligence

S5. Identity

Context

Not Validated
/Insufficient Data

Not Validated/
Insufficient Data

Not
Validated/
Insufficient
Data

Not Validated/
Insufficient
Data

Not Validated/
Insufficient Data

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient Data

Notable
Convergence

Insufficient
Data

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient Data

Insufficient
Data

Insufficient
Data

S1.
Autonomous
Units
Not
Validated/
Insufficient
Data

Insufficient
Data
Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence

Notable
Convergence
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The first row in Table 5.4 attempts to capture the general impact of crisis
conditions on a control center’s distributed cognition. The first cell in this row
suggests that the general pressure of a crisis may lead to basic mistakes by
autonomous units as they question themselves more intently as they perform in a
crisis, become more sensitive to outside stimulus, and focus on items relating
primarily to the needs of the crisis. Case 2 observations relating to S1 systems
included the untimely processing of project progress information, attack damage
information, untimely or inaccurate communication of attack and alarm
notification made by the alarm condition change notification systems, and poor,
untimely performance by PAR teams. The occurrences of these errors were
frequent and constant regardless of scenario intensity levels. To reiterate the
description provided in the previous section, basic competence was lacking in the
UCC. It is thus difficult to tie a change in S1 performance to changes in the
potential for negative outcomes. Similarly, it is difficult to tie changes in S1
performance to stress levels and complexity changes. Thus, no convergence
with the DC5 framework was seen in the first cell of the first three rows of Table
5.4.
Similarly, coordination was seen as inadequate by both the researcher
and the inspectors throughout the exercise and reflected thusly in the final report.
Alarm changes impacting geographically separated construction sites were not
communicated and their impacts on mission accomplishment not accounted for
or anticipated. What coordination did exist was reactionary in both the
researcher’s view and the inspectors view. Again though, because the general
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competence of the UCC team was so lacking in this area, it is difficult to attribute
the coordination impacts to crisis intensity. Thus the second cell of the first three
rows of table 5.4 also lacks sufficient data for validation.
As documented in the observer notes and in the inspector interviews little
was specifically done in response to the slowness of the S1 systems or lack of
coordination or even in response to inspector-provided feedback during the
inspection. The control function was lacking. Similarly, the intelligence function
within the UCC failed to understand the impact of high winds shutting down one
project and in turn failed to reallocate resources to more readily constructible
projects, effectively leaving a crew of a dozen people sitting around for two
hours. Again, it is not possible to ascertain if this was a result of crisis pressure
or just lack of UCC competence in general. This lack of competence became the
identity of the command and control function of the unit. Finally, in terms of
context, the inspection was characterized by a simple lack of competence on the
part of the UCC team. It is difficult to attribute the lack of staff competence to
crisis pressure though. Thus the remaining cells of the first row of Table 5.4 are
all labeled as having not been validated by the second case.
The first and second cell of the second row of Table 5.3 suggests the
notion that an increasingly complex scenario may impact the ability of S1
systems to function as the demand for a single specialized expertise increases
and that those demands may impact the ability to coordinate actions. As noted
by both the researcher and the inspectors, the scripted scenarios did not require
high degrees of expertise, whether they are individually specialized or broadly
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integrated and interdisciplinary.

Mere processing of information and using local

expertise to facilitate expedient interpretation was all that was required. Thus
neither of these cells for the second or third rows of Table 5.4 can be considered
validated by the second case’s data set.
As described in the setting, the UCC team did not succeed in following up
on the identification of error or slowness with specific action. The control function
was not to be found. Similarly, in terms of the intelligence function, scripted
scenarios did not require extensive integration of knowledge bases or further
development of specific specialized knowledge bases. Lastly, the identity and
the context of the UCC remained unchanged despite scenario demands for
expertise. No convergence with the DC5 framework was seen in these areas.
The third, fourth, and fifth cells in the second and third rows of Table 5.4 thus
remain not validated.
In terms of the fourth row of Table 5.4, in the researcher’s judgment and
that of the inspectors, as well as, the reflections of the participants afterwards, no
scenarios were really presented to the SRC that would have represented crises
because they were composed of simply unknowable events. All scripted
scenarios were imminently knowable given the time and expertise involved.
Thus, most of the postulates relating to unknowability cannot be validated
positively or negatively by the case data. Consequently, again no convergence
with the framework was noted here.
The first cell of the fifth and sixth rows of Table 5.4 captures the
framework’s notion that the volume of information flow from a large number of
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entities or quickly moving pace of events may challenge a control centers ability
to process the large amount information. While, in the researcher’s judgment
and that of the inspectors, the scripted attacks were hardly of sufficient scale in
terms of mission impact to stress more usual UCC teams, this UCC team
seemed overwhelmed by basic information processing. Both the researcher and
the inspectors agreed that pace of events was intense during the first two days of
the exercise and this could easily have explained some lack of performance from
S1s, but it difficult given the low overall competence of the UCC to distinguish
between these to aspects of complexity. To borrow from track 2 in the first case
study, it could be argued that the level of DC5 fitness was so low that even smallscale impacts constituted a crisis environment to this particular UCC. Simply put,
the amount of information generated by any scenario impacted the functional
representatives, the STs, in the UCC and their ability to perform. Notable
convergence was noted here.
In the second cell of the fifth and sixth row of Table 5.4, the notion that
coordination is impacted by the scale of events is postulated. While little
coordination existed in the UCC until events were growing out of control it could
be said that the amount of information required to be processed exceeded the
basic competence levels of the UCC to coordinate response leading to the errors
captured by the raw findings. Notable convergence between framework and data
was noted in this area.
The third cell of the fifth row of Table 5.4, captures the notion that the
number of entities involved in a crisis will challenge a distributed cognition
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system’s S3 function’s to ensure that S1 functions are not being overwhelmed.
Similar to discussion in the previous paragraphs, as little information flows, as
was required by the scripted scenarios, it exceeded the competence of the S1
functions and, as described previously, little specific action was taken to improve
performance. Perhaps this is because the control function was overwhelmed by
the information flow as it was. Notable convergence is noted in this area.
The fifth cell of the fifth and sixth rows of Table 5.4 suggests that the
increasing volume of information flow that must be sorted through as a crisis
intensifies impacts the ability of a control center to make sense of them. As
described previously, little was done by the UCC to anticipate the mission impact
of attacks and adjust accordingly; perhaps because the information flows as they
were exceeded the S4 function’s ability to assimilate the information. Notable
convergence between case data and the framework was noted here.
The sixth cell of the fifth and sixth rows of Table 5.4 references the
suggested impact of such large-scale events upon the identity of the
organization. Again general incompetence became the identity of this UCC. The
very basic function of processing small information flows as a UCC constituted a
crisis environment. Notable convergence with the DC5 framework was noted
here.
The final cell of the fifth and sixth rows of Table 5.4 captures the notion
that redundancy of systems and visualization tools provide flexibility by making
tracking of data easier and more reliable thereby increasing the useable horizon
of visibility. The unit again failed in this basic area by simply not establishing or
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following rigorous procedure. Thus key information was lost or forgotten and
decisions that could have enhanced overall unit performance were simply not
made. Again, any processing of information for this UCC constituted a crisis.
Notable convergence was noted here.
The researcher additionally is drawn to assessing the impact of wearing
chemical mask and ensemble on DC5 fitness. Not a part of the scenarios of
case 1, use of the ensemble in this case motivated the need to articulate its
impact in terms of DC5 constructs. As previously described, the ensemble and
mask are severely hot and uncomfortable and inhibit hearing and vision. All data
sources converged on the notion that it inhibited the UCC’s ability to process
information. It could be said that the mask and ensemble suddenly reduces the
horizon of visibility for all UCC personnel as they have difficulty managing basic
breathing and job functions and cannot readily see or hear the flow of information
through the SRC. Secondarily, inter-subjectivity is reduced amongst UCC
players as they become distracted by their own discomfort. This directly impacts
the ability to receive information, coordinate understanding, build
representations, and construct response. Wear of the mask and gear effectively
reduces the competence of all personnel to some degree. Such reduction can
be offset by rigorous adherence to established procedure and training in the gear
to minimize its affect. Additionally, as the researcher and inspectors attest,
leadership in the form of motivation and demonstration of personal disregard for
the discomfort of the gear can also offset the impacts on performance.
Unfortunately, the general level of poor performance by the UCC made it
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impossible to characterize further degradation of performance and validate the
suppositions; just detailed in terms of the DC5 constructs in Table 5.4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

398

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ackoff, R. (1989). "From Data to Wisdom", Journal of Applied Systems Analysis,
(16), 3-9.
Adam, E., Toward More Clarity in Terminology: Frameworks, Theories, and
Models, Journal o f Nursing Education, 24 (4), (1985), pp 151-155.
Air Combat Command (2002). ACC Supplement 1 to AFI 90-201, Operational
Readiness Inspection Criteria. Headquarters ACC/IG Official Document.
Allport, F.H. (1924). Social Psychology. Boston. Houghton-Mifflin.
Andersson, A.H. 1998. Guiding Principles in Combining the Viable System
Model and Team Syntegrity. Department of Informatics, Mid-Sweden
University, Osterland, Sweden.
Argyris C. and Schon D. (1978). Organizational Learning. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
Argyris C. and Schon D. (1996). Organizational Learning II. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
Artman, H. & Garbis, C. (1988).Situation Awareness as Distributed Cognition. In
T. Green, L. Bannon, C. Warren, J. Buckley (Eds.) Cognition and
cooperation. Proceedings of 9th Conference of Cognitive Ergonomics,
(pp. 151-156). Limerick: Ireland.
Babbie, E. (1990). Survey Research Methods. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Bacharach, S., Organizational Theories: Some Criteria for Evaluation, Academy
of Management Review, 14 (4), 1989, pp 496-515.
Barton, L. (1993). Crisis In Organizations. Managing And Communicating In
The Heat Of Chaos. Cincinnati, OH: South-Western Publishing.
Beer, S (1984). Diagnosing the System for Organizations. New York. Wiley.
Beer, S. (1979). Heart of Enterprise, Wiley, Chichester
Boiset and Canals (2004). Data, Information, and Knowledge: Have We Got it
Right. Internet Interdisciplinary Unit. University of Catalonia,
http://www.uoc.edu/in3/dt/20388/20388.pdf

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

399

Bolzinger, A (1982). The Clinical Concept of Crisis", Bulletin of Psychology,
Volume XXXV, N) 355, p. 475-480.1982, p. 478.
Bonoma, T., Case Research in Marketing: Opportunities, Problems, and a
Process, Journal of Marketing Research, 22 (1985).
Borins, A. (2002). Leadership And Innovation In The Public Sector. In
Leadership and Organization Development Journal (vol 23, no 8). MCB
University Press.
Carlisle, P. and Rebentisch, E. (2003). Into the Black Box: The Knowledge
Transformation Cycle. IEEE Engineering Management Review (vol 31,
no. 4). IEEE.
Checkland, P. (1980), "Are organizations machines?", Futures, Vol. 12 pp.421
Checkland, P. (1981). Systems Thinking, Systems Practice. Wiley. Chichester.
Clark A. (1997). Being There, Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again.
The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Clemson, B. (1991). Cybernetics a New Management Tool. Gordon and
Breach.
Coombs, T. (1999). Ongoing Crisis Communication. London: Sage Publications.
Coram, R. (2002). Boyd, The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. Little
Brown. New York.
Cramer, M. (1996). Command and Control Warfare: OODA Loop
Countermeasures. 33rd Annual AOC International Electronic Warfare
Technical Symposium and Convention.
Creswell, John W., Research Design, Sage Publications, (1994).
Crossan M., Lane H., and White R. (1995). Organizational Learning: Dimensions
for a Theory. In International Journal for Organizational Analysis (vol 3,
no. 4).
Dab, W (1993). "Crisis and Responsibility", in: The Decision in public health epidemiologic monitoring, urgencies and crises, National School of the
Public Health, Rennes, 1993.
Dalton, M., Men Who Manage, Wiley, (1959).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

400

Damsio A. (2000). The Feeling of What Happens, Body and Emotion in the
Making of Consciousness. Hartcourt. San Diego, CA.
Decortis F, Noirfalise S., and Saudelli, B. (2000). International Journal of
Human-Computer Studies, Volume 53, Issues 1-6.
Denzin, N., The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological
Methods, Aldine, (1970).
Dewey, J. (1938). Experience and Education. New York. McMillan.
Dhar, Vasant (2001). Machine Learning in Organizational Learning. In
Organizational Cognition Organizational Cognition: Computation and
Interpretation. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Publishers
Douglas D. Grounded Theory and the ‘And’ in Entrepreneurship Research,
Electronic Journal o f Business Research Methods, 2(2) (2004).
Dyer W. and A. Wilkins, Better Stories, Not Better Constructs, To Generate
Better Theory: A Rejoinder to Eisenhardt. Academy of Management
Review, 16(3), (1989), pp 613-619.
Dubin, R., Theory Building. Free Press. (1969).
Eisenstadt, K. (1989). Building Theories from Case Research. In Academy of
Management Review (vol 14).
Espejo, R., Schuhmann, W., Schwanininger, M, and Biello, U. (1996).
Organizational Transformation and Learning: A Cybernetic Approach to
Management. Wiley, Chichester,
Fadok, D. John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power's Quest for Strategic
Paralysis Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, February 1995
Fearns-Banks, K. (1996). Crisis communications: A casebook approach.
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Fields, R., Wright, P., Marti, P., Palmonari, M. (1999). Air Traffic Control as a
Distributed Cognitive System: a Study of External Representations.
www.cs.mdx.ac.uk/staffpages/bobf/ papers/ecce-9-atc.pdf
Fink, A.and Kosecoff, J. (1985). How To Conduct Surveys: A Step-by-Step
Guide. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Fiske, S.T. and Taylor, S.E. (1984). Social Cognition. Reading, MA: Addsion-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

401

Wesly.
Flood R. and Carson E (1993). Dealing with Complexity: An Introduction to the
Theory and Application of Systems Science. New York: Plenum Press.
Fowler, F. (1988). Survey Research Methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Freese, L. Formal Theorizing, Annual Review of Sociology, 6, (1980), pp 187212 .
Heals, Jean, and Gibson C., A Conceptual Framework for Thinking About
Conceptual Frameworks, Bridging the Theory Practice Gap, Journal of
Education Administration, 30 (4), (1992) pp 4-25.
Garud, R. and Paruc, J.F. (1999). Kognition. In Advances In Managerial
Cognition And Organizational Information Processing (Vol. 6). Greenwich,
Co.: JAI.
Giere, Ronald (2001). Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition. Cognitive
Bases o f Science. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
Greene, J., V. Caracelli, and W. Graham, Toward a Conceptual Framework for
Mixed-Method Designs, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis,
11(3), (1989), pp 255-274.
Guba, E., The Paradigm Dialog. Sage Publications (1990).
Guadagnoli, E. and W. Velicer, Relation of Sample Size to the Stability of
Component Patterns, Psychological Bulletin, 103, (1988), pp 265-275.
Hermann CF (1963). Some Consequences Of Crisis Which Limit The Viability Of
Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly. (8) 343-358.
Hoelter, J., The Analysis of Covariance Structures: Goodness of Fit Indices,
Sociological Methods o f Research, (1983).
Hofstede, G, B. Neuijen, D. Ohayv, and G. Sanders, Measuring Organizational
Cultures and Quantitative Study across Twenty Cases, Administrative
Science Quarterly, 35, (1990), pp 286-316.
Hollan, J., Hutchins, E., And Weitzman, L. (1984). Steamer: An interactive
inspectable simulation-based training system. Al Mag. 5, 2, 15-27.
Hollan, J. D., Hutchins, E. L., And Kirsch, D. (1998. KDI): A distributed cognition
approach to designing digital work materials for collaborative workplaces,
http://www.nsf, gov/ cgi-bin/showaward?award= 9873156.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

402

Holsti, O. (1978). “Limitations of Cognitive Abilities in the Face of Crisis.”
Studies on Crisis Management. Edited by C.F. Smart. Butterworth.
Toronto.
Hooper, Michael (1999). Disaster Prepeparedness: An Analysis of Public Safety
Agency and Community Preparedness during the Northridge Quake. In
International Journal of Public Administration. Ann Arbor, Ml: Marcel
Dreker.
Hutchins, E. (1980). Culture and Inference. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Hutchins, E. (1994). Cognition in the Wild. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hutchins, E. L. (1995). How a cockpit remembers its speed. Cogn. Sci. 19, 265288.
Hutchins, E. L. (1996). The integrated mode management interface. Tech. Rep.
University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, CA. Final report for project
NCC 92-578, NASA Ames Research Center)
Hutchins, E. L. And Klausen, T. (1996). Distributed cognition in an airline cockpit.
In Cognition and Communication at Work, Y. Engestr m and D. Middleton,
Eds. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 15-34.
Hutchins, E. L. And Palen, L. (1997). Constructing meaning from space, gesture,
and speech. In Tools, and Reasoning: Essays in Situated Cognition, L. B.
Resneck, R. Saljo, C. Pontecorvo, and B. Burge, Eds. Springer-Verlag,
Vienna, Austria.
Hutchins, E. L., Hollan, J. D., And Norman, D.A. (1985). Direct manipulation
interfaces. Human-Comput. Interact. 1, 4, 311-338.
Hutchins, E. (1990). The Technology of Team Innovation. In Intellectual
Teamwork: Social and Technical Bases of Collaborative Work
(Eds.Galegher J., Kraut, R., and Egido, C.). Hillsdale, New Jersey:
Erlbaum.
Hutchins, E. (2000). Distributed Cognition, http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/
Anthro179a/DistributedCognition.pdf
Isaac S., and W. Michael, Handbook in Research and Evaluation, EDITS
Publishers (1981).
Jannis, I. (1989). Crucial Decisions. The Free Press. London.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

403

Jackson, M.C. (1986). “The Cybernetic Model of the Organization: An
Assesment.” Cybernetics and Systems, Reidel Publishing, Dordrecht.
Jackson, M. (1991). Systems Methodology for the Management Sciences,
Plenum, New York.
Johanssen, B., Artman G., and Waern, D (2001). Technology In Crisis
Management Systems - Ideas And Effects. In Document Design (vol. 2,
no. 3). Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases. New York: Cambridge University Free Press.
Keating, C (2000). A Systems Based Methodology for Structural Analysis of
Health Care Operations. Journal of Management in Medicine. Vol 14, no.
3/4. MCB University Press.
Keating, C. and Varela, M (2002). Project Management Systems. Old Dominion
University, Norfolk, VA.
Kerlinger, F., Foundations o f Behavioral Research, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston
(1986).
Kish, L., Some Statistical Problems in Research Design, American Sociological
Review, (24), (1959), 328-338.
Lagadec, P. (1990). States of Emergency. London: Butterworth-Heineman.
Lant, T.K. and Shapira, Z. (2000). Organizational Cognition: Computation and
Interpretation. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Publishers.
Lee, H. (1999). Critical Issue For Business Area Impact Analysis In Business
Crisis Management: Analytical Capability. In Disaster Prevention and
Management: An International Journal (vol. 8, no. 3). MCB University
Press.
Lincoln Y. and E. Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry, Sage Publications, (1985).
Loosemore, M. (1998a). Emergency Systems In Construction Contracts. In
Engineering Construction & Architectural Management (vol. 5, no. 2).
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Science Ltd
Loosemore, M. (1998b). The Influence Of Communication Structure Upon
Management Efficiency. In Construction Management and Economics

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

404

(vol. 16, no. 6). New York: Taylor & Francis Group.
Loosemore, M. and Hughes, J. (2001). Confronting Social Defence
Mechanisms: Avoiding Disorganization During Crises. In Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management (vol. 9, no.2). Oxford, UK:
Blackwell Publishers Ltd
Lord and Maher, K.J. (1991). Cognitive Theory In Industrial And Organizational
Psychology. In Handbook Of Industrial And Organizational Psychology
(Eds. M.D. Dunnete and L.M. Hough, vol 2, 2nd ed.). Palo Alto, CA:
Consulting Psychologist Press.
Magnus, P.D. (2004). The Promise and Perils of Science as Distributed
Cognition, http://www.fecunditv.com/iob/dcoq.pdf
Malik, F. (2002). Understanding a Knowledge Organization as a Viable System.
Management Cybernetics. Cwarel Isaf Institute. Frankfurt.
March, J.G and Simon, H. (1958). Organizations. New York. Wiley.
March, J. (1991). Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning.
Organizational Science (2). 1.
March, J. (2001). Intelligence in Organizations. Organizational Cognition:
Computation and Interpretation. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Marshall C. and G Rossman (1995). Designing Qualitative Research, Sage
Publications
Mayrs, G. and Holusha, J. (1996). When it Hits the Fan. Boston: HoughtonMifflin.
McConnell S. and Stark S. (2002). Foot and Mouth: 2001 The Politics of Crisis
Management. In Parliamentary Affairs (vol 55). Hansard Society for
Parliamentary Government.
McCracken, G (1988). The Long Interview. Saga Publications, Newbury Park,
California, 1988.
McEwan, A.M., 2001. Navigating Complexity in Organizations, An Examination
of the Viable Systems Model. Paper Submitted at the Founding Meeting
of the European Chaos/Complexity in Organizations Network, Lage
Vursch, Netherlands.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

405

McFadden, W., A Systems Based Methodology For The Construction And
Representation o f Organizational Knowledge Systems, PhD Dissertation,
Old Dominion University, (2000).
Miles H. and M. Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: A Sourcebook, Sage
Publications, (1994).
Mintzberg, H., An Emerging Strategy of Direct Research, Administrative Science
Quarterly, 24(4) (1979) pp 582-589.
Mitchell, E., Multiple Triangulation: A Methodology for Nursing Science,
Advances in Nursing Science, 8(3), (1986), pp 18-26.
Mitroff, I. and Anagnos, G. (2000). Managing Crises Before They Happen. New
York: American Management Association.
Mitroff, I., Crisis Management and Environmentalism: A Natural Fit, California
Management Review, 36 (2), (1994) pp101 -114.
Morse, J., Approaches to Qualitative-Quantitative Methodological Triangulation,
Nursing Research, 40 (1991), pp 120-123.
Murphy, P., Mezias, S. and Chen, Y (1997). Adapting Aspirations to Feedback:
The Role of Success and Failure. In Organizational Cognition:
Computation and Interpretation (Eds. Lant, T.K. and Shapira, Z).
Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Nachmias, D. and C. Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences, St.
Martins Press (1976).
National Research Council (1996). Computing and Communications in the
Extreme. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Nelson A. and French S. (2002). Plan Quality and Mitigating Damage from
Natural Resource. In Journal of the American Planning Association.
Chicago: American Planning Association.
Norman, D (1993). Cognition in the Head and in the World: an Introduction to the
Special Issue on Situated Action. Cognitive Science 17, 1-6.
Nudell, A. and French, S (2002). Plan Quality and Mitigating Damage from
Natural Resource. In Journal o f the American Planning Association.
Chicago: American Planning Association.
Ocasio, W. (2001). How do Organizations Think? Organizational Cognition:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

406

Computation and Interpretation. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Ogrizek, M. and Guillery J. (1997). Communicating in Crisis. New York: Aldine
De Greuter.
Paul-Chowdury, C. (2000). Internal Dissemination of Learning from Loan Loss
Crises. In Organizational Cognition: Computation and Interpretation (Eds.
Lant, T.K. and Shapira, Z). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Publishers.
Patton, M.Q., Qualitative Evaluation Methods, Sage Publications, (1980).
Patton, M.Q., Qualitative Evaluation Methods, 3d ed, Sage Publications, (1990).
Patton, M.J., Qualitative Research on College Students: Philosophical and
Methodological Comparisons With the Quantitative Approach, Journal of
College Student Development, 32 (1991), pp 389-396.
Pea, R.D. (1996). Practices of Distributed Intelligence and Designs for
Education. In Distributed Cognition: Psychological and Educational
Considerations, (Ed. G. Solomon) Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press.
Pettigrew, A. (1990). Longitudinal Research on Change. In Organizational
Science (vol 1).
Plehn, M. (2000). Control Warfare: Inside the OODA Loop. Air University,
Maxwell AFB, AL. School O f Advanced Airpower Studies.

Potter, W.J., An Analysis of Thinking and Research about Qualitative Methods,
L. Erlbaum Associates, (1996).
Poplin, M.S., “Self-Imposed Blindness: The Scientific Method in Education”,
RASE-Remedial and Special Education, 8, 1987, pp 31-37.
Roberts, J. (1964). The Self Management of Cultures. In Explorations in
Cultural Anthropology; Essays in Honor of George P. Murdoch, W.
Goodenough (Ed.). New York-Mcgraw Hill.
Rogers, Yvonne and Scaife, Mike (1997). School of Cognitive and Computing
Sciences, University of Sussex.
http://www.sv.cict.fr/cotcos/pis/Theoreticalapproaches/distributedCoq/Dist
CoqnitionpaperRoqers.htm
Rossman, G. and B. Wilson, Numbers and Words: Combining Quantitative

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

407

Methods in a Single Large Scale Evaluation Study, Evalution Review,
9(5), (1985), pp 627-643.
Rubin, H. and Rubin, L., Qualitative Interviewing, The Art of Hearing Data.
Sage (1995).
Rulke D. and Zaheer S. (2000). Shared and Unshared Transactive Knowledge in
Complex Organizations: An Exploratory Study. In Organizational
Cognition: Computation and Interpretation (Eds. Lant, T.K. and Shapira,
Z). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Sandelands, L.E. and Stablein, R.E. (1987). The Concept of Organization Mind.
In Research In The Sociology Of Organizations (vol 5). Greenwich, Co.:
JAI
Saunders, Ralph B., Consortia as Technology Innovation Management Vehicles:
Toward A Framework For Success in Venture Based Public-Private
Partnerships, PhD Dissertation, Department of Engineering Management,
Old Dominion University, (1998).
Schein, E (1992). Organizational Culture and Leadership. Jossey-Bass
Publishers. San Francisco.
Shavelson, R. and L. Townes (Eds), Scientific Research in Education, National
Academy Press (2002).
Shrodt, P (1999). Early Warning of Conflict in S. Lebanaon using Markov
Models. In The Understanding and Management of Global Violence. New
York: St. Martin’s Press
Simon, H.A. (1947). Administrative Behavior. New York: The Free Press.
Sieber, S., The Integration of Fieldwork and Surveys, The American Journal of
Sociology, 78 (1973), pp 1335-1355.
Stake, R., The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry. Educational Researcher,
7(2), (1978).
Strauss A. and J. Corbin, The Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory
Procedures and Techniques, Sage Publications, (1990).

Sudman, S. and Bradburn, N. (1986). Asking Questions. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Sutton, R. and B. Straw, What Theory is Not, Administrative Science Quarterly,
40, (1995), pp 371-384.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

408

Tamuz, M. (2001). Influnces on Managerial Cognition. In Organizational
Cognition: Computation and Interpretation (Eds. Lant, T.K. and Shapira,
Z). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Thagard, P (1996). Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA.
MIT Press.
Unzucker, J. (2002). Lessons Learned in the Management of Critical Incidents.
In IEEE Engineering Management Review, (vol. 30, no. 2). IEEE
Weick, K. Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination, Academy of
Management Review, 14 (4), (1989), pp 516-531.
Whetton, D., What Constitutes Theoretical Contribution, Academy of
Management Review, 14 (4), (1989), pp 490-495.
Vera A. and Simon H. (1993). Situated Action: A Symbolic Interpretation.
Cognitive Science, 17, 7-48.
Vidaillet, B. (2001). Decision Making in a Crisis Situation. In Organizational
Cognition: Computation and Interpretation (Eds. Lant, T.K. and Shapira,
Z). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Voss, C., N. Tsikriktisis, and M. Frohlich, Case Research in Operations
Management, International Journal o f Operations Management, 22(2)
(2002), pp195-219
Vygotsky, L. (1929). The problem of cultural development. Journal of Genetic
Psychology, 36, 415-434.
Waarn, Y. Garbis, C. Artman, H. (1999). Co-ordination for Distributed Cognition in
Control Rooms, in S. Bagnara (ed.), proceedings of the European
Conference on Cognitive Science - ECCS '99, 27th - 30th
October,Certosa di Pontignano, Siena, Italy, 31-36.
Walsh, J. and Ungson G. (1991). Organizational Memory. Academy of
Management Review, 16, 57-91.
Weick, K.M. (1979). The Social Psychology of Organizing. New York. Random
House.

Weick, K, Ammendments to Organizational Theorizing, Academy of
Management Journal, 17 (1974), pp 487-502.
Wertsch, J. (1985). Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind. Cambridge,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

409

MA. Harvard University Press.
Whitt, E., “Artful Science: A Primer on Qualitative research Methods”,
Sociological Forum, 4, (1991), pp 367-385.
White, D. (2001). Moving Beyond Crisis Management. In Forum for Applied
Research and Public Policy (Spring 2001).
Wright P., R. Fields, M. Harrison. Analyzing Human-Computer Interaction As
Distributed Cognition: The Resources Model (Draft PDF version). Human
Computer Interaction Journal 51(1 ):1 -41, 2000.
Wundt, W. (1921). Elements of Folk Psychology. London. Allen and Unwin.
Yin, R. (1984). Case Study Research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Yin, Robert K., The Case Study Crisis: Some Answers, Administrative Science
Quarterly, 26 (1), 1981.
Yin, Robert K., Case Study Research Design and Methods, Sage Publications,
(2003).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

410

CURRICULUM VITA
for
CHRISTOPHER J. WEST

DEGREES:
Master of Science (Engineering and Environmental Management), Air
Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio, December 1996
Bachelor of Science (Electrical Engineering), Auburn University, Auburn,
Alabama, August 1991
STATES WITHIN WHICH REGISTERED:
Engineer in Training, New Mexico
PROFESSIONAL CHRONOLOGY:
Department of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering, Old
Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
Doctoral Student, Aug 2002-Present
Air Combat Command Inspector General Team, United States Air Force,
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
Civil Engineer Inspection Section Chief, January 2000-August 2002
363rd Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron, United States Air Force,
Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Deployed Maintenance Engineering Flight Commander, June 1999October 1999
347th Civil Engineer Squadron, United States Air Force, Moody Air Force
Base, Georgia
Readiness Flight Commander, November 1998-January 2000
Environmental Flight Commander, January 1997-November 1998
Department of Environmental and Engineering Management, Air Force
Institute of Technology, United States Air Force, Wright-Patterson AFB,
Ohio
Graduate Student, April 95-January 97
554 RED HORSE Squadron, United States Air Force, Osan Air Base,
Republic of Korea
Project Engineer, April 94-April 95

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

411

27 Civil Engineer Squadron, United States Air Force, Cannon Air Force
Base, New Mexico
Maintenance Engineer, November 1992-April 2004
Project Engineer, February 1992-November 1992
SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES MEMBERSHIP:
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
American Society of Engineering Managers
Society of American Military Engineers
Auburn University Electrical Engineer Alumni Association
HONORS AND AWARDS:
Inductee, Epsilon Mu Eta, Engineering Management Honor Society at
Old Dominion University-2005
ACC/IG Company Grade Officer of the Year-2000
363rd Expeditionary Wing Company Grade Officer of the Month-1999
347th Support Group Company Grade Officer of the Year-1998
George K. Dimitroff Award for Best AFIT Master’s Thesis Supporting Air
Force Civil Engineering-1996
Air Force Meritorious Service Medal-2002
Air Force Commendation Medal (3 Oak Leaf Clusters)-2000, 1995, 1994

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

